# Contemporary Review

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**HOW THE WEST LOST THE PEACE IN 1945**
**Sir John Colville**

**A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT**
**Brian W. Walker**

**HOMELESSNESS: WHOSE FAULT?**
**Sheila McKechnie**

**HOMAGE TO BARCELONA**
**Philip Vann**

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

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incorporating The Fortnightly

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## HOW THE WEST LOST THE PEACE IN 1945

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**by Sir John Colville**

FORTIETH anniversaries are in vogue, none more so than those celebrating the end of World War II. That war was won—against the unsurpassed valour and organising skill of the Germans and the suicidal courage of the Japanese—by the collective strength of the British Empire, which fought the longest; of the Soviet Union, which suffered the most; and of the United States, which fought doggedly on two fronts while supplying the essential needs of its allies. These were the three powers which won the war, but it was the Soviets who won the peace.

The Soviet triumph was largely due to the folly of American policy in the last, vital months of the fighting. That folly stemmed from what Winston Churchill called 'the deadly hiatus' between President Roosevelt's loosening grip and President Truman's tightening one. It occurred at the most inopportune time. Eighteen days before Hitler committed suicide in his Berlin bunker on April 30, 1945, President Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia, while having his portrait painted. He had been weakening fast and for several weeks before his death the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General George C. Marshall—a soldier rather than a politician—was effectively in control of US policy.

Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, had only been Vice-President since the election of November 1944. During the intervening months he had been granted only two interviews with the President. He was pitchforked into a political and military maelstrom without having been informed, let alone consulted about the increasing urgency and complexity day by day, indeed almost hour by hour. As Churchill put it, 'the indispensable political direction was lacking at the moment when it was most needed'.

The background of the relationship between the US, Britain and the Soviet Union is, of course, relevant to this tragedy. In November, 1943, at the Tehran conference of the Big Three and their numerous satellites, the Americans began to misread the directions on the signpost. The British were well aware that victory over the Axis depended on the latent power of the United States which had only recently shifted into higher gear after years of isolationism and disarmament. Until Tehran the British Empire had been the dominant partner in the Anglo-Saxon alliance, at any rate as far as combatant contribution went, having much the greater number of men and aircraft deployed against the enemy. That was a state of affairs which would not last.

At Tehran President Roosevelt, Britain's stalwart and generous champion when it stood alone in 1940 and 1941, began to develop the strange conviction that the welfare of mankind should, when the war ended, lie in the hands of two great powers, the US and the Soviet Union —the latter, purged of its guilt by suffering, freed from its deep-rooted suspicions, and cauterised in the furnace of war. The British Empire, by contrast, was played out, exhausted by its superhuman efforts in the previous three years, and destined to be dependent on American charity.

Besides, Roosevelt believed the primary British war aim to be the restoration of the empire to its former grandeur. Among other things he was resolved that imperial preference in trade must go. Like many of his colleagues he gave little or no credit to the empire's achievements and the material help it had brought to lawless, warring, tribal communities. Meanwhile Churchill, unlike Roosevelt, had grown anxious about Stalin's intentions. The genuine enthusiasm he had felt for the Soviet Union in June 1941, when Hitler invaded, was gradually eroded. The British shipped guns, tanks and aircraft to the Soviet Union—in all 5,000 tanks and 7,000 aircraft—losing many ships and men in the dangerous Arctic convoys. The ships' crews received only surly treatment on arrival at Murmansk. The British and American military missions sent to Moscow to co-operate with the Soviet armed forces were disregarded and often snubbed. A major effort was made to supply every kind of armament, often at the expense of home requirements. There was no word or gesture of thanks, but constant demand for more.

Even if the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939, which had partitioned Poland and made war inevitable, and the Soviet attack on Finland in the early months of 1940, were tactfully consigned to oblivion, it was impossible to forget the atrocious Katyn massacre of 1940 when 14,000 Polish prisoners of war were butchered in cold blood. The Soviets said the Germans had done it, and the State Department in Washington tended to believe them; but British intelligence left Churchill in no doubt that the Soviets were guilty of that abominable crime.

At Tehran, to Churchill's disgust, Stalin seriously suggested that after victory was won a German military revival should be prevented by the immediate execution of 50,000 German officers. Then, in August 1941, came the martyrdom of Warsaw when Moscow Radio called on the home

army, loyal to the Polish Government in exile in London, to rise against the German forces. The Soviet army then halted on the banks of the Vistula until the Germans had massacred the insurgents.

One night at Chequers, his country retreat, Churchill said to air chief marshal Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris and to me that he viewed the future with growing apprehension; when Bomber Command had finished its destruction of Germany, and the American armies had gone home, what would remain between the white snows of the Soviet Union and the white cliffs of Dover? Roosevelt and the State Department had no such misgivings about Soviet intentions, but their relations with their British allies remained friendly, if sometimes critical. Indeed, at the second Quebec conference of September 1944, in which only the Americans and the British took part, the President and the Prime Minister continued to set a cheerful example of co-operative goodwill which their staffs assimilated and echoed.

I personally was shocked by the President's appearance. His eyes were glazed and lack-lustre. I was not surprised when on the way home on the *Queen Mary*, Churchill told me that he felt deeply worried about President Roosevelt's health. Perhaps if Roosevelt himself had been a little more worried, he would not have run for a fourth term as President of the US the following November. But he was vain, he no doubt liked the thought of breaking all Presidential records, and his courage was dauntless. He certainly wanted to be at the helm when the war was won; but an unfit helmsman is a liability in the calmest seas and in rough waters he is likely to be a disaster.

The Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence continued unchecked and totally frank. The courtesies were unblemished; but Roosevelt sometimes showed impatience with the British Prime Minister, at any rate in the remarks he made behind his back, a practice begun at Tehran in his private conversations with Stalin. Roosevelt also seemed to think he had a right to intervene in matters which were not his concern at all. At Tehran he told Stalin he would like, some time, to discuss with him the future of India; and at Yalta, without a word to the British, he talked to the Soviets about the future status of Hong Kong. *Folie de grandeur* had taken command of a formerly remarkable man.

Churchill went to Moscow in October 1944, a month after the Quebec conference, precisely in order to show Stalin that there was none of that Anglo-American 'ganging up' which the Americans thought discourteous to the Soviets. All the same, Roosevelt was far from pleased. He told his ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, to let Stalin and his Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, know that he would not necessarily endorse the view Churchill might express. He wanted Harriman to act as a watchdog and he did not agree that Stalin and Churchill might be encouraged to reach agreement on the vexed Polish question.

Then came Greece. Churchill had no intention of allowing the communists, certain by the end of 1944 to control most of Eastern Europe, to seize Greece by stealth or force. To Roosevelt's impotent fury (but

not, strangely enough to Stalin's), he himself went to Athens on Christmas Day and with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Field Marshal Alexander beside him, imposed a democratic settlement of Greek affairs. Roosevelt should have been delighted that Greece, and in consequence Turkey, were excluded from Soviet domination. He was not.

In the following February, on the way to the Yalta conference in the Crimea, the President would pause only briefly at Malta for talks with the British, though the two chiefs of staff committees did have useful meetings. Roosevelt would not agree to any preliminary discussion of strategy or foreign policy. When he reached Yalta he pointedly avoided seeing Churchill alone until the fifth day of the conference, and in talks with Stalin he spoke, to Averell Harriman's horror, of his differences with Churchill. Oblivious to the fact that the Soviets had colonised the Crimea in the very same year that the British recognised the independence of the American colonies, he spent some time with Stalin poking fun at Churchill and at the British colonial conquests.

To the distress of Churchill and Eden, Roosevelt agreed to the Soviet demand that the existing Polish communist regime, installed by the Soviets at Lublin, should be the Government of Poland with the addition of a minority of non-communist Poles from London and elsewhere.

It was a complete sell-out to Stalin, for once the Presidential election was over and the Americans of Polish descent had cast their votes, Roosevelt had a diminished interest in Poland. What he wanted was to gain Stalin's agreement to the conditions he favoured for establishing a United Nations organisation and to ensure eventual Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

I did not go to Yalta, but I went to meet the returning British delegation and drove to London with Anthony Eden. I asked how things had gone. He replied that as Roosevelt was the sole head of state present, Churchill and Stalin being only heads of government, Roosevelt had been the chairman at every plenary session.

That, said Eden, had been most hampering, for the President's powers were obviously failing and Eden had the impression that half the time he was unable to concentrate.

So the deadly hiatus was already beginning to have its effect. As far as military affairs were concerned, it was evident that General Marshall was now directing American policy. He was naturally worried solely about the military objectives, for the political overtones, daily more important, were no concern of the chiefs of staff.

At this stage there was in Washington, if not in the United States Embassy in Moscow, little change in the American Government's optimism about future relations with the Soviet Union or in the belief that a policy of appeasement was the surest method of taming the bear.

It was not a belief held at 10 Downing Street or in the Foreign Office, but the British and American peoples were unwavering admirers of the Soviet Union's successful resistance and any overt hostility to the Soviet Union would have caused an uproar in both the United Kingdom and

the USA.

Warnings from Averell Harriman in Moscow fell on deaf ears. In September 1944 he had written to Harry Hopkins, as close as anybody to Roosevelt: 'I have evidence that they (the Soviets) have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness and acceptance of their policies... unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication that the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever (its) interests are involved.'

He advised Secretary of State Cordell Hull to beware of giving the Soviets a free hand with their Western neighbours, and he advocated a policy of demanding a quid pro quo for each Soviet demand. But, as he sadly recorded, after the 1944 election was over, 'the President consistently shows very little interest in Eastern European countries except as they affect sentiment in America'.

It needs to be remembered that the British were no longer able to speak from strength. In June 1944 the troops of the British Empire fighting in Normandy equalled those of the Americans. By September the ratios were changing: by March 1945 only 25 per cent of General Eisenhower's forces were British and Canadian, although they amounted in total to a million soldiers, in addition to the considerable weight of the RAF and, on the high seas, an undimished naval power. The Americans were firmly in the driver's seat.

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[Sir John Colville served as Private Secretary to Winston Churchill during World War II. Publications include *The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries 1939-1955* (Hodder and Stoughton, £14.95). Part II of 'How the West Lost the Peace in 1945' will be published in the February issue of *Contemporary Review*.]

# A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

## by Brian W. Walker

THE process of delivering aid, effectively, to developing countries is extraordinarily complex. In Western Sudan, in the province of Darfur, there live the Fur people. Their province is about the size of France, but boasts only 200 kilometres of reasonable roadway. Traditionally, the people are small farmers, living under the protection of the local sheik. They are Islamic. For four years, their communities have been severely stricken by drought. By the turn of 1985 their plight was desperate. They became a target for some of the Western aid agencies, including Oxfam and The Save the Children Fund.

The American aid agency—USAID—agreed to supply US surpluses of the Fur's staple food—sorghum—in the form of food aid under their Title 21 programme. Locally, this grain is called *dura.* Inevitably, some of the US sorghum was the latest product of the 'green revolution,' growing prolifically and successfully in the US. The food aid was therefore the harvest of an FI hybrid plant which responds magnificently to a range of technical, high energy inputs including fertilisers, pesticides and weed killers. Usually in famine situations people are so hungry that they eat their seed corn. By doing this they preserve life today, but make escape from the poverty trap virtually impossible in the future.

However, in July and August of last year, there had been rain in Darfur and so the Furs, anxious to produce their own food, took the sorghum food aid grain, and planted it in the parched ground. It germinated and is producing a harvest of sorts. What the Furs do not understand is that it is in the nature of an FI hybrid that it is regressive in its genetic characteristics. So their harvest will be poor to non-existent. If they try to repeat the exercise again next time round, by planting seed from what harvest they do manage to crop, it will be even worse the following year. These dwindling assets affect not only the food to eat equation. US developed FI sorghum is short stemmed. Local Sudanese *dura* is long stemmed. The traditional crop residues—the stalks —are essential to the local economy, providing roofing material, fuel, bedding for cattle and other uses. The seed extracted from sorghum food aid, if it grows, will provide none of that.

Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, a quite different scenario is being enacted. In the same province of Darfur it is possible to assess what tonnages local food production will generate. When this is added to the food aid imported under the relief operation and then, allocated to the number of hungry people against their calorie needs, it is possible to reach a view as to the number of likely deaths from malnutrition. The actual input of food aid this summer was calculated at only one fifteenth of what was needed. There are many reasons for this significant shortfall. Transporting food aid is a difficult and costly exercise. As I write, some 200,000 tons of US sorghum are still waiting for distribution by the

Save the Children Fund. At one time during the current relief operation ships were waiting two weeks to offload their cargoes. In August alone 26 ships were queued up for entry to the port. From there the supplies would be transported by rail to the West. But the ill equipped rail system, rickety and unreliable at the best of times, was incapable of measuring up to the task. In any case, the rains wash out fifteen or so sections of the rail track each year. SCF turned to a trucking company—Arbel Talab—but little effective progress was made before the rains came. By then it was calculated that people were receiving, at best, only 14 grammes of food per week! A kilo is basic to mere survival; two and a half kilos if progress is to be made. Given these statistics, it is not surprising that malnutrition amongst the under fives was assessed at 40 per cent. Vast numbers of people under these cruel conditions ought to have been dying or dead—but they weren't. The figures of actual deaths simply do not correlate with anticipated deaths by a factor running into many hundreds of thousands. Clearly, a maverick element was at work, not included in the calculation and which was keeping people alive.

In fact, the people had fallen back on traditional methods of survival; techniques and stratagems learned over some 3,000 years of tribal experience, but which under the impact of colonialism at the turn of the century had begun to be squeezed out. The mid-century movement to independence, followed by the subsequent impact of the 'aid-machine', tended to obliterate what was left as it rode rough-shod over the traditional survival techniques. These techniques fall into a range of categories, or thresholds, which enable people to survive in famine conditions. Obviously, migration is one such reaction. The sale of cattle stock to rich merchants either within their own community, or from Khartoum, or even further afield, is another. Personal possessions, household furniture and eventually jewellery and weapons are sold. More interestingly, people look for their needs to drought resistant local varieties of plant or shrubs. In Darfur, perhaps the most important of these in the *mochette* (phonetic spelling) bush. This produces orange berries the size of a grape. At their centre is a pea sized kernel. When gathered, it is soaked for 12 hours to dilute its salt content. It is then cooked for an hour before being eaten. Throughout Africa, and certainly in Darfur, another survival mechanism lies in raiding termite mounds, some of which can stand higher than a man, for the ears of grain stored within them. Then there are grasses to be eaten, whilst the lolob tree can provide protein from its edible leaves. Once the rains came in July, green shoots emerged from the ground and these, again, can be eaten as a kind of salad, or made into a vegetable stew.

Tribal knowledge of this kind is of immense importance to the future of Africa. It might be compared to the genetic material hidden in the tropical moist forests of the Congo basin. Both are threatened by the process of 'development'. There is an urgent need to analyse and assess what traditional survival mechanisms have evolved over so many centuries. Traditional knowledge, inherited wisdom, may contain a sub-strata

of mumbo-jumbo, and even witchcraft or sorcery. But much of it is solid and soundly based, even if its science is not comprehended. The early African explorers referred to it constantly, and were amazed at the range and variety of food which was available. People had learned, essentially, to live in harmony with their environment. They knew that to over burden nature's biological carrying systems with man or his beasts led to disaster and would threaten his survival. They became experts in exploiting those biological systems to the optimum. Tribal records show that pastoralists could leave large areas fallow for 10 or even 15 years.

When the Russian plant geneticist, Vavilov, visited Ethiopia, he commented on the range and variety of edible plants and foods. Today, six million people are facing high risk malnutrition in Ethiopia alone. For centuries, the shea 'butter' tree was prolific throughout today's Sahelian drought zone, with butter marketed as a standard part of people's diet. Mali, central to that zone, was once recognised as the 'bread basket' for North Africa. Further south in the West African rain forest there grows a plant called *katemje* which local Africans have been using for centuries to sweeten tea, wine and sour breads. In fact *katemje* seeds produce the world's sweetest known compund. Molecule for molecule it is 100,000 times sweeter than sugar and, on a weight basis, 3,000 times sweeter. These examples can be multiplied many times over. Nature provided vast, indeed boundless, resources in Africa. People and cattle simply had to find their niche, fit within it, and nature would provide for all their needs—whether physical, mental or spiritual.

First, colonialism, then the imposed market economy and finally the political corruption of the post-independence period brought an end to what had gone before. Little that was viable was offered in its place. Africa is now a continent in decline. Environmentally, large regions the size of Europe's largest countries, are bankrupt. The whole development process is at a crossroads; a crisis crossroads.

No Sahelian government survived the 1970s drought and already the mid-eighties drought is taking its political toll. In 1984 arms imports exceeded grain imports for the first time in the history of the continent. Since 1945 Africa has witnessed 73 coups and the assassination of 15 heads of states. Political instability, fuelled by massive population movements, themselves a response to environmental degradation, is not the basis for sustainable development. Amid such social and political fluidity, sustainable livelihoods are difficult to come by.

The aid process itself has to change. People at village and community level have to participate in designing the aid programme which is going to determine their lives. They must be invited, in effect, to write that agenda. Inevitably, such a strategy will ensure that aid programmes are culturally sensitive—seeking the development of people and their communities as a prerequisite to the development of GNP. This does not mean that 'hi-tech' or the economic infrastructure are unimportant or have no role to play. They do. Western Sudan needs an effective railway; Ethiopia needs improved port facilities; the whole of the Sahel needs

a better road network. But more than these, a style has to be developed that starts with the assumption that the poor are an asset and not a liability; that, furthermore, tucked away in their collective sub-conscious are all kinds of survival techniques; and bits of inherited knowledge can be exploited sustainably, to the advantage of the whole community.

The 'green revolution' will play an important part when agricultural research stations, which over the past three decades have absorbed immense sums of finance, but which have contributed almost nothing to redeeming Africa's ecological and human crisis, take to designing their research to fit the needs of people living within a hundred mile radius of their stations, and then replicate their successes further afield through culturally sensitive field extension work. Little real attempt has been made yet to engineer genetically appropriate local food plants to the climates and vagaries of African life. Instead of trying to bend the environment through the use of massive dams, irrigation schemes, tree planting schemes and the like, we should be bending the plants genetically to suit the environment. Some such success has been achieved in a mere two years of experimentation with sorghum—but practically all the other traditional foodstuffs await analysis and research.

Beyond this, storage at village level, local literacy campaigns, improving the role of women by reducing the physical energy they expend on grinding grain, carrying fuelwood, transporting water, or a thousand other jobs which women, the farmers of Africa, are expected to perform, need support. Politically, the issue of fertility and expanding populations urgently demands sensitive and imaginative policies in order to secure reduced populations. Kenya, with a fertility rate of eight has the fastest growing populations in the world. A host of other African countries are right behind Kenya. Again, the sustainable use of Africa's magnificent tropical rainforests, together with environmental profiling, country by country, should feature in any new strategy. There is virtually no intellectual underpinning to the current data or statistics produced out of Africa. Such statistics are either unreliable, or are used unreliably by incompetent bureaucracies.

Nature blessed Africa with abundant sunshine, rich soils in parts, massive watersheds, genetic treasure houses of plants and trees and a diversity of flora and fauna. The issue at stake is whether or not the human species can find a place within this abundance, and so order his affairs as to be in partnership with nature and not in opposition. If we continue to wage war against our environment, we threaten our own survival as a species, for that is a battle we cannot win.

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[Brian Walker, formerly Director of Oxfam, is President of the International Institute for Environment and Development.]

# THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF ZAKAH

by Abu N. M. Wahid

SOME of the income maintenance programmes now being practised in the West have clearly originated from Islamic sources: e.g. the negative income tax and the old age pension can be traced back to the Islamic institutions of Zakah and old age parental care respectively.

Zakah is one of the most important pillars of Islamic faith. It was not only instituted to increase the welfare of the poor but also to serve as a means of economic growth and stability. It should not be translated as charity but as the poor's due. Allah has repeatedly mentioned the payment of Zakah in the holy Quran. One of the verses can be quoted as:

> Those who believe,
> And do deeds of righteousness,
> And establish regular prayers
> And regular charity,
> Will have their reward
> With their Lord:
> On them shall be no fear,
> Nor shall they grieve.[1]
>
> 2:277.

Zakah is a compulsory payment on the part of Muslims as a share to the poor, having a wide variety of economic and social ramifications. Yet misunderstandings to various extents do prevail among both Muslims and non-Muslims about the holy institutions of 'Zakah' in Islam. Commentators have translated the word 'Zakah' as 'poor's due', 'poor's share', 'alms', 'charity', etc. The real spirit of Zakah is not reflected in any of these. However, some of the meanings such as poor's due or poor's share can capture the individual or private aspect of this holy institution. The payment of Zakah is mandatory on those who, at the end of the year, are left with assets in excess of 7.5 tola of gold or 52.5 tola of silver in value, after taking care of the debts and liabilities at a flat rate of at least 2.5%.[2]

Some may argue that through the introduction of Zakah, Islam indirectly recognises the existence of a class system; more precisely, there has to be a poor class in order to receive Zakah from the rich. This question may be addressed in a very humble way by saying that Islam does not believe in the perfect equality of man in the first place; but at the same time it is unequivocally for the equitable distribution of resources. Secondly, the presence of Zakah does not necessarily mean that a poor class has to exist in order to collect it. The collection and disbursement of Zakah is not an individual affair, it is rather a responsibility of the public authority. When Islam will be practised in its entirety under the framework of generalised equilibrium, poverty will disappear and Zakah will go to the public fund for the general provision of public goods such as parks, museums, highways, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc. In the absence of full-fledged Islamic institutions, it is recommended that Zakah be directly disbursed to the poor on an individual basis. This is an exceptional provision, not a general rule. Thus, the payment of Zakah

by the rich to the poor is not an act of charity. The economic justification of Zakah may be explained as follows: the theory of general equilibrium suggests that every single economic activity influences and is influenced by every other activity. Thus, the earning of one individual, whoever he is and whatsoever he does, must be, in some way or other, contributed to other individuals. Thus, everybody has genuine rights on the income of everybody else. The neoclassical theory of functional distribution can take care of the shares of four broad categories of participants in the production process. They are: the labourers, the capital owners, the land lords and the entrepreneurs. It cannot go beyond this into further minute details of the contributions made by other people from remote distances. Because of this inherent shortcoming, on the top of the neo-classical distribution, something must be done in order to settle all the possible claims and counter claims of individuals participating directly and indirectly in the production process. The institution of Zakah is the only remedy to this problem. Zakah recognises the complex process of claims and counter claims and as a rule of thumb, it abandons the right of the rich on the poor; the surplus is thus the right of the poor on the rich, and this in effect, is Zakah. The wealthy are clearly defined without any ambiguity, the rest are 'the poor.'

It is interesting to note that the rate of Zakah is proportional. It is neither progressive nor regressive. Islam, the universal religion of man, purposely does not make the rate of Zakah progressive in order to avoid the loss of incentive to work and earn more; on the other hand, neither does it make it regressive for the sake of the universality of fairness and justice.

The equilibrium rate of Zakah is divinely determined at 2.5%. The justification of this cannot be understood in the present social context where defence spending is sky-rocketing, economic exploitation increasing, wastage of resources rising and, above all, moral bankruptcy is increasing around the world.

Islam, from a realistic and idealistic point of view, visualizes a world free from all of these vices. In other words, Islam wants to achieve a 'generalised global equilibrium' where exploitation and wastage of resources would be non-existent. Under that situation theoretically it would be entirely possible to discover 2.5% (the rate of Zakah) as a magic number required for the stability of the aforementioned ideal of generalised equilibrium. The achievement of this state would make the Western institution of income tax (ranging from 0 to over 70%) redundant. A thorough Islamization programme can, therefore, not only save the millions of the non-believers from the Hell first in the Hereafter but also from the tax phobia of the modern Western world.

With the help of the neoclassical theory of labour supply it is possible to demonstrate that Zakah may have a positive impact on the individual's labour supply. This theory considers labour potentiality from a micro point of view, where the individual chooses an optimal combination of income from work and leisure so as to maximise his total usefulness. The impact

of Zakah on the labour supply of a poor individual in an Islamic economy (of course not in a generalised global equilibrium) can be explained as follows:

Let the initial equilibrium of the individual be at point A in figure 1, where he is enjoying the utility level $U_1$

*Impact of 'Zakah' on Labour Supply of a Poor Individual in an Islamic Economy.*




*Figure 1*

with the budget line MN and indifference curve $U_1$. The receipt of income from the Zakah fund will change his budget constraint from MN to MPQ. Given this upward partial tilt in his budget constraint, he can increase his utility level by moving to a higher indifference curve, if he remains on the right side of point P in terms of leisure choice. Suppose his new equilibrium is at point B on indifference curve $U_2$. Individual's movement from A to B implies a reduction of his leisure choice, clearly resulting in an increase in labour supply.

This increase in labour supply due to the payment of 'Zakah' requires some further qualifications. Movement from A to B can be decomposed into substitution and income effects. According to figure 1, movement from A to C, i.e. increase in leisure by the amount RT (equivalently a decrease in labour supply) is due to substitution effect. However, due to income effect he is moving from C to B reducing leisure by the amount TS (equivalently an increase in labour supply). The net effect of Zakah on labour supply is, however, positive in this case. But in some cases where the magnitude of substitution effect is larger than that of income effect, it is possible to experience a negative impact of Zakah on labour supply.

The institution of Zakah in Islam has a very wide range of economic implications and applications. It increases the economic condition of the

poor and thus ensures a healthier and more productive supply of labour force, needed for a growing economy. It has, however, far more important ramifications.

The most important and unparalleled strength of Zakah is that it not only redistributes income in favour of the poor but also gets around the loss of work incentives. It strongly discourages the idle savers to hoard and keep resources away from the circular flow of income. In this respect, it is more effective than the capitalistic institution of interest. In capitalism, idle funds only suffer from foregone interest while in Islam, a hoarder must pay Zakah on top of the potential profit share sacrificed. Capitalism, however, obliges people to pay tax, a redundant institution in Islam.

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The February issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Breaking the East-West Myopia* by Paddy Ashdown MP, *Metaphysics and Reality: the Hillsborough Agreement* by Hugh Munro, *The State of Liberalism: Challenges from Left and Right* by Urs Schoettli and *The Beginnings of Contemporary Review* by Eric Glasgow.

# INDONESIA AND EAST TIMOR

## by Keith D. Suter

TEN years ago, in December 1975, Indonesia invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor and to this day Portugal and the United Nations continue to reject Indonesian control over East Timor. The UN Security Council, almost a decade ago, called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and for there to be an act of self-determination by the East Timorese.

National unity is one of Indonesia's main problems. Indeed, the drive for national unity overshadows all of the Indonesian Government's policies. While the decision to conquer East Timor had complex motivations, one was the belief that the conquest was necessary in the interests of maintaining national unity.

Indonesia, the world's longest archipelago, consists of 13,677 islands, strung out like a necklace of emeralds along an east-west axis of about 3,200 miles. It is on the crossroads of history. All the world's major religions (except Judaism) have adherents in these islands. The major religion is Islam, though its adherents are generally less devout than some in the Middle East. The repeated overlay of faiths has tended to weaken the hold of any one single religion so that, for example, each Middle Eastern religion is merged with pre-existing Javanese mysticism and a mixture of Hindu-Buddhism.

Indonesia's religious mixture arose out of its geographical and economic significance. It is astride some of the major waterways in the world and so has figured in trading arrangements by vessels passing between China, India and Europe. It has also been fabled for its natural resources—the old international reputation of the 'Spice Islands' wealth is illustrated by Christopher Columbus's 1492 voyage whereby he ran across the present United States when trying to find a west-about route to the 'Spice Islands'. The Portuguese and Dutch were the main European nations active in the Indonesian region during the era of imperialism.

It is fascinating to speculate upon how different Indonesia would be today if the colonial powers had adopted other policies. The Dutch gradually pushed Portugal out of this area, with the exception of East Timor, which it held onto for 450 years. (Owing to the April 1975 revolution in Lisbon, Portugal's hold was weakened and the province had a brief period of independence, followed by the Indonesian invasion in late 1975.) East Timor is the most obvious part of Indonesia to which the Government really has little claim.

West Irian, one-fifth of Indonesia's total land area, is more Melanesian than Indonesian. Ethnically it should be part of a greater Melanesian federation composed of other like-minded nations such as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. It is part of Indonesia, however, because it was part of the Dutch empire (though administratively separate from it) and so went, after a prolonged period of negotiation

and confrontation, to Indonesia. Had the Germans (who took posession of the north-eastern part of New Guinea late last century) been more greedy, they could have taken more of the island, especially since the Dutch were doing little with it beyond using it as an island for political prisoners. Similarly the British (who were reluctant to claim the south-eastern part of the island) could have been more eager in their empire-building and taken the western half from the Dutch. As it is, the Germans and British were satisfied with their parts of the island, and the Dutch maintained control over the western part and provided the bridge over which the Indonesian Government travelled to claim West Irian.

At the other end of Indonesia there is Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, which is composed of some of the most zealous Muslims in the world. It was not until 1903 that the Dutch got formal acknowledgement for its control over this rebellious province, though sporadic rebellions continued this century. The main competitor this time was Britain, which controlled the nearby Malaysia and which in the latter part of last century had reservations about permitting Dutch control. Again it is a matter of speculation what would have happened had Britain tried to gain control. The province, incidentally, has been almost as unfriendly towards the Indonesian Government as it was towards the Dutch. The Darul Islam movement in Aceh in the post-independence Indonesia opposed secular Indonesian rule and fought for its point of view until 1963. The province still has some periods of rebellion but is more tranquil since the Government permitted it an unusually large degree of autonomy.

Indonesia can, therefore, be viewed as the island of Java (containing over 70 per cent of the Indonesian population) with satellite islands, some of which have either rebelled or are rebelling against Jakarta rule. Despite being composed of elements of some of the world's oldest civilisations, Indonesia as a nation-state is less than 40 years old. Thus, the previous four decades should be looked upon as a testing period to see whether the nation-state has a future. Other newly independent nations have been subjected to the same test and some have proved not to be viable nation-states, notably Pakistan and the Congo, and have split up; others, like Nigeria, have survived intact. Indonesia varies from most other countries because of the scale and scope of its unity problems.

It has a large number of islands to control; there are few (if any) unifying factors such as religion and the country is plagued with economic problems. Its rate of economic growth has been slow and uneven (with the ruling elite gaining at the expense of the others), with a growing landless population, many of whom are residing in Jakarta.

It could be asked at this point: given Jakarta's other problems closer to home, why did it take over East Timor? Although East Timor may have some economic potential (offshore oil), an important reason was the need, ironically, to maintain national unity. Indonesian Governments (both under Sukarno and Suharto) have seen Indonesian rule over East

Timor as essential for unity.

A thriving, independent East Timor would have indirectly threatened Indonesia. It could have induced the rest of (Indonesian-controlled) Timor to work for independence or perhaps federation. It would also have provided an example of independence for the rest of Indonesia. Few parts of Indonesia are so materially backward and yet if it had been successful, this would have shown that even a poverty-stricken place like East Timor could provide an example in development for other parts of Indonesia. By invading East Timor, the Indonesian Government showed the rest of Indonesia that it was willing to go to great lengths to maintain national unity and so the invasion was a lesson for all potential secessionists.

Unfortunately for the Government, this show of force has been marred by the poor performance of its armed forces, which have still not apparently obtained control over all of East Timor. Indeed, with the armed forces bogged down in the east one wonders whether other parts of Indonesia will take advantage of the situation and step up their campaigns. In attempting to control East Timor, it is possible that Indonesia has embarked upon a protracted process of disintegration. Having just about survived its first forty years intact as a nation-state, it is doubtful if Indonesia can survive another four decades.

The Indonesian people seem to have derived little benefit from Indonesia as a nation-state. The main exceptions are, of course, the Javanese, especially the ruling elite (only a few of whom are not Javanese). The rulers have done well out of post-Sukarno Indonesia. It is difficult to argue that the landless peasants on Java have benefited from the nation-state. But if Indonesia were to fragment, these people will still be left on Java and so the collapse of the present nation may not mean much one way or the other.

The situation is a little clearer outside Java (and Bali). It is evident from the record of anti-Jakarta feeling (often expressed in violence) that these people are dissatisfied with Jakarta rule. Indeed, few other nations have had, in recent years, such a task in maintaining unity. This does not deny that the Government has been busy trying to instil, via the educational system for instance, a sense of unity. But there is a limit to what cultural factors can be inculcated into unwilling people and one wonders whether all the Government has managed to do is to put an Indonesianised veneer over pre-existing and still vibrant local cultural patterns and mores. There comes a point—and the Government may have reached it—when attempts at maintaining national unity become in themselves counter-productive because the energy expended on this project is less than the benefits flowing from national unity.

Indonesia faces no risk of invasion. Its armed forces are used to maintain national unity (broadly defined to include territorial aggrandisement, of which East Timor was the most recent example), as well as to perform operations which aid the civil community, especially at times of natural disaster. The function is a mere by-product of the forces

already existing; it could be carried out by other persons not in uniform.

The multinational corporations have done very well out of the nation-state of Indonesia. They have only one central government with which to negotiate. The Government is amenable since the Suharto Government has pinned its hopes on western technology, expertise and aid forming the basis of development and this policy exposes it to pressure from western corporations.

It could be argued that a fragmented Indonesia would be an even easier source of plunder for these corporations. We shall see when the federation fragments. In the meantime, I believe that since the corporations are doing so well out of the present Indonesia, it would not necessarily be in their interests to have to deal with smaller units since this could represent a setback from their present advantageous position. Certainly the arms companies would not have such a wide scope for operation if there were not a central government worried about maintaining unity.

The United States has a record of propping up the nation-state of Indonesia. Even during the Sukarno era, when Australia, Malaysia and Britain wanted American assistance to defeat the Indonesian 'confrontation' with Malaysia, the United States preferred to remain out of the dispute and provided aid to Indonesia.

The United States prefers to have one central government with which to deal. Indonesia is, with the reduction of the US's Asian military presence, becoming some kind of policeman in South East Asia. After the ending of the Vietnam conflict, the US was pushed off mainland Asia (except for Korea) and relies to a larger extent on nations like Indonesia. As a result, Indonesia took over East Timor, since there was risk that it could become another 'Cuba', by obtaining aid from the communist countries.

A series of independent nations composed of the present Indonesia would be more difficult for the US to influence simply because they would be more numerous and even able to play off the super powers against one another.

Indonesia is an accident of history, whose present frontiers are derived more from European colonial actions, rather than the expressed desires of the present population. All nation-states, of course, are accidents of history. If the Dutch, Spanish or Portuguese had been more enterprising and done more than merely hover around the Australian coasts in times past, Australia could be very different from what it is now. It so happens that the British were not so disenchanted with Australia's bleak and uninviting landscape and decided that it could be of use (especially because the initial white inhabitants were to be persons for whom the landscape was well suited).

Nation-states are not fixed objects handed down from God, whose frontiers are permanent. On the contrary, nation-states come and go. In international law terms the era of the nation-states is taken to begin in 1648. Before that time, international law (such as it was) gave less prominence to nation-states and there was a tendency for people to be

ruled from (in Europe) one central place, such as Rome. Nation-states have, then, only been with us for about 400 years. They have served a purpose but one which is coming to an end.

Second, the nation-state as an institution is threatened by a series of forces, whose full significance is not recognised by government and most of their citizens. Multinational corporations are the most obvious form of recent innovation which is threatening the nation-state, if not making it redundant. Few (if any) governments can withstand pressures from these corporations; they either cave in or, in Washington's case, become so closely allied with them that it is difficult to ascertain the precise division of responsibilities. The 10 largest corporations produce a wealth greater than the GNP of 80 of the world's nations and on present trends will control 41 per cent of world production (excluding communist nations) by 1988.

Meanwhile, the growth of international crises concerning the Earth itself, such as pollution, food and energy, has forced nations to surrender some of their political independence to the United Nations as a way of working collectively to solve common problems.

Meanwhile individuals no longer (especially in western countries) look so much to their governments to settle problems and they pay more attention to non-governmental organisations, such as human rights organisations like Amnesty International. These organisations, though lacking money and armed forces, can cause embarrassment for governments and force them to introduce policies which they do not care for, such as Amnesty's campaign for the release of Indonesian political prisoners.

Within nation-states (as we see in Indonesia) there are peoples who feel that they can get along better either with a large degree of autonomy or complete separation. Almost every nation has problems with minority groups. Additionally, given the haphazard method of drawing colonial boundaries, people within one nation often feel closer to people in another, such as the Melanesians in West Irian and Papua New Guinea. Independence since 1945 from imperial powers is sometimes only a transition phase during which people prepare themselves for yet another national identity.

Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, therefore, in the long-term may have contributed little to the maintenance of national unity. On the contrary, in carrying out one of this century's most violent invasions—in which about a tenth of East Timor's population has been killed—Indonesia has acted contrary to its national interests. The costs of maintaining an occupation force and in rebuilding the country sap the resources from elsewhere in Indonesia.

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# HOMELESSNESS: WHOSE FAULT?

## by Sheila McKechnie

I CHOSE the title of this article to emphasise my fundamental opposition to the idea that the current housing crisis is similar to an earthquake or other natural disaster. The current housing shortage is the outcome of a combination of social and economic policies and will only be reversed if those policies are reversed. As long as the provision of a home for all who live in our society remains the hope of a committed few and not the specific end of clear social policies, progress will be slow if it takes place at all.

Facts very rarely express the totality of the human problems caused by homelessness but they do reveal the sheer size of the problem. In the opinion of Shelter the deterioration of the housing stock is accelerating at such a drastic rate that shortly we will be faced in certain areas with slum-clearance-programmes reminiscent of those after the 2nd World War. Ironically, many of these areas will be council-owned-and-some will have been built in the last three decades. The Government's own English House Condition Survey showed that 1.1 million homes were unfit and 900,000 lacked amenities such as inside toilets.[1] The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA) recently estimated that £19 billion would have to be spent in council houses to remedy faults. Reports from organisations like the National Economics Development Organisation and various professional institutes confirm these figures.

At the same time the number of new homes built both in the public and private sectors have fallen dramatically. House building completions have fallen from just over 300,000 a year in 1975-77 to about 200,000 in 1984. New starts could be down to 180,000 in 1985 of which less than 30,000 are in the public sector (i.e. available for rent).

The end result of these trends is simple; a substantial rise in the number of homeless. The total of officially accepted as homeless has risen from 53,000 in 1978 when the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act was introduced, to nearly 90,000 this year. At least twice that number register themselves as homeless but are not accepted, usually because they are single or if couples have no children, but occasionally because of the use by certain councils of the cruel intentionality rule. Shelter estimates that one in a hundred households are effectively 'homeless', i.e. they have no secure permanent accommodation.

The social misery behind these figures can be illustrated in a number of ways.

In 1983, it was reported that 8,900 children were in care under the official category of 'unsatisfactory home conditions',[2] i.e. the family has primarily a housing not a social problem. The number of families with children living in bed and breakfast hotels in London is approximately 3,100 in short life and 1,191 in hostels. All these families know that their children are suffering severe deprivation but it will take time to show in

statistics. Links with social services and medical care are difficult. People drop through the growing, gaping holes in the welfare state.

Apart from the depth of the housing crisis illustrated by the facts quoted, nothing has shocked me as much as the way this society is prepared to treat its young. Nothing illustrates so well the obscene values which underpin our current housing policy.

Earlier this year the Government introduced its Board and Lodgings Regulations which effectively turned the young homeless into the scapegoats of its housing policy. Young unemployed people on social security without permanent accommodation found that they would only receive a payment for board and lodgings (the only accommodation available to them) for up to eight weeks in selected major cities and down to two weeks in coastal resorts. Then they had to move on and could not return to their home area for at least six months. Shelter dealt with approximately 500 cases of homelessness caused by these regulations before they were judged illegal. We will deal with many hundreds more when the Government reintroduce them as they have promised to do. Here are a few examples of these cases:

1. Two brothers, aged 20 and 17, have both been in care most of their lives. The youngest is exempt under the regulations, as he left care less than a year ago. But his elder brother, who is educationally sub-normal, and suffers from anxiety problems and other medical complaints, has had this benefit cut—despite a doctor's letter.
2. Tony, aged 20, has been twice in hospital because of the violence of his stepfather. But because he is over 19, family violence is not a ground for exemption, and he will have his benefit cut.
3. A young mother of two took an overdose when she received a letter from the DHSS telling her that her benefit would be cut. She is technically a single person, as her children are still with her ex-cohabitee.
4. Pete, aged 19, has been sleeping in a carpark since his benefit was cut. His father has remarried and moved away from the area; his mother lives in a one room bedsit. Neither can take him in.
5. Janice is 18. When her mother died ten years ago, she came into the care of her mother's boyfriend. She was forced to move out when he formed a new relationship. In effect, she has no home.

There has been no comprehensive study into the reasons for young homelessness. However, at least 13,000 young people leave care in England and Wales each year. They are aged 16-18. The structure of family life is changing. Parents separate and remarry. Often children from previous marriages are seen as a burden on the new. The level of unemployment among the young has increased sharply and with it their ability to be financially independent.

The housing shortage has meant that the shrinking private rented sector is unwilling to rent to the young even if they could afford it. No job no home; no home no job is a common complaint. Councils rarely give the young priority even in cases of great social need and vulnerability.

So we in Shelter are forced to defend the only accommodation that remains, cheap bed and breakfast hotels, rooms shared with strangers, where the fire risk is nine times greater than in other accommodation, where some ruthless landlords can make huge sums in profit exploiting the desperation of young people and costing the state more than it would to provide them in many instances with three-bedroomed semi-detached houses. It is the economics of the mad-house. But more than that, if a society should be judged by how it treats its young, we come out very badly.

The post-war consensus on housing began to break-up in the 1970s although the origins of the break-up probably go back much earlier. The consensus consisted of the view that the government had a responsibility to secure decent housing for people. Whether that was by public provision or home ownership was hardly an issue while both were competing against the private rented sector. This ceased to be true when the private sector diminished to relatively insignificant proportions. Could we continue to both build and invest in the public sector and feed the insatiable home ownership spiral? The consensus was already showing signs of cracking in the last period of the Labour government.

In addition there was a growing belief that the post-war thrust into public housing had lost its way. High rise tower blocks and systems build were not what people wanted—had anyone bothered to ask? The Tories opted for owner occupation and argued that state intervention in housing was either useless or hamful. Cuts in public expenditure and the right to buy followed. Having operated within the consensus for so long the opposition to Thatcherism seemed to be suffering from a state of amnesia —we seemed to forget that for the majority of people public housing was the way out of Victorian slums. We also seemed to forget how to argue for collective rather than individual responsibility for housing. Even councils who had a stake in the collective approach to housing issues could be seen to encourage individualism. The denial to tenants of a collective forum did not encourage general social responsibility.

Very few people who are well housed would argue that they have achieved this by depriving other people of similar opportunities and yet in a crude way that happens. Obviously, if councils have too few houses, giving one category of people higher priority deprives others. Equally true is that the present level of subsidy to owner occupiers would be a serious problem for any government wishing to allocate more finance to building new homes or providing subsidies to improve the current stock.

It is estimated by Frank Field, former Director of Child Poverty Action Group, that since 1979 £2 billion has been removed from the social security system and transferred to those paying the higher rates of income tax. Similar calculations in housing are difficult to make, however, no aspect of Government spending has been cut as severely as housing. The consequences are that the rich find their housing costs more heavily subsidised than the poor. But housing is divisive in physical as well as financial terms. Investment by local authorities in England has fallen

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by 45% of its level in 1979. You do not need statistics to know that inner city deprivation is creating scenes of squalor and anger.

However, it is foolish to imagine that in the current climate of fear people will make altruistic assessments of housing needs for society as a whole. It takes many years, as David Donnison has argued, to mobilise the willingness of people to contribute the large funds needed for a social security system.[3] This is equally true of housing. A collective social strategy on housing takes years to develop and years to pay for. The housing provided by one generation provides the basis of the housing for the next and it takes longer than the lifetime of one parliament to implement a successful policy.

Instead of a general collective solution to housing need we have been offered 'special needs' housing for the very old or very sick or very disabled, i.e. society takes responsibility only for those unable to fend for themselves. This strategy is a terrible mistake. To quote David Donnison at length:—

> 'Poverty' was never the basis for such unity. It is not a word much used by poor people themselves, for the good reason that it evokes scant warmth. Programmes specially designed for the poor, they know well, end up as poor programmes. Every survey shows that the National Health Service is one of our most popular social services, while supplementary benefit is one of the least popular. The former is a universal service to which we all turn when we need its help; the latter is for the poor only. Compare, in the same social security offices, the waiting rooms for supplementary benefits and insurance benefits: two different worlds. Campaign on behalf of 'the poor' may attract some support if the objects of charity are sufficiently appealing and few: little orphans, blinded ex-servicemen . . . But they never did much for the big groups: the ordinary working families raising several children on low wages, and the unemployed. Those group would not be being victimised today if the public had much sympathy for them.[4]

To some extent the 'housing lobby' has contributed to this approach by targeting specific groups. We have taken up single issue campaigns. As the effects of the government's policy of withdrawing from the public sector became evident, it was easier to concentrate on the specific consequences of that policy, e.g. houses in multiple occupation, bed and breakfast squalor, the health effects, the sheer rise in the number of homeless. Identify the problems, hammer home the human cost, seek to create the atmosphere where the government must *do something*—but don't worry too much about what! The first successes of this policy were not in fact what the government did do but what it did not do. De-regulation of the private sector has been shelved and the debate on the Home Improvement Green Paper has been stretched to the next election.

But single issue campaigns produce single issue responses and play straight into the hands of those who support a 'targeting approach' to housing. The only losers being those who see these single issues as a symptom of a more deep rooted debate—the debate moreover that there seems to be a conspiracy of silence on all sides to supress. Why? Because there are a lot of political questions we need to answer. Are we seeking to restore the old censensus? Is it possible? What would it mean? What would a new view of collective responsibility be?

The great political success of current Government policy is the raising

of owner occupation to the level of the eleventh commandment. 'Thou shalt own thine own house.' I have spent considerable time since coming to Shelter analysing why home ownership has reached this position. As a homeowner I have not had to look far for the evidence. Home ownership gives you control over your house, it is financially the most attractive form of tenure both in the short and long term and it is a capital asset with no real equivalent. The Government finds it attractive for another reason. A property owning society is seen as the best bulwark against radical social change. International comparisons make this a somewhat dubious argument on empirical grounds but the fact that the Government believes it has been a major factor in its commitment to the extension of home ownership.

Home ownership has become so popular that we now have the highest level of home owners in the under 30 age group in Europe. (We also have a growing number of people unable to keep up mortgage payments but they are seen as failures and know how to keep quiet.) Home ownership for all is a delusion. The conditions which would have to exist for it to be possible are no less than a massive redistribution of resources between rich and poor, able bodied and disabled, young and old, i.e. the optimum conditions would require that everyone is rich enough to pay for their own housing and rich enough to provide it. A strange policy for a government committed to such glaring inequalities.

Home ownership does not work for the poor, the old, the young or single parents. Indeed, it does not work for about 40% of the population. If it was not so financially attractive or the options so unattractive it would not be the preferred solution of the young on grounds of mobility, the old in terms of upkeep costs, the single parent on the grounds of repair and general responsibility and perhaps at many other times in our lives if there were attractive alternatives.

But the alternatives get less appealing by the minute as council estates deteriorate, repairs do not get done, rents rise to new levels. Council rents in most areas have more than doubled since 1979. In four years between 1980-84 the number of tenants in receipt of housing benefit rose from 1.57 million to 4.87m.[5] The problems created by high rise and systems built estates are treated as individual council problems. They were the creation of central government policy and a generation of architects and planners, few of course, who now live in them. They are a collective social problem which we should all pay for.

But political reality is more stark. Home ownership is difficult to attack; public housing difficult to defend. This is a dangerous over-simplification but it remains the central stumbling block to a new approach to housing.

A new consensus means encouraging support across a wide spectrum of society for the view that there can be a collective solution to housing problems that will benefit everyone. Any such consensus will have to face up to a few basic facts. These are the minimum conditions for progress:

1. The end of the inequitable system of housing finance, including the

integration of subsidy to the three sectors, public, owner occupied, and private rented.
2. Massive investment in renewing the existing stock accepting that this is a collective social responsibility not the problem of an individual owner occupier or an individual council.
3. A completely reformed system of financing new building and the review of existing debt charges on public housing.

It is a dry prescription and not one on which it is easy to see politicians build an electorally successful campaign. Why? It is the wrong debate; the wrong consensus. Imagination comes before money and only a minority of policy makers will be interested in the details of housing finance. The first issue in politics is always: do people want what you are offering and secondly, do they believe you can deliver.

Fundamental to what is at issue in the debate is how we can give people what they want at a price they can afford to pay. Or is it? How *we* can *give* people what they want. Divide this into two issues. Who are 'we' and 'what do people want': 'we' is the 'housing department', 'we' are the housing lobby, the activists, and 'we', the Shelter campaign. Shelter and other organisations exist to compensate for the powerlessness of the constituency we purport to represent. How democratic is this 'we'? Is 'we' still predominantly white, middle class male and politically somewhere left of centre. Racism and sexism is not a problem *for* the voluntary movement. It is a problem *in* the voluntary movement.

How does political change take place? And what do people want? On one level this is a very simple question to answer. People want what you and I want. We want a house that is ours to control. We want the means to provide this for ourselves. This, to quote Colin Ward, is the first issue in housing, not an optional extra.[6] The challenge of the next two years is to develop a structure, a strategy and a policy to get it right next time. Whether or not we get a 'next time', to put a collectivist approach is an option even a pessimist can't bear to contemplate.

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NOTES

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# THE BISHOPS' PASTORAL LETTER: A CATHOLIC CITIZEN REPLIES

**by John F. Gaski**

THE pastoral letter* published in 1983 of the US Catholic bishops on War and Peace represents the official position of the United States Catholic hierarchy on issues of national defence, especially those pertaining to nuclear weaponry and warfare. One of the stated purposes of the letter is to arouse American Catholics to participate in the public debate on defence policy at a time of evident danger of conflict. As the bishops put it,

> This letter is... both an invitation and a challenge to Catholics in the United States to join with others in shaping the conscious choices and deliberate policies required in this 'moment of supreme crisis' (p. 2).*

Unconditional support for the 'nuclear freeze' is found in the bishops' recommendation for 'immediate, bilateral, verifiable agreements to halt the testing, production and deployment of new nuclear weapons systems' (p. 18).

With the statement 'we possess a power (nuclear weapons) which might be used if we do not reverse our direction' (p. 13), the bishops reveal their belief that an increase in such weaponry is associated with an increase in the danger of their use. Many people assume this as an 'article of faith.' Indeed, the bishops' literal statement is irrefutable. But it may be equally, or more, true that nuclear weapons might be used if we *do* reverse our direction. The bishops should ponder whether the use of nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union would be more or less likely, in light of the probable consequences, if each country possessed but ten, rather than ten thousand, warheads. If this question cannot be answered with certainty, then it is conceivable that an increase in nuclear weapons is compatible with an increase in security. In fact, the sole empirical evidence on the subject establishes that the only use of nuclear weapons in this planet's history occurred when a much smaller number of them existed.

Concerning the observation of a 'sharply increased awareness of the danger of the nuclear arms race' (p. 13), perhaps this has arisen as a result of the West's voluntary sacrifice of strategic superiority to an aggressive, belligerent, imperialistic, barbaric and hostile adversary, with an active proclivity for the use of force when having an advantage, whose proclaimed national objective involves, and requires, the destruction of the West.

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* 'The Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,' *Origins, NC Documentary Service*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (May 19, 1983). References to the letter are accompanied by parenthetical page citations, rather than footnoted, for simplicity.

Ultimately, the bishops, and most others, would prefer the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Of course, this hope is a chimera. One reality that cannot be erased is the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. Given the Soviets' and other nations' record of treachery and deceit, how long could they be expected to refrain from reconstructing their stockpiles in violation of any possible abolitionary agreement. Anyone who proposes on-site inspection as the answer had better be prepared continuously and eternally to survey every cubic metre of the earth's territory, above and below ground, as well as all of outer space. But perhaps even the universally-wished total eradication of nuclear weapons would not be so desirable as is believed. Considering the abiding hostility between the super-powers, and the number of crises since the end of World War II, how many global wars would have been fought between the United States and the Soviet Union since 1945 at the cost of how many millions of lives, had the deterrence of nuclear weapons not existed?

Apart from being hopelessly utopian, the bishops' position is unacceptable for very pragmatic reasons. It is irresponsible and dangerous for the bishops to fail to consider the impact of their own actions in a real-world context. Because of the differences between democratic and totalitarian societies, efforts to effect a nuclear freeze do have the potential to achieve some success in the Western democracies, where the public will is considered, but they do not have the potential to affect Soviet strategic policy. There have been rare instances in which Western public opinion has had limited impact on Soviet conduct, but never in the area of strategic policy. Therefore, the only possible outcome of the nuclear freeze movement would be to weaken the West relative to the Soviet Union. Considering the Soviets' proclaimed intention to achieve world domination by any means necessary, and their demonstrated affection for international violence, it should be self-evident that this course of action is intolerably dangerous.

The bishops severely criticise 'recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war,' recoiling at the moral unacceptability of actually preparing to wage and survive a nuclear exchange (pp. 13-14). But can there be a better deterrent to the initiation of nuclear war by an adversary than the ability to prevail in such a conflict? To respond to the obvious complaint here, of course there is no such thing as 'winning' a nuclear war by civilised Western standards. But since the leadership of the Soviet Union obviously lives by different standards, and would define 'victory' in nuclear war differently, we are impelled to meet the enemy on its own terms and be prepared to 'win' a nuclear war in the sense of denying it its objectives.

The bishops declare: 'We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare on however restricted a scale can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another state must be resisted by other than nuclear means' (p. 15). What this amounts to, among other things, is a prohibition against the neutron bomb (enhanced radiation weapon). This may be inadvisable for the following reasons:

1. The neutron bomb is strictly a defensive weapon. Its only conceivable purpose is the defence of Western Europe against Warsaw Pact invasion—to be used against invading forces on NATO territory without, at the same time, destroying domestic property and cities. If it were an offensive weapon, i.e. to be used on enemy territory, there would be no reason to restrict the weapon's destructive blast, as the neutron bomb does.

2. The argument has been advanced that the neutron bomb is an inhumane weapon. But this can be said about any lethal weapon of war. Frankly, it can also be argued that those forces who would commit aggression against the peaceful countries of Western Europe would also fully deserve the unique punishment of the neutron bomb.

3. One of the more persuasive arguments aginst deployment of the neutron bomb, superficially, at least, is that it would lower the threshold of nuclear war. That is, its initial use would be far more likely than that of strategic nuclear weapons, and such use would also be likely to provoke a strategic nuclear exchange.

In response to this, it should be recognised that no single event has greater potential to precipitate all-out nuclear war than a conventional war in Europe. Since the possession of the neutron bomb by NATO forces would deter the Warsaw Pact from initiating such a conflict, the neutron bomb actually has the effect of *raising* the threshold of nuclear war.

4. Perhaps the most powerful argument in favour of Western deployment of the neutron weapon, and the most ominously revealing of Soviet intentions, is the vehemence of the Soviet propaganda campaign against it. Since the neutron bomb is demonstrably a defensive rather than offensive weapon, for use within domestic rather than enemy territory, what possible objection could the Soviets have to its deployment unless they actually intend to invade Western Europe?

The bishops make much of the need to use only 'proportionate means' in warfare, acknowledging that 'peoples have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor' (p. 9). This invites a very fundamental question: Consider the horror that would result from Soviet achievement of world domination. Witness the Soviets' abusive, repressive treatment of their own people, their savage behaviour toward other peoples, of which there are abundant, and vivid, recent examples. Dwell on the suffering of humanity as it would groan under centuries, or a millenium, of Soviet totalitarian rule. The question is, is there any price that would be too high to prevent this outcome, any means that would be disproportionate—even the deaths of hundreds of millions of people in thermonuclear war? This is not to contest the sanctity of human life. Western society attaches a nearly supreme value to human life. But we do attest to even higher, spiritual values. To deny this, as the bishops are doing by designating nuclear war as the supreme horror, is to profess allegiance to the supremacy of corporal, material values.

Not too many years ago, while anguishing over the morality of war in the face of Viet Nam, the draft and my own pacifist inclinations, I myself questioned whether any cause was sufficient to justify the mass physical agony of warfare, even, perhaps, the defence of mankind against Hitler during World War II. Fortunately, more mature minds than mine had correctly answered that question in the affirmative. There certainly are some values that justify the prosecution of total war, even at the cost of millions of lives! Perhaps Christ Himself provides the relevant example here. If the sacrifice of even His life was the appropriate price for saving mankind from damnation, then perhaps the sacrifice of millions of innocent human lives would be justified to save even more lives from the living hell of Soviet world domination.

The bishops firmly and categorically condemn the use of nuclear weapons 'for the purpose of destroying population centres' (p. 15). Further:

> Retaliatory action, whether nuclear or conventional, which would indiscriminately take many wholly innocent lives, . . . must also be condemned (p. 15).

On this issue, the bishops do consider the 'sanctuary' argument but without dealing with it adequately. The problem is, what if an adversary purposely locates war-making facilities in population centres to protect them from attack by a nation that observes the bishops' advice that 'it is not morally acceptable to intend to kill the innocent as part of a strategy of deterring nuclear war' (p. 17)? Since millions of innocent lives surely would be lost in an attack on Soviet military targets clustered in populated areas, acceptance of the bishops' doctrine by the United States would have the effect of completely emasculating our deterrent capability. And the bishops make it clear that that is what they require:

> The location of industrial or militarily significant economic targets within heavily populated areas or in those areas affected by radioactive fallout could well involve such massive civilian casualties that in our judgment such a strike would be deemed morally disproportionate (p. 18).
>
> It would be a perverted political policy or moral casuistry which tried to justify using a weapon which 'indirectly' or 'unintentionally' killed a million innocent people because they happened to live near a 'militarily significant target' (p. 19).

What the bishops unequivocally demand is unilateral disarmament with respect to nuclear weapons (although they claim not to, p. 20):

> A nuclear response to either conventional or nuclear attack can cause destruction which goes far beyond 'legitimate defense'. Such use of nuclear weapons would not be justified (p. 16).

Since the history, particularly the recent history, of Soviet military conduct, along with the Leninist doctrine of world domination by any means necessary, makes it implausible that the Soviets would willingly abide by the US bishops' instruction, implementation of it by our side (the bishops' intended audience) would place the population of the United States in grave danger. Of course, it would greatly reduce the risk for the Soviet population.

This point demands further scrutiny. For the US bishops to accept so complacently such a reckless, non-symmetrical position is rather startling. Let us not mince words. They advocate a policy that would conspicuously, and mortally, endanger the entire US population while protecting the

Soviet Union. Actual implementation of it, being tantamount to unilateral disarmament, would render the United States virtually defenceless against an adversary that has shown little mercy toward those in similar position.

There are a number of occasions in the bishops' letter where arguments are presented that, to say the least, appear somewhat illogical.

The bishops' presumption 'that all sane people prefer peace, never *want* to initiate war' (p. 10) is analytically false, and may go a long way towards explaining the fundamental error of their position. The proper reply to their statement is: Not if the conditions associated with war are valued more than those associated with peace! Sanity, rationality, merely means acting in one's self-interest, or maximising utility.

The admonition that a government may not act to defend its people until 'every means of peaceful settlement has been exhausted' (p. 8) is excessive and dangerous. If an aggressor has made the decision to initiate war, while the peace-seeking nation continues assiduously to contemplate non-violent alternatives per the bishops' advice, this may allow the aggressor to solidify its position to the extent that it can inflict more damage and achieve victory.

The bishops' acknowledgement that they are not technical experts in these matters may be an understatement. The authors of the bishops' letter undermine their credibility further with the following tendentious misrepresentation, '... billions readily spent for destructive instruments while pitched battles are waged daily in our legislatures over much smaller amounts for the homeless, the hungry and the helpless' (p. 14). Actually, the US defence spending as a percentage of the federal budget and GNP has declined, while social spending has exploded over the past 20 and 30 years.

On a number of occasions in the letter the bishops decry the lack of 'any central authority' (pp. 4, 13, 30) in the world, 'with effective power to safeguard, on behalf of all, security, regard for justice, and respect for rights' (p. 8). Of course, such power is tantamount to, and can only come from, war-making capability, which the bishops deplore. Although the bishops desire freedom from the nuclear threat, ultimately the abolition of nuclear weapons, it is difficult to imagine any force short of a nuclear capability on the part of a central world authority that would be sufficient to enforce such a condition.

The confidence the bishops place in institutions and conventions such as the United Nations and the Helsinki agreement (p. 21) as the saviours of the world is nothing short of astonishing. Examples of their abject trust include:

> We regret the apparent unwillingness of some to see in the United Nations organisation the potential for world order (p. 10).
>
> We urge that prohibitions outlawing the production and use of chemical and biological weapons be reaffirmed and observed (p. 20).
>
> ... ongoing negotiations for mutual, balanced, force reductions, the prospects for which are certainly not dim ... (p. 21).
>
> We turn to our own government and we beg it to propose to the United

Nations that it begin this work immediately; that it create an international task force for peace (p. 30).

In general, the bishops' recommendations are pitifully naïve and utopian. They include:

. . . disarmament, ratification of pending treaties, development of non-violent alternatives (p. 19).

. . . periodic, carefully prepared meetings (between the US and USSR) (p. 20).

Nations must accept a limited view of those interests justifying military force (p. 20).

We hope that a significant reduction in numbers of conventional arms and weaponry would go hand in hand with diminishing reliance on nuclear deterrence (p. 21).

. . . the arts of diplomacy, negotiation, and compromise must be developed (p. 21).

Non-violent means of resistance to evil deserve more study (p. 21).

Citizens would be trained in the techniques of peaceable non-compliance and non-co-operation as a means of hindering an invading force or non-democratic government from imposing its will (p. 21).

The goal is winning the other over, making the adversary a friend (p. 21).

. . . replacement of military by negotiated solutions (p. 23).

. . . disarmament of the human heart and the conversion of the human spirit to God (p. 26).

. . . reading of scripture and devotion to the rosary, . . . contemplative prayer (p. 27).

(We) encourage every Catholic to make the sign of peace at Mass (p. 27).

. . . prayer, penance and almsgiving for peace (p. 27).

We call upon our people voluntarily to do penance on Friday by eating less food and by abstaining from meat. This . . . should be accompanied by works of charity and service toward our neighbours (p. 27).

Though some people erroneously apply the 'separation of church and state' doctrine as a prohibition against such political activity, the areas of politics and morality overlap to such a degree that certain political issues, such as nuclear war, are proper subjects for the Catholic bishops to consider. It is only their method of address, and its outcome, that are questionable.

First, the bishops display a rather offensive moral arrogance. There is the revelation that they 'are called to be peacemakers . . . by our Lord Jesus' (p. 30). People like Ernest Angley, Jim Jones and the Ayatollah Khomeini teach us to be wary of those who claim to receive their instructions directly from God Almighty.

Another concern is the intellectual quality of argumentation in the bishops' letter. Surely, many American Catholics, irrespective of agreement or disagreement with the bishops' politics, would have been 'rooting' for them to produce at least a respectable document.

In sum, the US bishops offer a position that differs very little from conventional pacifism. They agree with the rest of us that nuclear war is not a good idea. Yet their response to this abiding danger is to reduce the issue to an extreme form of unilateral disarmament and, ultimately, surrender. Considering the nature of the Soviet Union, which would be the principal beneficiary of their policy were it to be adopted by the United States, this would constitute a repudiation of the basic moral and religious values the bishops claim to support.

But while the bishops' position has been rejected so categorically, it is incumbent on this author to specify an alternative policy. Fortunately, there is one that comes recommended by a substantial amount of empirical evidence.

For the first 30 to 35 years following World War II the United States enjoyed strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. During that period of approximately ten thousand days, the world managed to avoid a nuclear war while the United States had strategic superiority. Maybe the perfect correlation over those ten thousand cases was just a coincidence. Maybe it is also a coincidence that during the past few years, when the United States has accepted a position of, at best, strategic equivalence, the danger of global war has increased to the point of tangibility. And maybe not. But the available evidence suggests that, for the purpose of avoiding nuclear war, American military pre-eminence (and, implictly, the will to use it) is the desirable condition. Perhaps this derives from the differences in aims between US and USSR?

Naturally, a policy of continued strategic superiority would come at a high price, but not as high as is commonly supposed. Because the strategic component represents such a small fraction of the US defence budget, it has been estimated that even an all-out arms race would only increase American total military spending by 30%—a lot of money but not unaffordable in relation to total federal spending or GNP.

Unfortunately, it appears to be necessary to expand whatever resources are required to assure strategic superiority over the Soviet Union until either of two conditions evolves: (1) Nuclear weapons are neutralised, rendered useless by technological advances in forms of defensive weaponry, such as laser or particle-beam weapons, or (2) an advancement in the human spiritual condition occurs, manifested by the emergence of a new generation of Soviet leadership that is civilised enough to abandon its aggressive aims.

If the bishops get their way, we may not be around to see how it all works out!

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# A NEW ASSESSMENT OF DENTON WELCH: PART III: A VOICE THROUGH A SHROUD

## by Richard Whittington-Egan

THE funeral panegyrics which had greeted *A Voice Through a Cloud* echoed on. C. P. Snow wrote in the *Sunday Times* of March 19th, 1950:

> Sadness hangs over us all as we write of Denton Welch. His great gift as a writer was his ability to immerse himself completely in the sensuous moment. His great gift was also a limitation: the moments of sensation were so vivid that he could imagine nothing else. The spirit that drove Denton Welch to go on with this book rouses one's admiration as much as his art. It was a spirit which resembles that of another brave man—Barbellion's in *The Journal of a Disappointed Man*—though Welch had more sweetness than Barbellion and lacked the blaze of Barbellion's masculine pride. Welch was the finer artist.

On March 31st, 1950, *The Times Literary Supplement* pronounced:

> The murmur of 'genius' has already been raised. At times, reading these strange, dazzling pages . . . it is easy to understand why . . . *A Voice Through a Cloud* is an extraordinarily impressive achievement. Strange, original and disquieting images are threaded upon a style so compact and assured, the whole effect is so much one of effortless brilliance that it might be easy to overlook the remarkable nature of the achievement altogether were it not for the brief, moving forward in which Mr. Eric Oliver . . . describes the circumstances in which most of the book was written. . . . 'Towards the end he could only work for three or four minutes at a time and then he would get a raging headache and his eyes would more or less give out.' . . . But perhaps the most remarkable achievement of all is the dispassionate manner in which he follows the course of his own illness, aware of every swiftly changing nuance in the obscure chemical wrestling match between mind and body, and prepared to struggle on with his lucid record at the lowest ebb of despair. . . . To try to guess what such a writer might have produced had he lived is always a dangerous hazard, and never more so than in the case of Denton Welch, who embarked upon his first book fully armed with literary gifts, and whose succeeding books impress the reader not so much by any development of new potentialities, but by a patient, scrupulous refining of those he already possessed. No one who reads *A Voice Through a Cloud* will fail to see in his early death a grievous loss to English literature.

And, in the *Daily Herald*, dear bumbly old John Betjeman's impulsive 'considered opinion' declared *A Voice Through a Cloud* to be 'without doubt, a work of genius.'

Emboldened, perhaps, by the scatterings broadcast of such late-flowering superlatives, John Lehmann Ltd. bustled into print in the spring of 1951 with *A Last Sheaf*. It was a veritable miscellany or hotchpotch of Welchiana —stories, essays, sketches, poems, a fragmentary novella, even photographic reproductions of Nine Paintings by Denton Welch.

The sharp eye of Angus Wilson thought to descry in it a 'vision of adolescence.' He wrote:

> The posthumous stories and unfinished novel of Denton Welch recall nostalgically a period of more personal writing which, although it was only yesterday, is rapidly vanishing into history. . . . His work was filled with an unique and persistent personal note which could enchant, infuriate and even repel, but could never bore or flatten the reader. He lived, probably, on a past vision, a vision of his adolescence, but though this narrowed the compass of his work, it

was so intense an experience of life that it coloured and shaped the whole world for him . . . His painting, perhaps, showed only his fantasy, his poems only his tenderness and wit, but in the unfinished chapters of novels there are clear signs that, although the pool of his talent was narrow and smooth, it had still greater depths, which his unhappy death will never allow us to plumb.

*The Times Literary Supplement's* anonymous reviewer echoed the Wilsonian theme:

No one of Welch's generation has caught more vividly the green sickness of adolescence, with its boredom, its betrayals, its devastating insights, and, perhaps most of all, its dreadful cactus patches of embarrassment. . . . He has a flair (one is reminded curiously of both Mr. Betjeman and Mr. Angus Wilson) for perceiving, beneath the dull, well-regulated surface of English life, the little secret glints of dedicated madness.

Towards the end of the following year—1952—*The Denton Welch Journals*, Edited and With an Introduction by Jocelyn Brooke, was published by Hamish Hamilton.

Cyril Connolly wrote:

I have read every word of this long book with increasing delight, I have blotted out wind and rain, age and infirmity, anxiety and want in the recesses of his keen, bright, fresh, sensuous thought-stream and lived happily behind his mischievous observant eyes. . . . Our foreknowledge of his death (a few weeks after the journal breaks off in 1948) illuminates many of the trivial entries with a lyrical underglaze as poignant as the becalmed sadness of the exquisite idling creatures in the dying Watteau's 'Halt During the Chase'. . . . One is never conscious of hard work and erasures: his style ripens like an October pear that measures every hour of sunshine against the inevitable frost. . . . Denton Welch had some of the clairvoyance of genius and a little of the terrible malice of the sick, he glimpsed the appalling vulgarity inseparable from rude health except in the bodies of the Housmanesque farm labourers . . . Otherwise he was a very old-fashioned young man. . . . Mr. Jocelyn Brooke compares him to Firbank. I am also reminded of Barbellion, Katherine Mansfield, Mr. E. M. Forster. Mid-Kent, half suburban, half huge romantic park, is delineated in all weathers with careless affection, curious people come and go, we find ourselves in a bright microcosm of childhood . . .

Vita Sackville-West, reviewing, unsigned, in *The Times Literary Supplement*, wrote:

What a natural writer he was! Utterly underivative, he was from the very first a master of the flashing phrase, with a power of sudden illumination which sprang from the sheer intensity of his own perception. Words were merely the clothes of his thought.

For a variety of reasons—many of them prudent considerations of liability in tort—the 1952 edition of the journals presented a very scant selection from the original nineteen-exercise-book manuscript. Thirty-two years were to elapse before Michael De-la-Noy gave us the journals in full, but in 1958 an additional section, a complete-in-itself, 35,000-word account of the 1933 West Country walking tour, was privately published in two separate limited editions under the cumbrous title *I Left My Grandfather's House*. That also had to wait another twenty-six years before Michael De-la-Noy provided a generally available edition.

The publicaion, on May 9th, 1963, by Chapman & Hall, of *Denton Welch: Extracts From His Published Works*, Edited, with an Introduction, by Jocelyn Brooke, supplied an interim, as it were, period, fifteen postmortem years on, for detached, unsentimental second bites at the critical

cherry. An opportunity to consider the overall *oeuvres.* Colin MacInnes wrote that:

> The acutest nostalgia for lost youth comes in late youth itself; for though middle age may bring affection for the young, it cannot recapture the pain the young themselves feel when their own youth vanishes. The analysis of this tender agony is the chief theme of the five books and journals of Denton Welch. . . . At times, the author's voice is somewhat prim, like a bright-eyed censorious child's, and throughout there is often a curiously bourgeois flavour, as if these books were written in the twenties at the latest, not two decades later. Nor can I personally enjoy an occasional post-Pre-Raphaelite mood which reminds me of that morbid masterpiece, Alain Fournier's *Le Grand Meaulnes.* . . . Despite over excited and emphatic overtones, Denton Welch was an acute, astringent and far from 'literary' writer. Even in passages of nightmare, seeming as if mescalin-induced, his brain is sharp and economical, his heart open and self-aware. To read him is to hear an unmistakably individual voice, far graver than its superficial shrillness may at first suggest.

Jeremy Brooks found the *Journals*

> flawed with preciosity, self-absorption, the narcissistic obsessions of inversion. [He says]: Of his daydreams, Welch writes: 'Everything was made in my image, and I was a sort of small god, keeping carefully within his own territory'. Of meeting people: 'I hated the thought of an old man. It spelt dirt and bad temper to me. With women it was different. I felt that, whatever they were like, some part of them was human and could be reached.' . . . Welch was a miniaturist, a small master of a small world—but a master, nevertheless.

L. P. Hartley noticed that Denton was 'chiefly concerned with his own reaction to experience. He nearly always wrote in the first person. . . . He was his own subject. But that did not make for easy writing. He was careful and scrupulous in his use of words: the effect of spontaneity he seems to achieve so effortlessly was really achieved by very hard work.' And Hartley identifies Denton's 'tingling absorption in the sensation or impression of the moment.'

Richard Mayne admits that it is 'difficult to read Welch's writings with fresh and responsive attention, and to strike a just balance between impatience of past critical excesses and appreciation of whatever virtues endure.' He points out that 'At a distance of twenty years, one's tempted to approach these qualities with less eagerness than in the days of rationing: the Forties, after all, were also the years of the 'New Apocalypse' or Old Surrealism writ juicy.' He remarks on the homosexual theme:

> Time and again, the author describes tingling and timid encounters with splendid specimens of manhood: he shares a barn with a tramp; he has his back scrubbed by a Canadian doctor; he massages a skiing companion; he spies on some horseplay between a young man and two boys. 'Nothing', as they say, 'happens': but this fact in its way is just as maddening, because the final impression is that of a convent gush. . . . My own complaint against Welch would be that his honesty sometimes failed him, and that he overplayed his own childlike simplicity. This is the real source of irritation, I think, in some stories and in *Maiden Voyage:* it's less apparent in the *Journals,* and it's scarcely at all evident in *A Voice Through a Cloud* . . . Unless one has read this work, and unless one knows the facts that it reveals, it's very easy to do Denton Welch grave injustice both as a writer and as a man. . . . Normally, the life of a writer has little bearing on the examination of his work. One thinks no less, and no more, of Pope for his deformity, of Keats for his tuberculosis, of W. H. Davies for his missing foot. Posterity is cruel: it judges by the written record. But sometimes the record may be illumined by biographical facts; and there are those who'd claim that a tuber-

cular condition, for example, adds a kind of nostalgic clarity to its victim's descriptions of the sun and air and normality that he craves. Myself, I think one senses this in Denton Welch: it adds a dimension to his otherwise cloying descriptions of healthy young men, and it explains not only his nostalgia for childhood, but also the minuteness of his curiously magnified vision, and the vivid sensuous delight he took in *objets d'art.* Consumption makes magpies of us all.

Denton, of course, suffered tubercular complications in the later stages of his life. Mayne continues:

Spiteful, silly, snobbish, and sometimes modish, much of Denton Welch's writing annoys me considerably. I don't share his tastes, and I only fitfully admire his bird-bright vision. What makes him a considerable writer despite these reservations is not the genuine pathos of his situation, but the use he made of it in *A Voice Through a Cloud.*

Jocelyn Brooke himself writes in his Introduction to his Selection of Extracts:

During the last half-century English writing has, I believe, suffered more than it has gained from the growing sophistication of the reading public. There has been an increasing tendency, among serious writers, to conform to certain critical standards, and to adopt those moral or philosophical attitudes which happen to be fashionable at the moment. Above all, the writer has become—as Denton Welch recognised—excessively self-conscious, and liable to conceal or disguise the emotional sources of his inspiration, from a fear of being written off as naïve or exhibitionist. Denton Welch never succumbed to this temptation: though in some respects very sophisticated, he was basically, I think, a *naïf*; and he was convinced—quite rightly—that he must have the courage of his own naïveté. It is this blend of subtlety and simplicity, of the worldly and the childlike, which gives his writing its peculiar and highly original flavour. For Denton Welch, whether one admires him or not, was a true original: his work is remarkably free from obvious literary influences, and this might lead one to suppose that he was less well read than was in fact the case. His style is what Cyril Connolly would call 'anti-mandarin', he never indulges in fine writing, nor uses a long word where a short one will do, and he makes free use of slang and colloquialisms. Though he cared greatly for literary values, he might also be described as anti-literary, for to him Life was more important than Art; he had something to say, and the manner in which he said it was of secondary importance. His every utterance has an air of being entirely natural and spontaneous . . . This off-hand, colloquial manner occasionally reminds one of Christopher Isherwood, but the resemblance is only superficial: Denton Welch has none of Isherwood's glib, self-protective detachment, he makes no pretence of being a mere camera-eye. His observation of the world about him is exact and true, but heightened, nearly always, by a deeply imaginative perception of what lies beneath the surface.

Shrewdly analysing Denton Welch's literary artistry, Brooke points out that he 'makes us feel the precise atmosphere, the "inscape" of the place he is describing without ever resorting to a deliberately poetic or "evocative" diction. He achieves this, I think, chiefly by his selection of significant or suggestive details. He was by nature unusually observant, and he seems to have made a conscious effort to cultivate the faculty.'

His was a world where a discarded eggshell could assume the significance of a madeleine; where the antler-branched, black treacle ponds of his mind fought against the dying of his day. And he peopled that world with a gallimaufry of cordial grotesques and passing friends: no matter that some were bronzed and golden-downed of torso.

If asked to name the writer with whom Denton has the closest affinity,

Brooke would:

> without hesitation say D. H. Lawrence. I do not, of course, mean that Denton Welch is in the least *like* Lawrence, nor am I suggesting that he is a writer of comparable stature . . . yet his attitude to art and life is basically the same as Lawrence's, in that it implies an habitual affirmation of human values and a profound respect for the individual. As much as Lawrence, Denton Welch loathed the industrialised society in which he lived, and the increasing predominance of the intellect over the instinctive life of the body. . . . His most notable gift, perhaps, was for capturing and fixing the minor and more transient pleasures that came his way, and he is an adept at portraying what Cyril Connolly has called 'the beauty of the moment, the gaiety and sadness, the fugitive distress of hedonism' (Mr. Connolly's words refer to Ronald Firbank, with whom, again though no two writers could be more dissimilar—Denton Welch has certain affinities). He had, above all else, a faculty for making one see familiar things with a heightened vividness . . .

That last judgment is one which Eric Oliver has independently formulated. In the course of the many and long conversations which he and I have shared, it is surprising—and to no one more so than to Eric Oliver himself—to find the persistent influence which, thirty-seven years on, still flows from his relationship with Denton. It still dictates to a considerable extent the colour of his seeing.

There is a wistfulness come into his eye, though. The mirror shows him a man of seventy. But the twin image in the mirror of his mind reflects back a Denton who did painfully achieve his ambition to stay the clock. *He* was then, is now, and always will be a curly-haired young man of thirty-three, fixed in the eye of Time.

Watching the suffering of Denton Welch, Eric Oliver felt, he told me, himself also to be doomed. He misunderstood. He was not to die young like Denton. He was doomed—to live on . . . alone . . . waiting . . .

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[Part IV in the series, 'A New Assessment of Denton Welch: Shells and Fishbones' by Richard Whittington-Egan, will be published in a later issue.]

# GLADSTONE IN PERSON

## by Eric Glasgow

NOW that Asa Briggs and the Harvester Press, of Sussex, have issued a new edition of Lionel A. Tollemache's *Talks With Mr. Gladstone*, edited by Asa Briggs, which was first published in 1903, we can have no excuse for neglecting these vivid and personal glimpses of the 'G.O.M.' of Victorian politics. History, after all, is most interesting and significant when we recollect, not what happened, but what people said about it when it was happening; and in that important respect, this newly-edited volume of the varied sayings of Gladstone, made at home and abroad, must be permitted to renew their meaning and their relevance.

There is not much here about 'the political Gladstone.' Instead, we are supplied with very many insights about the great man's personal attitudes and opinions; and these can only be refreshing and stimulating as they must always bring us closer to Gladstone the man. They relate chiefly to Gladstone in England, between 1856 and 1870; and then, after 1890, to Gladstone, more particularly on holiday in Biarritz (where he went in 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894, and 1895-96).

Gladstone, in 1856, was at the very beginning of his political career. He had still not entirely jettisoned many of the ideas of his earlier Toryism. Thus, as he told the young Tollemache, he was not yet convinced that aristocracy in England was bound to give way to democracy. Gladstone seems to have advanced towards the latter view, as in the Reform Bill of 1884, more by pragmatic stages than by systematic or theoretical arguments. Eventually, he became the 'People's Champion,' because the political circumstances required it: especially after 1868. Previously, if we may judge from this book, 'he thought that the feudal sentiment and traditions were deeply rooted in England.'

In retrospect, too, he could cast doubts and reservations concerning his 'somewhat romantic mission to Greece' in 1858-59. He was sent there in order to try to resolve the nationalist unrest in the British Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, where, since 1848, there had been a growing agitation for union with Greece. Although this eventually occurred (in 1864), Gladstone proposed at that time only an unsatisfactory compromise of Liberal administration. He was still very much bemused by his Homeric Studies, first published in 1858, on the eve of his departure for the Ionian Islands. These had been, rather unfairly, dismissed as 'mere nonsense' by Benjamin Jowett (1817-1893), at Oxford. Nevertheless, it was very much in the Homeric light that Gladstone saw the Ionian Islands—Ithaca, Corfu and Cephalonia among them—and that it was scarcely before 1870 that Gladstone even began to appreciate the modernity as well as the antiquity of Greece: in its language and its literature, as well as its politics and its statecraft.

Even his studious and metriculous Boswell—Lionel A. Tollemache—conceded that Gladstone, on the occasion of his rather futile Ionian Islands mission, 'appeared to think that the old Greek type of countenance still

lingered in Continental Greece more than is commonly supposed.' He would not even accept the authority of the historian, Gibbon, to the contrary. He added that, when he was in Corfu, he 'had never witnessed anywhere else such complete and contented idleness.' He had himself seen 'three men leisurely occupied in driving two turkeys along the road.'

Gladstone was by no means an uncritical libertarian. Thus, although he rejected the institution of slavery, during the American Civil War (1861-1865), he was also fearful of the economic and social difficulties attendant upon its abolition in the Southern States: as it turned out, with good reasons.

Tollemache provides us here with exceptional opportunities to encounter Gladstone's views as a student alike of the Classics and of theology. 'He felt himself in heaven when he was breathing the pure atmosphere of Homer.' We all know, however, that Gladstone's Homer turned out to be a somewhat misleading and idolatrous pursuit and concept. In his theology, he was, of course, profoundly orthodox; so that, even at Hawarden, it was inadvisable to allude overmuch to innovation or to heresy.

Even in his literary scholarship, Gladstone indulged overmuch in 'the oratical faculty.' It impeded, to some extent, his 'mastery of details.' But, throughout, he had 'an abnormal, if not morbid, intensity of purpose.' 'Whatsoever his mind or his head found to do, he did it with his might. The result was that his intellect grew to be like a giant oak, wanting in pliancy by reason of its massive strength. His difficulty in sympathising with opponents was measured by his unfaltering conviction—a conviction as intense as that of St. Paul or of Savonarola—that his own cause was the cause of God.' Even in quite trivial matters, Gladstone frequently took a high-handed and serious line. 'He will talk about a piece of old china as if he was standing before the judgment-seat of God.'

What his observer, Tollemache, outstandingly discerned about Gladstone was his 'intensity.' It could mislead, as well as inform and illuminate. It was also the gift of the orator; and that could often be hostile to a desirable and philosophical calm. Too often, Gladstone acted, and even wrote, in a 'white-hot fever.' But it was perhaps the very basis of his religious faith: it made him scorn cynicism and scepticism of all sorts, and speak very severely of Talleyrand, and even of Matthew Arnold. 'It was necessary to keep alive the sense of sin.' Such wholesale introduction of religion into politics was both remarkable and exceptional, even in Victorian England. It is very much more so today. Yet, for Gladstone, it was the essential ingredient of both his personality and his political quest; and it is also the one which is the most distinctively and singularly disclosed in the pages of Tollemache's book. Elsewhere, of course, we can read in abundance about Gladstone the politician. That is the chief theme and preoccupation of John Morley's great biography of him. The latter, indeed, was specifically warned by the Gladstone family, after 1898, not to attempt to survey Gladstone's religious life in any detail. Therefore, it is Gladstone as the Christian statesman who must still remain as the enigma to be explored and evaluated for future generations of historians. Meanwhile, however, it is readily possible to

extricate from even the fragmentary remarks and statements in Tollemache's book the rudiments of the religious and personal life of Gladstone, which may well be deemed to be, in the end, even more memorable and significant than the outward and visible forms and expressions of his political career.

Gladstone in person, therefore, becomes altogether a more lucid and authentic theme than many of the convolutions of his political career. Politics, indeed, provided a centrality for Gladstone's life and work which has often been overrated to the detriment of adequate consideration of other facets of his life and his mind. Here, at any rate, we may readily discern Gladstone in privacy. It can never be a useless or an uninteresting quest, even for professional historians. Gladstone merges from these resilient and honest pages as a figure of abiding greatness indeed, but also as a very vibrant, even sometimes perplexed and perplexing, human being. It is the sheer humanity of that massive Victorian past which is in the end both relevant and instructive.

Tollemache supplies his readers with only a very episodic and scattered survey of Gladstone's conversations. Perhaps we should expect nothing more from him? It is not a professional or exhaustive history. Thus, there are huge gaps in his story: for example, between 1870 (during the first enthusiasms of 'Liberal England'), and 1890, when Gladstone, in his old age, began to frequent Biarritz, and so became easily available for leisured comment and talk. At the latter European resort, Gladstone was at his ease and remarkably responsive. 'His only complaint against Biarritz was that the society was too exclusively English.' He was still reading widely; he regarded the English literature of the nineteenth-century as 'quite extraordinary.'

He attributed his good health partly to his habit of masticating his food twenty times. He had brought up his children to do the same, although the ritual was undoubtedly a bar to conversation. He also regarded his observance of Sunday as a day of rest among his own rules for the preservation of physical well-being and had acquired the habit of keeping his mind off politics while he was in bed.

He was already bemused by the Parliamentary rejection of his plan of 'Home Rule' for Ireland (1886 and 1893). It was bound to come, sooner or later, as Tollemache puts it; 'People will have a difficulty in understanding the state of mind which postponed the carrying out of it so long.'

Gladstone, for all his profound admiration of Shakespeare, did not deny that the dramatist had been a worshipper of Tudor despotism. Late in his life he was still studying Horace. 'He found that he could write Latin verses at least as well at sixty as when he was a young man.' It was not a case of all passion spent. Even in his old age, Gladstone 'wished above all things to keep up righteous indignation.' So it was that, as late as the year 1895, he waxed eloquent against the 'massacres' in Turkish Armenia.

He was already thinking about the forthcoming changes in education and did not deny that the ascendancy of the Classics, as in the first half of the nineteenth century, had gone for ever. 'I believe that science will be the

great instrument of education in the future,' he declared. He attacked the Americans for not being sufficiently aware of the responsibilities of wealth.

'I used to think the Irish the most oppressed people on earth; but now I think that the Jews have been even more oppressed. I believe that Dollinger wrote in favour of the Jews and I thought it very creditable of him to do so.' 'I am a great admirer of the old Olympian religion, as it was set forth by the supreme genius of Homer. It was quite different in the hands of the later Greeks; and the mythology of the Roman poets serves as an opaque curtain which hides it from us.' These are just a few of his relevant and interesting expressions of opinion.

*Talks With Mr. Gladstone* ends in 1896: two years before Gladstone's death. It covers an extraordinary diversity of themes and topics, literary, cultural, theological, and political. Tollemache leaves us with an instructive impression of Gladstone's greatness and his unique range of knowledge and interests.

As these conversations were being concluded, the Victorian Age was approaching its end. Gladstone himself lamented the decline in standards (literary as well as political). He was not destined to live into the twentieth century, the social and cultural implications of which he already anticipated and deplored. Such was, perhaps, the inevitable price of 'progress'.

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# HOMAGE TO BARCELONA

## by Philip Vann

THE study of the history of art of the first half of this century has been decidedly 'Parisocentric'. The innovative experiments of the Modern Movement, as epitomised by, say, Picasso, Miro and Picabia have been absorbed into our collective cultural bloodstream and labelled (irrevocably it would first appear) 'Made in Paris'. This trinity of artistic radicals was not chosen, it must now be said, at random, for Picasso spent much of his early manhood living, studying and painting in Barcelona; Miro trained from 1907-15 at the School of Fine Art and the Academy Cali in that city; and Picabia dreamt up there, provocatively, much of his own avant-gardism for avant-gardism's sake. As the exhibition 'Homage to Barcelona' at the Hayward Gallery, London, makes abundantly clear, even in the provinces of modernism an important contribution was made to what we now take for granted as its capital splendour.

It is not just modernism which is contemplated in this affectionate but broadly inclusive homage. It is the history of Barcelona consciousness, from the time of the Universal Exhibition of 1888 to the outbreak of Civil War in 1936. The Gallery has been transformed. Its antiseptic spaces have been partly tiled and divided by lemon yellow walkways. On entrance, we are faced with a 1/10 scale model of two nave bays of Antoni Gaudi's 'Church of the Sagrada Familia'. This structure in white plaster, of a fantastic nature, partly Gothic, partly Catalan folkish, partly elementary crystalline, is the playful yet serious antithesis of its drab, temporary host.

There are several names which emerge strongly from a welter of Barcelonian figures. Each possessed something of genius, though in the cases of the latter two it was more like a creative genius for publicity: Gaudi, Casas, Nonell, Picasso, Miro, Torres-Garcia, Picabia and Dali.

Late nineteenth century Barcelona, reaping the rewards of its industrial expansion, had become the most worldly and popularly liberal city in Spain. The new confident upper-middle classes were eager for their own distinctive art and architecture. Parisian Art Nouveau and Viennese Secessionism undoubtedly contributed to the remarkable nascence of Barcelonian architecture, but there is a quality intrinsically Catalan—free spirited, organically decorative—in the works of Gaudi, Domenech and Puig. It is odd that Gaudi was ostensibly the most Carlist and reactionary of men, when to us his creations—(including a chair exhibited here which would accommodate its occupant like robust giant petals, and his designs for the benches in Park Guell whose carved confines of splintered tiles reveal a folk art inventiveness and imaginativeness)—have effectively re-interpreted Barcelona in a childlike, pre-Surrealist way, with perfect assurance in their intellectual aims and materials.

The exhibition gives us the chance to assess the two best known

Modernista (not in the equivalent sense we know by 'modernist') painters: Ramon Casas (1866-1932) and Santiago Rusinol (1861-1931). They were the rebellious artistic bourgeois of their day who were influenced by the subject matter and, less, by the style of French Impressionism. In his unusual perspectives on bohemian life and the portrayal of charming and often blatant ugliness, Rusinol manifests the influence of Degas. His quiet interiors are moving but the pseudo-pious personified figures, the other 'half' of his work, move us mainly to irritation.

Casas' portraits and interiors have an air of sad distinction but it is his modern historical works—atypical of his overall *oeuvre*—which excite, indeed amaze us today. 'The Garroting' (1894) and the 1898 depiction of a Corpus Christ procession are major, subtle, monumentally composed pictures. In the first of these, a sketchy figure awaits, or is in fact undergoing, excecution in the midst of a great courtyard. The ceremonial guards standing nearby by in black conical hoods and the slight smudgy smokiness in the air create a morally murky atmosphere. Most effective is the painting of the crowd of onlookers at the front. Quick, darting brushstrokes convey their tensed enjoyment. Dreadful in this scene of dread is one moustachioed face, ferociously attentive, picked out from the general surge of people, the swell of brushstrokes. Another face, singled out, is of a bescarved woman, lock of hair on forehead, turning away from the spectacle. Does she pale away in disgust, in pity, or simply to talk bloodcurdlingly with the spectators behind? We do not know.

Isidre Nonell, the discovery of the show for many, died, relatively unknown, at the age of 35 in 1911. He had exhibited at *Els Quatre Gats*, a cafe on which centred much of the city's artistic activity and which spawned significant avant-garde art journals. The final effect of his work is one of a grand, at times remote, Spanish, and specifically Catalan querencia. 'Two Gypsy Women' (1913) consists of two modulated blocs of colour, one warm terracotta red, the other a very black green.

There was another artist who reputedly created the 'Sign for Els Quatre Gats' (two staring cats, as manic as any by Louis Wain!) and has since more than 'proved' himself. The Blue Picasso. Influenced by the symbolism of Puvis de Chavannes and by his friend Nonell's compassionate art, Picasso painted the poor, bathed, exposed and assuaged by blue light. These works do remind us of the other side of Barcelona, the want that co-existed alongside the vigorous culture of the prosperous. Picasso's early works are famous; Nonell should be better known as his equal of this period.

Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism and all the other -isms reached Barcelona between 1912-18. Diaghilev's Ballet presented 'Parade' in the city in 1917. The giant 'Construction for American Manager', on show here—with its huge extended arms carrying a megaphone, the cylinder black top hat, the backdrop of painted skyscrapers and bunting—coheres (in a way that Hockney's pastiche of Picasso's Parade shown earlier this year at the Hayward does not) and announce to us, at an amplified volume, the spirit of New World modernity.

The early Miro is represented here—a primitive, van Goghian Fauve. The presence of Salvador Dali in Barcelona was pervasive from 1925, although he studied, exhibited and polemized there only intermittently. He is an easy target to belittle, but as time goes on his surrealist vision appears increasingly empty and synthetic. 'Soft Construction with boiled beans; Premonition of Civil War' (1936), depicting a monstrous woman tearing herself apart, imparts a slight frisson of horror but a much greater one of amusement at its sensationalism. Picasso's 'Weeping Woman' (1937), on the other hand, is a universal personification of grief, as well as a shockingly immediate person and victim, whose hair flows like a deluge of tears.

A roomful of lithographs by Joan Miro, executed during the Second World War as a reflection on the Spanish Civil War, is a universe entire of itself, of disorientation, catastrophe and not a little bemusement. I saw a two and a half year old child stumble in frank awe from image to image. He saw, I felt, this raw, crazy hell with an innocent, fresh eye.—Everywhere the gnashing of teeth, the beating of breasts, the imploding of each and every mentionable and unmentionable feature; total dissonance; the crotchets and minims fallen off the harmonious stave, metaphorically speaking. 'The Barcelona Series' is the unbearably anguished creation of a visionary joker and humanist.

The exhibition of Miro's work at the Sainsbury Centre for the Visual Arts in Norwich looks at the background and working context of Miro's life. It displays examples and photographs of his collections of peasant and naïve artefacts. Into sculptures of bulbous bogeymen and ghostly creatures from the outer space of our innermost thoughts, he translated his whirligig calligraphy of blobs, spasms, cells, sperms, stars and eyes.

What emerges clearly from the Barcelona-related exhibitions is the attempt by several acutely determined geniuses to unify three main strands, split asunder by our modern civilisation: that is, the primitive, preconscious impulse, the spirit of joyous play discovery, and the confidence of advanced intellectual awareness. Gaudi, Miro, Picasso and Torres-Garcia all aimed at this unity and achieved it, in unique ways.

The works of Joaquin Torres-Garcia (1874-1949), shown in their own exhibition also at the Hayward, are those of a man who is considered slightly peripheral to the School of Paris. He was in fact central to it, but it should be noted that he was Uruguayan-born, half Catalan and part Amerindian; he spent most of his youth in Barcelona, and later lived in Paris, Madrid and Montevideo. In the early 1930s he began composing his grid-pictures, wherein recognisable objects—here a star, there a face, a letter, a ladder, a number—are precisely compartmentalised. He saw these objects in both an archaic and a contemporary context, in as much as they became transformed into elements of a universal language, a magic code of realities which were at one and the same time abstract symbols. Thus, in a painting from 1932 of a fish, which has been segmented on its surface into representations of a star, a ship, a bottle, etc., we feel immediately that our human experience of

this fish includes all these signs and all these things. The rhythms of his carved wooden block sculptures—rough, unveneered, unglossed—are unconscious like those of music, but this is a warm, earthy music, not a celestial, non-human one. Catalonian as well as Amerindian sensibility informed his every thought—and in its imaginative earthiness his work has something of the authentic Barcelonian spirit.

(*Homage to Barcelona: The city and its art* and *Torres-Garcia: Grid-Pattern-Sign* are both at the Hayward Gallery, London until 23 February 1986. *Joan Miro: Ceramics and Bronzes 1949-1980* was at the Sainsbury Centre for Visual Arts, University of East Anglia, Norwich until 8 December 1985. *Joan Miro: Etchings and Lithographs 1952-1981* was at Waddington Graphics, London until 23 November.)

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# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

### by Rosalind Wade

*Loyalties.* Raymond Williams. Chatto & Windus. £8.95. *Hawksmoor.* Peter Ackroyd. Hamish Hamilton. £8.95. *The Catholic.* David Plante. Chatto & Windus. £8.95. *The Wrong Face.* Dianne Doubtfire. W. H. Allen. £8.95. *Nothing Happens in Armincross.* Benedict Kiely. Gollancz. £9.95. *Family Madness.* Thomas Keneally. Hodder & Stoughton. £9.95. *The Heart of the Rose.* June Barraclough. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £8.95.

Writing about the Thirties is difficult. So many people who lived through the decade are anxious to re-examine their attitudes during the years that led up to World War II, although their recollections may vary widely. At the same time, those not born or merely children have a developing curiosity about the period. A curtain seemed to descend on the thirties' scene in August 1939 and so the relevant years, which of course included the Spanish Civil War, may be seen in isolation. To attempt to analyse the four post-war decades is an even more ambitious aim. This is the purpose of Raymond Williams' new novel, *Loyalties,* in which the many narrative threads are made comprehensible by the device of using short chapters headed by dates and locations.

We first meet a group of young people in 1936. They are in Wales for a political get-together in a Welsh mining area. Among others are Emma Braose, aristocratic yet dedicated to an extreme brand of Socialism; her brother Norman; a local man, Bert Lewis and, most important of all, Nesta, an unsophisticated country girl who attracts the hitherto uncommitted Norman. From this modest gathering is set in motion a conflict of personalities and events which are to span half a century; for from Norman's rejection of Nesta and their child, Glyn, emerge jealousies, frustrations, some happiness but, overall, sadness and recrimination. The group mature in their individual ways during the progress of the novel. Some take part in the Spanish Civil War; others, who may later be charged with complicity in espionage and treason, move on to fame and affluence. Political events such as CND marches and the miners' strike provide a backcloth against which the personal dramas are enacted.

The festering legacy of resentment which stems from Norman's rejection of his illegitimate son haunts the young Glyn, even though his mother has married Bert Lewis and he is formally 'adopted'. This reaches its climax while Glyn is being vetted for an important appointment by the egregious Dr. Meele, and quizzed about his relationship with the now eminent Sir Norman Braose. Beside this poignant situation the detection of the 'spies' comes a poor second yet there would have been more than sufficient excellence without it. Although overlong and often obstructed by too much political debate and conversation, *Loyalties* will be remembered for its masterly portrayal of a disparate group, and must rank as one of the outstanding novels of the late autumn season.

Also complicated, yet in an entirely different way, is *Hawksmoor* by Peter Ackroyd, titled somewhat misleadingly, for although about churches the Hawksmoor of the title is not the celebrated architect but a nineteen-eighties CID officer whose assignment is to solve a series of apparently motiveless murders in and around the City of London. The miasma of evil and tragedy which surrounds the area may have its origin in an unhappy event in the distant past. Nicholas Dyer, born 1654, was commissioned by Queen Anne to design and oversee the building of seven new churches placed at strategic points in and around the City of London. It was usual, when the spire of a new church was completed, to send a messenger to the pinnacle as a gesture of celebration. When the first church was in its final stages young Thomas, eleven-year-old son of the master mason, was dispatched on this perilous errand. A gust of wind swept him off balance and he fell to his death on the pavement below.

From this sad accident follows the series of sinister events which form the contemporary and historical fabric of an enthralling and unusual novel. Extensive sections are devoted to Nicholas Dyer's contemplations and activities, recorded in the vernacular of the times in a copious diary, almost too convincing to suggest a *pastiche*. Nicholas Dyer was a waif, flotsam on the tide of an uncaring society brutalised by its ignorance and disregard for human dignity: yet side by side with the squalor, art and learning flourished unimpeded, and the existence of scientific skills in building is borne out by those City churches still standing today. The young Nicholas Dyer was fortunate to come to the notice of Christopher Wren (Sir Chris) who needed an apprentice of outstanding ability to assist and continue with his work. Through the young man's eyes, his benefactor emerges as honest and kindly, standing above the casual street killings and depravity which lurked in and around his magnificent edifices.

The contemporary overlap of all this is highlighted when a rough sketch map is placed on Hawksmoor's desk by an unknown caller, linking the present murders with the locations of the seventeenth century churches. It is then that the general beastliness of dark deeds in unlit rooms and alleyways demonstrates its ability to return and create further evil.

> We live off the past: it is in our words and our Syllables. It is reverberant in our Streets and Courts, so that we can scarce walk across the Stones without being reminded of those who walked there before us.

No attempt is made to solve the mystery by conventional detection methods; rather, the requirement is for the reader to accept the far-reaching influence of wickedness and its power to return and perpetuate similarly horrific happenings. In *Hawksmoor*, even for the most hardened unbeliever, this proves not too difficult.

To complain that the love scenes in *The Catholic* are so over-explicit as to induce nausea would be to acknowledge distaste for the frank discussion of the emotional problems of young homosexuals. This would be out of touch at a time when novels and plays explore freely the complexities of male relationships. David Plante's chief character, Daniel Francoer, has had few personal advantages as a teacher of English in a Boston language school. Although successful at his job, he does not much care for the semi-academic way of life involved. As an antidote to private tensions he frequents local bars where a male pick-up may be available, and it is here that he meets Henry, a reserved, enigmatic person, attractive in bed but not giving much in terms

of loyalty or affection. Soon, Daniel is hopelessly enslaved and whether his new acquaintance is male or female makes little difference to the pangs of unrequited love.

Daniel, a Roman Catholic by upbringing, is first seen to be concerned about the conflict between his religion and physical inclinations; but this interesting side-theme is abandoned early on, and *The Catholic* concentrates on the purely personal aspects of an unsatisfactory love affair. Soon, he becomes quite ill with anxiety as he awaits the telephone call which never comes. He attempts to re-establish at least a passing contact and in his failure to do so he finally acknowledges defeat; yet so powerful is his imagination that he has little difficulty in keeping alive the fantasy that Henry will one day return, as in the closing lines of the novel...

> A thrill spread over the surface of my skin. I looked out and listened. There was someone in the room and, if I waited, he would come just close enough for me to see him in the dark....

David Plante has a talent so colourful and incisive that the most ordinary situations become touched with a kind of tarnished brilliance as, for instance, the picture of Charley, a loyal friend, playing with his infant son. This and other brilliantly observed small incidents do much to maintain David Plante's reputation.

A contemporary fashion in fiction is to deck out a purely romantic story with sophistication to a degree unthinkable only a short time ago. An example is *The Wrong Face* by Dianne Doubtfire, the story of a failed marriage ending in happiness for at least one of the nerve-torn partners. The crux of the dispute is a teenage daughter, Nicola, adored to an almost incestuous degree by her father, Robert Slingsby, and detested by her pathologically self-obsessed mother. Their mutual animosity is frightening in its intensity yet convincing enough. Inevitably, Nicola leaves home to escape from the tensions and her chosen haven is the boyfriend, Terry's, home, presided over by a lovable though slatternly mother. Terry is a blameless enough young man, keen on working with cars and promoting woolly egalitarian ideals. Nicola's seduction is casually contrived: it brings in its wake little happiness, particularly when she realises that her immaturity makes her a disappointing partner in the act of love. Unfortunately, Terry is deeply in love with a woman twice his age. On discovering this, Nicola's belief in the future is shattered. In desperation she returns home, only to find the menage there in limbo. Her bedroom has been dismantled and her beloved father has eloped with the new housekeeper, Alison Laurie. While retreating from this grim scene she suffers a serious accident. Was it fatal? Will she survive? This is not made clear and the final picture is of Robert and Alison in a country house hotel, determined to build for themselves from the ruins a satisfactory way of life; which would include the care of Nicola if she would like that. But then, at that moment they are unaware of the terrible moment when she was impaled on the garden railings. The complicated and unhappy story is unfolded by means of brief, graphic scenes, switching the focus between father to daughter. Dianne Doubtfire is an experienced and skilful writer, yet at times it appears to be a somewhat arbitrary device by which to convey situations and events which would seem to demand a fuller and more serious treatment.

The on-going 'troubles' in Ireland are seldom more adroitly pin-pointed than by the vigorous, rip-roaring approach of a writer who belongs there and so understands every quirk and inconsistency of the Irish character. Benedict

Kiely is one such writer. His new novel, *Nothing Happens in Armincross* is a racy account of Mervyn Kavanagh's return to his native village for a niece's wedding; and, from the vantage point of temporary absenteeism from the Republic, reveals more than any number of newspaper reports on what goes on in the Irish mind. As Mervyn pursues his leisurely progress, renewing old acquaintances and making new ones, curious examples of fable and fantasy jostle the more sophisticated concerns of people set on having the best of both worlds. Yet the feeling persists that the main priority is the rural way of life. Perhaps the scenery has something to do with it? Magnificent bays, huge sandy beaches, surrounding hills and the isolation of a mainly farming community must tend to insulate the spirit from the commercialism of the contemporary world.

Moving on to Thomas Keneally's long awaited new novel is a chilling experience. His *Schindler's Ark*, winner of the 1982 Booker Prize for fiction, was a mammoth work of absorbing originality, even if based largely on true events. *A Family Madness* does not, unfortunately, kindle the same degree of interest. True, it has some outstanding moments, but in the main the curious device of dividing the narrative between the present day concerns of racy, easy-going Terry Delaney (a security agent officer and footballer in his leisure hours) and the diaries and papers of the 'Kabbel' clan, relating mainly to the nineteenth-forties, does not help to sustain attention. The documents outline the fate of yet one more hapless family caught in the cross-fire of the East-European theatre of war; yet sadly, this time there is a definite feeling about of *déjà vu*. What is essentially a straightforward love story of the passion conceived by Terry for Kabbel's daughter, Danielle, and the problems which arise from this affair, provide the most readily comprehensible sections of the novel. But as always, with Thomas Keneally, there is much more to the basic idea than an illicit love affair. His understanding of the grim territories which lay between Germany and Poland in the fluid situation of Russia and the Third Reich make the effort to assimilate this complex tapestry despite some misgivings about over-exposure infinitely worthwhile.

Finally, something altogether different. Although sub-titled 'A Yorkshire Love Story', *The Heart of the Rose* is, in fact, a historical *vignette* of an always interesting period, the first decade of the nineteenth century, when old customs lingering on from the Stuarts and the Tudors were gradually giving way to more enlightened ways of thought. Yet the home of the Hardow family, Fountaynes Castle, was still run on feudal lines, ruled over by the elderly and formidable earl: a self-supporting unit employing a large staff all certain of life tenure so long as they did not transgress the unwritten code of behaviour. Into this promising future moves the young Anne Tessyman, a sewing maid, soon to rise to the coveted 'nursery' service. It was Anne's misfortune that in this capacity she met and fell in love with the heir to the earldom, George Hardow and he, contrary to expected custom, wished to marry her. How the star-crossed lovers lost themselves in a labyrinth of jealousy and convention, complicated by the ugly situation in which she was also seduced by George's father, is recounted with frankness and sympathy; nor is lip-service paid to a happy ending. Anne dies in childbirth and George passes the remainder of his life as an eccentric bachelor. All in all, *The Heart of the Rose* is a valuable contribution to social and public history and if the light, conversational tone does not always accord with the portentous nature of events, it is absorbing and has the ring of truth about it.

**Also Received:**

*A Dying Fall.* June Thomson. Constable. £7.95. As her publishers point out June Thomson, while enjoying considerable acclaim for her crime and detection novels, is not a 'household name'. There can be no doubt that she deserves to be placed alongside P. D. James and Dorothy Sayers for she has the same forthright though meticulous approach to the business of murder and never forgets that convincing real life characters are more effective than cardboard puppets. There are several people within the village scene who might have been tempted to liquidate Rex Holt, an aggressive, unyielding retired builder who has built up for himself and his heirs a small fortune. True to her reputation, June Thomson invites the reader to look farther afield for the culprit, and when found he is seen to be by no means an unlikely candidate. There are many side issues and much evocative nature description which make *A Dying Fall* worthy of attention beyond the mere fascination of a 'who-dunnit'.

*Litter.* Les Ross, Malvern Publishing Co. £5.95. The enterprising Malvern Publishing Co. continues its policy of publishing only first novels. An interesting list of upwards of six titles is now on offer. One of the latest, *Litter*, has the world of education as its background. Les Ross has some relevant points to make: his characterisation is sharp and all in all this is a promising debut.

# NON-FICTION REVIEWS

## ANNE FLEMING'S LETTERS

*The Letters of Anne Fleming.* Edited by Mark Amory. Collins Harvill. £16.50.

Anne Fleming was a brilliant letter writer. Not quite such an artist as her mentor Evelyn Waugh but involved in much more glamorous social activities. Her special talent from the reader's standpoint is to convey her own gaiety of spirit and at the end, her courage, through the medium of these letters. She was frequently bored (not least I regret to discover by this reviewer) but she makes it sound quite an exhilarating experience.

She is severe on prime ministers. Of Mrs. Thatcher she writes, 'She seems totally humourless and with a nervous system usually attributed to fishes. Surely she has never read a book or looked at pictures.' She treats Anthony Eden as a pathetic figure, though she loved his wife. At first she finds Harold Macmillan very interesting but soon she is writing, 'I conclude that he was a crashing bore. Not uncommon to love lords but it is rare to be besotted about dukes.'

If a phrase must be found to encapsulate her life I suppose that it is 'grandeur and misery'. Her three husbands, Lord O'Neill, Lord Rothermere and Ian Fleming sound splendid. But the first was killed in the war, the second ceased to attract her and Ian Fleming turned nasty to her towards the end. His way of life brought about his death when he was fifty-six. Her brother died at forty-eight. One of her two sisters died of alcoholism. A baby was born dead. Her beloved son by Ian Fleming committed suicide after a miserable life. She herself suffered ill-health for years before dying of cancer.

She remained gallant to the end. She had no better friend than Peter Quennell. In April 1981 she was writing to him:

> Darling Peter,
> Belated wishes for your birthday. I have laryngitis and cancer—no voice to complain! *Damn.* Home tomorrow. I will telephone when not speechless. The pills I have to take cause nausea, dizziness and despair, but no surgery, and apparently side effects lessen with time. With much love to you.
> A.

The letters to Evelyn Waugh and some of his replies not printed already are the centrepiece of the book. They develop an idiom which is scintillating enough, though painful for some of those who imagined that they were viewed more favourably. I will take one example at random.

> Botulic (Connelly) came to luncheon accompanied by a skinny blonde. But she is not hostile. She had no chance to speak because Angus Wilson, Thunderbird (Ian Fleming), me and Cyril were all shouting at Willie (Maugham) because Angus said you were far and away the best living writer and Willie looked frightfully cross.

Her letters to Sir Nicholas Henderson after Evelyn Waugh's death make a fitting complement. The tone is milder but she was writing to a much more genial man. Mark Amory, who edited Eveyln Waugh's letters, has once again done an excellent job. Indeed I feel that he has entered into Anne's spirit spirit even more completely than Evelyn's. He does well to bring out less well known facets of her character, for example her love of natural beauty. In this respect she found her dear friend Evelyn and another dear friend, Hugh Gaitskell, somewhat deficient. He is deliberately non-judgmental about the morality of her life, which seems the right course. Suffice it to say that she gave immense pleasure to her devoted circle of friends, and many others including some whom she came to 'think that she did not love.'

FRANK LONGFORD

## THE VIEWS OF HENRY KISSINGER

*Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays 1982-1984.* Henry Kissinger. Michael Joseph. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. £15.

The US was lucky when during the collapse of the Nazi regime in Europe it recruited the young Henry Kissinger into its service. This German immigrant is now one of its most wise and informed counsellors. The European background, the years at Harvard as student of the politics of Metternich, the long experience in the Department of State and as chief adviser to Presidents Nixon and Ford, and his recent role under President Reagan as Chairman of the Bipartisan Committee on Central America all give these essays and reprints depth and originality.

Dr. Kissinger's experience and knowledge are such that it is impossible in a short notice to do more than touch on some of his main points. What are they? He sees that, though still prompt to use the moralistic rhetoric of the Founding Fathers and to assume to itself a role above the battle, the US is involved in the world now—as Britain has long been—merely as one power among others; it has to manoeuvre, to adjust and to negotiate, even if usually from positions of great economic strength. It must be realistic and even opportunistic. He is equally insistent on the unpliable and totally unconstitutional character of the USSR, and, given its rigidity of system, he recognises the folly of pinning many hopes on the personality of whoever emerges as the

leader in that system. He sees it as folly to pour resources of wheat and technical expertise into a country that refuses to give anything in return. He sees it as special folly not to tie such aid to binding foreign policy or strategic concessions—not least when the USSR is surrounded by states that are not sympathetic (had they freedom to say so) and when in Afghanistan and Cuba, Angola and East Africa, it clearly abets revolutionary and terrorist movements. He offers a searching analysis of African problems—and did so in an address in Johannesburg itself. Indeed, the striking feature of this survey is that the only country he does not 'tackle' is China; and he confines himself *re* Japan only to a paragraph of indirect praise, in noting how skilfully and how opportunistically Japan plays the free trade game internationally, but from a safe, entrenched and protectionist base. One would welcome an essay from him on our own recent wave of liberal conscience—product largely of televisual razzamatazz—and of generosity to famine victims in Africa, where almost all the countries that are to benefit are ruled by non-liberal and non-conscienceless regimes that appear all—but—totally indifferent to the plight of their own peoples. The politics of the West are those of open societies, open to enemy as well as friend, to spies as well as refugees. They are open too, not least in the US and Britain, to waves of do-goodism and moralism that must make many in very different societies stand constantly aghast. Yet it is this very openness that explains their inventiveness, their progress, their political balance and—one continues to believe—their civilised quality.

The area on which Dr. Kissinger speaks with special interest is the Middle East. He recognises the interlocked nature of the politics of the Gulf, the fact that economic and political advance there, as anywhere else, are not necessarily simultaneous or even interlinked, and that the real threat to any solution comes from Israel's persistence in demanding (and occupying) what to us are Judaea and Samaria but which to Jordan and to the Palestinians are simply the 'West Bank'. On this he needs as many American as British readers. He is under no illusions at all about Arafat or the P.L.O.; but is equally aware that both 'Palestine'—wherever precisely it is—and Israel—whatever may be its tenable as distinct from its legendary boundaries—do need secure, recognised and accepted frontiers. It is refreshing to read these surveys by one who brings to his experience and his wide reading a vigour and a clarity that are all too rare, not only in our politicians but also in our soothsayers in print and on the screen. Could Mr. Schultz and Sir Geoffrey perhaps read the appropriate essay here each time they go to Geneva, to Moscow—or to any Commonwealth Conference?

ESMOND WRIGHT

## THE PRIME MINISTER AND MONETARISM

*Mrs. Thatcher's Economic Experiment.* William Keegan. Allen Lane. £9.95.

William Keegan, who has been Economics Editor of the *Observer* since 1977 and previously Economics Correspondent of the *Financial Times*, makes a telling attack on monetarism in this text.

He takes us on a 'tour de force' from Conservative economic policy during the 'heady days' of Heath's administration through to the 1983 Thatcher Government, giving us an insight into the development of the monetarist ideas of the present Government. There was no doubt that traditional Keynesian policies

in the early 1970s were not working, but the book suggests that it was almost by accident that monetarism filled the vacuum. Friedman had expounded his theory, that by controlling the money supply affects the upward pressure on prices, during the sixties, yet the time was not ripe for it to be practical. It is also a fact that the time lag between changes in the money supply and its effect on the price level is open to argument, from anywhere between six months to two years, and this may partly explain why the Conservatives during 1979-1983 kept on arguing that 'things were getting better'! As William Keegan points out, if you are going to use monetarism as a 'tool' on the economy you've got to be able to define just what exactly is meant by the money supply and, once done, then be able to control it. The Conservatives did appear to have difficulty in doing both. Moreover, as an administration that believed in controlling the P.S.B.R., the agreement to honour the public sector pay awards of 1979 appeared to be odd.

This book, however, is particularly interesting in relating to us the 'in-fighting' within the Conservative Cabinet about policy and the amount of detail sought by the Conservatives with regard to economic and monetarist theory. One thought shines through, however: Mrs. Thatcher is not for 'turning' and will not. Perhaps more important for the general reader is the idea that things would not have been so bad without monetarist policies, as the OECD point out. The Conservatives have reduced inflation, but one is made to think by how much would this have fallen on its own with the world recession. Given the high levels of unemployment, poor output by industry and the tight control over P.S.B.R. (the figures appear often to be inaccurate, resulting in an over-severe fiscal squeeze), then how did the Conservatives win the 1983 election? William Keegan suggests that the Falklands factor and the disorganisation of the opposition were two main factors, plus the beneficial timing of the general election.

This book is very readable, therefore, especially since its style is aimed at the general reader, though from an academic viewpoint it lacks source references, suffers from a 'popular' style, and is often repetitive. Nevertheless, for those who want to learn more about the reasons why monetarism is popular in the U.K. and are looking for an easily grasped criticism, then this is the book to read.

MARK COOK

## THE NEW TESTAMENT REVISED

*The Original New Testament.* Hugh J. Schonfield. Firethorn Press. £14.95.

It is true to say that until comparatively recently interest in the New Testament had dwindled. It was considered relevant, apart from familiar texts and some remarkable passages which appeared in anthologies and on such occasions as memorial services. New translations, however, have both been a sign of awakened regard and a stimulus to it. The Authorised Version, for all the magic of the language, gave uniformity to the text and disguised the fact that so much of the writing is from varied standpoints. Quite different accounts were given of the person of Jesus. Some are complimentary: some in marked contrast.

Nevertheless to be confronted with another translation at first seems daunting. And yet with the present work initial resistance is soon eroded. Hugh Schonfield's title makes a big claim. He aims to produce the story of Jesus as the original writers intended to tell it, and contends that the work has been manipulated in language and ideas by later theology. In order to be objective,

he has tried to avoid ecclesiastical terms which he considers do not reproduce the sense of the original. He also rejects what might have been included, namely an account of Jesus produced by Jewish followers in Judaea. As a result of this, he says, the new churches mainly Gentile became anti-semitic with long-term consequences.

Though the translation is intended for the general reader, it must receive the attention of biblical scholars. To understand the minds of those who wrote in the first century is also the purpose of modern theologians. Jewish scholarship is essential for an appreciation of the New Testament, and Hugh Schonfield is especially qualified to correct the text where the original translators into Greek had made slips and when scribes in succeeding centuries had miscopied the text.

The person of Jesus has a hold on the minds of men more widely than in the institutional church, and a work which contributes to this awareness is to be welcomed. In addition, the New Testament is unique as a source material for the secular history of the period. This translation, with its Introduction, is very readable, absorbing and alive; and the Notes, mercifully included at the foot of each page, maintain interest. To give a random example of the liveliness, the comic chaos of the incident involving Demetrius, the silversmith, can be cited.

The one question, perhaps naïve, which bothers is this. If those in the early centuries organised the text for their own purposes to produce an idealised interpretation, why did they leave so many outstanding problems?

LAURENCE TANNER

## DAVID GARRICK AND HIS TIMES

*David Garrick: a Biography.* Alan Kendall. Harrap. £12.95.

Alan Kendall's life of David Garrick is a most workmanlike addition to the Garrick literature for it is full, detailed and easily accessible. These are undoubtedly virtues to be prized by the general reader and also by students of the theatre, literature and the graphic arts of the eighteenth century. Material published here for the first time, other than privately, is for example an account of the letters written by Garrick to Georgiana, Countess Spencer: reference to this correspondence does not exist even in the otherwise admirable American edition (inaccessible in England) of the actor's letters. Much useful information is to be found in Garrick's communications to his aristocratic patrons and friends, not least in reference to his Shakespeare performances made in private country houses such as Althorp, for patronage was still, in the mid-eighteenth century, quite frequent. Thus, his own version of 'mad Lear', frightening though it clearly was, is described as different from a stage edition in the Drury Lane *King Lear.*

Garrick's chief contribution to theatrical history is to have introduced a more naturalistic style of acting than any seen before on the English stage. Other important reforms brought about a revolution in the production and appreciation of Shakespeare's plays: the fashion of the time, set by Dr. Johnson in England and Voltaire in France, was to ridicule the dialogue and extol passages of poetry, rather like picking the plums out of a pudding. Neither Voltaire nor Johnson was converted but the theatre-going public certainly was.

Indeed, had it not been for Garrick, perhaps Harley Granville Barker's much later revolution in Shakespeare production might have been far harder. But above all, Garrick raised the status of the previously despised actor and turned the profession into a respectable one.

David Garrick moved amongst some of the most interesting people of his day. Alan Kendall's biography shows him amidst the rivalries and feuds of a stage career, rising to eminence as manager, writer, actor and employer of some of the greatest artistic talent in the land. Already a friend since school-days in Lichfield of Samuel Johnson, he subsequently became an important member of the group of intellectual writers surrounding Johnson in Gough Square. He employed Robert Adam, his next door neighbour in Adelphi, on improvements in that terrace. His portrait was painted by Reynolds, Gainsborough, Zoffany and Hogarth whom he often visited in Chiswick whilst staying, as he was invited frequently to do when wanting a rest from Drury Lane, in Chiswick House, the lovely Palladian mansion built by the Earl of Burlington where Pope and Horace Walpole came for music and good talk. London was clearly a village where men and women of significance in its cultural life were readily known to one another and from which their light radiated to provincial centres throughout the land.

Beautifully illustrated with portraits and engravings, this excellent biography brings to life both David Garrick and the community in which he lived. Equally with the praise of his friends the calumnies of his enemies are recorded: but perhaps the worst that was said of him, and that by Oliver Goldsmith, was that he loved flattery. A small failing this, in one who, according to Edmund Burke, 'raised the character of his profession to the rank of a liberal art'.

BETTY ABEL

## THE CASE FOR SDI

*SDI: The Case for the Defence.* Alun Chalfont. Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 12.

Lord Chalfont's pamphlet must be assumed to be a trailer for his book *Star Wars—Suicide or Survival*, due soon. He makes plain — or as plain as the language and alphabet of nuclear war permit—his view that President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative offers a real possibility of substantial reductions in nuclear arms without producing instability. It is plainly to be preferred to the present reliance on the threat of suicidal retaliation as the only effective deterrence against aggression. He does not see it as a single or unique solution to our problems of security. It needs to be accompanied by continuing dialogue with the USSR, to—no doubt—repeated 'Genevas'.

He outlines and rebuts the case 'against'. He does not deal with the Western European debate, to which Dr. Werner Kaltefleiter of Kiel University addressed himself in an earlier paper. Lord Chalfont makes plain that this is at present a 'research' project only, but one in which some 16 US nuclear centres are already involved, and an unquantifiable number of Russian. It would indeed be idle to argue that 'space' must be off-limits to war, since so many satellites, Russian and American, are already there; and equally, that space research, whether for purposes of war or peace, is not a duopoly of the USSR and the US. Indeed, for Europeans to talk of nuclear free-zones, of opting out of research into a strategy for survival, to speak of a Milton Keynes or a Camden Town that pronounces that it is not 'involved', is at once selfish and silly. European scientists are not idle themselves. The Super Powers will go ahead with

or without Greenham Common. We would be wise to be involved—or treachery among scientists will grow and flourish.

Lord Chalfont's tract is quiet in style, and persuasive. He is to be congratulated as much on his tone as on his content, since we move here in a world—as nowadays in so much domestic as international politics—that is dominated by strident voices, bitter, raucous and too often treasonable.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## TWO QUEENS CONSORT

*Matriarch, Queen Mary and the House of Windsor.* Anne Edwards. Hodder and Stoughton. £12.95.

*King George VI and Queen Elizabeth.* Christopher Warwick. Beaufort Books, New York. $16.95. Sidgwick & Jackson, London. £10.95.

Christopher Warwick's 'portrait' follows usefully Anne Edwards' exhaustive study of Queen Mary and her family. After the death in 1892 of the heir apparent, the Duke of Clarence, she married the heir presumptive, who later became King George V. Her engagement to the former was more a matter of duty, than love, imposed upon her by Queen Victoria. As a Princess of Teck, she was greatly influenced by the traditional German view of monarchy. Anne Edwards repeatedly makes clear that she believed in the 'sweep of majesty', regal detachment and superiority, with her sense of royal duties. She lacked all outward show of warmth and showed little to her own children. By way of contrast, Queen Elizabeth, the present Queen Mother, shows warmth without the trappings of majesty. Both women dominated their husbands, both weaker personalities. Christopher Warwick writes of 'George VI and Queen Elizabeth's partnership'.

'Throughout their married life, the Queen's positive presence, her potently decisive mind acted as the perfect counterbalance to the king's more diffident nature'.

He points out that beneath the charm, the smiling and waving in public, there lies a ridge of steel, and on occasion of bitterness. The abdication which brought the Duke of York unwillingly to the throne, 'had pulverised the Yorks, far more, in fact, than many would ever realise . . . and great bitterness had entered her heart'. She has not forgotten or forgiven. The author justifies the refusal to grant to the Duchess of Windsor the same royal status as her husband, the Duke of Windsor. On the other hand, he concedes that the new king would not have taken so vindictive a stand, 'had he not been under very considerable pressure to disregard her existence'.

In a 'portrait' of this kind where space is limited, there are bound to be omissions which readers may regret. For example, in discussing the annual Duke of York's Camps, designed to bring together different social groupings, no mention is made of Southwold, Suffolk, where they were held or the year when they were started. Mention might also have been made of the great interest which the Queen Mother has taken in the running of the Middle Temple Inn of Court.

This is a valuable and well written appreciation.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Working-class Parents and the Medical Establishment** (Gower. £16.50). This is a valuable historical study by David G. Green on 'self-help in Britain from the mid-nineteenth century to 1948', when the National Health Service came into being. Mr. Green shows that until the National Insurance Act, 1911, the working classes organised for themselves medical care through friendly societies and medical institutes. Doctors were engaged under contract, with the friendly society and the institutes as the dominant partners. In addition, the poorest of the poor went direct to the private hospital. Doctors were not content with their own working conditions. Mr. Green argues that as a result of the passing of the 1911 Act and the medical profession's agitation between 1910 and 1912, doctors 'most notably . . . freed themselves from lay control, insinuated themselves into the machinery of the state, and nearly doubled their incomes'. He contends that lessons from the past can be learnt in the event of any privatisation of the National Health Service.

**Marx and Marxism** (Longman. £3.75). This is a brief introduction in the Longman Paperback Original series by Cliff Slaughter, well known as an academic writer on Marxism. The study 'has the strictly limited aim of providing an introductory guide to Marx's basic theories and their subsequent development'. As the author appreciates, in recent years particularly, there have emerged a diversity of 'Marxist doctrines' among various groups who profess themselves Marxists. What is a Marxist, has become a good question. The answer is strictly in this volume. 'The writer has tried to stay close to the texts of Marx himself and of his principal followers'. This book should prove a useful touchstone upon a very controversial subject.

**The Rise of the Gothic** (Hutchinson. £20.00). This is a remarkable and superbly produced volume devoted to the emergence of Gothic architecture in the twelfth century, starting with the great cathedrals at St. Denis, Sens and Chartres, and its development throughout Europe and beyond. William Anderson, poet and author, provides the text, and Clive Hicks the magnificent photographs, both in monochrome and colour. The author's theme is 'the revelation in architecture of the works of the creative imagination'. The pointed arch found its way from the Middle East to Europe at a time of advance in building and engineering techniques, and became a symbol of spiritual and artistic outpouring. William Anderson includes the early development of English and Scottish Gothic. He is also concerned rightly with the remarkable pieces of sculpture and carvings which adorn so many cathedrals, but which are rarely seen. Mr. Hicks has photographed with great effect some of the most noteworthy. The book is remarkably comprehensive for its two hundred pages of text and photography. The latter includes 157 illustrations. There is a useful bibliography. The volume is of coffee table size.

**The Sicilian Specialist** (Penguin. £3.95. $12.95). Norman Lewis first wrote this novel on the Mafia for publication in the U.S.A. in 1974 and in the U.K. in 1975. It is now republished as a paperback. It is a thriller which shifts internationally, including Sicily and America. Mark Richards of the brotherhood goes to America to pursue elimination, and the plot culminates in a political assassination. It is a tense and chilling book.

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


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## BREAKING THE EAST/WEST MYOPIA

### by Paddy Ashdown, MP

HISTORICAL parallels are fascinating—they can also be instructive. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 created a five-sided balance of power to keep the peace in Europe. The idea, credited to Metternich and his adviser Gentz, was to form a multisided power structure (France, Germany, Britain, Russia and Austro-Hungary), in which a shifting pattern of alliances would provide weight and counterweight always tending to equilibrium. The same basic structure can still be found today in the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The Nineteenth Century balance of power, which Canning called 'The European Areopagiticus', succeeded in keeping the peace, more or less, for 30 or 40 years. It slowly came to an end in the process of filling the vacuum caused by the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Many feel the end of the British Empire parallels similar changes in our own age.

By 1858, the English political commentator, Henry Reeves wrote in *Encylopaedia Britannica*:

> All around us the signs are clear of the decay of the Balance of Power which has held the peace of Europe since 1815. Europe is dividing into two camps and the result is the massive augmentation of military budgets, which is the disgrace and scandal of our age. If we cannot halt the drift, war is inevitable.

Change the date, and this could have appeared in an editorial in last week's *Times* or *Die Welt*.

By 1912 the old balance of power had dissolved into a starkly bipolar world. In that year Kaiser Willhelm told his chiefs of staff that he suspected an Anglo-French plot to surround and strangle the German nation and asked Von Schlieffen to prepare a breakout plan. In the same year John Buchan wrote *The 39 Steps*, based on German plot to dominate the world. Two years later, both sides were so immersed in the psychology of war that it took only the assassination of an obscure Archduke in Sarajevo to set the world alight. For Archdukes in the present age substitute an Ayatollah or an oil potentate.

It is clear that those who constructed the post-war peace at Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco, like those at Vienna before them, did not wish to see a bipolar world. But that is what we have now got. The confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which Europe is also irretrievably trapped, has so dominated world affairs that

almost all other events have become subsumed under it. We may claim to have kept the peace in Europe since 1945. But the result has been that we have fought out our East/West conflicts by proxy on other people's territories and at the cost of other people's lives—about 15 million of them since 1945. It is the East/West struggle, operating at one remove, which has fuelled the conflagrations in Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, El Salvador, etc. Indeed, the world has become so dominated by the East/West axis that we have almost totally ignored the North/South one. East/West relations are considered the preserve of statesmen and governments; North/South ones, merely the playground of non-governmental enthusiasts, endearing charities and, more recently, pop music enthusiasts. And yet, I suspect that if we can prevent an East/West war in the next 15 years (a big enough 'IF' I grant), then the real long-term threat to world peace will not be East/West at all, but North/South.

The dominance of the East/West axis has not only given us a dangerous case of tunnel vision in international affairs—it has also severely damaged our international organisations themselves. A world which is so dominated by naked bipolar power politics is a world in which there will be little real role for international organisations of a multilateral character. The UN remains important to the small (especially Third World) nations; for the big powers it is a backwater. The US and the USSR effectively propose and dispose on everything important between themselves. It is scarcely surprising therefore that we cannot find the political will to make the UN work effectively and relegate it to the status of a talking shop on minor matters and a convenient neutral meeting place for the disarmament dialogue.

The domination of East/West power politics has also corrupted the normal pattern of nation to nation relationships. In a more stable world, the relationships between states would depend on a wide variety of factors—common interests and aims, cultural ties, trading links, historical factors and, of course, military alliances. At present, the military alliance dominates all. In Europe, NATO is not just the corner stone of our foreign policy, it is 90% of the policy itself. All other more normal relations between states have been forced to subordinate to the prevailing military imperatives. This is why the US has no scruples about using 'security' as a reason for applying, extra-territorially, its trading laws over firms in Britain in order to control perfectly routine low security technology trade with other countries (including those in the West); it is why we cannot get away from tied aid for the poor world; it is why Her Majesty's Government had no option but to knuckle under, with only private protest, when Her Majesty's principal ally (the US) invaded one of Her Majesty's territories (Grenada) without even bothering to inform Her Majesty. It affects domestic policies too, even for the more powerful 'second tier' nations, like Britain. There can be small doubt that the ban on union membership in Britain's Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was the result of US pressure—or that the

erosion of British sovereignty involved in allowing US servicemen in Britain to claim immunity from British law has the same origin.

One of the biggest casualties in a world so dominated by superpower politics, however, has been the concept of morality in international affairs. Some would doubt that there is such a thing. But it has existed, and was once even a sufficient force to elect a British Prime Minister (Gladstone at the time of the Bulgarian atrocities). Nearer our own time, international support for Live Aid provides a demonstration of the force of moral power, still. But such 'gentle forces' in international affairs have no chance in a world dominated by the tooth and claw of the superpower struggle.

If the dominance of superpower politics has served the world badly, however, it has served Europe little better. For 40 years the two sides of Europe have been caught in the middle of the superpower nutcracker and we have become increasingly impotent in the process. There is no longer a European voice at the disarmament table. The question of peace on our territory is now decided by the Soviet Union and the United States. They are the chess players, Europe merely the chess board on which they play. Economically, Western Europe is in danger of becoming more a collection of US client states rather than a network of allies. Eastern Europe has, of course, suffered the same fate, but more comprehensively and brutally, at the hands of the Soviet Union. Even in international affairs, the relationships which Europe might have liked to develop with, say, Latin America, have been checked by the pre-eminence of the Atlantic relationship in our scheme of things and the absolute necessity of not upsetting our US allies.

The structure of NATO itself has become increasingly unbalanced. John F. Kennedy worried about this 20 years ago and proposed a twin pillar NATO, with a united Europe able to treat on an equal basis with its US partner. Unhappily, his ideas died with him. Nearer our time, however, Henry Kissinger, expressing the same view, has said 'when one country (the US) dominates the alliance on all major issues—when that country choses weapons, decides deployment, conducts arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East/West diplomacy and creates the frame work for relations with the Third World—little incentives remain for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to co-ordinate foreign policy'. Under these circumstances, Kissinger warned, consultation between the members of NATO about what could happen has degenerated into briefing by one nation about what will happen. This is bad for NATO and bad for Europe too.

And yet, despite these inadequacies, the East/West structure within which we in Europe have conducted our foreign policy has remained basically unchanged since 1945. While domestic politics have remained in a constant ferment, adapting to the new challenges of unemployment, the new technologies, the decay of welfare provision, etc., foreign policy has enjoyed substantial cross-party consensus and little change for nearly 40 years. It is only recently that the surface has been ruffled by tremors

from the nuclear debate—but even these have not yet seriously affected official thinking in the main political parties.

Whatever our past reluctance to change, however, change is now about to be forced upon us. Three factors now at work will bring this about. First, there is growing realisation in the United States of the importance to their foreign policy of the Pacific Basin as well as the Mediterranean. This is not just the product of having a Californian in the White House—the industrial centre of gravity of the United States is shifting from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific. And for West Coast Americans, the nature of relations with Tokyo and Manilla are quite as important as those with London and Rome. At best we in Europe ought to recognise that the 'special nature' of the Atlantic relationship with the US will diminish as America takes account of her Pacific relationships. At worst there are forces in the US, albeit minority ones as yet, which regard Europe as played out, effete, feckless and of no further use.

Secondly, within western Europe itself, there is a growing feeling of unease about the intentions of the US. Clear recent British opinion poll evidence shows that the British public have an increasing mistrust of the United States. At best there is a desire for Europe to stand more together and to become more assertive. At worst there are those, albeit relatively few as yet, whose anti-Americanism is so strong that they would sunder the Atlantic relationship immediately.

Thirdly, there are clear pressures within the Warsaw Pact, too. At best the changes in relations between the satellite states and the Soviet Union could product a more flexible and less monolithic grouping. At the worst, they could provoke another outbreak of Soviet repression—another exercise in the Brezhnev doctrine.

That the nature of the framework in which our foreign policy has been fixed for so long is now changing, there can be little doubt. The trick will be to make use of the best forces for change while not letting loose the worst ones. For there are forces on both sides which, if allowed free rein, could endanger the integrity of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Such violent changes would be extremely dangerous and destabilising in the present context of the superpower confrontation. Balances of terror work only when both sides remain approximately in balance—the decay of one side before the other produces conditions in which risks to limit damage and adventures to exploit advantage can become attractive. Furthermore, reducing the weights on either side is best done where the moment of forces is least, around the fulcrum, at the centre.

And this is Europe's unique position. The world faces two principal and so far intractable problems—peace in the rich world and life in the poor one. The European nations are in a special position to lead the way in helping to solve both these problems; but it will need a change in our foreign policy to do so.

Within NATO, the Western Europeans should combine to create a

cohesive force capable of forming the second pillar of Kennedy's vision. The purpose will be to ensure that the European voice is strong enough to act as a counterbalance and restraint on our US allies. We will certainly need more co-ordinated defence industries, more closely integrated defence forces, and maybe even a European component to the Western nuclear deterrent, to give this effect. We could then demand a third chair at the disarmament table. Our role would be to show the two superpowers the way out of the cul-de-sac. Taking up Mr. Gorbachev's recent offer of direct bi-lateral disarmament talks could be a first step.

Meanwhile, Western Europe can follow a positive and, if necessary, aggressive policy of contact, trade and rapprochement with our eastern European neighbours. Both superpowers will be nervous of this and the Russians will probably actively resist it. We will have to find the strength and the imagination to persist. In the end we might even reach a point where the gradual implementation of a Rapacki type mutual withdrawal of Soviet and US forces from the border areas could become a possibility. However, it would be foolish to fix targets or end points for these developments. We will have to be flexible, pressing at open doors rather than waste time attempting to overcome blockages.

Externally, Europe can start actively developing its North/South relationships. The Lome conventions provide an interesting if very limited role model on which to build. We can only gain from stronger specifically European links with the Arab nations. Latin America shows every signs of wishing to avoid entrapment in either of the superpowers spheres of influence. We should support them. China has a crucial role to play in establishing a multi-sided structure of world influence to take the place of the present bipolar one.

New North/South relationships may also require changes in our traditional patterns of trade; for instance in agriculture, where Europe has now developed unmanageable surpluses. Why should we be trapped within our historical position as an importer of food and an exporter of industrial goods to the extent that we now seek to inhibit our agriculture industry, one of the few efficient ones we have left, in order to solve the problems? A key problem in the Third World is food. If we change the trading pattern we could help provide what they badly need, sell goods we can produce efficiently and build new North/South relationships in the process.

I recall, as a diplomat at the UNCTAD IV conference in Nairobi, being required (by a Labour Minister incidentally) to spend my time trying to smash up emerging groupings between the Nations of the Second and Third World. The growth of alternative 'blocks' were considered by the British Foreign Office to be inimical to Britain's best interests. Why? We should be working to encourage alternative centres of influence in the world as a method of breaking out of the present dangerous East/West myopia. One way of achieving this might be to reconsider whether we really need two European places on the UN Security Council, or whether we would all be better served by a

more flexible and more relevant pattern of membership. As Metternich knew, a multi-sided world is safer than a bipolar one. More importantly, it would also be a world in which the influence of smaller groups such as Europe is likely to be better protected and prosecuted than as at present, crushed between the superpowers. Most important of all Europe, developing and profiting from alternative North/South relations, might cause the superpowers to recognise that they too had better begin paying some attention to matters other than their own eyeball to eyeball confrontation with each other. Again, both superpowers would be nervous about such independent action—but again, we will have to find the imagination and courage to resist them.

Europe's subservience to the US/USSR relationship has distorted the superpowers' vision of the true nature of the world in which they exercise power and blinded us to the options which are open to us. The time has come to begin to break out. We in Europe have a unique role to help loosen the dangerous stranglehold of bipolar politics and to establish a more natural and stable multi-sided pattern of world relationships. In the process we could protect and pursue our own interests; better still, we could help to create conditions which would breathe life back into our international organisations and defuse the narrow band power dominated relationships which prevail between nations at present, in favour of more robust 'broad band' ones.

It is a role which Metternich would have recognised—and enjoyed.

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# ACCORD OR DISCORD—REPUBLICANS AND UNIONISTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

## by Roy Morrell

THE Ulster Unionists' surprise that the Irish Republic—an 'alien power'—should be consulted about the affairs of the United Kingdom is itself surprising. Dr. Paisley and his followers are surely aware of the love, passionate and longstanding although sadly unrequited, which the English have for the Irish. A tiresome weed that I try to eradicate from my rose-bed, and would not wish upon my most bothersome of neighbours, is ceremoniously flown every year from the Irish Republic for presentation on 17th March to the Queen Mother. British soldiers, if we may judge from the recent Cenotaph ceremonies, still march to a song proclaiming that the 'sweetest girl' known to each marcher lives in a remote town in the Republic and that his 'heart is right there', and if the Unionist leaders still doubt the willingness with which the English welcome the co-operation of Irish Republicans, they have only to consult the Electoral Registration Form which many of us have recently filled in and on which we were required by law to enter every resident Irish Republican over the age of eighteen so that he can vote in all elections alongside British citizens and, of course, serve on juries in British Courts: the last a very necessary provision, for by what other shibboleth could defence lawyers hope to select jurors for the acquittal of spies and terrorists?

In an article published a few years ago I suggested the possibility of a solution to the 'troubles' if a revision of the Border, long overdue, excluded from the Province some of the largely Republican areas, so that the ratio of Unionists to Republicans was increased from two to one to possibly three or four to one. This would be strenuously opposed by 'Not-an-inch' and 'No-surrender' Unionists and opposed equally passionately by the IRA who would see in it an endorsement and perpetuation of Partition. But it is precisely because no solution will satisfy both sides, and because no solution short of overwhelming victory with humiliation and unconditional surrender of the enemy will satisfy either side, that a compromise, logically defensible but resented equally by both sides, must be imposed. Not imposed by the British: that would be disastrous for Anglo-Irish as well as Anglo-American relations. But imposed by a consensus of European opinion, backed by the Irish and British governments—imposed, indeed, rather as the present 'agreement' has been imposed. Both the IRA and the Protestant extremists would be enraged at having to make the best of a bad job, but for the rest of the United Kingdom (who pay the bill for the violence and the slaughter and destruction in the Province) and for most of the inhabitants of Ireland, North and South, that 'best'—meaning peace—would be more than acceptable.

The strength of the Unionist position lies in their two-to-one majority and in the promise, by successive British governments, of self-determination. But the stance adopted by the Unionist MPs jeopardises that position by endeavouring to stretch the promise so as to implicate Britain in unreasonable and unjust commitments. First, they assume that the British promise confers a Unionist right to veto consultations between Dublin and Westminster: they make it clear that had they been consulted about the recent Anglo-Irish agreement, they would have blocked it and that, now that it has the support of Westminster, they will do all they can to make sure the agreement fails. In this last endeavour they will at least have the full support of the IRA, and of Mr. Tom King's unruly tongue.

But the full significance of their opposition to the agreement lies in what it reveals of the unionist hard-liners' true aims. Dr. Paisley and Mr. Molyneaux are not fools; they are experienced politicians who do not need Mr. King to tell them that the agreement, with its reaffirmation of the principle of self-determination by Mrs. Thatcher and a recognition of that same principle by Dr. Fitzgerald as well as a recognition by the latter of the Border, enormously strengthens the 'union'. So their objections must mean that union with Britain is not their sole aim. Their real aim is clearly to maintain the *status quo*, to maintain a situation in which the traditional feuds against Republicans and Catholics can be carried on. Actions sometimes have unintended effects; but if the action is repeated again and again with the same effect, we can assume that the effect is part of the aim. So what is the aim of the Parades? What is all this about King William III and the Battle of the Boyne and 'the sash my father wore' and the Londonderry Apprentice Boys? Was the 1969 Apprentice Boys' March scheduled to last over six hours or was it rather that it took over six hours—and might have taken ten—to achieve its aim of so humiliating the Republicans (who are in a majority in Londonderry) that they at last resorted to stone-throwing? What are all the Union Jacks, big and little, doing in Belfast? Except on some special occasion, such as victory day at the end of a war, the Englishman sees no similar display in England, and wonders why some streets of Belfast are full of them? And why the word 'Unionist'? Has not union with Britain been part of Northern Ireland's constitution for generations? So, why have a political party so named? The United States enjoys its independence without having an 'Independence Party': the very idea of its having one is grotesque. We don't have a 'British Party' to remind us that we are no longer ruled by the Normans. So what sense, what practical use, can the word 'Unionist' have? Like the flags, and the marches, and the bricks on the house-fronts painted red white and blue, and the obscenities about the Pope scrawled on the slum walls, the word Unionist' serves one useful purpose: it is a taunt, a confrontation, something to arouse and to keep alive the old hatreds, the triumphs and betrayals and humiliations of nearly three hundred years ago.

Of course, this is not the whole story. The IRA is sufficient reminder

that there is plenty of bigotry on both sides. In its actual Constitution the Irish Republic claims jurisdiction over the whole of Ireland, North and 'South', and the Northerners rightly resent this. But this is precisely where Dr. Fitzgerald is trying to rectify matters. One of the few mistakes in the agreement, surely, is the proposed permission for the display in the Province of the Republican flag. The Province is too full as it is of banners, challenges, declarations, taunts and confrontations; and it would have been more to the point if—with the exception of two or at most three official buildings—the Province had banned display of the Union Jack. As for 'Unionist', the word should have been banned long ago, and so too the parades—which would seem comic to any disinterested observer if they were not so pitifully barbaric and childish. They should be seen for what they are: incitements to public disorder and breaches of the peace. And it is these incitements that Britain is gulled into endorsing when we promise to guarantee Ulster's way of life, her self-determination and her continued union with Britain.

But on both sides of the fence in Northern Ireland many people are living a normal, peaceful, working-and-playing, family life, oblivious of the 'troubles' except for what they see on television, and they would be happy to continue thus. And a very large number of 'Unionists' (in the broad sense of those who accept and favour union with Britain), perhaps the majority of them, take no part in these absurd marches, and would be very content with the new agreement. Unfortunately they are only too easily rallied under the Loyalist flag by Dr. Paisley and other extremist leaders. Taking a lead from Pavlov's experiments, Hitler and Goebbels long ago discovered that fear was the quickest and surest means of persuasion, and loyalist extremists have only to present the bogey of Catholic and Republican domination for almost every Protestant in the Province to react in panic. The greater security offered by the agreement will count for nothing if the matter can be brought to a referendum: the extremists can be confident of controlling the result.

All the same, in Britain and (I believe) abroad, Dr. Fitzgerald's and Mrs. Thatcher's 'accord' has had an excellent press, and it is to be hoped that reason and good sense will prevail against the indignation and anger in loyalist ranks. Typical of these was the protest—shown on television—of a preacher telling his flock that victims of the IRA must not be seen to have given their lives only for their cause to be betrayed and for peace to be brought to Ulster through an evil compromise with their killers and their killers' supporters. Not perhaps a notably Christian message, but understandable enough and even reasonable and arguably urged in good faith, if the Protestants of Northern Ireland stood to lose anything. They do not. Or rather, what they stand to lose is a bundle of negative stances directed at perpetuating past hatreds and honouring past heroes: what they stand to gain is peace for their children and grandchildren. Committed to the past, they ignore present values and envenom the future.

The enemies of Ulster often argue that Ireland is nationally, culturally and economically a single entity, and that a democratic vote from the

Republican majority in all Ireland should decide the issue for the whole island. They forget that the British Isles were once taken for granted as a single entity, nationally, culturally and economically; and that a majority vote would have kept Ireland within the British Isles. Most of us would agree today that the Republic had, and has, a right to self-determination and freedom. By the same criterion, Northern Ireland has a right to self-determination and freedom from the Republic. How far—that is to how small a unit—should such a principle extend? Not, one supposes, to hamlets or small enclaves. But to an outsider it certainly seems glaringly obvious that when there exists a natural barrier such as a broad river, and on the Republican side of it and contiguous to but not actually in the Republic there is a city the majority of whose citizens are Catholics or Republicans, then the same principle should apply, and that city, if its inhabitants so desire, should be part of the Republic. I refer, of course, to Londonderry—fully aware that not only the Apprentice Boys, but all Unionists, will be up in arms in horror.

None the less, I recommend to Mr. King the idea of a commission on the Border. I know little of Newry and other towns in the south of the Province, but I suspect that with the co-operation of the Republic the Border might very sensibly be re-drawn with two aims in view: first, that of incorporating areas of mainly Republican sympathisers into the Republic and so increasing the security of the Province and, second, of creating a real (and perhaps much shorter) frontier which could be defended more effectively and penetrated less easily.

'Something there is that doesn't love a wall' wrote that tolerant and kindly poet Robert Frost, and surely most of us in Britain and America would like to see that wall down and both parts of Ireland friendly, if not united; but until North and 'South' are ready to trust each other, the wall seems inevitable. As Frost's friend insisted, 'Good fences make good neighbours': perhaps we should regard the wall not just as inevitable, but as an inevitable preliminary to the coming of good neighbourliness and—who knows—eventual unity.

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# THE FUTURE FOR HONG KONG

## by S. F. Bailey

HONG Kong, the last real spending money in the British Imperial Treasury, consists of a small piece of the Chinese mainland and well over two hundred islands, only two of which are of any size. The biggest, Lantau, is about the size of the Isle of Wight but is only sparsely inhabited, and the second biggest is Hong Kong Island itself. The whole colony (but territory is the term the Chinese prefer us to use) amounts to about 410 square miles and the built-up area is about 8% of it, roughly 34 square miles. In that 34 square miles are nearly 5½ million people, 98% of them Chinese and 57% born in Hong Kong. 46% of them are under 25 years old.

There are three solid rocks which provide the foundation for Hong Kong's economy. First is the port, one of the world's greatest, and the trans-shipment and entrepôt work that goes with a big port. The installations are large. It is the third busiest container port in the world after New York and Rotterdam and will shortly overtake New York. The port, trans-shipment and entrepôt work, the original reasons for establishing Hong Kong nearly a hundred and fifty years ago, are almost wholly manned, and mainly managed, by Chinese. Second, there is the rock of manufacturing developed mostly after the Red Army's victories in 1950. This, too, is large—for example, Hong Kong is by value the world's second largest exporter after Switzerland of watches, and by volume the world's largest. This sector is also mainly manned and managed by Chinese. Third there is banking and international finance, up among the world leaders and close behind New York and London. In this sector the non-Chinese are more conspicuous, but it is still mainly manned and to a considerable extent managed by Chinese.

In short, in the event of the 2% of non-Chinese being thrown out of Hong Kong, the first two sectors and most of the third would notice very little difference and survival, then as now, would be subject only to the vagaries of party line directives from Beijing with possible amendments from the by no means powerless Provincial Government of Kwantung in Canton. The crucial questions are: does the Government in Beijing really want Hong Kong in roughly its present form; and what is the likelihood of that Government being able simultaneously to develop China industrially and keep under control the centuries old dislike of foreigners?

The historical record is not comforting. China's long isolation was intensified when Manchu invaders from the north set up the Ching dynasty in 1644. Foreigners themselves, they were quick to guard against any further contacts with the outside world; but even before the Ching a pack of hungry outsiders had begun to gnaw at the fabric of the Chinese Empire. In 1535 the Portuguese bribed their way into a settlement at Macau and in 1573 by administrative fiat declared it their possession in perpetuity. In 1689 the

Russians, who had long been raiding from the north, signed with the Chinese the Treaty of Nerchinsk. This was at least a formal treaty, formally concluded, and as a result the Russians had for many years the diplomatic status denied to other foreigners. The British, who had no diplomatic status, seized Hong Kong Island as a result of the Opium Wars of 1839/40 and this was followed by constant manoeuvring between the western powers as they jockeyed for position round what was generally seen as a very lucrative corpse. Trouble, for the Chinese, was never far away and in 1860 the British, partly aided and partly hampered by the Russians, Americans and French, forced their way into Beijing and sacked the Summer Palace. The British as a reward for their vandalism were granted by the Chinese freehold rights in Kowloon. The near-catastrophic defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 led to more concentrated efforts to get as much as possible from the unfortunate victim, especially by way of railway concessions and in the case of the British by way of the lease of the New Territories as well. As leases go it was an odd one, badly drafted and incomplete; and unlike most leases no rent was specified, not even a peppercorn rent, and no rent was ever paid either. The Boxer Rebellion of 1900, which highlighted the role of inland transport in attack as well as in defence, heated still further the scramble for railway concessions.

Indeed, the story of China's railways in what became known as the War of Concessions well illustrates both the relentless commercial acquisitiveness of the crowd of invaders (there were a round dozen national representatives trapped in the Boxer siege of Beijing) and Chinese attempts, then regarded as pathetically inadequate but now perhaps more accurately seen as merely far-sighted, to hold them off. The concessionaires made their profits several times over on the basic financing, on the supply of equipment and materials, on the construction and finally on the running of the lines when construction was finished, not to mention persistent attempts to claim extraterritorial rights on and near the lines. Effective opposition came not from the throne in Beijing, which was ill-informed, pusillanimous and corrupt, but from the Chinese bureaucracy which, despite being about equally ill-informed, pusillanimous and corrupt, nevertheless retained sufficient professional pride to try to maintain in the documents recording successive defeats some sort of escape clause or ambiguity which one day might help a future Chinese government to redress the position. P. H. Kent writing in 1907 said of the Peking Syndicate Railway Agreement of 1905 that it 'affords a remarkable illustration of the Chinese dislike of foreign-owned railways in the country, and their desire to secure wherever possible at least a theoretic control regardless of cost' and speaking more generally said 'there is not one (railway) line . . . of which China has not secured the right, some time or other, to assume sole control.' That was the spirit which pervaded railway concession agreements, and it ran as strongly in all Chinese dealings with outsiders. Industrially, technically and militarily they were outclassed and knew it; but they never abandoned the hope, however forlorn it might appear, that one day, somehow, China would be Chinese again.

The bitterness fostered by a century and a half of plundering and humili-

ation is today still present, as bright and fresh as ever; but the position of the Chinese has changed. So has ours. In, say, 1898 they saw Britain as a major power even though the pre-eminence in heavy industry which was the source of that power had by then been lost to the USA and Germany. It was a declining and soon to be broken power to which the Chinese kow-towed, although neither they nor we recognised this. But now, now they know we are not a major power; and if China is willing (as she is) to face if needs be either the USSR or the USA, or both, in the field there will be little hesitation over scoring off Britain. Nor does it present physical problems. It will not even be necessary to push over the frail chain-link fence separating the five and a half million from the thousand million. All they need do is turn off the water tap and Hong Kong will fade as rapidly as it rose. And when they speak of sovereignty they mean it. They also mean to have it. Chinese chauvinism is alive, waiting to be irritated into action. What about the party line in Beijing?

The Chinese being Chinese, and more far-sighted than we are, physical confrontation will probably not arise unless in our outdated arrogance we push them into it. For safety's sake we have to abandon the rhetoric of 'Great' Britain and talk and walk as quietly and as unobtrusively as possible; and for the moment we seem to be doing this. With any luck (and the record is black enough for us to need some luck) the political managers in Beijing may be able to develop a rational party line for Hong Kong unhampered by too many outbreaks of popular hatred of foreigners.

The agreement which has now been formally ratified between the Chinese Government and the British is better than almost anyone expected and many would say better than the British, whether in London or Hong Kong, deserved. There is a fairly obvious reason for this. The Beijing policy line for the moment needs Hong Kong. As long as the pressures in China for economic and technical improvement persist then the economical and technical expertise thick on the ground in Hong Kong will be a relatively important part of Beijing plans; and Hong Kong expertise, whatever the influences which have enabled it to develop, is acceptably Chinese and mainly managed by Chinese. This counts for a lot. Moreover, there are solid reasons for expecting this situation to continue for some time. Western commentators, mostly city-orientated, tend to look to the big cities for the emergence of poliical developmens. China has plenty of big cities (Shanghai with a population variously estimated at about 13 million, and Beijing, Tientsin, Shenyang, Wuhan, Canton and others coming along nicely) whose growth, turmoil and proletarian instability are attractive and easy subjects for news reports. This overlooks the fact that roughly 80% of Chinese are in the countryside and that Mao and his successors have worked hard to keep things that way. The rate of growth of the population as a whole has fallen dramatically since the early 1950s, but within that overall figure the rate of growth of the urban population has fallen even more. In a stage of development where Western assumptions would expect urban rates of growth to increase while rural population rates of growth remained static or decreased, China has for the last thirty years or so worked the other way.

And the 80% are now better off and have better prospects than they perhaps have ever had. This is a very recent development. The seeds have been present for a long time, but Mao's increasingly erratic judgement on priorities in his later years first confused and then actively prevented useful progress. Statistics are hard to come by on the up to date position, but there is too much anecdotal evidence about increased rural prosperity for it to be wholly ignored and what statistics there are generally support the picture. According to the official figures, foodgrain production (which consists of rice, wheat, coarse grains, pulses, soybeans and root and tuber crops) has since the 1950s risen from about one and a third tons per hectare to over three tons per hectare in the early 1980s; and more of the benefits seem to be staying with the producers. From 1979 to 1981 the per capita retail sales of consumer goods (including the free market) rose by a little under thirteen per cent in the urban areas but by nearly forty-five per cent in the rural areas; and for the same period per capita personal savings rose by about sixty per cent in the urban areas but by well over one hundred per cent in the rural areas. In part, of course, the figures for personal savings are a measure of the extent to which people cannot get goods on which to spend their money, and even a train journey through the countryside provides ample visual evidence of what are by Western standards appalling levels of rural poverty. The point is that however bad it looks to a Westerner it is better than it was and has continued to improve since 1981. A further point is that after many, many generations of grinding hardship, some eight hundred million or so peasants are getting the flavour of a different way of life. It will take more than a palace revolution in Beijing to make acceptable a return to their immemorial sufferings. The Beijing party line, like most centrally controlled party lines, may wave about a bit, but there are now far too many people with a vested interest in continuing in the same general direction for there to be anything like a complete reversal. In these circumstances and with reasonable competence in the party managers (and their present control of a huge and nearly ungovernable country is some evidence of this), China should stay on course and there should continue to be therefore a role for Hong Kong as the provider of the technical expertise and experience that will make that line work until far into the next century.

Even so, there is plenty of room for trouble in that the agreement which has been signed has, perhaps unavoidably, many ambiguities and evasions. Hong Kong, for example, retains its legal and financial systems, and the socialist system and socialist policies practised in the People's Republic will not be extended to Hong Kong; but to an unknown extent this will depend on the Basic Law still to be enacted and on definitions still to be agreed. Everyone hopes that the present goodwill between officials on both sides will be maintained in the work of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group established to manage the transition and handover, but there can be no guarantees. Again, Hong Kong has under the agreement been guaranteed freedom of the press, speech, assembly, association, residence, and entering and leaving. Great stuff; but these freedoms are all guaranteed right now in China itself under the present constitution and no deep research is needed

to find out that they have in practice become limited. Admittedly, these freedoms have at times also been eroded by the British government of Hong Kong, but for most of the time they have been more widely respected than they have in China. Oddly enough, on two points Hong Kong is being offered a better deal by the Chinese than they have had under the British. The agreement provides, at least in principle, for Hong Kong to control its own shipping register and aviation routes, both of which have in principle and in practice been kept rigidly under Whitehall control by the British; and Hong Kong may possibly have more say in its trade and GATT agreements. On these points Beijing has been more sensitive to local aspirations than have Whitehall and Downing Street.

The factor which remains incalculable, although precautions can be taken, is the popular dislike of foreigners; and the major difficulty is that it will lie hidden under a combination of good manners and political necessity until some incident, possibly in itself a minor affair, releases a sudden flood of outrage and fury. The colonial service managers of Hong Kong, living and working in the place, have generally been aware of this problem, whatever their other faults. They had to be; and almost any Hong Kong old hand could quote examples of sudden surges of resentment and popular tumult that came uncomfortably close to disaster. The expectation now is that Beijing, having demonstrated the ability to clamp down on the Chinese tradition of large families, will similarly be able to hold a line on an acceptable level of contact with foreigners. There is every indication that the party leaders recognise the need to do so, and are going to try.

Whether foreigners either recognise the danger or have the ability to do anything about it is another question. At the moment the position bears a superficial likeness to that early in the last century, when the major world powers were scrambling to get at the spoils in the old Empire. Then, however, the Empire was seen as an inert victim, ripe for highway robbery; the People's Republic of today bears no comparison. There is another difference. A century and a half ago Britain was leading the raiders, but today it is well to the rear in securing business openings in China. Some British business is channelled through Hong Kong, and the figures for British deals in China may be understated; but although there has recently been a rapid increase in trade between Hong Kong and China, not all of this is necessarily to the benefit of Britain. The USA, for example, has a manufacturing investment in Hong Kong nearly eight times greater than that of Britain. In any case, the fact remains that since it was opened to the outside world, direct involvement in China by Britain has so far been poor and there has been little evidence of Hong Kong being used as a substitute channel either. The failure to make more use of Hong Kong as a specialist and experienced intermediary is puzzling, but there seems little that can be done about it. There have been endless exhortations from Hong Kong businessmen and officials, including the Governor; a short video extolling the existing international investment in Hong Kong (with hardly a British name mentioned) aimed at British businessmen has been produced; the Hong Kong Trade Development Council beavers away world-wide; and the Hong Kong Gov-

ernment Office in London yearns for signs of interest. It gets nowhere. Given the British penchant, well known outside Britain, for stamping on other people's corns, the limited amount of direct business is, however, perhaps just as well.

To summarise, there is a high probability that the managers of the People's Republic will in one way or another cope with their own troubles whatever they may turn out to be, and that Hong Kong will continue in something like its present form up to and beyond 1997. It will continue to be the obvious place to work with, and through, for anyone with a serious interest in dealing with China and will continue to be recognisably much the same noisy, hard working, extrovert, sensitive but, above all, successful place in fifty years' time as it is now.

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## A NEW STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT

Brian Walker wishes to make the following correction in his article, 'A New Strategy for Development', published in *Contemporary Review* (No. 1440, Vol. 248) on page 6 line 2 and 3 of second paragraph . . . 'under their title programme'. . . should read
. . . 'under their PL 480 programme' . . .

# HOW THE WEST LOST THE PEACE IN 1945: Part II

## by Sir John Colville

SINCE 1941 goods shipped to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease had, by Roosevelt's order, been sent without careful documentation or searching questions. Now the Soviet authorities were making enormous demands for aircraft and munitions, and for industrial equipment of a kind they could use only after the war. Roosevelt and Hopkins firmly declined Harriman's proposal that these orders should be carefully examined. The State Department suffered from the strange delusion that a tough policy towards the Soviet Union might result in its making a separate peace with Germany—a reversion to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

The President, Harry Hopkins and many in the State Department believed that the leopard really was in the process of changing its spots. To some extent they resembled those who in the early 1930s argued that Hitler was not to be judged as the author of *Mein Kampf*, a book he had written ten years previously. He had mellowed; responsibility had sobered him; he should no longer be judged by his original ideology. What the gullible had said of Hitler, the White House and the State Department were in danger of believing of Stalin; and Roosevelt constantly declared that he knew how to handle 'U.J.' (Uncle Joe). Churchill suffered from the same illusion; but unlike Roosevelt, he was not the dupe of Soviet policy and he was fully alive to the dangers. 'U.J.' was in fact much more cunning than either of them and not in the least ashamed of duplicity.

In February 1945, SS General Karl Wolff approached Allen Dulles, head of the American intelligence organisation, OSS, in Zurich, to discuss the possibility of negotiating a German surrender in Italy. The Russians got hold of the story even before the approach had been reported to the White House and Downing Street. They made a fuss which lasted over a month, accused the Western allies of plotting a separate peace with the Germans, and used such harsh language that even Roosevelt was roused to express resentment 'for such vile misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted colleagues.' Stalin, who thought divisive tactics might be rewarding, then alleged that the plot was organised by the British, who in fact only knew about it secondhand. This episode left the Americans with a sense, not indeed of guilt, but of anxiety not to offend the Soviet Government further. Appeasement had high priority in Washington and, what was still more serious, at Supreme Allied Headquarters (SHAEF) where Eisenhower held sway in Europe.

Stalin declared that he only wished to extend Russia's boundaries for defence purposes. *Primarily* would have been a more appropriate adverb than *only*; for although the Soviet rulers were understandably determined never again to risk invasion of their Russian heartland, they did not

discard the dream of Communising the whole world in accordance with the prophecies of Marx and Lenin. The Comintern had been dissolved; friendship and even an occasional expression of gratitude were temporarily permissible; but further ideological aspirations had been shelved rather than abandoned.

For the present, the wretched Baltic states fell into the 'frontier security' category. So did Finland's Karelian isthmus, the Rumanian province of Bessarabia, and also Bukovina, which had never before been part of Russia, not even in the palmiest days of czarist expansion. Stalin was determined to hold all the territory which had been granted to him by the Nazis under the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939. Later on, by declaring war on Japan a few days before the Japanese surrendered, he acquired desirable accretions in the Far East. Rumania, Bulgaria, what remained of Poland, and in due course Hungary and Czechoslovakia might remain nominally independent; but they must be controlled by the Soviet Union.

It was the fate of Poland, for which Britain and France had gone to war in 1939, and which they had promised to restore to freedom, that was the main bone of contention in the early months of 1945. The legal Polish government had sought refuge in London and many thousands of Poles, under the indomitable General Anders, were fighting with their usual dash and gallantry in Field Marshal Alexander's army. The British therefore felt a greater obligation to ensure an acceptable Polish settlement than did the Americans, though prior to the presidental election Roosevelt did, as already noted, have to bear in mind the sizeable Polish element in the American electorate. The trouble was that the Soviet armies were already on Polish soil and they were not at all disposed to abandon control of it. Before the war the French had hoped to use the Little Entente of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, originally formed to prevent a restoration of the Hapsburgs in Hungary, to help contain Germany. Stalin was understandably determined there should be no such peripheral arrangement to contain the Soviet Union.

In August 1944, the United States was at first grudging in providing airlifted aid to the beleaguered Home Army in Warsaw; but Roosevelt finally listened to Churchill's urgent demand for support in augmenting the supply of arms and ammunition the RAF was dropping for the Poles. It was a long flight; the Russians refused to allow British or American planes to land and refuel on Soviet territory; and the Americans had at first declined to agree to the use of two airfields in Italy under their control and in range of Warsaw. The State Department told Harriman it was anxious not to upset the Russians by helping the Warsaw insurgents. Roosevelt instructed Harriman to let the Kremlin know that he would take no interest in Polish affairs until after the November election. Churchill prevailed, but despite all the efforts of the British and American air forces, the epic struggle of the Polish patriots ended in defeat.

Then, in February 1945, came the Yalta Conference. The British were insistent that a settlement of the Polish problem should be high on the

list of priorities, and the Americans, though more cynical in their approach, did not demur. After long discussions and much argument it was agreed that some non-Communist Poles should be invited to join the government—though they would be but a minority—and that 'free and unfettered elections,' in which all except the fascist parties should be allowed to put forward candidates, would be held within a few months. The British delegation was not content with the vagueness of the Soviet promises or the design of the proposed Polish government; but since the Russians and Americans were in agreement, Churchill and Eden had to give way, though they knew there would be trouble in the House of Commons.

During the next two months it became clear that the Russians had no intention of abiding by their undertakings. Stalin had told Harriman that he never broke a promise, but he did sometimes change his mind! The Russians prevaricated, they arrested and incarcerated sixteen Polish leaders who had been given a safe conduct to visit Marshal Zhukov, and Stalin blandly stated that he was pledged to the formation of a pro-Soviet government 'by the blood of the Soviet people which had been profusely shed on the fields of Poland in the name of liberation.' Nobody had the courage to mention the blood of the Polish people shed at Katyn and the murder of Polish leaders at Siedlec in East Poland and elsewhere. It was soon clear that the Yalta agreement on Poland was a dead letter.

This Polish imbroglio, and the unscrupulous overthrow of the democratic leaders in Rumania, might have been expected to alert General Eisenhower and the American Chiefs of Staff to the fact that there *were* political factors to be taken into account as the Anglo-American armies continued their advance into Germany. Unfortunately they were wrapped up in a purely military cocoon from which Eisenhower only once emerged and that with dire consequences.

General Eisenhower was in no sense a 'field commander' as Marshall and many other Americans maintained. But he ranks with Marlborough as the commander of an alliance. His scrupulous fairness, his untainted honesty, and his qualities of leadership were such that no criticism can diminish his fame as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Unfortunately in the last two months of the war, deprived of authoritative political advice when it was particularly important, he made a capital error; for with all his virtues he was remarkably naïve.

His two principal lieutenants were the British General Montgomery and the American General Omar Bradley. Both were men of high quality, but Montgomery, who had fought throughout World War I, and had already won high praise in this war for his command of the 3rd Division in the Dunkirk campaign and for having led the 8th Army to victory in North Africa, was incomparably the more experienced professional soldier. He had, however, shown signs of being, as Eisenhower (and indeed Churchill) thought, too slow and cautious in Normandy; his sole adventurous decision, at Arnhem, had failed tragically; he could not resist criticising, with total lack of tact, both Eisenhower and Bradley,

whom he considered military amateurs; and although he had been called in to retrieve the situation when, in December 1944, the Germans, bursting out of the Ardennes, all but broke the American armies in front of them, his subsequent boasting was insufferable. So, not surprisingly, Eisenhower preferred Bradley whom, in a letter to General Marshall, he described as 'the greatest battle-line commander I have met in the war.' Americans often tend to make excessive use of superlatives.

The plan had been that Montgomery's 21st Army Group, containing the large British 2nd Army, the Canadian Army, and the American 9th Army under the excellent General Simpson, should mop up resistance in north Germany, capture Hamburg and Lübeck, and then, once the Ruhr had been taken or surrounded, strike eastward to Berlin. Suddenly, late in March, Eisenhower altered his strategy. He removed Simpson's 9th Army from Montgomery and gave it to Bradley's central command. Impressed by false intelligence information that the German government had left Berlin and was intent on a desperate last stand in the mountains near Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden, he decided to change his objective from Berlin to Leipzig and Dresden.

He made this decision without consulting the President, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Prime Minister, or even his own Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Air Marshal Tedder. The only person he did consult, without the slightest authority for so doing, was Marshal Stalin.

Stalin must have licked his lips. Eisenhower's telegram was so incomprehensibly drafted that the American military mission in Moscow held it up for twenty-four hours for elucidation; but when it was delivered to the Kremlin on March 29, Stalin at once replied 'Your proposal entirely coincides with the plan of the Soviet High Command. Berlin has lost its former strategic importance. The Soviet High Command therefore plans to allot secondary forces in the direction of Berlin.'

Berlin, where Hitler, Goebbels, and Bormann were still installed, had not lost its importance. The capture of the capital of the Reich and the seizure or death of the Fuehrer could not fail to destroy any further German will to resist. Nor did the crafty Stalin have any intention of allotting the task to 'secondary forces.' Few things were likely to have a greater psychological effect in Eastern Europe than the capture of Berlin by the Soviet armies.

Eisenhower informed Churchill on March 31 of his unorthodox action. The next day Churchill sent a telegram to Roosevelt pointing out that the Russians were in any case sure to take Vienna. 'If they also take Berlin, will not the impression that they have been the overwhelming contributor to our common victory be unduly printed in their minds, and may this not lead them into a mood which will raise grave and formidable difficulties in the future? I therefore consider that from a political standpoint we should march as far East as possible and should Berlin be in our grasp, we should certainly take it.'

A day later Churchill replied to Eisenhower, including in his robust comments: 'I am all the more impressed with the importance of entering

Berlin . . . by the reply from Moscow to you which says Berlin has lost its former strategic importance. . . . I deem it highly important we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the East as possible.'

It so happened that the climax of Molotov's intransigence over Poland (and Molotov was, of course, obeying his master's voice) coincided with Eisenhower's approach to Stalin. Even this did not stir a dying President, a blind State Department, and generals who saw no reason to inject political considerations into strategic decisions. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, the able and energetic Bedell Smith, made one of the few wholly silly remarks in his career when he told a press conference that Berlin had no significance by comparison with the (mythical) National Redoubt in the Alps and with clearing German troops from Norway. In Washington they put all their trust in Eisenhower: he must make the decision. The State Department was convinced that an Anglo-American entry into Berlin ahead of the Russians would mean a fundamental change in American foreign policy. And who could authorise that? Only President Roosevelt, and he, who had once been such a fearless innovator, was long past taking such an initiative. His Vice-President, Harry Truman, had no knowledge of what was happening.

The 21st Army Group had been poised to set off for Berlin since March 28, but Eisenhower told Montgomery: 'As far as I am concerned Berlin is nothing but a geographical location.' So Montgomery was checkmated. However, General Simpson and his 9th Army, now detached from the 21st Army Group, were convinced that they could take Berlin on their own. They crossed the Elbe on April 12, the day Roosevelt died, and there was only one weak German force between them and the city. Simpson believed he could take it in less than forty-eight hours, but Eisenhower forbade him to move. It is said that on April 11, when the 9th Army first reached the Elbe, General Patton besought Eisenhower to let Simpson go for Berlin. 'Well, who would want it?' Eisenhower is reported to have asked. 'I think history will answer that question,' Patton replied. History's answer was, of course, the Russians. They reached Berlin on April 22; the Anglo-American armies had been standing within easy range for more than three weeks.

On April 13 there was a new President in the White House, a man of drive and courage who rapidly assimilated the information which had been so long denied him. It was too late; quick though he was to learn and to put a firm hand on the steering wheel of the world's most powerful machine, he could not be fully briefed in three weeks. Churchill hoped to impress on him, as he had vainly tried to do on Roosevelt, that although in due course British and American troops would have to be withdrawn from all parts of the zone of occupation allotted to the Soviet Union, they should stand firm until an acceptable solution to the Polish question had been reached and an Allied Control Commission had been established in Berlin. The Soviet government must also be forced to respond to the proposals made to them about Allied zones in Austria where they had denied entry to the Allied missions and had established

a government to suit their own purposes.

To the same end Churchill also wanted American troops to take Prague where the Czech insurgents were in control and had invited their entry. The Americans were within a few hours' distance, but Eisenhower thought it best not to risk upsetting the Russians. So he stopped his men short of Prague and consulted the Russians. Surprise, surprise; they at once endorsed his decision not to enter Prague; and though Churchill telegraphed urgently to Truman, the President, still too new to disregard the advice of his Chiefs of Staff, felt bound to uphold Eisenhower.

The sequel came three years later when the Soviet government organised a Communist *coup d'état* in Prague and democracy vanished from Czechoslovakia.

Truman was not, however, prepared to accept continued Soviet assertiveness. He soon recognised the importance of building counter-weights to Soviet importunities. No longer would it have been possible for the American Chiefs of Staff to decline to retaliate at Fairbanks, Alaska, when the Soviets grounded American aircraft and held their crews incommunicado at Pultava. No longer could the Russians deliberately break promises given at Yalta, as when they refused to allow a United States naval team to visit Gdynia in Poland. Under the previous regime, when Harriman had protested to Washington about such unfriendly acts, and advised mild retaliatory action, his pleas had been unheeded. Now things had changed, and to Churchill's joy, when he asked Truman to stand firm with him against Marshal Tito's aggressive designs on Trieste and Venezia Giulia, Truman's reply was prompt and affirmative. Indeed, only ten days after entering the White House, when Molotov called with his usual denials of breaches of the Yalta agreement, Truman was so wholesomely abrasive that Molotov complained that no one had ever spoken to him like that in his whole life.

It was no use for Stalin to continue his strategy of playing off the Americans against the British, as he tried to do in May when an ailing Harry Hopkins and Averell Harriman went to Moscow for talks in the Kremlin, talks replete with expressions of good will but achieving nothing. Truman was more impressed by the telegram Churchill sent him on May 12, first using the words 'Iron Curtain,' which he repeated in the world-shaking speech he made at Fulton, Missouri, the following March. As Churchill subsequently wrote: 'New perils, perhaps as terrible as any we had surmounted, loomed and glared upon the torn and harassed world.'

No doubt those perils would have loomed in any case, but they might have been mitigated if longer and wider views had prevailed in Washington under the eye of one of the greatest of American Presidents which had so unfortunately glazed over at a time when clear-sightedness was essential. His successor, also a great President, did all he could to restore sense and sanity; but he arrived in the White House at least three months too late. Churchill had good reason to call the last volume of his history of World War II *Triumph and Tragedy.*

# THE STATE OF LIBERALISM—CHALLENGES FROM LEFT AND RIGHT

## by Urs Schoettli

IN democratic societies Conservatives, Christian Democrats and Social Democrats are the main rivals to Liberalism. Extremist groupings both on the right and on the left are of marginal importance, since there is only a minimal loss of voters to them. A more complex challenge, however, is posed by the new citizen groups that have been formed around issues like ecology and peace. Although in some cases manipulated by extremists, these groups, both because of the nature of their support and because of the problems with which they are concerned, are not seen by many, particularly by younger voters, as extremist. Furthermore, since such groups tend to attract the educated, they pose a serious challenge to Liberalism.

In recent times the role of ideologies, particularly in Western Europe, has changed considerably. Abstract dogmas giving a general view on man and society have become irrelevant. This is evident in the rhetoric of politicians and in the texts of electoral manifestos and party programmes where the traditional terminology, clearly identifying the ideological position of a party, has given way to a pragmatic, even technical language.

This development has led to an erosion of distinctions between the major political families. The policy of Chancellor Schmidt was very similar to that of Margaret Thatcher when it came to such crucial issues as defence and monetary policies. In France, President Mitterand has shifted the emphasis of his economic policies more and more in the direction advocated by his centre-right opponents. Furthermore, the international solidarity seen by Socialists as one of their main political values has—in the face of specific national interests—repeatedly proved to be an illusion.

At the same time the late sixties and early seventies witnessed a rush of the major democratic parties towards the moderate centre. In fact many socialist, christian democrat and conservative parties usurped liberal values and a liberal image, knowing full well that to get a majority of the voters on their side such a label was useful. Elections are still won today on the basis of the centrist vote (most voters in the Western industrialised societies anyhow describe themselves as moderates), but since the middle of the seventies we witness—at least in rhetorics—a hardening of positions in some countries on the right as well as on the left side of the political spectrum.

The advent of conservative populists like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and the ideological hardening of the socialist movement in some countries (Great Britain, certain wings in the German SPD, Benelux) have created new challenges for Liberalism. Quite obviously, for a

growing sector of the electorate the ambition does not lie anymore with a moderate centre but with a distinctly coloured movement on the right or on the left. From these points of view the moderate position of liberals suddenly became unattractive or seemed even unfit to deal effectively with the new social and economic problems of the industrialised countries. Naturally, these developments have not taken place in all Western democracies. In fact we are currently faced with the situation that in some countries the struggle towards the centre is still very much alive, whilst in other countries a new polarisation is taking place. Therefore, any general analysis or answer must fail and the first task in developing a political strategy lies in the clear distinction of these two fundamentally different situations.

Among other aspects these divergencies are responsible for the international confusion about political terminology. Not only in the developing countries but also in many industrialised democracies there is a growing confusion about the term liberalism. This is not a new phenomenon. It has its roots in the 19th century when the tendency was to identify liberalism exclusively with a certain economic theory. However, in recent times this confusion increased partly due to the abuse of the term 'liberal' for a number of purposes, partly due to a loss of influence of the liberal forces in the media, particularly in the press.

Liberalism being a highly complex system of political ideas requires the existence of a press which need not necessarily be pro-liberal but which stimulates political debate, helps the formation of a differentiating political opinion and informs its readership in a fair way across the political spectrum. It has been repeatedly proved that in rational debates Liberalism has a clear edge over other political thoughts. Therefore, it is primarily to the detriment of Liberalism if the quality press loses ground or even turns against it. The modern mass media, with its tendency towards simplification and sensationalism, is an extremely stoney ground for political thoughts which require discrimination.

After an upsurge of Marxist and pseudo-Marxist movements in the late sixties and early seventies Communism has largely lost its appeal in the industrialised societies and its influence in the Third World has been on the wane ever since the imperialist nature of the main communist power, the USSR became evident in the Third World (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Indochina). Nevertheless, in one way Marxist thinking has had a lasting effect on the mind even of many non-Marxists—it has helped form and consolidate the opinion that human history is a one-dimensional process. This view leads to the conviction that in the process of development Socialism has replaced Liberalism as a political theory with a future. This is particularly the case in African and Asian developing countries where Socialism is synonymous with progress and democracy.

Taking these points into consideration, modern Liberalism is therefore confronted with the following challenges:

- a confusion of terminology
- a lack of possibilities to communicate with the public at large

the confrontationist attitude of neo-conservatism
the struggle of other political movements for a liberal position
the attraction of issue-oriented citizen movements.

Bearing in mind that political, social and economic conditions vary greatly from country to country, the possibilities of an international body like the Liberal International evolving a commonly valid strategy must be greatly limited. However, there are some areas in which the LI can be useful, particularly in helping to stimulate the exchange of ideas and experiences across national borders. Furthermore, in terms of ideas, use can be made of the basic documents of the LI. None of the other three Internationals has been able to reach a consensus on such detailed and realistic declarations of principles.

In the Western democracies Liberals once had a rather favourable press. In many countries the leading dailies used to be liberal in their political approach. In recent years many of these papers either moved away from Liberalism or opened themselves to all major political thoughts, claiming to be independent or ceased publication. This coincided in many countries with a general trend away from party-politically oriented newspapers. Quite obviously, this loss of an audience cannot be compensated by party newspapers. During the good years many Liberals became complacent and only reluctantly entered the now much harder competition for a press audience. Today, more attention should be given by Liberals to the training and selection of journalists and editors. In recent years there has been an unfortunate neglect of the journalistic profession by non-socialist parties. While the Left has been giving special attention to influence and woo journalists, the Liberals have, in general, remained rather distant. This is particularly evident in some state controlled media like TV and radio.

The neo-conservative movement as represented by leaders such as President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher or M. Chirac has—with considerable success—made confrontation with other political thoughts a central part of their political strategy. Unlike the general moderation which dominated party politics in the West in the seventies, the neo-conservatives have made it a point explicitly to distance themselves from the centre and from a general climate of democratic consensus. They have also taken up issues and used a language which hitherto were considered by the traditional non-socialist parties as being too populist or even 'taboo'.

It is quite evident that it would—to some extent—be self-defeating for Liberals who to a large extent depend on an educated, highly differentiating electorate, to imitate this strategy. However, the neo-conservatives have realised one important aspect of the modern media-society: in order to be heard and seen on the 'marketplace of information and communication' one has to use a more forceful language.

Furthermore, there have been some basic values of the free society which, in recent years, have been continuously attacked and disparaged by the left and which, after some time became suspicious even to the moderate forces right of centre. There was in the late sixties and seventies

a general reform of values in the industrialised societies of the West, and Liberals were, in many respects, part of this movement of reform. But on the other hand, one has to recognise that some of these reforms went too far and that values which could have made a useful contribution to liberal society were totally abandoned.

While the neo-conservatives have turned once more to the opposite extreme, it is the task of Liberals to identify and re-introduce those traditional values that are not only compatible with, but essential for, a free society. In several areas these values also concern form and tone (i.e. respect for authority, for majority decisions, etc.). There can be no doubt that a great number of potential or current liberal voters have been affected or even troubled by the rapid social and economic developments of the late sixties and seventies.

While promoting and accepting reform, it is equally important to give one's followers a clear idea of where the battleline is, where the defence of fundamental values begins.

The meaning of this may be explained by an example concerning international politics. There is a very wide-ranging consensus about the necessity and desirability of aid to developing countries. While the industrialised countries of the West experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth it was politically fairly easy and also rewarding to favour development aid. In recent years, however, doubts about over-generalised conditions of aid-giving have arisen, partly because the economies in the West grew less fast, partly because after several decades of development aid, conditions for the poorest of the poor in the LDCs had not improved noticeably. Furthermore, certain LDCs followed an openly anti-Western policy while still demanding aid from the West. In the eighties in particular, neo-conservatives brought into the debate new elements of doubt and criticism of traditional development aid. The notion came up that development aid should also be seen as part of the strategy to secure economic growth and employment in the industrialised countries, and that development aid should be tied to certain political demands like the respect of human rights.

To these arguments various approaches are possible. The least attractive and perhaps least popular is that of dogmatically defending development aid as an absolute value that is beyond criticism. In particular, there must be recognition of a legitimate measure of self-interest. In this, as in other cases, Liberals should be seen by the public to be in favour of progressive values such as reform, solidarity and internationalism, but promoting these values with a quite distinctive degree of realism and moderation.

During the last two decades Western Europe in particular has been witnessing a seemingly contradictory development. On the one hand, Liberal parties in many countries lost territory to competing parties on the left and on the right. On the other hand, liberal values and liberal attitudes became ever more popular, in fact so popular that individual representatives or even groups of the other democratic political families openly started adopting them. Before the growth of the neo-conservative

movement it looked as if all major political families would like to be seen to be part of the liberal centre.

There are three main challenges:

a challenge of image and perception
a challenge of values and contents
a challenge of opportunism.

All three challenges are interconnected and can be combined to form a formidable force eroding the electoral base of liberalism. The challenge of image and perception again arises out of a confusion about terminology. There are hardly any educated people who, in one way or another, would not like to consider themselves liberal. This may, on the one hand, be limited to certain aspects of life, e.g. a liberal attitude towards the arts, a liberal life-style. Conversely, it may describe a political attitude which the individual subjectively considers to be liberal.

The challenge of values and contents reaches even deeper. There is a considerable number of politicians and voters both on the right and on the left who would openly admit that they could subscribe to most of the liberal manifestos and programmes. This may be partly because certain liberal principles are so general that they can be supported by all democratic forces, partly, however, it is due to the fact that others have a highly eclectic attitude. Individual liberal values might easily be integrated into a conservative, christian-democratic or social democratic programme, since it is only the spirit of the whole programme which is decidedly liberal. The conservatives might adopt liberal principles with regard to cultural policies, whilst completely rejecting liberal principles regarding social policies, etc.

Finally, where to the public it seems possible to be a 'liberal' Social-Democrat or a liberal Conservative, the challenge of political careerism is particularly strong. If I can maintain a liberal image, I might as well join or support one of the large parties which not only have a greater chance of forming the government, but which also provide the comforting feeling of belonging to the strong and powerful forces. In answering these challenges, Liberals have to lay renewed emphasis on their distinct image and ideological identity.

Liberalism has much to do with a certain way of life or attitude to life. As mentioned earlier, this makes one of the major difficulties *vis-à-vis* other political families, since there is no such thing as a social-democratic or christian-democratic life-style. However, there are attitudes which are clearly incompatible with Liberalism, e.g. the approach of a functionary, of overbearing moral rigidity, etc. It is therefore, more than in any other political movements, important that leading Liberals adhere to this way of life and that the liberal movements are guided by its essence. This can manifest itself in the way parties are run, how election propaganda is made, etc.

The challenge of contents has to be seen in the historical light of the fact that today's free democracies are the creation of liberalism, there is in fact, only a liberal democracy not a social or conservative democracy. Therefore it is unavoidable that all political movements which fight on

the basis of a pluralistic, free democracy embrace a considerable number of common values that are distinctly liberal, e.g. the principle of division and control of power, the principles of religious freedom, press freedom, etc. It is therefore up to the Liberals to show to the public that there is a difference between a political approach that is entirely based on Liberalism and one which is dominated by other values. This is best conveyed by the fact that Liberals alone will not compromise on the basic principles of liberal democracy. In the case of the principle of division of power, both Christian-Democrats/Conservatives and Social-Democrats are not willing completely to give up, but certainly to undermine this principle when it clashes with their specific party political aims, e.g. major parties of the left and right, once in government, are frequently seen to reduce their parliamentary groups to mere acclamation instruments for the executive, by that abolishing the constitutional obligation of the legislative power to control the executive power.

In this Liberals should be seen by the public to take a distinctly different line, defending the people's influence and control against the vested interests of powerful lobbies.

While it is quite obvious that big parties can hand out many more favours than small parties, it has to be stressed that Liberals, when faced with such opportunities, quite often fail on two accounts. Firstly they tend to be too over-cautious to promote their own interests and party-members. There have been, and are, a number of cases where Liberals in high office rely on advisers, etc., who have either no party affiliation at all or even belong to another party. This is rarely the case where Social-Democrats or Conservatives hold power. Secondly, there is a tendency among Liberals to over-rationalise politics. There is in many Liberal parties a distinct lack of community feeling, which for historic reasons is particularly evident in the social-democratic parties. However, with the big parties having become entrenched in large-scale administration and in a functionalistic approach, it is time for the Liberals to popularise their political organisation, i.e. through giving more emphasis to grassroots-politics and to internal participation in decision-making.

This need for the return of Liberal parties to citizen movements leads directly to a major new challenge to the traditional party system as a whole, but to Liberals in particular. The movements which in recent years have arisen all over Europe, taking up such issues as peace, the environment or citizens' rights, should be taken up by Liberals with a positive, aggressive spirit. There is no reason to sit on the fence complaining about today's generations and wait till these 'new fashions' are fizzling out. Citizens' movements as such do not threaten or destroy traditional political parties, they are a challenge because, quite obviously, they have been concerned with issues which the traditional parties have either neglected or, through lack of grassroots contacts, have not been able to sense as major new problems. The appropriate way to deal with these new movements is neither to completely ignore their demands

nor to try to jump on the bandwagon. Liberals must stress their image as an open movement, open not only to new ideas but also to new people, particularly to those people who do not want to participate in the traditional forms of party work, but want to be more innovative and action oriented.

Furthermore, Liberals must stress that in the long run politics can never be oriented on single issues alone, that it is a complex system of values and decisions. There are many problems in society which are not linked to ecology or to international peace but on which parties and politicians are called upon to take a position. It is quite evident that many of the new movements fudge the issues by gimmicks, knowing quite well that if they deal with a specific problem fundamental ideological differences might come up which eventually will destroy the unity of the movement.

The task of Liberals is three-fold: Firstly they have to give greater attention to the new political problems, dealing with them in an open-minded manner. There are still too many ideological prejudices. Peace and the protection of the environment are neither left nor right, in fact valuable instruments to realise them are based on the liberal tradition, e.g. international arbitration, trans-national co-operation, free movement of goods, persons and ideas; decentralisation, competition, control of monopolies, whether in private or public sector. Particular attention must be given in order that other ideologies cannot claim exclusive rights over certain issues. There is nothing inherently peaceful in Socialism, nor is peace, by definition, a socialist prerogative.

Secondly, Liberals must open themselves to new modes of political activity. More spontaneity, more direct contacts with the citizen, more decentralisation of political decision-making within the party organisations themselves and a more issue-oriented language, instead of ceremonial declarations, are required.

Thirdly, a renewed effort must be made to explain and introduce to the public the fundamental difference between political movements based on single issues and political parties based on an extensive structure of political ideas. This refers not only to the fact that the political debate requires decisions on a whole variety of issues, but also to the fact that in reality issues like peace and the environment are interlinked with many other political issues. In fact a single-minded pursuance of a particular issue can do more harm than good. For many voters the green movement has been a reason to reject the whole issue of environmental protection as radicalism and excentrism. The integration of such issues into a wider political context helps to see them in the right perspective and to avoid hasty solutions which, in the long term, can only be negative.

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# BRITTLE LANGUAGE

## by John Elsom

I MUST start by explaining my somewhat fanciful title, for language is not supposed to be brittle. Brittle is a word which describes dry sticks, leads inside pencils, anything which snaps or breaks easily. Jumbo jets with metal fatigue become brittle. You can talk about a brittle beauty, meaning someone who looks fine in the right light—but cracks under stress, such as getting up in the morning, and you can describe people's characters as being brittle, if they are not to be trusted in a crisis.

But languages are not thought to be brittle, quite the reverse. They are flexible, adaptable, resilient. We have been using much the same mixed-up language in Britain for five hundred years, which is proof of our conservatism, and we've shaped the core language, English, into dialects which reveal where we've come from, our educations and sometimes our statuses. English can be used for high technology or low graffiti, can be transformed into a system of grammatical rules and vocabulary for the purpose of relating it to other languages through translation and it can provide the basis for new mixed-up languages, like Pidgin. It can even be spoken by Americans, up to a point. But it does not break, it does not snap.

The language of the theatre is equally malleable. In our theatre departments in universities we no longer concentrate on the plays of some twenty or thirty dramatists, the 'set texts', allowing research students to dig vainly around the seventeenth century to find some forgotten playwright on whom to build their doctorial theses. We have learnt, with the infinite ingenuity of academics who want their departments to expand, that drama is a process involving some form of *mimesis* which performs many functions in society and is certainly present in such non-literary theatrical forms as carnivals and circuses, hunting and religious rituals, street theatre and television game shows.

If we take this broad view, then theatre has clearly adapted itself well to the challenges of the new technology, further proof that it isn't brittle. There is more theatre in Britain than ever before and it reaches, through television and radio, more people. We have a choice of four or five plays on television every night, another three or four on radio, while those of us who have video-recorders can store those plays which were carelessly transmitted on nights when we had to go visiting; or we can replay films from local video libraries. With the coming of satellite and cable television we can happily look forward to a time when our social lives are completely saturated by the theatrical process.

I do not, on principle, view this prospect with alarm. There are many people whom I'd prefer not to talk to because television is on. When my children watched cops-and-robbers movies after school I felt that it kept them out of mischief, and fifty murders a night on television was

fine by me, provided that they didn't have the sound up too loud. And it is not complacency, but the reverse, which convinces me that sex and violence on television is not a fundamental cause of violence in our streets or on football terraces.

Many reputable surveys in Britain have failed to establish any causal link between television violence and city riots, or even muggings, and there is in fact no statistical connection. The same number of television murders are seen in peaceful British towns like Cheltenham or Tunbridge Wells as are watched in Liverpool and Brixton. Of course, there are those who cast doubt on this evidence. British judges are wont to point out that the rapists on trial before them have been watching pornographic videos, thus attempting to establish a link between pornography and rape, by which token Britain would have some ten million rapists which is not the case. Mrs. Thatcher recently tried to prevent, but fortunately failed, a BBC interview with an IRA leader, Martin McGuinness, arguing that it would stir up even more trouble in Northern Ireland.

Despite the evidence fears about the impact which the mass media could have on the public mind has led to an inbuilt caution on the part of our television authorities, who believe that if they are too controversial in their programme-making the government might take powers to intervene. This has led to a kind of self-censorship. If a young dramatist were to offer a contemporary *Titus Andronicus* or *Othello* to the BBC or an independent television company, it is unlikely that it would be screened on a national network, although it might be made into a horror movie. Certain new fundamental inhibitions creep into our use of the theatrical language as a result of the presence of the mass media, which is partly what I mean by the language becoming brittle. If the theatre is prevented from expressing the range of human experience, for whatever worthy motive, it starts to lose touch with how people think and feel, becomes less useful and more dispensable.

Indeed, it is tempting to turn the conventional arguments inside out. Since there is little provable connection between what we see on television and what we do in our everyday lives, what has happened to the potency of our theatrical language? For thousands of years mankind has used *mimesis* as a way of anticipating events, of understanding them, of preparing the mind to receive them. It has performed the central artistic function which is 'the shaping of experience'. If the theatrical process within our societies no longer performs that function, something has gone wrong. Those who are prone to violence can reach no fuller understanding of its causes and consequences from watching bad ad-mass television drama, where it is too frequently presented as *kitsch* and ketchup, and accordingly they have to learn the bitter lessons of violence from real life. An inhibition of language leads to the expression of feeling by other, more anarchic means.

But I do not want to stress the political or quasi-political restraints on the theatrical language at the expense of other more commonplace restrictions, which derive from the scale on which we have to operate

when we develop plays for the mass media. During the 1960s, I worked in the script department of Paramount Pictures, a time rich in incident. My job was to scout for scripts—we called them 'properties'—in British theatre, which was then bursting with new talents; writers, directors, actors and above all ideas. It was also a time when Paramount had decided to switch from making many pictures on comparatively small budgets to making fewer films on bigger budgets, in the interests of cost-effectiveness. The theory was that more people would spend more money to see bigger pictures and it was one of several streamlining measures which came in the wake of a takeover of Paramount Pictures by Gulf Oil, the frozen food division.

In practical terms, this meant that I had to produce more copies of my reports because they had to be read by more people because more money had to be raised, and since there were so many synopses of 'properties' cluttering up the offices, we developed a coding system for listing them. *King Lear* would have been coded: Drama/Family-character part/Middle Ages. If historical soap operas with Burl Ives were doing well that year, there was a chance that they might dig out *King Lear* from the filing system—which is now, of course, computerised. Good plays looked exotic when subjected to that formula. 'Marries his mother? What kind of *schmuck* is that?' If a story got past that filter, the script would be discussed by various levels of middle management who would then gather round boardroom tables to decide whether the public was ready for it. Much has changed since those days, but I still sense intuitively that in the dim recesses of Wardour Street there are clusters of middle management earnestly debating whether the mid-Atlantic market is ready for the ultimate in horror movies, a Jewish *Dracula* with AIDS.

This was when I fell in love with the little theatres in Britain, where a dozen or so professionally trained enthusiasts would work impossibly hard for impossibly low wages in order to put on plays which might have only a minority appeal but in which nonetheless they all passionately believed. Under those conditions the theatrical language was subjected to more rigorous tests than any which could be devised in the crowded boardrooms of film companies. If an actor or actress didn't like the part he or she would say so, mainly without tantrums, for questioning the director's decision was a more normal part of the daily rehearsal process than it ever could be on a film set. And so, at best, you could reach a kind of mutual understanding, a group creativity which, as Peter Brook said earlier this year, was still the rarest but richest reward from his work with the International Centre for Theatre Research. When the phase of preparation was over, there was no way of avoiding by statistical analysis the penultimate test as to whether the work had been worthwhile (the final one being future history)—the responses of a live and paying audience. It was then that you could tell whether you had caught the attention of the people who were watching, or lost it, whether they laughed at the jokes, and the quality of that laughter, and could some-

times feel, very occasionally, the presence of a great myth which had seized the collective imagination and would not let go, to the extent that future impressions and experiences would have to come to terms with it; and that it was there, this myth, indelibly implanted in the mind, so that even when we are not 'waiting for Godot' we nevertheless suspect that we could be waiting for him, at any time.

Such joys were ground out of films intended for the mass market not by any malevolence or lack of talent among the film makers but by the day-to-day routines of raising money, disposing of resources and calculating the odds in market terms; but I do not wish to suggest that philistinism is yet another nasty by-product of capitalism, for the same kind of inner destructiveness occurs within the BBC, which is state-subsidised, and also in theatres which become too large. Indeed, I was poignantly reminded of Paramount Pictures in Novosibirsk in Siberia last November, when the director of their excellent local theatre described the prolonged discussions they had had with the Ministry of Culture about whether Victor Rozov's *The Woodcock* was too far ahead of its time.

It was scale that made the difference, when there were too many people in the producing team, when the audiences were calculated by population percentages, when too much money was at risk or too much national prestige. It was then that the imagination seemed to freeze and thought itself had to be simplified into primary building blocks, as in infants' school. Here is a Conflict, there is a Crisis; he is a West Indian, she is a young girl trembling with desire on the verge of womanhood. And theatrical language not only became less expressive but positively resisted that which had to be expressed. For many years in Britain it has been fairly easy to put on facile, left-wing, shock-the-bourgeoisie plays; but away from those ruts, and those of standard boulevard drama, the dramatist with anything new to say has to fight against the narrow limits of our expectations.

There is nothing wrong with fighting, and at least our dramatists can write for small theatres as well for the mass media. But it's not so easy to earn a living by writing only for the theatre and any British playwrights find the financial rewards of television not just hard to resist but necessary to survive. And the outside critic can observe how their playwriting techniques dwindle and diminish as the result of working for television, how they can never sustain a scene for longer than four and a half minutes, how they can never handle more than three characters on a stage, how their stories become episodic mentally to allow for commercial breaks, how the span of attention fits into the 55-minute slot and how their dialogue loses its sensitivity to audience response so that their jokes are over-explained. And you can feel how their work is designed for sloppy viewing, for people who have just switched over from water-polo and are trying to find the News.

And you can sense how the theatrical language starts to lose its resilience and strength to rise to the great issues of our age, how it cannot imaginatively encompass even the immediate questions so that a

really tatty disaster movie like *The Day After*, which was so successful in Britain and the United States, has to stand as our response to the prospect of nuclear warfare, and you stop believing that the theatrical process can do any better—it's mere entertainment after all—or that there is any way in which the inexpressible future can be better contemplated, as we ride, blindly, in mid-winter (snap) across Lake Constance.

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[At the Congress of the International Association of Theatre Critics held in Rome, November 1985, John Elsom was elected President of the IATC. He has been the theatre critic for the *Observer*, *The Listener* and *Mail on Sunday* and broadcasts regularly on such BBC programmes as *Kaleidoscope*, *Meridian* and *Critics' Forum*. Publications include *Theatre Outside London*, *Erotic Theatre*, *History of the National Theatre*, *Post-War British Theatre* and *Post-War British Theatre Criticism*. He adapted Samuel Beckett's *Malone Dies* for the actor-comedian Max Wall, whom he directed at the 1984 Edinburgh Festival. His play, *The Man of the Future is Dead*, is scheduled for production in 1986. He is Chairman of the Liberal Party's Arts and Broadcasting Committee, which brought together the 1982 Arts Manifesto.]

The March issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Israel: The Cultural Roots* by Raymond Cohen, *South Atlantic Opportunities* by Sir John Biggs Davison, MP, *Metaphysics and Reality: the Hillsborough Agreement* by Hugh Munro (held over from the February issue) and *Novelist, Philosopher and Playwright: Witkacy* by Konsanty Puzyne. *Cinema: A Quarterly Review* by David Shipman will be published in the March issue.

# THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

## by Eric Glasgow

IT was in January, 1866, that the London publisher, Alexander Strahan, founded *The Contemporary Review.* It was a time of profusion for such periodicals, of which there were then about a hundred. The same publisher was producing *Good Words, The Sunday Magazine, Good Words for the Young* and *Argosy.* The general intention for *The Contemporary Review* was to bridge the gap between 'secular and sacred reading.' But *The Contemporary Review* really began in direct response to the rival example of *The Fortnightly Review.* The latter was started in 1865. It speedily established itself as an organ of the advanced thought of the day. It was secular, rationalistic, and particularly critical of orthodox Christianity. It was edited from 1867 to 1882 by the famous John Morley (1838-1923), later to be the biographer of Gladstone. It attracted many distinguished contributors, including Walter Pater and Leslie Stephen (1832-1904), author of the *Agnostic's Apology* (1893).

In its beginnings, therefore, *The Contemporary Review* was intended to counteract the secular and potentially agnostic attitudes of *The Fortnightly,* by providing its readers with a more sympathetic approach to religious matters, which would be at the same time Liberal and for the most part open to constructive criticism. Broadly, it was intended to do for the Established Church what *The Fortnightly* did for the Nonconformists. At any rate, its first Editor was Henry Alford (1810-1871), Dean of Canterbury from 1857 until his death. His unique combination of religious orthodoxy with very wide cultural and literary accomplishments assured the new journal varied and uninhibited contents. It became particularly strong in its notices of music and the fine arts, as well as literature. Dean Alford was himself musician and painter, as well as poet and traveller. In religion, *The Contemporary Review* was not to be in any way hostile to the Church of England, but was not to exclude what it called 'high standards of scholarly Christianity.'

Dean Alford was a very noteworthy and gifted man. His publications were eventually to include a book on Greek poetry, selections of English prose, a volume entitled *The Queen's English* (1870), and an edition of works by John Donne (6 Volumes, 1839). He was 'one of the most voluminous writers of the Age', and his capacity for very varied work was almost limitless. Even his idea of recreation was 'to move from one employment to another.' He must, therefore, have been an ideal choice as the first Editor of *The Contemporary Review.*

The proposal for the new venture first reached him in July, 1865. He wrote in his diary that he was actually preparing for its first issue as early as August 8. On September 25, of the same year, he received the first article 'sent for the new journal.' It was Benjamin Shaw's 'Ritualism and the Eccle-

siastical Law' which, when printed, covered thirty pages. At that time, Dean Alford was expending a great deal of time and trouble in order to secure the assistance of contributors of sufficient calibre and industry for a monthly magazine of about 150 pages. He was even obliged to wean such authors from the clutches of *The Fortnightly*. General policy had to be defined and subjects specified and allocated. He wrote to a friend: 'I trust we are doing good service against Ritualism and extravagances of every kind and are serving literature and art too.' On December 18, 1865, he wrote to another friend, 'I have become Editor of *The Contemporary Review*, the first number of which came this morning . . . ' It was actually dated and published January, 1866. It totalled 184 pages, and most of its contributors were men of scholarly distinction.

Contributors to the first issue of *The Contemporary Review* included the metaphysical philosopher H. L. Mansel (1820-1871), appointed by Disraeli in 1868 to be the Dean of St. Paul's. He, too, was a clergyman of strong literary leanings. In this first issue he wrote on the philosophies of Sir William Hamilton and J. S. Mill. E. H. Plumptre (1821-1891), Dean of Wells from 1881, also had a keen perception of literary excellence, as well as unwearied industry. He did agreeable translations of Sophocles (1865), and Aeschylus (1868), as well as an English version of Dante (1886-1887). He contributed an appraisal of 'Sunday' for the first issue of *The Contemporary Review*. Henry Alford himself wrote on 'Education' ('Thring and Uppingham School'). Evidently, therefore, *The Contemporary Review*, as it set the tone in its first issue, denoted a very fair representation of the best minds and spirits of England in 1866. It was Liberal in the very valid sense that it was hospitable towards a diversity of interests and attitudes, although it was in general constructive and supportive in relation to the Anglican Establishment. It is difficult to see how even the great Gladstone would not have warmly appreciated this. It may indeed have been intended to bolster the rising star of the Gladstonian Liberalism. Gladstone himself was within two years of the beginnings of *The Contemporary Review* to become Leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister for the first time.

In its second issue (for February, 1866) *The Contemporary Review* enlarged the range of its contributors to embrace the Presbyterian W. F. Stevenson (1832-1886), then a Minister in Dublin. He wrote on F. W. Robertson (1816-1853), the famous Minister of Trinity Chapel, Brighton, whose *Life and Letters* had recently been edited by Stopford A. Brooke (1865). J. C. Robertson (1813-1882), Canon of Canterbury, and fresh from his book on *Becket* (1859), wrote an article on the same subject for inclusion in the second issue of *The Contemporary Review*. Edward Dowden (1843-1913), then a very young man, only lately graduated from Trinity College, Dublin, is here also with an article on 'French Aesthetics.' He seems to have virtually begun his career as a literary critic with *The Contemporary Review*. He had yet to make his name as the author of *Shakespeare: His Mind and Art* (1875).

John Tulloch (1823-1886), the distinguished Scottish scholar, reviewed the *History of Rationalism* (1865) by the historian and essayist, W. E. H.

Lecky (1838-1903), in the issue of March, 1866. Lowes Dickinson (1819-1908), portrait painter and associate of the Pre-Raphaelites, wrote on 'Modern Portrait Painting' in this third issue. It was a significant symptom of the artistic leanings of *The Contemporary Review* in these, its very beginnings. Samuel Cheetham (1827-1908), Archdeacon of Rochester from 1882, wrote here on 'Theodore Parker and American Unitarianism.'

The issue of *The Contemporary Review* for April, 1866 had an article on E. B. Pusey by Dean Stanley of Westminster. J. S. Howson (1816-1885) of Chester wrote about Dean Stanley's *History of the Jewish Church* (1863-65). T. C. Cheyne (1841-1915), the Old Testament scholar, wrote on 'The Revision of the Authorized Version of the Old Testament' in June, 1866. Bishop B. F. Westcott of Durham (1825-1901) wrote on 'The Myths of Plato' in the same issue. The missionary Thomas Smith (1817-1906) wrote about 'The Indian Mission of the Scottish Free Church.' He had been the Editor of *The Calcutta Review* from 1857 to 1859. W. C. Lake (1817-1897), Dean of Durham, wrote on 'Keble and the Christian Year' in July, 1866. John Keble (1792-1866), leader of the Anglo-Catholic Oxford Movement, had then lately died. His most famous work *The Christian Year*, was published anonymously as long ago as 1827. *The Contemporary Review* in 1866 evidently sought to be fair to his theology without surrendering wholly to the High Church tradition. Its 'middle of the road' policy in religious matters may be further illustrated by the publication of Henry Alford himself on the theme of 'Nonconformist Sermons', and of a book review by Charles Merivale (1808-1893), who from 1869 was Gladstone's appointment as Dean of Ely. Edward Dowden was back in the same issue with a piece on 'The Poetical Feeling for External Nature'. The historian James Gairdner (1828-1912), dutiful employee of London's newly-established Public Record Office and the eventual author of a volume on *Lollardy and the Reformation in England* (1898), wrote in September, 1866 on 'The Divine Right of Kings: History of the Doctrine.' Henry Alford, as the Editor, nearly always wrote for each issue of the journal and this practice was continued for most of the years of his Editorial control. Doubtless it helped greatly to set the tone of the journal, and to establish it as a magazine of acceptable culture, art and literature as well as religion.

In its beginnings, *The Contemporary Review* seems to have been rather overshadowed by the more trenchant *Fortnightly*, and not to have attracted very prominent notice until towards the end of 1866, when it had evidently come to stay. At any rate, although *The Illustrated London News* regularly reviewed similar journals, it did not notice *The Contemporary Review* until August 4, 1866. It then announced:

> *The Contemporary Review* is a very meritorious undertaking, and we hope it will meet with sufficient support. A doubt may not unreasonably arise how far such success is obtainable in a review which contains no light reading, and which is, moreover, chiefly written by and for the more scholarly section of the clergy. The preponderance of theology will not recommend it to general readers, while it is far too erudite and abstruse (and perhaps too dear) for the majority of those by whom theological journals are usually supported. Whatever the result of the experiment, we can but tender our best wishes to a review which has this very month acquainted us with Mr. Merivale's opinion of the Imperial Life of Caesar

> and with Mr. Westcott's splendid translations from Plato. The other articles are all able, if we except an ill-natured attack on Gustave Doré by a writer who is evidently quite incapable of entering into the spirit of his compositions. An assault on Keble in an essay on 'The Poetical Feeling for External Nature' will create a stir in the very wide circles where indifference to the claims of the High Church laureate is regarded as an equal outrage against poetry, piety, and good taste.

Thereafter, *The Illustrated London News* waited until December 8, 1866 before again noticing in its capacious columns *The Contemporary Review*. Then, however, it was appreciative, although by no means uncritical.

> Dean Alford's comments on the minor poetry of the day are more distinguished by good-nature than critical acumen. . . . An article on Ritualism displays a spirit of compromise. A very eminent German divine has contributed a very long essay on Luther, which has had to be considerably compressed before even the ample pages of the *Contemporary* could accommodate it.

By the end of 1866 *The Contemporary Review* was firmly established as a distinctive part of the extraordinary miscellany of the journals of mid-Victorian England. It had achieved its due place and its due recognition; although it may well be imagined that its first founders—Editor and Proprietor alike—can never have definitely foreseen everything that it was later to become, or its singular survival into the very different circumstances of our own times; although many of the subjects and titles have parallels in both periods. It is, after all, the last of its kind; in some sense a residuary challenge of the Victorian mind and outlook to all the contrary influences and pressures of the twentieth century. Dean Alford—typical of the 'scholarly clery' of his own age—set *The Contemporary Review* on suitable lines and our debt to him is, accordingly, paramount and outstanding.

Dean Alford remained as the Editor of *The Contemporary Review* until March, 1870. He devoted to it almost exorbitant quantities of time and labour. He took on so many different tasks (in addition to his work for the Church) that in the end he was obliged to relinquish the Editorship of *The Contemporary Review* (although for some time thereafter he continued to contribute to its pages). As early as January, 1870 he disclosed privately his intention to give up as Editor. He had done much to improve relations between Church and Dissent by means of the *Review*. His work therein had been moderating and conciliatory (although he had sometimes laid himself open to the accusation of unfairness towards the Anglo-Catholics). Under his enlightened guidance, the *Review* prospered and became 'a pioneer in a new path as an example of independent, unprejudiced and disinterested criticism.' Dean Alford permitted his contributors very considerable latitude of attitude and opinion. The *Review*, as he planned it, quickly became an organ for 'the free play of varied opinions, apparently unhampered by Editorial control.' Although it was opposed to Ritualism, it also regularly printed the apologetics of Ritualists. It had 'an ecumenical spirit and a commitment to the ideal of re-united Christendom.' All that, and also an exceptionally ample and well-informed coverage of art, music and literature.

After Dean Alford's retirement in March 1870, the publisher, Alexander Strahan, announced that 'the *Review* will be conducted on the same principles which have hitherto guided it.' Its second Editor, J. T. Knowles

(1831-1908), was a close associate of both Gladstone and Tennyson. He was an enthusiastic member of the Metaphysical Society and he persuaded many of its distinguished members to contribute to the *Review*, which gave extra impetus to its fame and circulation. During his Editorship, therefore, the pages were enhanced by important new contributors such as R. H. Hutton (1826-1897), part-owner of *The Spectator* from 1861 to 1897. He wrote in September 1870 on 'The Politics of War: Bismarck and Louis Napoleon.' The social reformer, J. M. Ludlow (1821-1911), wrote on the issues of the Franco-Prussian War in October, 1870. Walter Bagehot made a contribution in April, 1871 and the philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1920) in July, 1871. Soon a galaxy of comparable 'Victorian minds' entered the formidable arena of the pages of the *Review*. They included T. H. Huxley, Frederick Seebohm, Herbert Spencer, A. M. Fairbairn, John Ruskin, Goldwin Smith, W. E. Gladstone (on Homer, in February, 1874), G. J. Holyoake, Connop Thirlwall, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, Matthew Arnold, J. S. Blackie, and E. A. Freeman. It reads almost like a list of the greatest of all the Victorian minds in England: no mean or ignoble an horizon. Under J. T. Knowles, the *Review* included an even wider range and diversity of Victorian thought. It was quite eclectic in its general approach to life, thought, and letters. What happened, however, was that the *Review* then moved away from Dean Alford's cult of the 'Anglican Establishment'—adopted in 1866 primarily in reaction against the aggressive secularism of *The Fortnightly*—and in the direction of a stance which was more definitely Liberal, and less definitely of the Church of England. It was a development which was probably inevitable and desirable; and in no way militates against the value of Dean Alford's decisive guidance of 1866 to 1870.

J. T. Knowles was altogether a more forthright and combative character than his predecessor. He made the *Review* an organ of Victorian debate, moving it into circles of pure secularism which the benign and kindly Dean Alford would not have countenanced. The *Review* became vigorous, even iconoclastic. For example, when the *Review* published in July 1872 an article on 'Prayer for the Sick' there was a debate in its columns about its validity and relevance which lasted for eighteen months. That, in itself, was a sufficient indication of the growing secularism in the attitude and the coverage of the *Review*.

In January, 1877, the publisher, Alexander Strahan, sold his set of periodicals to new agents, while retaining for himself a large measure of control. J. T. Knowles did not like the new arrangement, which was hostile to his policy of admitting so much criticism of religion. So he left *The Contemporary Review* to join a new rival, *The Nineteenth Century*, itself to have a very important career as mirror and promoter of public opinion. Alexander Strahan himself took over as Editor of *The Contemporary Review* in February, 1877. He at once adopted a narrower policy, for the most part selecting his authors and assigning their subjects for them. 'He had a menagerie but it did not consist chiefly of roaring lions.'

In 1882 the Editorship of the *Review* was accepted by Percy William Bunting (1836-1911), a zealous Liberal and admirer of Gladstone. It will be

seen, therefore, how in the course of its nineteenth-century history the *Review* moved fairly consistently away from the 'clerical moderation' of Dean Alford and into a more secular and political atmosphere and commitment. Its Liberalism, although always present, became more explicit, and its allegiance more on party and pressing lines. Sir Percy at once assumed a more actively Liberal role. He was less concerned with scholarship, more with politics. He was particularly active in engaging for the *Review* foreign authors. Of these there had always been some; but now there were many more. The *Review*, after 1882, began to move increasingly into the practical advocacy of social reforms and political Liberalism. Its coverage of foreign events was notably expanded. Bunting travelled extensively and so was able to obtain the writings of many distinguished foreigners for the *Review*. The allegiance with the Liberal Party, under Gladstone, also became more definite and avowed. Bunting was a determined and successful worker for the *Review*, increasing both its relevance and its circulation. He remained as its Editor until December 1911. His Papers are now in the University of Chicago Library. Dr. George Peabody Gooch was then appointed Editor.

Alexander Japp (1837-1905) was editorial assistant under Dean Alford. He had settled in London in 1864 and worked as a general literary adviser to the publishing firm of Alexander Strahan, afterwards William Isbister and Company (from 1882-1899). He also assisted Robert Carruthers in the third edition of *Chambers's Cyclopaedia of English Literature*. Glasgow University gave him an Honorary Ll.D. in 1879. He was, in his own right, a versatile and prolific writer. Also active during this period, J. B. Paton (1830-1911), Nonconformist divine and philosopher, was a consulting editor of *The Contemporary Review* from 1882 to 1888. He had previously been joint-editor of *The Eclectic Review* (1858-61).

During the last decade of the nineteenth century, *The Contemporary Review* rejoiced in the acquisition of even more distinguished and famous contributors. Not a few of them were men of real genius; most of them achieved fame, whether in literature, religion, or politics. The *Review*, therefore, by the end of that century, had attained an enviable position as an important organ of opinion, reflecting in essence the chief currents of English thought. Its contributors after 1890 included A. V. Dicey, Stopford A. Brooke (on Tennyson, in December 1892), J. A. Hobson, Friedrich Max Muller, P. G. Hamerton on 'The Foundations of Art Criticism' in September, 1893, Edmund Gosse on 'Some Recent Literature in France, 1890-1900' and Sabine Baring-Gould on 'Priest and Prophet' in December, 1899. It was indeed a very wide cross-section of English (even international) thought and opinion. Nor, of course, had the *Review* (even by the end of the century) lost its initial concerns with literature, the arts, even religion. It could not have done so without losing touch with the English mind and society, as these then were. The more devastating blasts of the secularism of the twentieth century—even the advent of Socialism and the all-embracing Welfare State—were yet to come. Gladstone, at the end of his long life (1898), foresaw with trepidation much of what the future was to bring. For the *Review*, however, the year 1900 arrived with scarcely any disturbance

for the continuity of its Victorian belief in the sweetness and efficacy of reason, tolerance and individual liberty.

Quotations from *The Contemporary Review* of its Victorian years are prolific and profitable. The greater part of Walter Pater's writings first appeared in various Reviews, including *The Contemporary*. Similarly, other famous writers, such as Herbert Spencer, first aired their views about society and literature in *The Contemporary*. Its art criticism was just as likely as its politics or religion to stimulate or provoke its readers. For example, Holman Hunt's articles were of considerable importance, and were relied upon in preparing the Holman Hunt Exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum in 1969; but for those crucial Victorian times the *Review* had, at any rate, an ability to excite debate and attract attention which may well be envied by the periodical publishers of the present day.

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[Grateful thanks are due to Mr. Tom West, Librarian of St. Deiniol's Library, Hawarden, for his patience and assistance in the preparation of the above article. 'Gladstone in Person' by Dr. Eric Glasgow was published in *Contemporary Review* No. 1440, Vol. 248.]

# DOROTHY OSBORNE (LADY TEMPLE) 1626-1695: THE MISSING YEARS

by Rosalind Wade

TO pause by the Temple plaque on the North nave of Westminster Abbey is to mark a minor anniversary. It is exactly 300 years since Dorothy Osborne (Lady Temple) began to fade from public view. The woman whose youthful love-letters to her future husband, William Temple, have become a classic dropped into gradual oblivion during the final ten years of her life. He, on the other hand, having made only modest beginnings in authorship and political diplomacy, remained strongly in the public eye until his death in 1699 and not only as the man who employed Jonathan Swift as secretary and gave house-room to Esther (Stella) Johnson. Whereas she herself, after the marriage in 1654, reappears only intermittently through random items of correspondence and official records.

It was the period when families of importance would assume a burial place in the Abbey: yet the Temple memorial is not elaborate in design, stating simply that it is the resting place of:

*Sibi suisque carissmis*
*Dianae Temple dilectissimae filae*
*Dorotheae Osborne conjunctissimae conjugi*
*Et Martha Giffard optimae sorori*
*Hoc qualecumque monumentum*
*Poni curavit*
*Guilielmus Temple, Baronettus de Moor Park*

Dorothy Osborne, whose early brilliance should have ensured her a position equal to 'Orinda' (Mrs. Katherine Phillips) or Margaret, Duchess of Newcastle, and with far more reason, seems not to be commemorated in any other place.

Why the flame was so totally extinguished remains one of the literary enigmas of all time. With hindsight, it can be argued that the Temples were victims of a cliché image which has denied them assessment as ordinary human beings. Theirs was a courtship lending itself to romantic simplification without regard to the basic facts. The engagement began in 1646 with a dramatic episode reported in later years by William Temple's sister, Emma Giffard and she, being a child at the time, had presumably gained her information from family hearsay. Dorothy Osborne's father, Sir Peter Osborne, was at the time in St. Malo, having temporarily retreated from Castle Cornet in Guernsey which he was defending for the Royalists. Dorothy and a younger brother, Robert, were on their way to visit him and while on the Isle of Wight awaiting a ship to France, the impetuous Robert, outraged at the King's imprisonment so near at hand, scrawled graffiti on a wall to the effect that 'Hamon was hanged upon the gallows he had prepared for Mordecai'. He was promptly taken before the Island governor, whereupon Dorothy stepped

forward to accept the blame, thus saving her brother from almost certain imprisonment, if not death.

Among the passengers to France was twenty-year-old William Temple who understandably was impressed by the courageous and affectionate gesture. Thus began the 'amour', to quote Lady Giffard, which was destined to survive seven years of frustration and emotional torment.

A very brief reference in the *Letters* to Arne (Herm), a small island close to the Guernsey coast, suggests that William Temple remained for a time with the Osbornes at St. Malo. Little evidence exists as to the exact situation between them from then on, until the correspondence takes up the story consistently in the winter of 1652. Refusal by the respective families to sanction an engagement or even an occasional meeting provided the *Letters* with that edge of intensity which makes an immediate impact on the reader. Popular interpretation of the parental disapproval is opposing loyalties between the King and the Commonwealth. In fact, the Temples and Osbornes frequently crossed the demarcation lines. This was particularly true of William Temple's father, Sir John Temple. In the opposite camp the Osborne family approved of Henry Cromwell, the Protector's second son, as a suitor for Dorothy and at one time it even seemed possible that she might accept him.

A dispute over hard cash is infinitely less appealing as an explanation, yet the simple truth was that Sir John Temple demanded for his son a dowry of at least £5,000 and the Osbornes, in view of their newly impoverished circumstances, were not prepared to go beyond £4,000. There is no evidence that Dorothy resented the element of barter; not surprisingly, as only a century earlier property and money were the usual conditions of marriage and unions based on mutual attraction were virtually unknown.

When, in 1836, Sir Thomas Peregrine Courtney published his two volume biography of William Temple, much Temple material was made available to him by a descendant of the family, a Mrs. R. S. Longe. Among the official papers was a bundle of letters written by Dorothy Osborne to her future husband. After much deliberation Peregrine Courtney decided to include a selection of them as an Appendix to his book. This touched off a reaction from reviewers, notably Macauley in the *Edinburgh Review*, and inspired a young lawyer, Edward Parry, to seek out the originals and eventually to edit and publish them in book form. Without his tenacity of purpose, the diamond-edged wit and distinctive literary style of Dorothy Osborne might have been permanently overlaid by her husband's much publicised diplomatic career at the Court of King Charles II. Edward Parry also performed the seemingly impossible task of placing the undated letters in chronological order and providing annotations and an index.

He was not without critics. Sir Israel Gollancz, when bringing out his own *The Love Letters of Dorothy Osborne*, pointed to errors in the original transcriptions; but these are minimal by comparison with Edward Parry's scholarship and research, and Sir Israel's version was, in any case,

withdrawn following a dispute over copyright.

From that time on Dorothy Osborne ranked as a popular heroine—as Sophie Shilleto Smith put it in her *Dean Swift*: '... A history of her life and character would form one of the most desirable text-books to be placed in the hands of schoolgirls ...'—as well as the foremost exponent of the art of the correspondent. The often quoted:

> All letters, methinks, should be free and easy as one's discourse, not studied like an oration nor made up of hard words like a charm. 'Tis an admirable thing to see how some people will labour to find terms that may obscure a plain sense, like a gentleman I knew who would never say 'the weather grew cold,' but that 'winter begins to salute us'. I have no patience for such coxcombs, and cannot blame an old uncle of mine who threw the standish at his man's head because he writ a letter for him, where instead of saying (as his master bid him) that 'he had the gout in his hand', he said 'that the gout would not permit him to put pen to paper'.
>
> The Fellow thought he had mended it mightily, and that putting pen to paper was much better that plain writing! ...

laid down the formula for a new approach to letter-writing and sums up Dorothy Osborne's objectives perfectly. While for a pastoral scene, the description of an evening walk at the Osbornes' country home, Chicksands in Bedfordshire, can seldom have been equalled:

> You ask me how I spent my time here... The heat of the day is spent in reading and working, and about six or seven o'clock I walk out on the common that lies hard by the house, where a great many young wenches keep sheep and cows, and sit in the shade singing of ballads. I go to them and compare their voices and beauties to some ancient shepherdesses that I have read of, and find a vast difference there: but trust me, I think these are as innocent as those could be. I talk to them and find they want nothing to make them the happiest people in the world but the knowledge that they are so...

Yet these frequently anthologised extracts from the *Letters* do little to provide a true picture of Dorothy Osborne and tend to blur her sardonic wit and brittle comment on people and events, even if they underline the felicitous phrase and occasional dazzling sallies of humour. For in fact, as she herself confirms, Dorothy Osborne was a melancholy person. The early unsigned portrait displays a young woman of undeniable beauty, although prematurely grave. There is also a hint of arrogance and authoritativeness as witness the precise guidelines laid down for a future husband.

> There are a great many ingredients must go to making me happy in a husband. First, as my cousin Franklin says, our humours must agree: and to do that he must have that kind of breeding that I have had, and used to that kind of company. That is, he must not be so much a country gentleman as to understand nothing but hawks and dogs, and be fonder of either than his wife: nor of the next sort of them whose aim reaches no further than to be Justice of the Peace, and once in his life High Sheriff, who reads no book but Statutes, and studies nothing but how to make a speech interlarded with Latin that may amaze his disagreeing poor neighbours, and fright them rather than persuade them into quietness. He must not be a thing that began the world in a free school, and was sent from then to the University, and is at his furthest when he reaches the Inns of Court, has no acquaintance but those of his form in these high places, speaks the French he has picked out of old laws, and admires nothing but the stories he has heard of the revels that were kept there before his time.
>
> He must not be a town gallant neither, that cannot imagine how an hour should be spent without company unless it be in sleeping, and making court to all the women he sees, thinking they believe him, and laughs, and is laughed at equally. Nor a travelled Monsieur whose head is all feather inside and outside

> and can talk of nothing but dancing and duels, and has courage to wear slashes where everyone else dyes of cold to see him. He must not be a fool of noe sort. Nor peevish nor ill-natured, nor proud nor covetous, and to all this must be added that he must love me and I him as much as we are capable of loving. Without all this is fortune though never soe great would not satisfye me, and with it a very moderate one would keep me from ever repenting my disposal.

A close study of the complete correspondence reveals her also as deeply passionate, capable of jealousy over the mysterious and unidentified 'Mrs. C.H.' who Sir John Temple approved as a suitable wife for his son, and even against William Temple himself, as in the letters of 1653 when it seemed that the secret betrothal might be broken off. Perhaps she did not truly believe she would ever be married to William Temple and when, almost in a situation of stalemate, parental and family opposition was overcome and the dowry question waived, she might not have been unduly surprised at the virulent attack of smallpox which delayed her marriage until Christmas Day 1654.

Little is known of Dorothy Temple's way of life for the next six years, spent partly at Reading, where the first child, John, was born, and in Ireland at Sir John Temple's house in Dublin and on his estates in Carlow, County Wicklow. No definitive record remains of the toil and suffering of five infant deaths. She remains silent until, with a small collection of unrelated letters, she speaks for the first time as a wife and mother. The letters are difficult to date, yet one aspect of them is immediately apparent. The apt phrase and incisive judgement have given way to a mundane recitation of domestic cares. 'Tame and tepid' was how a future descendant described them, and even William Temple himself appears to have complained about their poor quality. They express her desolation and being left alone, with only a child for company, while her husband is 'in town'.

> . . . Can you tell me when you intend to come home, would you would, I should take it mighty kindly, good deare. Make haste. I am weary as a dog without his master . . .

For a while, then, Dorothy Temple lapses again into obscurity. On the birth of her daughter, Diana in 1665, the second of nine pregnancies to survive, we do not hear from her at all and she is encountered only in official documents connected with Sir William Temple's embassies in Brussels and The Hague. She is known to have braved the Ministerial echelons in an unenviable attempt to obtain her husband's overdue professional fees; until, in a new and unexpected role, she speaks again, through a single letter dated 31st October 1670, reporting on the complex and unpalatable situation at The Hague to William Temple in London, after he had been 'recalled.'

There is no trace of the early protestations of devotion or later mournful entreaties to return. The letter is a cogent, informative document from which her grasp of public affairs would seem to be equal to his own. After that, silence again for many years although she takes the stage fleetingly in reports of what is sometimes described as the 'confrontation on the high seas.'

The episode, as recorded cries out for full technicolour treatment. Soon after William Temple's return to London a 'yacht' was sent to

Holland to bring home Lady Temple and her children. The captain of this boat had instructions from the King to fire on any Dutch ship which refused to pay respects to an English vessel. This he duly did, after consulting Lady Temple about the risk to her own and her family's safety. She reminded him that his first duty was to obey his King. Eventually, the incident was amicably resolved after a Dutch admiral had come aboard to compliment the ambassadress on her courage and patriotism.

It seems that by this time that Lady Temple's personality had undergone a radical change, as can be seen by the Lely portrait. Here is a woman of aristocratic, almost imperial stance, expensively though not ostentatiously dressed, nursing a small docile spaniel. Yet it is not a happy portrait, for the general air of detachment and disdain suggests a withdrawal from the warmth of personal involvement which for most people makes life tolerable. Then the curtain descends again. Sir William had retired to Crowne Court at Sheene to write his memoirs and other works, enlarging the house to display his treasures, an undertaking made possible by the bequest from his father in 1677 as was the later purchase of the Moor Park estate at Farnham. We learn from Emma Giffard's *Chronicle* that Lady Temple was never 'kinde' to Sheene. This is all we know of her reaction to the quiet life in what was then regarded as a country district. On the tragic death from smallpox of fourteen-year-old Diana in 1679, we do not hear from her at all.

Ten years later, it was another family tragedy, an even greater one, her son John Temple's suicide, which prompted the final letter from Dorthy Temple which has come down to us, the almost embarrassingly self-denigratory reply to a letter of condolence from her nephew, Sir John Osborne.

> I give you many thanks for your kind letter and the sense you have of my affliction which truly is very great. But since it was laid upon me by the hand of an Almighty and Gracious God, that always proportions His punishment to the support He gives with them, I may hope to bear it as a Christian ought to do, and more especially one is that is conscious to herself of having in many ways deserved it. The strange revolution that we have seen might well have taught me what the world is, yet it seems it was necessary that I should have a near example of the uncertainty of all human blessings, that so having no tie in the world I may the better prepare myself to leave it: and that this correction may suffice to teach me my duty must be the prayer of your affectionate aunt and humble servant . . . D. Temple.

Some confusion has arisen over the reason for the suicide, yet the explanation was quite simple. There are circumstances in which the future becomes unbearable and this, it seems, was one of them. Since early manhood, John Temple had served as a courier for diplomatic information and court documents. He was 34 years of age when he received his biggest opportunity. He became Secretary of War for William III with special responsibility for advising on Irish affairs. In this capacity he urged the freeing of General Richard Hamilton from the Tower and his appointment as a suitable emissary to the Jacobite Lord Lieutenant in Ireland. Whereupon, on his arrival, Hamilton renaged on his allegiance to the new monarch and joined with James II's forces in a

last-ditch pocket of resistance at Derry. Much detailed and fully authenticated material is on record over John Temple's death: notably the account by Viscount Hatton as quoted in the *Hatton Correspondence.*

> He went upon the water about 12 at noon, enquired how the tide was. Betwixt five and six in the evening he took boat at Whitehall, went with the first oars who plied him, who was a stranger to him, refused those who used to carry him, bid the waterman carry him below the bridge, and just as he was shooting the bridge laid down in the boat a shilling and a piece of paper, in which was writ the following words: 'My folly in undertaking what I cannot perform hath done the King great prejudice, which cannot be stopped any other way than this. May his undertakings prosper. May he find a blessing'. He then bid the waterman farewell and leaped over. Afterwards he ris up again, but the eddies sucked him in before the waterman could bring his boat about, and so he drowned.

The last known portrait of Lady Temple, the Netscher painting, suggests that the mood of total resignation to the adversities of fate had laid on her its final mark. It shows a smooth, oval face with calm, wide open eyes empty of emotion. Meanwhile, during the remaining years of life left to her, Sir William greatly enhanced his reputation as a poet, essayist and political commentator, from the seclusion of Moor Park while her own mode of existence became ever more heavily shrouded.

In fact, during this period, she did not live at Moor Park in any regular sense, but in the Temples' London home in Pall Mall, originally purchased for the use of young John Temple and his wife. The house, on a site immediately in behind Marlborough House, no longer stands. Shortly after Dorothy Temple's death it was swept away in a massive rebuilding programme similar to our own in the capital today. Outside the mansions and minor palaces barbaric crime flourished, tacitly ignored by those who preferred to pretend that the hazards did not exist. How the once dazzingly intellectual woman passed her time in the metropolis is not known. As the wife of a former ambassador she should have been present at Court and other aristocratic functions, even though unattended by her spouse, yet no smallest record of her activities has yet been discovered in the contemporary diaries or memoirs, or of correspondence between herself and Queen Mary which would have provided confirmation of their reputedly intimate relationship. Her name is not listed those who attended the Queen's funeral in 1694.

There could, however, have been a plausible reason for her virtual separation from her husband and secluded, solitary existence in the London home: rarely touched upon or explored with any objectivity until recently; vehemently rejected by those Temple adherents who wished to preserve the legend of four dcades of devoted matrimony.

Even during Sir William's lifetime and certainly soon after his death, suggestions were voiced that Esther Johnson was his 'natural' daughter: thus interpreting the situation in which she lived on the Moor Park estate with her mother and younger brother and sister, received her education in the main house from Jonathan Swift, and inherited from Sir William a property on the Temple estate in Ireland.

Whether or not he became a 'town gallant' after marriage, he was referred to some fifty years after his death in the *Monthly Review* of

November 1751 as . . .

> a very amorous man, and much addicted to intrigue with various women: and it is not uncommon that a man such as Sir William should take uncommon precautions to provide well for his natural children, without letting the public, or even themselves, know that they were such.

while a few years later, in 1757 the *Gentleman's Magazine* published the recollections of a Farnham resident about the Johnsons and Sir William Temple too circumstantial to be ignored. To dismiss such soundly based assumptions and rumours does no service to the art of biography and may merely hamper attempts fully to understand important historical figures of the distant past.

Yet in an age when unofficial additions to the family were generally condoned, it might be supposed that Dorothy Temple was unable to accept the presence of the Johnsons at Moor Park. Having set her sights so high, she had that much further to fall.

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# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## A GREAT FAMILY FIRM

*First With The News. The History of W. H. Smith 1792-1972.* Charles Wilson. Jonathan Cape. £12.95.

It can fairly be claimed for W. H. Smith that they have been the most successful and distinguished family business in British history. Sainsbury's? Guinness? Surely W. H. Smith have made more impact than any other family firm in the last two centuries. Professor Wilson writes as one would expect with the authority and incisiveness of one of our leading economic and social historians. One is not sure at the end whether Smith's, who went public in 1949, could still be regarded as a family business when his narrative ends in 1972. 'Even after 1949,' he writes, 'its traditional, private characteristics were still clearly discernible beneath its vastly expanded "public" structure. And in a world where the ownership of business had become largely anonymous, management often hardly less so, it was not unimportant that for investors, staff, suppliers and customers, W. H. Smith still possessed an identifiable image and ethos.' I wonder if he would still say that of 1986.

On the whole, it has been a long success story. By the end of the nineteenth century, Smith's had already a tradition so strong on the station bookstalls that their monopoly was denounced. But the situation was by no means pleasant when the Smith of the day invited his rowing friend, C. H. St.John Hornby to join him in 1892. Hornby, then in his twenties, ruled the firm for half a century, succeeded by his son and grandson. He was the one great entrepreneur (apart from the original founder) who emerges in the history of Smith's. In the later story Sir Charles Troughton emerges as full of wisdom.

If, however, one is looking for a special moral quality associated with Smith's one finds it initially in W. H. Smith II, who presided over the firm for many years, but in later years was far more absorbed in politics. As every schoolboy should know, he became the Leader of the House of Commons and 'ruler of the Queen's navee.' The firm prospered exceedingly during his absentee rule. Known as 'Old Morality,' W. H. Smith II had wanted to be a clergyman and left a permanent imprint.

Many years later Lord Hambleden, 'Billy' brought almost saint-like qualities to bear on all matters concerned with the business. He himself was hardly a business man at all, but once again business success went hand in hand with Christian virtues. There are many interesting statistics supplied in the Appendices. I note, for example, that between 1957 and 1972 the retail turnover rose in real terms from twelve million to twenty million, but the actual numbers of staff fell from nineteen thousand to seventeen thousand. A shrewd collective brain was always at work. When battle had to be joined, as with the railway companies at the beginning of the century, there was a steely determination and a readiness to move into new and still more profitable outlets. Long may W. H. Smith prosper! May the values of W. H. Smith II and Billy Hambleden survive all commercial developments, as I have a feeling they will.

I was intrigued to notice that at the end of the last century there was a high employee complaining that after many years' service he was not being made a partner. A great friend of mine, Esmond Warner, played the main part in the development of Bowes and Bowes and the other 'Pedigree shops' referred to

here. I am disappointed to find no mention of Esmond Warner in the index. There are pluses and minuses attaching to life in a family firm. In the case of W. H. Smith the pluses have been much the more substantial.

FRANK LONGFORD

## THE JACOBITES: A NEW STUDY

*The Jacobites.* Frank McLynn. Routledge and Kegan Paul. £15.95.

There have been many studies of the Jacobites since Sir Walter Scott in *Waverley* began weaving legends around the facts—legends that now have become 'history.' In recent years there has been a fresher wind blowing, in the surveys of Rosalind Mitchison and Bruce Lenman, the biography of the Young Pretender by David Daiches, and John Prebble's vivid recreation of the battlefield of Culloden and the ugly story of the Clearances that followed. But this study of Frank McLynn's, a follow-up to his earlier book on the Jacobite army, brings a new depth and range to the theme and the old song.

The special strength of this book is that it takes the events of the Fifteen and the Forty-five as read, and wastes no time on telling the familiar tale. What it gives instead is a picture both of the Scottish clans that gave a base to the Pretenders, and of the Jacobite 'world' that moved in to exploit it, and again moved back to Europe when each attempt failed. The Fifteen and the Forty-five were but two high points in a near-century of Stuart plotting, with French connivance and support. Indeed, as late as 1809 Napoleon asked Louise of Stolberg (Countess of Albany), the widow of the Young Pretender, if she had ever had a son by him. When told no, he expressed his regret: he could have used a Stuart Prince as a puppet monarch on the English throne. It had been so since James II went on his travels in 1689, and since he and the French were first rebutted on Derry's walls in 1690. But this French exploitation of British divisions did not begin in 1689: every new dynasty on the throne in London from 1066 (until 1689) owed its finances and its equipment to those who ruled in France.

Frank McLynn is equally vivid on the court-in-exile at St. Germain, on the tormented spirits of the two pretenders, and not least on the scale and success of British Whig penetration of the 'enemy' camp. In fact, British intelligence in the eighteenth century was impressive, with many agents and quite a few double-agents: almost every move planned or made by the Jacobites was already known in London; even the famous decision to turn back at Derby at Christmas 1745 was due to a British agent deceiving the Highlanders about the size of the Hanoverian army that lay between them and London: instead of the 9,000 that Whig agent Dudly Bradstreet described, there were in fact no more than 9 men. Only the prince would have risked it—and probably won; his cautious advisers, already disheartened, insisted on turning back—to Culloden and disaster.

This is a readable and fresh study. It is thoroughly researched, though free from footnotes. Frank McLynn recognises that 'the honest historian of Jacobitism . . . will always leave the door slightly ajar to myth.' It is this awareness that gives depth and artistic quality to his book.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY POLITICIAN

*Lord Grenville 1759-1834.* Peter Jupp. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1985. 506 pp. £30.

British politics are seen today by many people through Victorian eyes. This is not surprising, as the present system of 'adversarial politics' descends from the days of Disraeli and Gladstone. Until recently this was regarded as the only conceivable form of government. Now, with the growth of the Alliance, it is useful to see how government functioned before there were only two solid parties.

The study of the eighteenth century has much to teach modern observers of political life. Britain's position in the world was more similar to today's role than her great days of Victorian predominance. Yet many people assume that the Georgian politicians, for the most part, are not worthy of serious study. They are dismissed as elegant amateurs with little real concern for detailed aspects of government. They seem to lack the seriousness of a Peel, a Gladstone or an Asquith.

Dr. Jupp's excellent biography of Lord Grenville should help to dispel this view. Lord Grenville is not one of the more memorable of Prime Ministers. Yet he had an important career in politics, a career that spanned the transition from eighteenth to nineteenth century England.

Grenville had many similarities with his cousin and colleague, William Pitt the Younger. Both had fathers who had also been Prime Minister: Grenville's father is best remembered for the Stamp Act which caused so much unrest in the American colonies. William Wyndham Grenville inherited his father's deep concern for the intricacies of government finance.

He had a brilliant career a Oxford: here, again, Dr. Jupp dispels another favourite nostrum about eighteenth century Oxford and Cambridge as nothing but nurseries of 'port and prejudice.' Grenville acquired a great knowledge of and love for the classics at Oxford. Indeed, Dr. Jupp informs us that Grenville read some Greek or Latin almost every day of his life.

This biography is based on a staggering amount of manuscript work. Dr. Jupp has been busy on his subject for almost twenty years and the necessary work of pruning has made his study into a thoroughly readable book, as well as a scholarly one. The general reader can learn much about eighteenth century life from this fine book. Throughout, the author shows an admirable concern for placing his subject in the context of the time. He shows, for example, how youthful the politicians of the day were. We often think that the younger Pitt was alone among juvenile politicians, yet Grenville entered the Commons when only twenty-two and one-sixth of the 1780 Parliament was under thirty.

Dr. Jupp quite rightly pays a great deal of attention to the whole Grenville family, for William was only the most successful, not the only successful politician in the group. His elder brother, the Marquess of Buckingham, was also an important political figure, not so much for the high offices he sporadically held, but for his wealth and control of various M.P.s. The least attractive feature of all the Grenvilles was their almost insatiable greed for the patronage of office. At one point the brothers held some £21,000 in government sinecures. (This brings to mind one minor criticism: a family tree would have been a great assistance.)

Grenville held various high offices under his cousin, Pitt, but he gained these not because of his family links, but because of his proven ability for hard work. For a short time he was Speaker of the House of Commons. He played an

important role in financial policy and in deciding most Indian questions. For ten years he was Foreign Secretary: it was a decade when the French Revolution and then Napoleon dominated Europe. Grenville had a crucial part in the abolition of the slave trade. Then in 1806 he became Prime Minister of a coalition government, 'the Ministry of All the Talents.' Dr. Jupp's discussion of the role of the various parties, both in the formation and in the dissolution of that coalition government has considerable relevance to today's politics.

While it is impossible to make Lord Grenville into one of the first-rate British political leaders, this well written and scholarly biography has succeeded in restoring him to an honourable place among the figures of secondary importance in British history. This is no mean achievement.

RICHARD MULLEN

## MEMOIRS OF A SCHOOLMASTER

*Headmastering Man: Picaresque Adventures in Education.* Stowers Johnson. Hale. £9.95.

It can be both refreshing and heartening to read so balanced, humorous and forthright an account of his teaching experiences as that of Stowers Johnson. He has clearly not only had a rewarding career as teacher, headmaster and head of large Adult Education Centres but he has also obviously done a great service to the boys, girls and student teachers whose careers he has guided with what was certainly sound common sense and good humour. If it should seem trite to refer to qualities like these in reviewing his book the reader might reflect that they are the very characteristics which the teaching profession in the past has prized above academic honours. They form, however, a reservoir of goodwill whose waters are at the present time almost imperceptibly seeping away, from neglect of nurture and unheeding bureaucratic acts.

'It appears,' says the author, 'that, right from the old time when it shrugged the task off to ecclesiastical foundations, the nation has never given enough attention to inducing the best of its people to care for its children: it has neglected adequate remuneration, it has ignored the duty of training and strengthening their incentives.' No plainer or more self-evident truth could be stated in relation to the current crisis in the lives of educators at all levels of school or college.

Much of Stowers Johnson's experience was gained in the service of the Essex County Education Authority, for a good deal of the time under the benign and intelligent guidance of its director (later Professor) Lester Smith. Other well-known names in the teaching world occur throughout the book, such as that of the redoubtable but strangely myopic Sir Martin Roseveare, H.M. Chief Inspector of Schools. For this and other reasons it is a pity the publisher did not see fit to allow Stowers Johnson to compile an index of names, including place names. All headmasters and others would relish the author's account of his early brief encounter with the Lewis Carroll-like Sir Martin. When Johnson was invited at interview to say where he would like to teach, he requested a post in Greater London on the irrefutable grounds that the capital afforded educational opportunities for pupil and teacher alike. Roseveare indignantly rebuked him for his temerity in expressing any desires at all,—'you will go where we send you'. Shortly afterwards, Sir Martin was himself translated, 'to show the Africans how to do it'.

As an autobiography and a social document this book provides valuable records and insights into the often unenviable but more often rewarding life of a headmaster in the public education sphere.

BETTY ABEL

## RURAL ECHOES OF THE 1914-1918 WAR

*Echoes of the Great War.* Oxford University Press. £10.95.

Dr. James Munson, the historian and writer, has edited with great skill and understanding the remarkable Diary of the Reverend Andrew Clark, 1914-1919. Born in 1856, Andrew Clark, for many years a fellow and historian at Lincoln College, Oxford, became Rector of the remote country living of Great Leighs in Essex, some 37 miles from London, in 1894 until his death in 1922. On August 2nd, 1914, he started a daily Diary and continued it regularly throughout the war and until the peace treaty in 1919. He lodged from time to time the volumes of his Diary at the Bodleian Library, amounting in all to 92 volumes containing over three million words. They were forgotten until, by chance, Dr. Munson came upon them. He realised their historical importance as showing the impact of the war upon the lives of ordinary country people, away from the corridors of power and without detailed knowledge of events.

Dr. Munson has compressed his selections for the Diary into some 300 pages, retaining 'as much of its variety and immediacy' as he could and 'that compelling sense of involvement which the Diary evokes'. Andrew Clark wrote as his purpose: 'to put down, from day to day, such echoes of the Great War as reached the rectory from outside, ignoring (of course) all information directly or indirectly from newspapers, but giving authentic written scraps of genuine village origin'. In fact he goes much further than this. He seeks also news and gossip about the war everywhere he goes outside Great Leighs, from family, friends and strangers alike, and in correspondence. In the result, there is inevitably a mixture of truth and fiction, but always the genuine fears and tribulations, the hopes and disappointments, the personal tragedies around him, the echoes of the war.

In the Foreword, Asa Briggs emphasises that Andrew Clark 'is concerned with the immediacies of experience and response and with collecting all kinds of material' and quite rightly accepts that 'the flavour is kept' in spite of Dr. Munson's formidable task in selection. The sense of immediacy and reality is assisted by the excellent contemporary photographs of the village and village people. There is also a useful index. The Diary is not only fascinating to read but also is an important contribution to the history of rural England during the 1914-1918 war.

ARNOLD DE MONTMORENCY

## OSCAR WILDE'S LETTERS

*More Letters of Oscar Wilde.* Edited by Rupert Hart-Davis. John Murray. £12.50.

So great a thief and deceiver is Time, it seems impossible that twenty-four years have passed since was issued forth the magnificent 958-page, copiously illustrated *Letters of Oscar Wilde*—more than a thousand of them addressed to close on three hundred correspondents. In the train of two

further decades and a bit's unwinding, two hundred or so more letters from, as it were, Père Lachaise, have come by late post. Happily, they have landed in the letter-box of Sir Rupert Hart-Davis and have now been forwarded to those of us who care to take delivery. Of the two hundred, thirty-six have been adjudged by the censor trivial, unworthy. So what we have are in fact one hundred and sixty-four letters—'the only interesting ones'—caparisoned this time in unexceptionable dove-grey, 215 pages, and one illustration.

*Eheu! fugaces*... For good measure Sir Rupert has, however, provided a welcome make-weight, a couple of highly desirable *bonnes bouches*—two conversations with Oscar, resurrected from the graveyard of long-dead prints—plus the full texts of ten letters which appeared in abbreviated form in the 1962 *Letters*, and seven letters to Wilde, and two about him, which fill in gaps and add extra details.

Clearly, this is a book of central, seminal, importance, which any serious student of the nineties *must* add to his library, for it is, in effect, a continuation, a supplement, a sizeable appendix to the *Letters*.

Sir Rupert has retained here the nine 'bundles' into which, in terms of chronologico-location, he previously divided the letters—viz. Oxford: 1875-1878; London I: 1879-1881; America: 1882; London II: 1883-1890; London III: 1891-1895; Reading: 1895-1897; Berneval: 1897; Naples: 1897-1898; Paris: 1898-1900.

And into these bundles are slipped epistles addressed to fifty-nine new, plus seven unidentified, correspondents. Among the new named recipients are John Barlas, Mrs. Dion Boucicault, E. T. Cook, R. B. Cunninghame Graham, Richard D'Oyly Carte, Mrs. W. H. Grenfell, George Grossmith, Mrs. Millais, Douglas Sladen, W. T. Stead, Florence Stoker, Edward Strangman, Rowland Strong and Fred Terry.

Some of the letters are, in the nature of things, slight.

However, a number of interesting biographical *aperçus* emerge from, and between, the lines...

Wilde's kindness and generosity to the poor, deluded poet, John Barlas, for whom he stood bail when, in 1892, he fired a revolver at the Speaker's residence.

Wilde's application, in February 1886, for the position of Secretary to the Beaumont Trust Fund, which Scheme opened the People's Palace in the Mile End Road in May 1887. His candidature was not accepted.

The disgraceful episode in 1881 when the Librarian of the Oxford Union, having requested of Wilde the favour of a gift of a copy of his newly published *Poems*, and having had an inscribed copy promptly and courteously despatched to him, returned it to Wilde, following the defeat by 140 votes to 128 of a proposal to accept this solicited 'gift'.

Wilde wrote:

> Pray assure the committee of the Oxford Union that, while regretting that they had not ascertained the feeling of the Society with regard to my art, I quite acquit them of any intention to be discourteous towards me, and that I readily accept an apology so sincerely offered.... I must also, for the sake of the good fame and position of the Oxford Union, express a hope that no other poet or writer of English will ever be subjected to what I feel sure you as well as myself are conscious of, the coarse impertinence of having a work officially rejected which has been no less officially sought for.
>
> Pray be kind enough to forward to my private address the volume of my poems...

Through the most diverting pages of this book one follows the *papillon*

paper-chase of his days.

November 1880. To Mrs. Alfred Hunt.

As for Miss Violet, I feel that politics are too harsh an atmosphere for her: it is like talking to a daffodil about Political Economy!

December 1880. To Rennell Rodd.

Greats is the only fine school at Oxford, the only sphere of thought where one can be, *simultaneously*, brilliant and unreasonable, speculative and well-informed, creative as well as critical, and write with all the passion of youth about the truths which belong to the august serenity of old age. I wish you had got a First, that my compeers should not *all* be sluggish and syllogistic Scotchmen; still, a Second is perhaps for a man of culture a sweeter atmosphere than the chilly Caucasus of an atheistical First.

All too soon the self-inflicted blow fell; and Wilde is writing from Reading Gaol.

April 1897. To Arthur D. Hansell, of Stoker & Hansell, Solicitors.

I am quite incapable of managing my own affairs, and always have been. I don't know what to do with money except to throw it away. . . . My royalties for the *week* preceding my fatal and idiotic step of beginning an action at law were £245. Those were my halcyon days, which did me, I dare say, a lot of harm.

Now indeed came his petrel days. Berneval . . . Naples . . . Paris . . .

29 May, 1897. To Edward Rose, Hôtel de la Plage, Berneval-sur-Mer.

The French were charming to me all the time, and produced my play *Salome*, and wrote about me as a living artist, but the English denied me even the barren recognition one gives to the dead.

And the wild regrets, and the bloody sweats, none knew so well as he.

4 June, 1898. To Edward Strangman, Hôtel d'Alsace, Rue des Beaux-Arts, Paris.

I have been in a position at once tragic and comic for some time, without money, and with that detestable preoccupation with money that poverty entails —a mood of mind fatal to all fine things. . . .

The solitary illustration in the book is one of strange, not to say uncanny, significance to this period of Wilde's declension. Disinterred from a vanished Edwardian manual of cheiromancy, *The Graven Palm*, it is of the pudgy right hand of Oscar Wilde, photographed by the Sibyl of Mortimer Street, whom both he and his wife Constance had consulted. She, Mrs. Robinson, had 'seen' for him a very brilliant life 'up to a certain point'. And then, 'a wall'. After his release from prison, Oscar visited a palmist in Paris. She looked at his hands and told him: 'I am puzzled. By your line of life you died two years ago.'

Now, indeed, for Sebastian Melmoth, the wanderer, the albatross days were closing in.

He is caught, bravely bold and cruelly pathetic, in the waning time by Wilfred Hugh Chesson—in Appendix B. At L'Idée, Perreux, Nogent-sur-Marne, the lost Lord of Language, with 'a level suavity that, like the lawns of Oxford, had centuries of culture behind it,' stammered his well-practised litany of roseate regrets between the fireflies, the begged cigarettes and bestowed wine of charity. His Calvary and his conversion awaited him in the dingy little first-floor apartment with the lethal lees-of-wine-coloured wall-paper of his last *pension*. He found the shadow he had for some time been expecting lying in soft wait in the doorway of the Hôtel d'Alsace.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**The Ward of Cripplegate in the City of London.** By Caroline Gordon and Wilfrid Dewhurst. Foreword by Lord Briggs. (From the Cripplegate Ward Club or Guildhall. £5.75 post free.) Those who, like the reviewer, have

been admiringly bewildered by the complexities of the 'civic City', of mayoralty and shrievalty, alderman and councilman, soke and ward, mote and guild, may here find enjoyable comprehension of how it came about and serves us well.

The history of an important Ward from Roman times to the present is here set in the splendour, stink and bustle of the medieval and modern City of London. What other land than England could have cherished this benign anomaly through dynasties and Cromwell's interregnum and the fires of war? With the disappearance of the Greater London Council, its role can grow no less.

Sales of this attractive, well illustrated study aid the Lord Mayor's Charity. (John Biggs-Davison)

**Joseph Conrad: A Letter to William Nicholson.** (The Eighteen Nineties Society. £7.50.) A beautifully produced and presented collector's item, this previously unpublished letter, in facsimile, is, as Dr. G. Krishnamurti points out in his most illuminatory Introduction, of particular interest as the solitary evidence of contact between Conrad and one of the most influential artists and poster-designers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The letter thanks for the gift of one of Nicholson's 'Beggarstaff' posters of Don Quixote —here also reproduced. 'The eccentric, misguided but endearingly idealistic quester, was one of Conrad's tutelary deities in life and work,' notes Dr. Krishnamurti, identifying Conrad's prevailing fascination with the tension between the Quixotic (idealistically active, if misguided) and the Hamlet-like (sceptically perceptive but often inactive) in human nature. The edition is limited to 550 copies. (R.W-E.)

**Uncovering the Ancient World** (Constable. £14.95). Mr. H. V. F. Winstone has produced a history of 150 years of excavation in Persia, the Near East, Greece and Egypt. He is concerned with the work and achievements of the great archaeologists, including Schliemann at Mycenae and Troy, Sir Arthur Evans at Crete, Sir Flinders Petrie, Auguste Mariette, Sir Leonard Woolley and Howard Carter in Egypt, among many others. He writes at some length on the Jews, their exodus and Israel. It would be interesting to know Mr. Winstone's view upon Professor Kamal Salibi's opinion, recently published in *The Bible Came from Arabia*, that we should reinterpret 'the geography of the Hebrew Bible in terms of West Arabia rather than Palestine'. Mr. Winstone himself raises a controversial question on the Dead Sea scrolls. In 1883, Clermont-Ganneau condemned as forgeries 'without hesitation or discussion' scrolls purported to have been found by tribesmen in a cave beside the Dead Sea. In 1947 scrolls were discovered by tribesmen on the other side of the Dead Sea. 'The leather scrolls contained incised lines and other features by which Clermont-Ganneau had condemned Shapiro's collection. The lettering was similar in some respects. But this time the scrolls were declared authentic by experts of the Oriental at Chicago.' Unfortunately Shapiro's scrolls have now disappeared for reassessment. This book has chapter notes and a considerable bibliography. It should be useful as an introductory volume.

**The Struggles of Albert Woods** (Methuen. £3.50). This delightful and hilarious story by William Cooper, first published in 1952 is now issued as a Methuen paperback. It is all about Albert Woods and his advancement from a lowly background to academic and social heights. It is full of warmth and humour, and indeed a commentary upon much of our national character.

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# Contemporary Review

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## ISRAEL: THE CULTURAL ROOTS

### by Raymond Cohen

AS the different parties in the Middle East equation manoeuvre in the expectation of renewed negotiations, despite the present uncertainties, the Israeli factor remains enigmatic for many. For a country under such intensive scrutiny, Israeli behaviour never ceases to surprise. Time and again appraisals have been wide of the mark: about Israel's defensive capacity, internal viability, skill in mobilising external support, resilience under pressure and true intentions. The reason for this pattern of error is the tendency to judge Israel on the basis of culture-bound assumptions. Yet it can be argued that Israelis and Europeans do not, in fact, share a common view of the world or of man's place in history; nor do they think or react in the same way. If one is to understand Israel at all, one must begin by acknowledging its cultural singularity.

Israeli culture derives from three successive layers of experience: the way of life of the diaspora community known as the *shtetl*; the ideology of Zionism and the national trauma of the Nazi exterminations. This culture is not static, but rather a living organism evolving consistently with its own inner logic and in dynamic interaction with its environment; nor is it invariant and rigidly homogeneous. Israel is a compound made up of many elements. However, I do believe it is possible to speak of an Israeli culture in the singular. First, the culture of the founding fathers has acted as a template, a matrix for later arrivals; second, the common features of the various Jewish sub-cultures outweigh their differences. Finally, both circumstances and deliberate policy have exerted considerable pressure on dissonant elements to conform to prevailing patterns.

For much of the history of the dispersion Jews lived in self-contained communities set apart from the wider society. Within these communities—and this is as equally true of the Oriental as of the European branches of Jewry—Jews enjoyed a substantial measure of autonomy. They spoke their own languages, worshipped in their own way and were free to organise their lives as they saw fit. Obviously they were influenced by their surroundings, but external forces and a strong sense of uniqueness helped to maintain their separate identity—just as today. This state of affairs continued for many centuries until the Enlightenment and French Revolution proclaimed the equality of all men and an end to discrimination. Even then it took generations for this message to percolate down to the far corners of the Czarist and Ottoman Empires.

*Shtetl* life was the seed-bed of a unique culture. Its focus was the ancient Jewish religion, given, after the failed Judean Revolts of 70 and 132-5 AD against Rome and the subsequent Exile, an obsessional and exculpatory character. 'Because of our sins we were exiled from our land' was the recurrent refrain. Deprived of the Temple, the seat of the cult, and therefore unable to expiate guilt by sacrifice on the altar, the Jews substituted in its place an elaborate system of study, prayer and ritual. No sector of life lay beyond the purview of religious injunction and communal institutions—the synagogue, house of study, school, ritual bath and slaughter house—provided services no Jew could dispense with. To be a solitary Jew was a contradiction in terms. The holiest prayers could only be said in a quorum of ten men. National survival was to be ensured until the hoped-for restoration of the Jewish people to their rightful inheritance.

From the Bible the Jews learnt of their collective responsibility before the Deity. On the one hand the covenant of their forefathers gave them a special place in divine affections. On the other hand the whole people would bear the penalty for misdemeanour. All misfortune, from the destructions of the Temple, via the Expulsion from Spain in 1492 and Chmelnicki massacres in the Ukraine in 1647, seemed to bear out this thesis. From this premise the Jews derived a strong sense of a shared national destiny, great communal solidarity and intolerance of dissent and a peculiar philosophy which saw in suffering not a denial of their special status, but its affirmation.

The mystical, messianic element in Judaism has always been present, but acquires particular emphasis at times of national disaster. The Jesus and Bar Kochba cults strongly appealed to Jews in conditions identified with the End of Days. Again and again the pattern has repeated itself, most recently in the shape of the Sabbatarian movement of the seventeenth century, the Chassidic movement of the eighteenth century and nineteenth and twentieth-century Zionism. Although Zionism itself consciously rejected the external trappings of conventional religion, its logic is recognisably messianic. And, significantly enough, it has fascinated those, both Jew and Christian, who live in imminent anticipation of the arrival of the Messiah.

Sustained by a faith which, in its salvationist expectations, gave meaning to dispersion and suffering, paradoxically the Jew simultaneously transformed the ritual study of written texts, particularly the Talmud, into a sort of vicarious experience of pre-Exilic national life. The Talmud itself is largely a voluminous summation of discussions, debates and rulings on every imaginable area of social and religious conduct. Much of it is not relevant in any strictly utilitarian sense; which is precisely the point. Minute analysis of the service of a destroyed Temple or of agricultural practices in a lost Homeland could provide a surrogate for the real thing.

Study of the holy books has had a decisive impact on Jewish culture. In the first place it elevated literacy to the level of religious obligation. The initiation ceremony for the male Jew when he enters manhood—barmitzvah—involves the public reading of a Biblical text. Where illiteracy severely restricts the geographical, historical and intellectual horizons of a culture, literacy encourages the development of a chronological perspective, pro-

vides access to a world far beyond the individual's everyday experience and permits acquisition of the tools of logic and science. From the point of view of his national identity literacy gave the Jew a strong sense of his place in history and, of vital importance to national solidarity and religious uniformity, facilitated communication between far-flung diaspora communities.

The style of Talmudic discourse was also formative. Although the overriding aim of its authors was to provide a single, authoritative exegesis of Jewish scripture and practice, Talmudic study itself is not necessarily dogmatic, provided one accepts its basic premises. Variant opinions are meticulously cited. Innovative explanations are prized. Personal study and meditation, which literacy anyway fosters, are encouraged. It is not far-fetched to see the Talmud as the key to one of the puzzling features of Jewish culture—the combination of personal autonomy with a strong sense of communal affiliation. In contrast, most of the collectivist oriental cultures only achieve group cohesion at the expense of the individual. Other features of Talmudic debate are its propensity for detailed textual analysis, verging on the scholastic, and a delight in intentionally far-fetched and impractical cases and arguments. At his best the Jewish intellectual, a Spinoza, a Freud or an Einstein, can be highly original. But scholarship can also degenerate into pedantry and imagination into the most fantastic dreaming or impractical idealism.

As a largely self-contained, autonomous society the *shtetl* developed a range of civic habits and mechanisms which have left their stamp on the State of Israel. Since, on the whole, Jews were barred from owning land and restricted in their choice of profession, the community was a classless society. This does not mean that there were no differences in wealth or status, only that success was seen as a result of ability or good fortune rather than part of the predetermined order of things. Rothschild might be richer than other Jews but none accepted him as their better—a perennial subject of Jewish humour, incidentally. In short, the *shtetl* was highly egalitarian. Leadership was invested in the prosperous or the learned and was close to the grass roots. As for the agenda of political life, it was restricted to two areas: one, the provision of communal services; the other, ensuring survival in an alien environment.

It should not be thought that the first, more mundane, sector of life was free of controversy. Far from it; the lower the stakes, the higher the voices; and in a society in which benefits were limited, seemingly trivial issues of prestige and standing could loom disproportionately large. The desire for *koved*, honour in the community, became a burning obsession. At the same time debate on parish pump issues was impassioned, even virulent. All this is still true of politics in modern Israel. What was rare was for political disagreement to spill over into violence: the diaspora Jew possessed an abhorrence of the use of force.

All too often the great issues of communal existence—expulsion, discrimination, persecution—were irreversible. The stateless Jew was the object of history, not its subject. Whether one defended oneself or not made as much difference for Jews faced by Cossacks as for Anglo-Saxon villagers faced

by Vikings. The only conceivable way the Jew could hope to affect his fate was by appealing to the state authorities. The Jews owed their presence to the express invitation or forebearance of the ruler and looked to him for succour. Thus the other great task of Jewish leadership was that of intercession and it is from this tradition that Jewish culture derived its approach to statecraft. The *shtadlan*—literally, one who intercedes—had, preferably, to be a Jew who had acquired some kind of standing in the wider society, as perhaps a physician or banker to the Prince. Since he could hardly resort to arguments based on power, only an appeal to personal favour or financial inducement could hope to be effective, if at all. And in the Machiavellian councils of Eastern Europe or the Ottoman Empire a familiarity with court intrigue was a valuable asset. Briefly put, the diplomacy of the State of Israel (like that, to some extent, of Soviet Russia) owes more to the complex tradition of Byzantium than to that of the West. The participation of Jews in the anti-Czarist underground, partisan and espionage activities in World War II and the pre-state struggle against the British Mandate, rounded out the Zionist training for statehood. It is hardly surprising that formal diplomatic isolation has never affected Israel's ability to spirit distressed Jews out of the Yemen or to acquire the intelligence and arms needed for defence.

The ideology of Zionism, with its stress on the soil, labour, self-defence, communal life and democratic government—and its contemptuous rejection of religious ritual—seems to owe more to the liberal nationalism of Mazzini and the socialism of Lassalle than to Rashi and the Rambam (two of Judaism's greatest thinkers). This would be a superficial judgement. Although nineteenth-century ideology provided a stimulus and a paradigm for Jewish nationalism, in timing, appeal and substance Zionism shares many features with previous cases of Jewish messianism. Its great popular flowering came in the wake of new threats to Jewish survival in Eastern Europe, such as the Ukraine grain riots of the 1880s. But as a practical solution its message seemed almost ludicrously improbable: the 'return' of the largely Yiddish-speaking, urbanised Jew to an impoverished backwater of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, only an utterly unpredictable series of convulsions on a global scale could transform the dream into reality.

No matter, the Zionist message proved compellingly attractive to the Jewish masses, a fulfilment of the age-old yearning to spend 'next year in Jerusalem'. When Theodore Herzl, the effective leader of political Zionism, visited London in 1898, he was received with ecstasy by the Whitechapel poor as their saviour. An imposing, regal figure, with the bearded countenance and brooding eyes of the Old Testament prophet, Herzl achieved revered stature. One of the delegates at the first Zionist Congress in Vienna described him as 'a royal descendant of David arisen from the grave who appears before us in the grandeur and beauty with which legend has surrounded him. Everyone is gripped as if a historical miracle had occurred . . . . it was as if the Messiah, son of David, stood before us. A powerful desire seized me to shout through this tempestuous sea of joy: *Jechi Hamelech*, long live the King.'

The first Jewish pioneers in Palestine were revolutionaries and iconoclasts.

They had not left the Pale of Settlement to restore the stifling life of the *shtetl*. They saw themselves as socialists and atheists, no less than as Zionists. Many of them even disliked the appellation 'Jew', a word which every European language had loaded with scorn and ignominy, preferring to call themselves Israelites, Hebrews or even, eccentrically, Canaanites. Yet whatever their explicit ideology, the practical programme of Zionism and the vocabulary it was couched in were redolent with messianic associations.

At the heart of the movement was immigration, in Hebrew, *aliyah*, ascension, connoting a transition from a place of lesser to a place of greater holiness. There was to be an *ingathering of exiles*, a term which, with its various synonyms, recurs throughout the prayerbook in messianic contexts. (The extraordinary nature of this idea is brought home if one considers that the State of Israel has absorbed immigrants from every continent, including 2,500 year-old communities such as those of Iraq and Iran, most recently flying in the black Jews of Ethiopia. This latter exploit was, in the words of Labour Prime Minister Shimon Peres, the accomplishment of 'a sacred mission'.)

The other pivot of the Zionist movement has been the single-minded, century-long campaign to 'redeem' the land itself. The word for redemption —*geula*—refers in a very characteristic way not only to the legal repossession of property by its rightful owner but also to the physical deliverance and spiritual salvation of human beings. The Zionists set about this task in two complementary ways. At one level they purchased land from the Arabs, using charitable donations collected abroad, built settlements and worked the soil. From the 1880s to the present day the task of reclamation has been seen as another 'sacred mission', the very fulfilment of Jewish redemption. In putting the land to productive use the Jew saw himself as restoring its promised, biblical fertility and rehabilitating his own productive character, stunted by centuries of *shtetl* life. Herzl's seminal tract was called *Altneuland*, Old-new land: the process of renewal of man and land would be reciprocal. At a second level Zionism has, of course, been a political movement *par excellence*, relentlessly pressing forward its objective of achieving and consolidating statehood.

It is easy to see how the idea of redemption of the Land of Israel has influenced the policy of the State of Israel. Not even Zionists who oppose the annexation of what Israelis call Judea and Samaria deny that Israel has an historical right to that territory. Their argument is simply that this right should be suspended in order to permit the realisation of a greater good. The resonance of this appeal is not widespread, as it goes against the grain of a Zionist dogma that owes as much to the Book of Joshua as to the Book of Isaiah. Less likely still is the possibility of concession over the city of Jerusalem. In 1948 Ben-Gurion gave defence of Jerusalem and the securing of a corridor to it the very highest priority, seeing it as essential to the spiritual viability of the new state. Able-bodied men, not long out of the displaced persons camps of Europe, were sent straight from the docks to fight and fall in their hundreds on the battlefield of Latrun. In June 1967 the commander of the Paratroop Brigade poised outside Jerusalem awaiting orders was

approached by the Chief Chaplain to the Armed Forces with the suggestion that he capture the Old City at his own initiative. In the atmosphere of the time this was not an incongruous proposal. Had the order not been given it would have been impossible, given the wave of messianic fervour sweeping the nation, to restrain the army from reuniting Jerusalem. As it was, the recapture of the Jewish Quarter and the Western ('Wailing') Wall of the Temple were seen as the very high point of the war, if not of modern Jewish history. Today the city has the fastest growing population in Israel and the Arab sections are hemmed in by massive housing developments, new towns and the Mount Scopus campus of the Hebrew University. Nor has this policy been in any sense artificial; the Jews have voted for Jerusalem with their feet.

The third crucial influence on Israeli culture was the experience of the Holocaust. The Jews, of course, are used to anti-semitism and their history is scarred by massacre and martyrdom; but the Nazi exterminations were of a totally different order from anything that went before, since their ultimate objective was to destroy the entire people. In effect, Hitler did succeed in wiping out the Jews as an indigenous East European nation. One result of this was to imbue the survivors with the sense that they were a remnant, duty-bound to commemorate the victims. Among the many forms this mission takes, the strengthening of Jewish life and the defence and consolidation of Israel are its most profound expressions. In Emil Fackenheim's aphorism, 'no posthumous victories for Hitler'. Operationally, this means very simply that there is literally no price that an Israeli leadership would not pay either to protect the borders of the State or to rescue Jews in peril of their lives. 'All is permissible', whether this entails a commando raid on Entebbe to rescue hijack victims, the bombing of PLO headquarters in Beirut and Tunis, or the demolition of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor. Any critical international reaction to Israel's policies or argument to the principle of territorial sovereignty is greeted with incomprehension. To the generation that knew Auschwitz it is naive to think that 'world opinion' could have any effect whatsoever, except to confirm the conviction of many Israelis that 'all the world's against us'. For reassurance they turn to Balaam's blessing of 'a people that shall dwell alone and shall not be reckoned among the nations.'

In some ways the Holocaust simply reinforced predispositions that had been conditioned by centuries of precarious existence: a perpetual sense of foreboding, a mistrust of 'the nations' and the conviction that for the weak there is no justice. Ironic indeed that, of all places, the Jews should seek their refuge in the violent and turbulent Middle East, thereby reproducing the very conditions of isolation in the midst of an alien, inhospitable environment that they sought to escape. In other circumstances the jagged edges of insecurity might have been smoothed down. It is true, as the Jewish joke has it, that 'even paranoids have enemies'. However, there can be little doubt that Israel, after the ineffable trauma of the death camps, has displayed an exceptionally low threshold of threat perception; premonitions of a recurrence of the catastrophe—characteristic of post-disaster commun-

ities—loom large. Forty years on, the wounds show no signs of healing.

The great shift in Jewish behaviour engendered by the Holocaust is in the use of armed force. With the defeat of the Bar Kochba Revolt in 135 AD, at a cost of hundreds of thousands of dead and the loss of the national territory, the stateless Jews were obliged to accept a doctrine of submission to the powerful. Incorporated into religious thought, soft words were felt to be more effective than swords for turning away wrath. The Rabbis discuss the conditions under which one must accept martyrdom but assume the hopelessness of physical resistance. Even the Zionist movement initially saw force as a defensive rather than an offensive instrument, basing its pre-war policy on the doctrine of *havlaga* (self-restraint). This thesis was abandoned in 1945. First, it was felt to be a demonstrably ineffective policy. Second, the humiliation of 'going like sheep to the slaughter' had to be expunged. Third, there was a burning desire for revenge. Once the State of Israel was established the Jewish nation was provided, in the shape of its army, not only with the means of resistance but also with a mechanism of psychological compensation.

The realisation that Israel is not a Wales or a Netherlands somehow transposed to the Middle East may come as a shock to some: but unless one grasps Israel's cultural distinctiveness her political behaviour will remain incomprehensible. Her ethos derives from a unique synthesis of messianism, sense of shared national destiny, foreboding of impending disaster and consuming will to survive. Within this frame of reference there is very little place for such Northern Protestant expedients as international guarantees, General Assemblies or 'good will' concessions. Most consequential are the attitudes brought to bear on the Palestinian question. Talk of 'Palestinian rights' cuts very little ice with a Zionist movement whose constitutive purpose is the fulfilment of the destined redemption of the national homeland. Moreover, the Palestinian preference for an armed struggle conducted indiscriminately against civilians (which in itself only makes sense in terms of the nature of violence in Arab culture) has struck the Jews on a very raw nerve indeed. For most Israelis the PLO is identified with Amalek, the biblical enemy who arises in every generation to destroy the Jewish people, and last appeared in the shape of the Nazis. The idea of accommodation with such a force acquires the character of a metaphysical absurdity. While culture is not a deterministic straitjacket, it seems unlikely that Israel would transcend its deepest instincts. If I am right, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be as far away as ever from resolution.

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# COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: AN ITALIAN VIEW

by Roberto Aliboni

VARIOUS great political entities gravitate towards the Mediterranean basin: the European Economic Community, Eastern Europe, and the Arab world. Within these areas of gravitation are organizations for cooperation and integration, or projects for cooperation and integration. For each one of these areas, the remaining two are not economically and commercially the most important. While specific exceptions do exist — witness the case of Italian-Yugoslav relations — Eastern Europe's basic economic relations are with the USSR, and relations with Western Europe take second place. More even than among themselves, the Arab countries, like those of the EEC, maintain particularly important relations with the USA.

No less noteworthy are the good relations between the Mediterranean countries, particularly between the West European and the Arab, and in these oil continues to play a key role irrespective of the fact that in the past ten years Europe has gradually reoriented itself in terms of supplies.

The very fact that these three political areas have their major economic (and political) partners outside the Mediterranean is not inconsequential. The most relevant consequence is the impossibility of speaking of Mediterranean integration or cooperation in the context of changes in relations between these three areas, or between any two of them. Rather than an area of integration, the Mediterranean seems more of an area where different fields of gravitation overlap.

Such a situation requires a special effort to be made for cooperation, for if it is not made, it is precisely in this area of overlapping, or of boundaries, that major conflicts could break out. We must in this sense see to it that special mechanisms of cooperation are established in the region. At present, there are only a few such mechanisms, in addition to a number of projects that are being implemented, for instance, the 'Blue Plan' within UNEP frameworks. There is, however, no network of cooperation on the extensive scale that is called for. In spite of numerous proposals from the recent past, such as those originating in the CSCE, or from the Euro-Arab diaglogue, there is no coherent and unified project for working in this direction. What does exist are important achievements in bilateral relations, those between Italy and Yugoslavia being a case in point, there is also a framework which, though vulnerable to criticism, is offered by the European Community through what is called 'Mediterranean policy'.

Areas of potential conflict are likewise areas of potential cooperation. A unified action framework is provided by concern regarding the organizing of joint efforts to suppress various forms of pollution of the Mediterranean basin. Other fields, too, frequently linked with the pollution

problem could offer opportunities for cooperation. If these opportunities are allowed to slip by we shall run the risk not only of losing our chance in words alone but of running into serious conflicts.

A particularly important aspect among the conflict/cooperation areas is that associated with economic exploitation of raw materials for energy, from prospecting and extraction to transport.

During the past ten years efforts have been stepped up to explore the off-shore continental shelf. These have yielded favourable results, and the estimate is that they will do so in the future as well, certainly with even greater intensity. The Mediterranean is characterized by a narrow shelf, as the basin quickly plunges to an average depth of 3,000 meters and technology still does not permit exploration at such depths. However, at certain places, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the shelf is wide. Certainly, this is an opportunity for exploration to lead to appropriate forms of cooperation, for instance, in the Adriatic, and it should not be missed although, on the other hand, a conflict situation could result such as has already happened in the Central Mediterranean. The conclusion would be that it is desirable to frame the necessary instruments for preventing such conflicts and leading to multilateral cooperation.

Transportation more than exploration and exploitation creates problems of cooperation and conflict. In the first place, the logistics of oil transport are changing. The reopening of the Suez Canal, its expansion, and projects for further widening are reasons why routes leading around the Cape of Good Hope and the supertankers that go with such distances are becoming obsolete. This trend has especially been hastened by the development of the oil pipeline network toward the Mediterranean: a) Sumed, from the Suez to the Mediterranean, which may be considered an auxiliary capacity of the Canal; b) the Trans-Arabian oil pipeline, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea; c) the oil pipeline under construction from Iraq to the Red Sea (both in a way intended to transcend the strategic limitations of the Hormuz Straits); d) the north-south Iraqi pipeline permitting the flow of oil from the Gulf northwards and to the Mediterranean; e) the aforementioned pipeline, passing through Turkey, emerging at the port of Ceyan. The result of all the foregoing is that the Mediterranean, after the 'eclipse' caused by the closing of the Canal, has become an area of heavy traffic with all that this means in ecological, economic and security terms. This upward trend could continue, even if gas is piped by lines through Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, as an alternative to the scarcely practical transport of gas by vessels after it has been converted into a liquid state.

A technological innovation in transportation is underwater oil pipelines. Italy has successfully developed this technology and today Algeria is linked up with Europe in this way. In the future, it would be possible to link up the European continent with the aforementioned oil fields in the East. This mode of transportation, too, is fraught with ecological, economic and security implications.

On the whole, these trends increase interdependence among countries and areas gravitating toward the Mediterranean basin. If interdependence

is not guided by appropriate plans for integration and cooperation, this opportunity for cooperation could be transformed into a factor making for even graver conflicts in the region.

Fishing is yet another area of conflict and/or cooperation. Already it has been the cause of several conflicts of considerable proportions in the Central Mediterranean. The framing of a unified Community policy on this question has not opened up any particularly promising prospects. A very delicate natural balance typifies the Mediterranean and for this reason cooperation is imperative, whether it be to safeguard the fauna or to ensure rational utilization. At the production level, transnational enterprises should be formed, accountable to governments or special international institutions which would exploit the sea economically while ensuring reproduction of its fauna. Regrettably, cooperation has made no progress in this field.

Opportunities for long-term international integration in the Mediterranean are provided by the industrialization now in progress in virtually all basin countries. In the last decade, the Mediterranean countries have registered on average a high rate of development since industrialization has by and large proceeded at a faster pace than in other regions. A characteristic of this process of industrialization is the important role played by public entrepreneurship and an orientation to on-the-spot processing of national raw materials. The availability of energy has also been a feature of industrial development that includes first phase processing otherwise not economical, as in the case of aluminium, refineries, certain stages in the petrochemical industry and so on. For Italy, this type of development has already created and will continue to create reconversion problems. If petrochemical products for the Arab Peninsula record sufficient success, as it appears they might, Europe would be the natural market outlet, rather than the USA, and this would raise the problem of the international division of labour. Problems of this nature are exaggerated in discussions but, as is evident from the unsuccessful Euro-Arabian dialogue, the fact is that no approach is being made to solving them, and this is what makes for conflict.

The greater flow of wealth to the Arab countries in the past ten years has increased effective demand in those countries but, owing to the slowness of the industrialization process, this has been transformed into an increase in imports. No appropriate policy of import substitution is being followed but the outlook is somewhat better for the policy of increasing exports, particularly in terms of certain forms of priority for exports from the less developed countries of the basin or other regions. It must be admitted that in this field the EEC has not made any far-reaching moves. On the other hand, cooperation among industrializing countries has not brought any particular progress.

In conclusion, I would like to stress the most important economic areas which, unless they become areas of cooperation, will give rise to conflicts: energy, fishing, and industrialization. All of them have an ecological aspect but even the only cooperation existing now, in the latter field, will

be weakened unless bolstered by appropriate cooperation in the other specific sectors already mentioned.

Setting up new specialized international institutions to cope with these problems is not always advisable or effective. Institutions already exist where these problems, given the right amount of will, can be solved. In this sense, activity by the Community has a key role since it constitutes the greatest industrial power of the basin. European countries wishing to make a special effort towards cooperation in the Mediterranean could commence only with transformation and enrichment of the EEC's present Mediterranean policy.

Understandably, bilateral relations retain their importance. Effective relations, such as those between Italy and Yugoslavia, could have a positive contribution to make to wide-ranging cooperation in the basin. Relations susceptible to conflict, a case in point being Turkey and Greece, act to slow down cooperation and development. If we wish the many opportunities for cooperation in the Mediterranean not to be transformed into just as many opportunities for conflict, then, in the framework of the EEC, or through the opportune mediation of other countries, we shall have to invest major efforts in solving these bilateral problems.

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The April issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Hong Kong and the Pacific Basin* by Paddy Ashdown, M.P., *International Obligations* by Lord Stewart of Fulham, *Protestants in Belfast: A View from the Inside* by Fred Boal and David Livingstone and *A Poor Deal for the Pensioner* by G. W. Stevenson, MEP. *Quarterly Fiction Review* is held over and will be published in the July issue.

# SOUTH ATLANTIC OPPORTUNITIES

## by Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

APPEASEMENT of an aggressor, culminating in Munich, preceded what Churchill described as the 'Unnecessary War'. There was another 'unnecessary' war in the South Atlantic. There need have been no 'Operation Corporate' for the repossession of South Georgia and the Falkland Islands and the rescue of our fellow subjects, if Buenos Aires had not been given the impression over a decade and more that Britain was prepared, under some formula or other, to abandon her territory and people. General Galtieri, no less, has been quoted as saying that there would have been no invasion if it had been certain that the British would strike back. On a vastly smaller scale, it was 1914 and 1939 over again. Vacillating Britain brought armed conflict upon herself.

After Munich in 1938, war inexorably followed. That was to be expected. 'Munich' then became a dirty word. It is therefore strange that there should be advocacy of a South Atlantic 'Munich' after victory. It often takes the form of exaggerating the cost of defending the liberated islands and their dependencies.

The new airfield at Mount Pleasant is already making savings and force reductions can follow. The Ministry of Defence has estimated that the cost of moving troops and freight will have fallen by the end of the current financial year by at least £25 million, thanks to the introduction of wide-bodied aircraft. The endurance test of the flight refuelled Hercules, which this writer has himself undergone, is now giving way to an easier passage for men and material. Against the expense of a garrison should, moreover, be set the value of a superb training area for the three Services.

In any case, Argentina is unlikely to attack again—unless we listen to the defeatists in the City of London, Whitehall and Westminster — and weaken. France never attempted to take the Channel Islands after the Battle of Jersey in 1791. (Incidentally, France has what some might consider as good a claim to *'les Malouines'*, named after St. Malo, as the Argentine to what she calls, by adaptation of the French name, the Malvinas.)

During 'Operation Corporate' a colour sergeant of Marines said that if the Islands were worth fighting for, they were worth keeping. To many, the Falklands and their dependencies seem to be the end of the Americas—if not the end of the world. They are in fact at the beginning of Antarctica—with all its untapped mineral wealth.

The Falkland Islands Development Corporation, recommended by Lord Shackleton in his Economic Study of 1982, is getting into its stride. Financed by the Overseas Development Administration, it yet operates separately from the Falkland Islands Government. Oil is a possibility. There is scope for local processing of the Falklands' staple, wool. Inshore fishing attracts visitors. There could be good yields of crustaceans of

high quality.

The international airport at Mount Pleasant, the wildlife and battlefield sites have already stimulated a volume of tourism which has outstripped the accommodation. Port Stanley's one hotel, 'The Island Goose', is not quite up to modern standards.

Falklands waters contain the world's largest marine resources. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation estimates a maximum annual yield of 3,000 tonnes of squid. Blue whiting, hake, croaker and other salt water species can also be caught. Krill, which was the food of the whale, is convertible into a meal the protein content of which ressembles fish meal. This can be used for the feeding of animals. Krill can also be processed for direct human consumption and could help to relieve world hunger.

But krill is not only whale food. It is an important link in the food chain of the whole region. Over-fishing threatens both the South Atlantic and Antarctica. The number of trawlers, from a number of countries, but not from Britain, has increased by more than a quarter since last season. In 1984 the Spanish fishing fleet, which accounts for about ten per cent of the known tonnage of ships fishing these waters, took nearly 20,000 tonnes. The size and number of vessels increase all the time and so does the catch. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office seeks 'a multilaterally based fisheries conservation regime around the Falkland Islands' but have not obtained it. It is time, therefore, to impose it and avert economic and ecological disaster. Those who know expect little objection, even from fisherman of the Soviet bloc. As for enforcement, air and sea surveillance is continuous and Argentine vessels are kept under careful scrutiny.

This then, is a region of special economic and strategic significance. In a speech delivered on 17th January 1969, Mr. Enoch Powell quoted 'a Conservative Member (who) asked the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment he had made of the value of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies to the United Kingdom's future maritime strategy. Mr. Healey replied: 'These islands do not have any contribution to make to our future strategy.' It is an assertion which becomes the more alarming the more one reflects upon it.'

Mr. Powell continued:

> The one absolute requirement of the defence of the United Kingdom is to deny an enemy the power to obtain or prevent access to these islands. Such defence cannot be simply coastal. With, or in the last resort, without allies, Britain must be able to give battle and exercise surveillance far out in the Atlantic: in short, her maritime forces must command the ocean which separates the Old World from the New. At the southern end of that ocean are situated, on the East, the Cape, with the naval base at Simonstown* and on the West, the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. How important those two positions are for controlling the Atlantic can be read from the naval history of the First and of the Second World Wars. Maritime war is in three elements: in the air, on the surface and below the surface. However great the technical advances

*If UK facilities there had not been surrendered, they would have been even more useful for Operation Corporate than Ascension Island which fortunately is sovereign British territory.

> in range and speed, an advantage which could be decisive will always accrue to the belligerent which has land positions conveniently sited, either as actual possessions or in the hands of reliable allies with common interests. Let me ask just one question. Russia is exploring the possibilities of maritime power, for the first time seriously in sixty years. Her surface ships and her submarines are making their appearance in all the oceans and her maritime aircraft make vast sweeps from their home bases. My question is this: 'If the Falkland Islands belonged to the Soviet Union, would their Minister of Defence be saying, "These islands do not have any contribution to make to our future strategy"?' If the answer is, 'No, he would not', then the answer of the British Government must be the wrong one.

The 'Conservative Member' was myself!

Contemplating in Port Stanley the memorials to two decisive naval battles fought by the Royal Navy in two world wars, I reflected that, if (which God forbid) there were to be a third, Panama would be highly vulnerable, and that the Magellan Strait and Drake's Passage should not pass to an unreliable power. President Alfonsin is not forever and previous democratic regimes in Argentina have been supplanted by military juntas.

A weak Argentine government resting on an unstable economy has not been conciliatory. It did not reciprocate in July when the United Kingdom lifted the ban on Argentine imports imposed in April 1982 on the morrow of the invasion. In announcing the concession, Mr. Tim Renton said that the Government's twin aims were 'to fulfil (their) commitments to the Falkland Islanders and to restore more normal relations between Britain and Argentina'.

For a decade and more I have pleaded for co-operation between Britain and Argentina for regional defence and development. Let us hope that one day the Argentine and other allied flags will fly over what Britain could provide as base and headquarters for the long-needed SATO or southern hemisphere system of security stretching from Australasia through Southern Africa to South America. NATO ends at the Tropic of Cancer—where many dangers begin.

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[Sir John Biggs-Davison is Member of Parliament for Epping Forest.]

# METAPHYSICS AND REALITY: THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT

**by Hugh Munro**

MARGARET THATCHER is reported to have said, some years back, that 'with Dublin it is all metaphysics'. She was referring, one assumes, to the preoccupation of Irish nationalists of the John Hume school of thought with concepts like 'identity', 'alienation', 'tradition', 'reconciliation of the two communities'. Certainly this kind of language, when used about the Northern Irish situation, has hitherto found a more ready response in the wetter areas of British politics, from the Labour right through the Liberal/SDP Alliance to the Tory wets. It is the dominant view in the Republic of Ireland — overwhelmingly strong in the governing Fine Gael and Labour parties, predominant in the media and strongly, if silently, represented among the anti-Haughey minority in the opposition party, Fianna Fail.

Among the Nationalists of the North it commands a weaker following. The 40% of Nationalists who vote for Sinn Fein, the IRA's electoral front, are, to say the least, not of the metaphysical school and a minority wing of John Hume's SDLP, led by the Deputy Leader, Seamus Mallon, would incline to more traditional Nationalist values.

The difference between the two schools of thought is clear enough. Your metaphysical Nationalist tends to see the Anglo-Irish problem as confined to Northern Ireland, to be dealt with by measures internal to Northern Ireland. He sees Northern Unionists as in some sense alien to Irish nationality. The present Fine Gael government in Dublin looks upon Dublin's role in relation to Northern Ireland as being to protect and support the Northern Nationalists; indeed this role is conceded to Dublin in the Hillsborough Accord. It is an attitude which loyalists could resent. They campaign to keep the Union in the shape and format they would prefer it to have — devolved government under the Crown such as obtained up to 1972. If London modifies Northern Ireland's constitution against their desire they will huff and puff (as they are doing now); but in the end they will accept a Union on whatever terms are on offer. They have nowhere else to go but into a united Ireland; for while Northern Ireland may be a hotly-contested political arena, it has not the makings of a nation. For Fine Gael to portray the Northern Nationalists as more genuinely Irish than the Loyalists may not be too objectionable as long as a united Ireland is not in question; but if it did become a live issue the Northern majority would resent any suggestion that they were not properly Irish. Charles Haughey's Fianna Fail would not have made such a point of identifying Dublin with Northern Nationalism. It would tend to see the Dublin government as in some sense a trustee for a future united Ireland, in which all Irish people, Nationalist and ex-loyalist, would be equal participants. In this respect at least, Fianna Fail's attitudes are more

attractive to loyalists than those of Garret Fitzgerald's Fine Gael.

Your metaphysical Nationalist is inclined to shrink from harsh reality. He would not like to face the tough fact that most conflicts end, not with contrived draws, but with one side winning and that the task of those who wish to end conflicts may often be best accomplished by picking the likely winner and backing him. Instead, he tends to think in terms of artificial policies like power-sharing; in other words policies which can only be arrived at and maintained in being by external arm-twisting (to be done by Britain; your metaphysical Nationalist does not envisage shedding Nationalist blood to make his desired policies work). While claiming to want Irish unity, he envisages Northern Ireland being a separate political unit in any 'solution' he envisages.

There is a basic internal contradiction to this view. That Northern Ireland is a politically-divided society is clear; but if so, the obvious answer is to abolish it, or at least partition it. Yet your metaphysician is clear that it should remain a separate political unit.

Where two communities have a separate existence apart from one another, a separate place to stand, they can come to terms over issues where they come in conflict — as, say, Britain and Norway can arrive at a satisfactory compromise solution over oil extraction rights along their North Sea boundary line. But Nationalism and Loyalism are inseparably intertwined. They have no separate place to stand, to cultivate their own welfare and interests without considering the other. The ultimate aim of all Nationalists, metaphysical or dry, is to unite the island, and this puts them at permanent odds with Loyalism. Some, like John Hume, would seek to redefine Loyalism into a force which can come to terms with Nationalism; but to Loyalism as it actually is, Nationalism is the permanent enemy. Your Nationalist is in business to extinguish Loyalism and make all people on the island citizens of an Irish state; your Loyalist is in business to resist that. His job is to say 'Not an inch'; he cannot say 'Well, not more than a few inches' without losing all credibility. Reconciliation between Loyalists and Nationalism is ipso facto impossible. The proper task of London and Dublin politicians is not to pretend to be able to end that conflict, but to manage it as peacefully as may be.

From the commencement of the Northern Irish troubles, up to late 1978, Liam Cosgrave and Jack Lynch led the Dublin government, and metaphysics, for all its internal confusions, held sway. John Hume was its chief prophet and the most significant Irish-American politicians — Tip O'Neill, Edward Kennedy, Daniel Moynihan — were enrolled under his banner. With the arrival of Charles Haughey as Taoiseach, things changed. He had a rawer, simpler message. To him, Northern Ireland was simply an unworkable political unit (unworkable, that is, except by continuing expenditure of British blood and treasure). No doubt there was a majority against change; but must majorities always prevail when the unit in which the majority has been arrived at is inherently artificial? Take away British support and Northern Ireland would become a politically-incoherent area. Irish unity would then be seen as the only possible policy. One need not

expect the Northern Loyalists to campaign for unity. With the ending of the British link, Loyalism would also have ended. It would no longer have a *raison d'être*. Unity would come, either by passive acceptance on the part of the North, or perhaps by an organised electoral majority.

Such was the Haughey policy — or we should rather say such was the logic behind the Haughey policy. (For his own reasons he never amplified his views, preferring gnomic references to the 'failed political entity'). It was not a view which would commend itself to Margaret Thatcher, but it was a view which she could understand. The Anglo-Irish summit of late 1979 was not a meeting of minds, but it was at least a meeting of moisture contents, of dry meeting dry. It transformed the Anglo-Irish problem.

From being seen as a matter to be dealt with by organising an internal solution in Northern Ireland by 'reconciling the two communities', the problem was taken to the Dublin-London level. There was to be an Anglo-Irish Council, an Anglo-Irish parliamentary body, composed of British and Northern and Southern Irish representatives.

Haughey, however, overplayed his cards, claiming more than he had achieved. The Long Kesh hunger strike came to dominate London's policy-making; Haughey further antagonised London by his publicly neutral stance in the Falklands War; and in any case, by early 1982 he was out of office for what would be a long term. His successor, Garret FitzGerald of Fine Gael, was a wet of wets. In British politics, he would be fully at home in the SDP. In response to John Hume's prompting, the Nationalist Irish Forum, composed of the three Southern parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour) as well as the Northern SDLP, was set up to deliberate the Anglo-Irish question. While the Forum's Report makes its chief commitment to a unitary Irish state, it does so with no great conviction. It is clear that a joint-sovereignty solution for Northern Ireland (the logical conclusion of the 'cockpit' assumption) and a North-South confederation also found favour. More important, it abounds with confused metaphysics — nonsense-talk about creating a solution where Nationalism and Loyalism would find equal expression, which makes about as much sense as to say that a mixture of oil and water is good as oil and good as water.

The omens were not, then, auspicious when Garret FitzGerald met Margaret Thatcher in 1984 to discuss the Forum report. The woolly formulations of what we may call Forum-speak were highly congenial to FitzGerald; to Thatcher they must have sounded flabby and meaningless, the kind of verbiage of which she had worked long to rid her party. The summit ended disastrously, with Thatcher countering Forum-speak with simple three-letter words — out, out, out.

As an exercise in communication her enunciation of her views of the Forum proposals was admirably clear; as diplomacy, it was disastrous. Her abrupt dismissal of the hapless FitzGerald did him great damage in the Republic's public opinion polls; and London hardly saw its interests being furthered by facilitating the replacement of FitzGerald by Haughey. Besides, the effect on Hume's influential American friends cannot but have been damaging; and London is always concerned that her Irish policy

is favourably regarded in Washington.

And so, to repair the situation, London and Dublin embarked on the long series of conversations which led to the Hillsborough Agreement. They ended, as any discussions based on so muddle-headed a document as the Forum Report were bound to end, in a fudge. Dublin gets a toe-hold in the administration of the North via the new Anglo-Irish Conference, which has a permanent secretariat based in Belfast; but the Conference can only discuss the powers and composition of Northern Irish government bodies, not their actions, and in any case all final decisions rest with the Northern Ireland Secretary.

London's chief gain is even more illusory — a guarantee from Dublin that the status of Northern Ireland will not be changed without the consent of a majority of the Northern Irish. Why this should be regarded as a gain is not clear. Dublin is in no position to change the status of Northern Ireland with or without majority consent; and in any case the status that is being guaranteed is not defined. Further, the Hillsborough Accord itself is not being submitted to the approval of the Northern Irish and most people, except apparently those who signed that accord, would regard it as a change in the status of Northern Ireland. Certainly the Loyalist leaders regard it as such. What good is a guarantee of a status when the people who give the guarantee reserve the right to say when that status has or has not been changed?

The effect of the Hillsborough Accord is to leave everyone (including, quite possibly, those who signed it) totally confused. Almost any outcome is possible. London may enforce the Accord to the letter and reduce the influence of the Dublin representatives at the Conference to a nullity. At the other extreme, they may be treated as partners in the government of the province, justifying the worst fears of the Loyalists. Certainly, everything depends on London's approach.

It may be of course that London has not made up its mind. The conventional wisdom has it that the Foreign Office has long since decided that the best interests of Great Britain lie in a peacefully-arrived-at united Ireland; and certainly the Accord could be used to further that aim. On the other hand, the Prime Minister makes it clear that she is a Unionist. She was clearly uncomfortable at having to use the waffly rhetoric of Forum-speak; and she may wish to use the Accord to support the Unionist position to the full. We shall simply have to wait and see.

In one important respect, however, the Accord has advanced matters. It is helping to make people face a question hitherto avoided — the relationship between Unionism and political Protestantism. Both are essential components of Loyalism. Indeed, while distinct, they have been up to now inseparable, for a reason which needs to be clearly understood, for it is the key to understanding Northern Irish politics.

Northern Ireland is, by a London political decision, a separate political unit. If it were politically integrated with the mainland in the way, say, East Anglia is integrated, matters would be different. Then Unionism could be organised on a British basis, in the way that East Anglians feel

themselves British with no particular reference to East Anglia. But Northern Ireland is a separate unit, and has therefore a separate political life. Unionism, in Northern Ireland, has to be organised in a Northern Irish context; and the difficulty is that Northern Ireland only makes sense as a Protestant polity. There is no such thing as a Northern Irish patriotism which cherishes all the people of the province equally without regard to religion. And so it follows that an effective, active Unionist party can only be organised on a Protestant basis. (The corollary is also true; a Protestant political party could not be organised unless it were Unionist as well.)

Now, while Unionism is a political movement concerned with the Crown and the United Kingdom state, political Protestantism is a movement which operates purely in the policies of the island of Ireland. It is concerned to resist Irish nationalism, which is seen as essentially Catholic.

The alliance between Unionism and Protestantism is almost certainly necessary to the Union. If that alliance were broken, if the official Unionist Party's links with the Protestant Orange order were severed and if clerics like Dr. Ian Paisley ceased to run for Parliament, then the Northern Irish majority for the union could probably not be kept in being. The significant thing about the Accord is that it is an attack, however unplanned, on that alliance.

Let us conjure up the vision of a Northern Irish Unionist whose Unionism is not complicated by Protestantism; one of the few Catholic Unionists. (The supreme irony of the Northern Irish situation is that the most genuinely Unionist Unionists are the Catholic ones.) Such a person might not like the Hillsborough Accord, but since it has been arrived at by the government of the state around which his Unionism is centred, he would accept it.

For political Protestantism, however, the Accord is a bitter blow. It admits Irish nationalists into a role in the administration of Northern Ireland. In deciding their reaction to it, Loyalists had for the first time to choose between their Unionism and their Protestantism. Probably inevitably, they chose Protestantism. They have displayed that when it came to the crunch it was their position in the politics of the island or Ireland and not their position as subjects of the Crown's government which counted.

It may be a decision with fatal consequences. The mainland British have over 15 years spent freely in money and blood to defend Northern Ireland. They did so, one presumes, because they saw the Northern Irish as, if not of their nation, at least near to it. They certainly would not have done it if it were clear that their involvement in the province were a matter of taking sides in the politics of Ireland. The current actions of Loyalists are apt to make them feel that that is the situation Britain has got herself into; and the inevitable conclusion will be that Britain must disengage.

The Accord then may be important not for the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of any political machinery set up, but for the light thrown on the situation by Northern Irish reaction to it.

# SWEDEN INTO THE NINETIES

## by Clive Archer

AT THE end of 1984 it seemed that the Nordic region had been moving to the right politically for some five years. There were centre-right governments in Norway, Denmark and Iceland and opinion polls in Sweden suggested that the Social Democrat government might be defeated in the 1985 elections. The only exception seemed to be Finland, though here the important Communist Party took the brunt of left-wing decline and proceeded to tear itself apart into pro- and anti-Moscow sections. Defence and security developments pointed to two other developments in the 1980s in the Nordic region — on the one hand the build up of the military effort of the five countries and, on the other hand, their increased diplomatic efforts to lower the level of tension in Europe, especially in the North (see my article in *Contemporary Review* of May 1984, Vol. 244, No. 1420).

The end of 1985 saw two of the Nordic governments being tested at the polls and all five governments continuing their fine balancing act between defence, deterrence and reassurance in their security policies. The elections were in Norway and Sweden — both in September 1985 — and their results, though appearing to be at odds, showed certain similarities. In both countries the existing governments were returned to power but with decreased majorities: in Norway it was the centre-right administration of Kaare Willoch, in Sweden Olof Palme's Social Democrats. There were considerable movements of votes but more between the non-socialist parties than between socialist and non-socialist. The salient issues for voters in each election were those of welfare and taxation. Defence and foreign policy issues remained of greater interest to the politician or the specialist than to the average elector.

The key state in Scandinavia is — and has been — Sweden. Despite Norway's petroleum, Denmark's membership of the European Communities and Finland's economic boom, Sweden's greater population, wide industrial base, long experience with democracy and central strategic position gives it a position of *primus inter pares* in the Nordic region. Its present political and security position are worth examining in detail.

As suggested, the 1985 Swedish election showed both elements of continuity and change. By far the most continuous element was that of the Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme. Palme first became premier in 1969 when Tage Erlander, who had held the office since 1946, retired. (Erlander, the essence of continuity in Swedish politics, died in June 1985.) In the 1976 election, Palme was defeated by the combined forces of the non-socialist parties — the conservative Moderates, the Centre Party (formerly the Farmers' Party) and the Liberal Party — and the folksy Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party became the first non-socialist prime minister for forty-four years. The coalition government was returned with a decreased majority in 1979 but deep divisions about nuclear energy and

taxation led to its break-up in 1981 and the return to power of Palme in 1982. The triennial 1985 election was a test of Palme's staying-power and of the unity of purpose of the three non-socialist parties.

The election campaign began in the summer of 1985 with the non-socialists ahead of the socialists — the Social Democrats and Euro-communist 'Left Party Communist' — in the opinion polls. The running was made by the American-style campaign of the Moderates and their outspoken leader, Ulf Adelsohn. The Moderates wanted to cut marginal taxes, reduce public expenditure and introduce more choice into public monopolies. Adelsohn was dubbed 'Thatcherite' and neo-liberal. He certainly left his party open to accusations that it would dismantle the welfare state, not because there was much substance in such statements, more because an emphasis on individual freedom overshadowed any commitment to protecting the basis of the welfare society.

The Centre Party, still led by Fälldin, also wanted to reduce marginal taxes but baulked at agreeing to cuts in sickness benefits, as suggested by the other two non-socialist parties. Having changed from being a rural party in the 1950s, the Centre Party has always had difficulty in projecting a new image. In the mid-1970s it took on the garb of the green movement but this became tattered in the experience of government. The party seemed more willing to compromise with the socialist majority in parliament and further blurred its image in the campaign by agreeing to an electoral pact with the small Christian Democrat Party (KDS). The KDS had never managed to get over the 4 per cent threshold needed to elect an MP but had built up a following of a couple of per cent that, if 'wasted', could mean the difference between non-socialist victory or defeat. The deal with the Centre Party, to form a 'Centre' ticket, seemed to guarantee the KDS leader, Alf Svensson, a place in parliament in exchange for a boost in the Centre Party's total vote. Clearly not all Centre Party voters were happy with their new partners and the opportunism of the pact may have repelled other electors.

The late-runner in the election campaign was the Liberal Party. It had had a disastrous poll in 1982, getting only about half of the percentage it had achieved in 1976 and 1979. In 1985 it was led by a new leader, forty-two year old Bengt Westerberg. He soon became the 'Mr. Nice Guy' of the campaign, giving honest answers and avoiding shouting matches. He also persuaded his party to target a different set of voters than before. Previously the Liberals had emphasised their concern for minority groups, and the voters' reward was to make them an endangered species. In 1985 the Liberal catchphrase was 'social responsibility without socialism'. At the start of the campaign Liberal and Moderate policies seemed very similar but as the poll came closer, Westerberg started to distance himself from the more market-orientated plans of Adelsohn and instead stressed the compassionate side of Liberal policies — for example, the right of people in institutions to have single rooms.

The Social Democrats paraded their economic record and emphasised the need to protect the welfare state — the People's Home — from the

ravages of the Moderates. It was basically a conservative message — 'You've never had it so good: don't let the Moderates ruin it'. There was talk of housecleaning the Swedish economy and cutting government deficits, as well as an active redistribution policy. Palme's reference to the Third Way reflected the wish to tread the ground between full-blooded capitalism and state socialism and a desire to balance welfarism and state expenditure with a certain amount of monetary rectitude. This brought criticism from the Left Party Communist, a Swedish home-grown Marxist party which has, despite its qualms, kept the Social Democrats in power with its parliamentary support.

Throughout the election the main fight was between the socialist and non-socialist blocs with the struggle for votes within each grouping appearing to be secondary. In fact, it proved to be crucial. If the Left Party Communist had lost too many votes, it would have ceased to have been represented in parliament and the Social Democrats may have lost their majority. The three (or four with the KDS) non-socialist parties had to gain socialist votes to obtain a majority yet it was only on the eve-of-poll that they presented a united front. Until then, they were still jockeying for position amongst themselves, thus laying their parties open to Palme's accusations that a non-socialist government would mean the political chaos and disunity of the 1976-1982 period.

In the end the greatest change in votes came within the non-socialist bloc. In a 349-seat parliament (Riksdag) elected by proportional representation, the Moderates took 76 seats (21.3 per cent of the votes), a drop of ten. The Centre had 44 seats, one of which went to Alf Svensen of the KDS, a net loss of twelve. The Liberals made a massive thirty seat gain, moving their vote up from 5.9 per cent in 1982 to 14.3 per cent. Thus the non-socialists only had a gain of eight seats overall. Seven of these came from the Social Democrats (166 seats) and one from the Left Party Communists, which gave it twenty seats. The turnout was just under 90 per cent, a little lower than in the 1982 election.

The election result has, of course, changed the outlook of the opposition parties. The Moderates seem to have missed their chance and may have to reconsider their tactics after this rebuff. Opinion polls since the election have shown a further erosion of their position, placing the Liberals as the lead opposition party with almost a quarter of the voters now preferring them. This, if anything, will persuade Mr. Westerberg to continue with the new profile and to judge each issue as it comes before parliament, rather than promise outright support to the Social Democrats. The polls now relegate the Centre Party to a single-figure percentage of the vote and indeed Thorbjörn Fälldin has resigned as leader, leaving Karin Söder as acting party-leader. Incidentally, this is the first woman party-leader in Sweden, but clearly not the last now that one-third of the Riksdag consists of women MPs.

Mr. Palme has strengthened his cabinet team. There are five women and three new incomers among its twenty members. Perhaps the most important changes are those affecting international affairs. The former Foreign

Minister, Lennart Bodström, who had such an unhappy term of office with a number of infamous 'mis-statements', is switched to Education and replaced by the experienced Sten Andersson, up to now the Minister for Social Affairs. It is thought that Andersson will be able to assert some discipline in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a period when leadership was lacking. Anders Thunborg will clearly be missed at the Ministry of Defence but it was known before the election that he would retire. Again, a man of some ministerial experience, Roine Carlsson (who was Minister for Industry), has taken over that portfolio. Deputy Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, the Orwellian Minister of the Future, is now also head of the newly-created Ministry of the Environment. One of the new junior ministers is Bengt Lindqvist who has been blind since fifteen years old and now deals with questions related to the handicapped.

The most serious problem facing Palme's reconstructed government is that of the economy. After the 1982 election the Social Democrats clawed back a more competitive position for Sweden in the international economy by devaluation. Helped by the fall in oil prices and the general trade upswing, the Swedish economy looked fairly healthy by 1985. However, the underlying trends were uncertain. The increase in exports had slowed down, whilst imports grew apace. The head of the National Bank pointed to the widening balance of payments gap as threatening the Swedish economy, whereas the trade unions criticised the government for keeping interest rates high. Savings rates have stuck at zero and growth in the Gross Domestic Product came down to 1.2 per cent in 1985 after a three per cent high in 1984. Swedish industry foresees a fall in industrial investment this year and a rise in unemployment, albeit from 3.1 per cent of the total labour force to 3.5 per cent. If these are the trends, the Social Democrats Keynesian economic policy may be severely tested and their weakened parliamentary position will not help their resolve.

In the long term there are two economic developments that are noticeable in the Swedish economy. For many years the service sector in Sweden has been of greater importance than manufacturing. This has had its effect on wage negotiations. Sweden has one of the highest rates of unionisation of workers — some 80 to 85 per cent — and traditionally wage negotiations were highly centralised. Furthermore the Swedish TUC — the LO — carried out a policy of 'wage solidarity' whereby stronger and better paid members moderated their demands to give a fairer deal to the weak and poorer paid. The 1970s saw the rise of more militant, organised white-collar unions in the public sector and in service industries, that wanted decentralised salary agreements and opposed 'wage solidarity' in favour of greater differentials. This distinction between white- and blue-collared workers can be seen at a political level — six out of ten of the former vote non-socialist, seven out of ten of the latter vote socialist. Whether the government can persuade workers to moderate their wage claims in such a competitive situation seems doubtful, though the Social Democrats have shown themselves willing to take on the white-collared public employees.

A second trend has been identified by an economist at the Federation of

Swedish Industries, Per-Martin Meyerson, in a recent book entitled *Eurosclerosis — the case of Sweden*. He considers that Sweden is suffering from an overdose of the welfare state and points to the rapid expansion of the public sector. Indeed it was estimated at the 1985 election that 54 per cent of those eligible to vote depended on the government for their incomes — the highest figure in Europe. He points to the creation of wage-earner funds (which buy up shares in industry) as an example of a distributive policy pursued at the expense of wealth-creation. The pursuit of the welfare state ideology reduces the economy's flexibility and ability to adapt to change, essential for a small, open, trading country. With a declining economy, the government will no longer be able to increase public expenditure and this will result in unemployment. Meyerson's answer is greater competition, less public expenditure and subsidies and, in the long term, tax cuts. These are just the policies that the Moderates propounded at the last election and which the electors seemed to reject.

One issue that did not generate much controversy during the election was that of defence. Sweden's security had been the source of disagreement in the previous parliament, especially in the form of Moderate criticism of the Defence Minister, but by September 1985 all-party agreement (excluding the Left Party Communists) had once again been achieved. However, this does not mean to say that Sweden's foreign and defence policies can expect an easy ride. Indeed, they have been faced with increased challenges over the past ten years and there is little reason to think that their problems will disappear.

Since the Second World War Sweden has based its security on an active alliance-free stance internationally, backed up by a strong defence posture. Sweden adopts a policy of neutrality to keep it out of alliances and their disputes. It supplements this policy by pursuing international peace and stability generally by supporting international institutions and the relaxation of tension. It actively promotes detente in Europe and supports policies that keep conflict from the Nordic region. It keeps a relatively strong military presence within its borders and upholds the concept of 'total defence' — military, economic, social, psychological — by its population. The aim of this is to repudiate any interference in Swedish affairs and to deter any potential aggressor by threatening losses out of all proportion to any gains the attacker may hope to achieve. As it was thought that no country would want to invade Sweden in its 'quiet corner of Europe', this policy seemed credible as long as Superpower conflict could be kept at bay in Northern Europe.

Three strategic changes over the past seven or eight years have placed Sweden's calculations at risk. First, the period of detente has cooled into the 'New Cold War' between the USA and the USSR. Generally, Sweden has to exist in a more dangerous world than in the early 1970s. Secondly, Europe has become more nuclearised, or, at least, its nuclear stockpiles have been refreshed by the replacement of redundant nuclear weapons by cruise missiles, the Pershing II and Soviet SS20s. In particular, this has heightened the Europeans' perception of nuclear weapons on their territory

and thus of the 'nuclear threat'. Sweden has had to respond to an immediate environment which, far from becoming more safe, has shown signs of contagious insecurity. Finally, the Northern part of Europe has attracted more attention from the Superpowers. There has been a growth in the Soviet maritime bases on the Kola Peninsula and an expansion in the US naval presence in the seas off Norway. Much importance is attached by NATO to the North Sea and by the Warsaw Treaty Organization to the Baltic Sea. Sweden is swimming in seas of strategic significance. This has been publicly demonstrated by the incursion of foreign submarines into Swedish waters, most notably Soviet submarines in October 1981, when one ran aground near Karlskrona base, and in October 1982 when midget submarines were detected in Hårsfjärden.

The Swedish response to the rising strategic interest in their area has been twofold. First, the Swedes have redoubled their diplomatic efforts to reduce the political temperature in Europe. They have hosted the Conference on Security, Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in Stockholm and have, with other neutral and non-aligned states, advanced their own proposals for consideration. Olof Palme has suggested that a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons should be created in Central Europe and his government took up suggestions for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. Secondly, Sweden has had to reconsider the effectiveness of its defence effort. In particular, extra attention has had to be given to protecting Sweden's maritime frontiers from incursions. However, it will need quite an effort to protect 1,250 miles of indented coastline especially when, as the Swedish Submarine Defence Commission stated, the possible motives for foreign incursions can be many, including preparatory planning of military operations. Nevertheless, the Government has decided to order four new Corvettes for the navy, specifically for the task of hunting submarines. Despite this, there has been concern among some serving officers that Mr. Palme has placed the political necessity of normal relations with the Soviet Union before a full commitment to dealing with the submarine threat. The question remains whether Sweden has the economic resources to build up its armed forces let alone replace obsolete equipment.

So, both in economic and security policy, Sweden continues to tramp the Third Way. It has a commitment to Western democratic values but not to US-style capitalism nor to the Atlantic Alliance. This can sometimes mean that it has a lonely existence, despite its stated internationalism. In the possibly harsh climate of the late eighties and early nineties, Sweden will need all its resources to survive threats both to its economic well-being and its security policy.

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# NORTH SEA OIL AND ITS IMPACT ON THE U.K. ECONOMY

## by Mark Cook

1975 saw the first year of North Sea Oil production for the UK and during the subsequent decade has followed a number of years of self-sufficiency. Today, however, the output from the UK sector is almost at its peak with 125 million tonnes being produced and this figure is predicted to decline to 110 million tonnes by 1987. In fact, some of the original oil fields, for example Forties and Ninian, have been in decline for some time.

Compared with the rest of the world the UK's estimated reserves of 15,000 million barrels (2,000 million tonnes) are not large. Its 3-4% of the world's proved reserves pales into insignificance when compared with the Middle East where approximately 53% of the world's proved reserves are to be found. Though in production terms, the UK was the fifth largest oil producer behind the USSR, USA, Saudi Arabia and Mexico in 1984, and, moreover, it is producing oil in a politically stable area, suggesting that the UK does have a significant role to play in world oil markets.

From the UK's point of view, oil has had a major impact on the economy. As a net oil importer prior to 1975, the UK has turned into a net oil exporter, though even today a substantial quantity of Saudi-Arabian crude is imported since this is particularly well suited to the UK's demands.

The discovery of North Sea Oil, however, has had and will have a number of repercussions for Government, Industry and Consumers. Of major relevance to Government has been the revenue raised from North Sea Oil. The Government receives monies from four main sources: royalties; supplementary petroleum duty; petroleum revenue tax; and corporation tax, resulting in £17,810 million at current prices in 1983. The projections for Government revenues in future years are based on the assumption that the price of North Sea crude will on average rise in line with oil prices, which in turn are assumed to rise with world inflation. By 1984, however, the scenario had changed, with the slump in world oil prices and the fluctuating exchange rate of the pound against the dollar, suggesting that the sterling price is now lower than it was a year ago. For example, if sterling oil prices were to turn out 1% higher or lower, then North Sea Oil revenues might be expected to be about £90 million higher or lower in 1984-85. It also follows that this will have effects on the PSBR (Public Sector Borrowing Requirement). Surprisingly, as a percentage of total GNP the impact of oil and gas production is expected to remain fairly constant at around 4½-4¾%, even though the value of oil and gas sales are expected to rise from £9.6 billion in 1980 to £19 billion in 1986 (both measured at current prices).

What then has been the impact of North Sea Oil on the economy? It

is difficult to be precise about some of the relationships but the general picture seems to have been as follows:— During the seventies there was considerable debate as to how North Sea Oil should be used. One school of thought argued that it should be used to reduce taxes, keeping government expenditure at its current level, whilst others argued that it could be used to finance additional government expenditure. The general concensus was that investment rather than consumption should be the major beneficiary. The outcome seems to have been neither, with unfortunately the surplus of oil coinciding with a world-wide recession and much of the oil revenue has been used to finance the increase in unemployment without increasing the taxation that would otherwise be needed. Oil, therefore, has been used to allow us to continue our consumption patterns, particularly of imported goods. On a world wide level, one feature of the impact of North Sea Oil has led to investors depositing money in this country through a combination of confidence in the economy during the late seventies and the ability to earn a high rate of return.

The result of this has been devastating, particularly for the manufacturing sector of the economy where the relatively high value of the pound has led to this sector finding it increasingly difficult to become competitive in its sales abroad. Contrary to this, some economists suggest that faced with the difficulty in selling abroad the UK's manufacturing sector will have to try harder to become competitive, reducing labour costs and over-manning and increasing the quality, reliability and delivery of the goods it sells abroad. In fact, such was the immense loss of competitiveness that many of them were forced out of export markets altogether. At the same time, foreign exporters found that the high value of the pound relative to their own currency meant that their goods were attractive in price to customers in the UK. Thus UK manufacturers were facing a two-pronged attack and the problems seemed to be further exacerbated by the monetarist policies being used by the Conservatives.

Care needs to be taken that we do not blame the demise of British manufacturing completely on the import of oil. Historically, British manufacturing has been in decline for several decades, though with higher productivity per man and the use of new technology this should not, on initial inspection. concern us unduly. Moreover, the decline in manufacturing is not solely a British phenomenon since most of Western Europe has suffered similarly. But Britain's decline is not simply a reduction in its share of world markets or total work force since its total manufacturing output has declined — this last fact does not seem to be replicated to such a large degree by other leading industrial nations.

Such is the collapse in British manufacturing that the Lords Select Committee's report on Britain's trade prospects revealed that from a £5.5 billion trading surplus in 1980 in manufacturing we have slipped to a £4 billion deficit by 1984. By product this is even more alarming with a deterioration in the net balance of £2.8 billion for vehicle manufacturers between 1978 and 1984, £2.1 billion for electronics and more than £1 billion for food, textiles, paper and publishing.

So now what happens when the oil runs out? Nigel Lawson in his reply to the select committee suggested that other sectors of the economy will rise to replace the £9.5 billion surplus currently being obtained on the oil account. But which are these sectors? Services were mentioned as one. Almost all services, Mr. Lawson claims, are potentially tradeable, though there would appear to be less scope for trade in services than for other sectors of the economy. For example, for every £100 worth of output, manufacturing exports £33, but services sell only £11 abroad and tradeable services are subject to the same competitive forces as goods. The service sector forms part of the invisible trade sector in the balance of payments and this sector has in recent years not been improving at the same rate as in those countries most actively competing in this area. Though for the UK our surplus in this area of the accounts is £4 billion in 1985 with an expected rise to £7 billion by 1987, from a more practical point of view, even if the service sector can grow to off-set the impact of North Sea oil on the balance of payments, it is unlikely to absorb all the losses in employment experienced, particularly in manufacturing, since it is expected that the impact of new technology will soon sweep this sector.

If the service sector cannot expand to replace the importance of North Sea Oil on our balance of payments then is it possible that manufacturers can expand after oil just as they contracted out, during it? This would seem to be unlikely at the existing exchange rate since markets once lost are difficult to re-establish, and may prove to be the over-riding factor, even if the exchange rate is allowed to fall. The government may look towards supply side factors to come to its aid, particularly as recent months have seen some indication of an improvement in manufactured exports. Much of this could be related to the United States rise in world trade growth during 1984 but this has been in decline for the first three quarters of 1985. We may see, therefore, a corresponding slowing down in UK exports.

There is one factor that would benefit the UK in the future. The abandonment of exchange controls in the late 1970s had led to the stock of UK overseas assets rising from £12 billion in 1979 to £70 billion in 1984. The return from these investments is registered in the invisible balance and contributes £2.5 billion a year rising to a predicted £7.5 billion in 1987. This is, however, still not sufficient to compensate for worsening oil and non-oil trade.

On a negative note there is certainly one way the UK economy could lessen its suffering and that is by a deterioration in world growth. This necessarily reduces employment, but leads to less imports being made, most especially for the United Kingdom since it has a high marginal prosperity to import. Conversely, the reduction in world growth and particularly US growth will see a reduction in the number of UK manufactured goods being sold abroad.

Why then, do we not just let the exchange rate fall, as most elementary economics textbooks would suggest, as a way of reducing the UK's

balance of payments deficit when the oil declines in importance? This would appear not to be Mr. Lawson's way, since as the pound falls against other major currencies, the price of imported goods rises, resulting in a possible upward move in inflationary expectations. A chancellor who views keeping inflation under control as his main target is unlikely to allow the pound to depreciate. Thus, we may see a period of deficits on our oil account which we enter with a chancellor trying to keep the pound up, leading to difficulties not only for manufacturing but for all industries which sell their products/services abroad. Behind this picture is the way in which the rest of the world views our economy. If foreign investors were confident (for whatever reason) in our economy when we had an oil surplus, surely some of this confidence will be dented when the oil accounts turn into a deficit.

As we know, economics is not the best of the predictive social sciences so it is difficult to be precise as to how the UK economy will actually behave. Perhaps in our favour is that oil will not 'run-out' abruptly but is expected to decline gradually and the UK economy may have time to adapt to any changes. Furthermore, if there is another threatened recession on the horizon as the US growth rate slows and its budget deficit increases, then the reduction in economy activity will allow our existing oil supplies to last longer. This fact, coupled with the increased ability to retrieve oil from a given well through improved extraction techniques, the latest relatively small finds on mainland UK, and around its western and southern coast line may put off the threatened date. Also, there is talk in some circles that we have started to understand just why Britain's manufacturing sector is in decline and begun to do something about it, though whether enough is being done and in sufficient time is open to argument. Nevertheless, since the balance of payments must always balance, the coming years look a very interesting time indeed as the current favourable impact of oil on the balance of payments changes to a future deficit.

The degree to which North Sea Oil affects the UK economy was clearly in evidence in the opening days of December. The collapse of the OPEC agreement and the general downward 'free-for-all' in oil prices served warning, once again, to the UK's economy. With the pound falling in value, the response by Mrs. Thatcher was to assure potential and existing investors in the UK that the rate of interest would not be cut, in line with the CBI's wishes. This was a necessary statement as a falling pound would lead to higher import prices, higher costs for industry and the possible increase in inflation. If the pound does collapse under increasing oil prices reduction pressure, then we may see interest rates go even higher. This may not be what is required as we begin the run-up to the next general election.

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# A WELSH FAMILY ON THE ENGLISH THRONE

## by Michael Nash

1985 marked the quincentenary of the beginning of the Tudor dynasty: a beginning marked by the victory of a virtually unknown exile at Bosworth Field. On Sunday August 7, 1485, shortly before sunset, Henry Tudor landed in Pembroke near the village of Dale and, reflecting his mediaeval piety, at once knelt on the ground, kissing it and making the sign of the Cross. From then, Providence seemed to go with him, his itinerary carefully detailed by Polydore Vergil, later to be his official historian. Making his way through West Wales, he seemed to be fulfilling the prophecy of Merlin and the coming again of Arthur. This was summed up in a Bardic stanza:

> Jasper will breed for us a Dragon
> Of the fortunate blood of Brutus is he —
> A Bull of Anglesey to achieve;
> He is the hope of our race.

Henry Tudor was the nephew of Jasper Tudor, the Earl of Pembroke, his chief supporter and mentor; the old Welsh kings claimed descent from Roman Brutus; and it was from Anglesey that the Tudors originally hailed. All seemed set fair for the fair-haired, gangling stranger.

The Tudors are always remembered as the Welsh dynasty — but how Welsh were they and how Welsh did they remain, during the 118 years of their royal tenure? They were certainly partly Welsh. Owen Tudor, the grandfather of Henry VII, was by blood entirely Welsh. But his chief claim to fame was his amazing *mésalliance* with the widow of Henry V, Katherine of Valois. She was left alone in a strange land on the death of the king, at the age of 21, with an infant boy who was to be reared by others: truly a 'Ruth among the alien corn'. The way in which she met Owen — it was said he was pirouetting in front of her at court and fell with his head on her lap — how they married surreptitiously and had four children, is the very stuff of romantic fiction, as romantic as the Beaufort source of the dynasty, immortalized by Anya Seton in her novel *Katherine*. How true the romance was is of course another story. It is fact however that Owen and Katherine had four children: Edmund, Jasper, Owen and Jacintha. The eldest, though the father of Henry VII, is a shadowy figure whose only child was posthumous, and the younger two became respectively a monk and a nun. The grave of Owen Tudor the monk can still be seen in Westminster Abbey. It is Jasper who was destined to play a major part in the upbringing of the young Henry and thus in the establishment of the new dynasty. As Owen had allied himself to the blood-royal of France, making his children half-brothers and sister of Henry VI, so his son Edmund allied himself with the blood-royal of England, by marrying the heiress of the Beauforts, Margaret, who was at the time of the marriage in 1456 only a girl of thirteen.

It should not be forgotten, however, that much more went to make

up the future Henry VII than this Welsh blood: he was, after all, only one quarter Welsh. Nevertheless this quarter was an indelible one — it gave him his patronymic and many of his characteristics. It is curious to think that the future dynasty might have been the House of Meredith: it was only a matter of choice which made Owen Tudor opt for one name instead of the other. Personality characteristics, we are told, are highly heritable, and 'personality is the expression of inborn tendencies'. Not only personality, but of course physique, the envelope of personality, is implied here: height, weight, eye colour, hair colour, form and familial appearance.

Christopher Morris, writing of Henry VII, said:

> It is notoriously dangerous to speak of *national* characteristics, and there is no more treacherous ground for the historian. Nevertheless it cannot be denied and it may be important that Henry VII was a Welshman . . . There are elements of truth in the popular belief that Welshmen are apt to be a little 'fey', and yet the possessors of sharp eyes for the main chance, romantics with a curious streak of realism, brave, stubborn, quick-tempered, moody, passionate, and also somewhat devious and hard to understand . . . whether or not he owed it to his Welsh paternity and upbringing, Henry Tudor had all these qualities. We know that he was consciously and perhaps romantically aware of being Welsh . . . he rewarded Welsh bards and kept St David's day. He called his eldest son Arthur. He used the red dragon of Cadwallader as supporter for the royal arms and had flown it as the royal standard on the field of Bosworth . . .

What then were these traits of person and personality which seem to have been transmitted to all the Tudors in some way or other? It appears more than possible that some of them came, not so much, or not exclusively from the Welsh, but from the French blood. This blood, from Katherine of Valois, was notorious for being 'bad' blood, or 'tainted' blood. In popular contemporary thought it was associated with melancholia, madness and even a predisposition to wickedness. This may well have come in turn through the mother of Katherine, Isabeau of Bavaria, a princess of German stock and a woman of evil disposition. Physically, the Tudors divided into several distinct types, and these, like the characteristics of personality, make a fascinating study for the geneticist. Owen Tudor himself was a fine specimen of male pulchritude — tall, well-proportioned, with fair hair and, it seems, dazzling good looks. He also had a quite beguiling charm. No descriptions exist of his sons Edmund and Jasper, but it seems possible that Jasper favoured his father; for he was certainly of a robust nature and survived until the age of sixty-five, an excellent age for the times. Henry's father, on the other hand, the little-known Edmund, died at 27 or 28 years old, possibly from an illness brought on or aggravated by war wounds; but he definitely seems to have been the less robust, pale and consumptive type which was to appear in the Tudors time and time again with often fatal and far-reaching results; for one of the most constant characteristics of the Tudor dynasty is infant mortality and a very unprolific nature.

Henry VII would seem to have taken after his father and his French grandmother: 'the countenance suggests the lineaments of his grandmother Katherine of Valois — rather a long face, straight and aquiline nose, wide mouth, deep chin and diffident, secretive eyes'. This family type was

repeated in Elizabeth; Naunton called her tall, of hair and complexion fair, and therewith well-favoured, and high-nosed, of limbs and feature neat; and of stately and majestic deportment.

There is the strange story of William Parry, the half-mad Welsh spy and traitor, who had 'vowed to kill her, being alone with her in the garden at Richmond and then resolved to act that tragedy, was so daunted with the majesty of her presence, in which he then saw the image of her grandfather King Henry VII . . . that his heart would not suffer his hand to execute that which he had resolved'. John Clapham, who tells the story, elsewhere repeats that Elizabeth I was known to resemble her grandfather. We know from many accounts that she, and indeed all the Tudors, had what we would now call 'charisma', and Elizabeth had it *par excellence*; one observer said 'she is full of the spirit of incantation'. Something inscrutable remained about the Tudors.

Edward VI also, it seems, resembled this part of the family: spare and neurasthenic, an infant prodigy, yet not without charm; early acquiring a cold reserve, so like his sister and his grandfather, yet also of 'piety and sweetness of disposition'. Mary Tudor seems perhaps to have favoured the low stature of her Spanish mother, but she too was spare and highly-strung like her brother. She also was of the type who must have followed the physique of Lady Margaret Beaufort, who is known to have been very small, and to have been described by her detractors as 'the Plantagenet dwarf woman'. This type reoccurred in Lady Mary Grey, the youngest sister of Jane Grey, who was indeed a dwarf. Early observers spoke of Mary Tudor's 'diminuitive but well-proportioned physique . . . her pretty face and very beautiful complexion'. She resembled in several ways her aunt, the elder Mary Tudor, known also for her profusion of beautiful red-gold hair and her stunning appearance, so that even the French, never known for their immediate disposition to be complimentary, called her 'a paradise . . . an angel'.

The Tudors, on the whole, had an unfairly large inheritance of good looks. There is no doubt to which physical type Henry VIII belonged: he was tall, powerfully built, with ruddy hair, bold, full eye, small, selfish mouth, broad, sensual cast of countenance, all conveying the impression of great will-power. The Venetian observer of 1515, when he was 24 years old, found him 'the handsomest potentate I ever set eyes upon; above the usual height, with an extremely fine calf to his leg, his complexion very fair and light, with auburn hair . . . and a round face so very beautiful that it would become a pretty woman, his throat being rather long and thick'. It is of course a contrast to the decaying physical bulk of thirty years later! It is tempting to say he was a throwback to Owen Tudor, described as 'a beautiful person garnished with many goodly gyftes both of nature and grace'; we also have some circumstantial evidence that Owen was tall, perhaps 6 foot two inches, since a skeleton, possibly his, was unearthed in a trench at Hereford in 1933. From Owen Tudor too the Tudors inherited their red hair. One of their line was indeed known as Dafydd Grudd (David the Red, or ruddy). But Henry VIII

must also have owed a good deal to his other grandfather, King Edward IV, also in his youth a fine physical specimen, described as 'a man so vigorous and handsome that he seemed to have been made for the pleasures of the flesh!' Nor was that the only inheritance on that side. Edward had married Elizabeth Woodville. Her father, Sir Richard Woodville, was described as 'one of the handsomest men in England', and 'He possessed something of that compelling physical charm which so often accompanies great personal beauty and athletic prowess'. How well this would describe Henry VIII!

The Tudors also inherited many physical disadvantages from various sources. Apart from Elizabeth, they were not long-lived. They suffered from being 'nervous, excitable, highly-strung, hysterical, neurasthenic and hypochrondriacal. They were also temperamental, quarrelsome, bad-tempered, and sometimes manneristic and even unbalanced'. Many of these characteristics can be explained by some physical ailment. The medical history of the Tudors has of course been put under the microscope many times, but we know that both Henry VIII and Elizabeth I suffered from ulcerated legs, that Edward VI, Mary Tudor and Elizabeth were all short-sighted, that both Mary and Elizabeth suffered from dropsy, and that possibly neither of them was capable of childbearing. Both Mary and Elizabeth also suffered from debilitating headaches, and medical evidence has recently suggested that the elder of Henry VIII's sisters, Margaret Tudor, the Queen of Scots, was the source of the disease porphyria, which emerged in such a virulent way in George III some generations later.

The Tudors remembered their Welsh origins. Throughout the century of Tudor rule they kept Welsh companions about the court. Perhaps because they were so unprolific they cherished any family connexions of a Welsh nature, although with a characteristic reticence, they kept many at arm's length. They all had an obsessive interest in their origins. Soon after his accession, Henry VII employed the Welsh genealogist Gutyn Owain to trace his family tree. This redoubtable man produced a pedigree which showed the king descended from Cadwallader, Roderic the Great and all points beyond. Doubtless, too, Queen Elizabeth was similarly gratified later on and perhaps not surprised, to see the genealogy in Hatfield House (which is still there), so long that it was difficult to see it all at the same time, so that it had to be partly rolled up — and no wonder, for it traced her descent, without a blush, from Adam!

As F. Maynard wrote in 1922, 'Welsh pedigrees are wonderful things: in one of them it is said, there is a marginal note about half-way down to the effect that 'about this time the world was created!' But this was all part of the Tudor mystique: they would have agreed with Bagehot that 'you do not let daylight in on magic'. It explains Elizabeth's hieratic splendour, and the fact that when portrayed both Henry VIII and Mary Tudor were aware of defects in their noses and so were loath to be seen from an unfavourable angle!

The Tudors perhaps knew they were a diminishing race. Henry VII had several children, but only three of them, one son and two daughters,

grew to maturity. Henry VIII, for all his six marriages, had only three living children, the one boy dying at fifteen, and the two daughters childless. Of these three, only Mary married, and her illusory pregnancy is one of the tragic farces of royal history. But what of the bar sinister? What of the illegitimate Tudors? It is said that Henry VII had an illegitimate son, Sir Roland Velville, born of a liaison with a Breton woman during his fourteen-year exile there. In recent years this has been seriously questioned. The grand-daughter of this knight, made Constable of Beaumaris Castle by Henry VIII shortly after his coronation and an English citizen in 1512, certainly seems to have believed in her royal connection. This lady was the famous Katherine Tudor of Berain who, contrary to Tudor tradition, was extremely prolific by three of her four marriages, and who is known in Welsh legend as *Mam Cymru,* the Mother of Wales. Her illustrious descendant, none other than Dr. Johnson's Hester Thrale Piozzi, also very much believed it, although her version presents an amazing genealogical puzzle, claiming to be descended not from Sir Roland, but Jasper Tudor, the uncle of Henry VII. Jasper Tudor, according to some genealogists, had a daughter (an illegitimate one) named Helen, who was reputedly the mother of Stephen Gardiner, the Tudor bishop of Winchester. It has been said that this was one reason for his rapid preferment. Again, the unravelling of this tale presents another complex genealogical problem.

Less disputed is the one bastard child acknowledged by Henry VIII, Henry Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond (a favoured Tudor title) who was born to his mistress Elizabeth Blount, in 1519. Henry Fitzroy, although married to Mary Howard, the daughter of the Duke of Norfolk, died without issue in 1536.

There is another and persuasive candidate as a bastard son of Henry VIII. This is Sir John Perrot, reputedly the son of Henry VIII and Mary Berkeley. He bore an astonishing resemblance to his putative father being 'almost a giant'. Both his half-sisters Mary and Elizabeth tacitly acknowledged him as their brother. At a tournament in 1554, before Queen Mary Tudor and her husband Philip of Spain, a tournament in which both English and Spanish grandees took part, Sir John 'fought best of all'. The queen herself distributed the prizes and gave to Sir John, a 'diamond ring of great value'. Elizabeth made him lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and the command of a fleet to intercept a meditated invasion of Ireland by the Spanish. Ireland had a strange effect on the favourites of Elizabeth. Whilst there, Perrot acted in a high-handed and independent manner, as Essex was to do after him. Elizabeth would not brook this. Perrot's comments to or about his royal half-sister were reckless to say the least. When the queen appointed a Mr. Errington to be clerk of the Exchequer in Ireland, Sir John exclaimed: 'this fiddling woman troubles me out of measure. God's dear Lady, he shall not have the office! I will give it to Sir Thomas Williams', (who sounds suspiciously like another Welshman!)

Again, at the time of the Spanish invasion, he was reported to have said: 'Ah, silly woman, now she shall not curb me! now she shall not rule

me! Now, God's dear Lady, I shall be her white boy again', adding that when Sir John Garland brought him a letter from the queen, he said, with violent execrations, 'This it is, to serve a base-born woman! Had I served any prince in Christendom, I had not been thus dealt withal'. It is easy to see how a reckless, hot-blooded Welshman of this type could have said these words and how a trumped-up charge of treason could have been made out of them. When he was told he must die, he exclaimed, 'God's death! Will my sister sacrifice her brother to his frisking adversaries?' Elizabeth admired courage of this type; moreover, she tacitly admitted he was her brother. She commuted the death sentence to imprisonment in the Tower, but there he pined, 'like a prisoned eagle', until he died in 1592 at the age of 65. It thus seems true, as someone has written, that 'the greatest contradictions ever offered to Elizabeth proceeded from men of her own blood'; this is of course also a reference to Essex, a cousin on the Boleyn side.

A much happier relationship was enjoyed by Elizabeth with her chief gentlewoman, Blanche Parry, and with the latter's erstwhile cousin, the infamous Dr. Dee, the Elizabethan magus. Elizabeth was deeply influenced in her private life by these two people. It was Blanche Parry who 'rocked her in her cradle at Greenwich; who watched over her motherless childhood; who stood beside her through the tormenting anxieties of her reign, and who lived to see its crowning glory in the year of the Armada' Indeed, Blanche Parry was one of several remarkable women in Tudor times, not least remarkable for their longevity. We may think of her with Catherine Willoughby, Bess of Hardwick and Katherine Tudor of Berain. Blanche was born about 1507 or 1508 and, as the century progressed, must have seemed indestructible like the queen herself, and the other formidable women mentioned. A little biography of her, written in 1914, says: 'like her mistress, Blanche was deeply influenced by the spiritualistic beliefs and fancies of those days, and touched by the magician's wand wielded by the hands of her lifetime crony, the very dubious comrade of the angels, sorcerer, quack and arch imposter, the Welsh astrologer, fitly named Dee or Black'. This was the Dr. Dee who cast the most propitious date for the queen's coronation, January 15, 1559. Why, we may ask, did the great Queen 'bend her commanding intellect in childish incredulity?' Perhaps because religion was so riddled with politics, did she turn to the 'old religion' which existed before Christianity? The same, after all, was true of her great rival and contemporary, Catherine de Medici, who relied on the prophecies of the equally mysterious Nostradamus. Or was it because, like her Welsh grandfather, she harked back to her Celtic origins? When Friar Forrest was burned at Smithfield in 1538 the executioners threw onto the fire a great wooden image of an ancient warrior which eight men could scarcely carry. It had been 'brought out of Wales' and was known as 'Darvel Gatheren' and it was reputed to fetch damned souls out of hell. It was almost certainly Hu Gadern, the Celtic god of war. The Middle Ages, especially in backwaters like Wales, were still dangerously close for comfort, with the Dark Ages behind them.

There were other reasons for the rise of Dr. Dee. He led the queen on in her perpetual quest for youth and beauty; and he persuaded her that she was rightful sovereign of strange and far-distant lands. This suited the Elizabethan image. Empire was beginning. It was fitting that someone should discover that she had 'title royall . . . to foreign Regions' among them Atlantis or America, because of the voyage of 'the lord Madoc, sonne to Owaine Gwynedd, Prynce of Northwales'. Even greater claims were reserved for the legendary Arthur, but it was all part of the mystique which the Tudors fostered, part of their propaganda. Elizabeth loved all this flattery, but was not deceived by it. It had a purpose.

Unfortunately for Dee, the queen tired of him eventually. It was left to Blanche Parry to help him 'when most distressed by the lubricity of fortune'. She secured for him the Mastership of St. Cross at Winchester, a famous charity. She also stood godmother to his son, predictably named Arthur. But Dee's star, as he himself perhaps might have foretold, was on the wane, although he lived until 1608. Blanche Parry herself was a more enduring, perhaps more influential person around the queen. On her accession in 1558, Elizabeth made her keeper of the royal books, a proto-librarian. She was then in her fiftieth year, and surprisingly knowledgeable. Her skill in learning went beyond the occult sciences. She was famous in her day for her mastery of foreign languages (so apparent in her royal mistress) and it is assumed that it was she who taught the great-grand-daughter of Owen Tudor to speak Welsh. Blanche was also deeply interested in historical and antiquarian research. She obtained a manuscript for her friend David Powel for his *Histories of Cambria* and he acknowledged her aid in the final paragraph of his work. Blanche was also the Keeper of the royal jewels, an important office. Whether she was also musical, like her mistress, is not recorded, but undoubtedly this is a talent associated with the Tudors and with the Welsh. Henry VII never travelled without his minstrels. There is a payment recorded: 'to a Welsh harper, 6s. 8d.'. Henry VIII wrote several pieces of music himself. Mary Tudor's love of music, especially sacred music, is said to have amounted almost to mania; while Elizabeth herself was a most accomplished player on the virginals. Henry VIII and his two daughters were also extremely fond of the dance.

Although none of the Tudors returned to Wales proper, it is significant that they remembered and provided for it. Henry VII is supposed to have asked his son on his deathbed to 'have a special care of Wales'. Certainly the first of the Tudors named his eldest son Arthur, and had him both born and christened in the ancient capital of Winchester. Mary Tudor chose also, perhaps for security reasons, to be married in Winchester cathedral.

Henry VII lost little time in resurrecting the princely office of Wales. Arthur was created Prince of Wales and Earl of Chester in 1489 and after his marriage to Catherine of Aragon in 1501, was sent to Ludlow to keep court there, and to maintain the Council of the Marches. It was politic to have persons of Welsh blood on the borders or within them. Sir

William Stanley had been appointed chief justice of North Wales by Richard III in 1483, and continued in this office under Henry until his downfall in 1495; while Jasper Tudor, the king's uncle, was appointed chief justice of South Wales in 1485 and so continued until his death also in 1495. Wales seemed loyal and contained, but the Tudors were aware of the need of reform and of ensuring equality with England. The Welsh dynasty achieved things for Wales which perhaps another family would not have done. Henry VII took the first step in the emancipation of Wales by enfranchising the bondsmen on the great Crown lordships and two years before his death in 1507 this was extended to the Principality.

He opened the boroughs to the Welsh and gave them equality with the English before the law. In 1536 came the great constitutional change in Welsh history: the Act of Union. It is surprising that it took the Tudors so long to integrate their own principality into the English kingdom. Perhaps Henry was conscious that the daughter whom many had called 'Princess of Wales' and who had had in turn her own quasi-independent court at Ludlow in 1527, was now declared a bastard and discounted as his possible successor; perhaps also the king had become nervous of vulnerable points in his kingdom after the Pilgrimage of Grace.

Whatever the reasons, English law was thereafter to take the place of the ancient customary Welsh laws and English was to be the official language. All land in Wales was 'henceforth to be after the English tenure not after the form of any Welsh law or custom'. The absorption, or takeover, in legal terms, seemed complete. As a kind of symbolic act of this 'upgrading', the body of Edmund Tudor was taken from the Greyfriars Church in Carmarthen, where it had lain for 80 years, and where chantry priests had prayed for its soul since Henry VII's will in 1509 ,and laid in St. David's Cathedral in Pembroke.

What did the Welsh themselves gain from the Act of Union? Wales was admitted to complete equality of citizenship and was to be represented fully in Parliament. Thus, Wales had a voice at Westminster. An Act of 1535 had sanctioned the appointment of Justices of the Peace in the old Welsh shires, and another Act of 1542 made them operative. A new system of courts was established throughout Wales, independent of Westminster. The Council of Wales was given statutory authority to supervise: a euphemistic way of giving it considerable powers.

It was, after all, a fulfilment of the ancient prophecy. In the fourteen years of exile in Brittany 'Welsh bards had not ceased to pour out their propaganda, in the form of vaticinatory poems, on behalf of Jasper and Henry Tudor, endowing them with all the properties and qualities traditionally attributed to the Mab Darogan, the long-prophesied deliverer (often called Owain, but here the son and grandson of Owen), who was to come in the fullness of time to avenge the ancient treachery of the Saxons'.

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# WITKACY: NOVELIST, PHILOSOPHER AND PLAYWRIGHT

by Konstanty Puzyna

NINETEEN eighty five was celebrated by UNESCO as Witkiewicz Year. Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, Polish by birth, was an amazing artist and an unconventional personality, with a hint of mockery even in the very pseudonym 'Witkacy' with which he usually signed his paintings; yet if he is now quite well known in the world it is mainly as a playwright. His plays have been translated into some twenty languages — including Arabic and Japanese — and have been performed in countries as far afield as Australia and New Zealand. More than half of them are available in an excellent English translation by Daniel Gerould, an American Witkiewicz scholar and translator. In addition to three volumes of Witkacy's plays, Gerould has also published an outstanding critical monograph, providing a detailed analysis of Witkacy's entire output as a playwright and novelist.

Witkacy, a child prodigy, started writing plays at the age of eight. He wrote comedies, childlike, but amusing, and recently they have been given productions in puppet theatres. His work as a mature artist began with his novel. It is largely autobiographical, permeated with daimonic eroticism and the characters holding forth on philosophy and art. This novel was not published. It displays nearly all the trademarks of his paradoxical style combining a tragic outlook with derision, neurosis, self-analysis and a grotesque deformation of reality. What is still missing is Witkacy's catastrophism. This was to make its appearance later, after Witkacy had lived through the Russian Revolution of 1917 and returned to Poland in the year 1918.

The inter-war period saw the best of Witkacy's writing, though he published less than half the number of works written during that time. Many manuscripts, including more than a dozen plays, perished during World War II. He failed to win full recognition during his lifetime and was subsequently consigned to oblivion, only to be rediscovered after 1956. Since then, all his extant works have been published and revived in Poland, to the exclusion only of a large collection of his letters which still remain to be analysed and edited. His *oeuvre* includes twenty-two plays, four novels, several volumes of critical, aesthetic and strictly philosophical writings, a short treatise on narcotics and a thick volume of writings on literary subjects, dealing primarily with artistic criticism.

However, it must not be forgotten that Witkacy was also a painter. He began painting early, under the guidance of his father, a noted art critic but also a painter in his own right whose own inclination was naturalistic. He made no effort to impose this on his son. He believed that formal school education destroyed the pupil's individuality and so arranged to

have his son educated privately at home. Later, however, Witkacy quarrelled with his father and in 1905 entered the Academy of Fine Arts in Kraków. His artistic development as a painter was assisted during that time by his many travels abroad to Italy, Munich, Paris and London. He began by painting naturalistic landscapes, but then discovered Bocklin and later Gaugin. In 1908 he was in Paris during the twenty-fourth *Salon des Indépendantes.* Discovering fauvists and cubists was a revelation for him. He abandoned landscapes and started treating the canvas decoratively and two-dimensionally.

At that time, he also painted his first portraits and 'monsters', as he called them — demonic and fantastic compositions in charcoal — later also in oils, displaying Art Nouveau and expressionist affinities as well as clear links with the metaphysical tradition of Bosh and Goya. Witkacy continued with this style into the early twenties. After 1925 he gave up painting as a serious pursuit, confining himself to portraits either of his friends or as a money-making occupation. In either case, he viewed them contemptuously, as utilitarian objects and not works of art. Significantly, it is to them rather than the 'monsters' that today's painters attach a much higher value. He subjected his paintings to his own theory of 'a pure form', one of the most fascinating aesthetic theories to have been produced by the *avant-garde,* particularly because of its philosophical underpinnings. Witkacy meant it to encompass painting, theatre, poetry and music; but not, the novel. He argued that only Pure Form — that is a uniform composition of specific elements — matters in a work of art. All content related to everyday life serves merely as a pretext for 'directional tensions' in painting, and 'dynamic tensions' in drama. It may also be deformed at will, or indeed become absurd or fantastic. To all intents and purposes, this may appear similar to cubist theory, formulated to justify an abstract style of painting. And yet Witkacy's paintings were totally different from the cubist ones. His plays, too, virtually overflow with 'content', and most interesting content at that. Witkacy believed that though 'content' serves merely as a pretext for something else, it is a necessary component of a work of art which is — and must be — primarily an expression of its author's conscious and subconscious psychic states, his experiences and dreams: in short, of everything that goes into the making of his individuality. So, we are dealing here with a combination of two theories: the cubist theory or art as form, and the expressionist theory of art as expression. In order to explain this contradiction we must have recourse to Witkacy's strictly philosophical writings and to his ontology.

His philosophical works — and he devoted himself to philosophy particularly in his later years — are rambling and convoluted and do not make for easy reading. They were written by a man who, though well-read in philosophy, was self-taught. Hence, highly exciting and original ideas can be found in his writings cheek by jowl with muddled thinking which professional philosophers usually know how to avoid.

Witkacy's philosophical approach was one of deliberate ontological

dualism. The child's fundamental realizations that reality is divided into 'me' and 'not me' (that is, the rest of the world) was the key problem faced by Witkacy. To the very end he was unable to come to terms with a world thus tragically torn asunder. It can be surmised that he saw works of art as belonging to both spheres 'I' and 'not I'. When viewed from the outside, a work of art is part of the 'not I', a composition of forms, an object, a thing. When viewed from the inside it is part of the 'I', an expression of both the artist's and the viewer's inner life, provided that the latter is sufficiently sensitive in his perception to be able to identify with the work or art, as it were. And this is why art can mediate between the 'I' and 'not I', and can bridge this metaphysical gap. It makes it possible to experience in one blinding flash — and I quote — 'The Secret of Existence as unity in multiplicity'.

The theory of Pure Form represents an effort to return *avant garde* art to 'metaphysical feelings', which wither away in today's art and the increasingly secularised world. The original religious dimension of art is a thing of the past, but then Pure Form, too, is the last attempt to preserve the fundamental values of art. Social development, Witkacy believed, has condemned art to extinction. And here we arrive at Witkacy's theory of culture, which was of supreme importance in his reasoning and has won for him a lasting place in world culture.

Long before Huxley or Orwell, Witkacy created one of the major anti-Utopias of the twentieth century. It appeared in its full theoretical shape in *New Forms in Painting*, published in 1918. It was then to be magnificently portrayed in Witkacy's two best futuristic novels: *Farewell to Autumn* (1925) and *Insatiability* (1927). It was also constantly present in his plays. Witkacy's point of departure in creating this anti-Utopia was anthropology, in which he took a lively interest, partly by reading Frazer, Davy and above all Bronislaw Malinowski, his boyhood friend. In May 1914 he arrived in London to join Malinowski's anthropological expedition to New Guinea as a photographer. They sailed together for Ceylon, via the Suez Canal, and then on to Australia, where news of the outbreak of Word War I reached them. Witkacy returned to Europe and, travelling by way of Greece, went straight to Saint Petersburg in order to join the Russian Army as a volunteer. Anthropology and his direct experience of the Russian Revolution thus provided the foundation for his theory of culture.

In Witkacy's view, the mediating function between human beings and the Mystery of Existence — which can today be performed by Pure Form art — was once performed by humans. Their metaphysical status had elevated them to the positions of tribal chiefs and subsequently of rulers. In the past, when power was linked with religion it produced individualities in addition to rulers, scholars and artists. Today, social development tends inexorably to promote egalitarianism and democracy. As a consequence, Witkacy argued, 'individual man' is slowly dying out. The kind of society we are moving towards — moulded as it will be by technical civilization, mechanization of life, egalitarianism and consumer

orientation — will be devoid of drama, religion or philosophy. Many social upheavals, coups and revolutions were yet in store, but the doom of contemporary culture was certain.

This pessimistic and catastrophic vision of the future, his bitter derision of parliamentary systems and democracy in general, his cult of individuality might suggest that Witkacy's political sympathies lay with fascism. Not so. Characters of quasi-fascist dictators abound in his plays, but they are portrayed as grotesques. They are the final flashes of dying individualism, mere shadows of the giants of old, already anachronistic in Witkacy's own time. Nationalism is seen in his writings as equally anachronistic and nations themselves as relics of the past, soon to fade away in the greyness of mass societies. Those societies may perhaps turn out to be genuinely happy, but it will be 'thoughtless happiness of well-fed animals'. And that's not for us, Witkacy concluded. It is in this light that his suicide in 1939 has to be seen, committed at a time when Nazi German armies invaded Poland from the West and the Red Army entered from the East.

Thus the death of a dying world was the chief subject of Witkacy's plays and novels. Certain motifs recur in them in a wide diversity of forms. Among them are inhuman, bloody dictatorships and the fact that everything seems to be happening just before, during or after a revolution. The characters are tragi-comic, puny relics of former 'great individualities': aristocrats, financiers, military men and artists, either failed or gone astray. They live out their last days engrossed in absurd debates on art and philosophy. Witkacy makes them recite whole passages from his own theoretical writings, thus mocking himself and his own work. These discussions are intermingled with perversely erotic scenes or 'orgies' of drinking and drugs, in which the characters vainly seek a semblance of metaphysical feeling. The finales are usually far from reassuring.

Today, Witkacy's plays remain as great a challenge to directors and actors as in the past. It is still difficult to convey their profound intellectual content. A young critic argued recently that directors who stage Witkacy cannot but produce silly work, at best capable of amusing the audience with stale jokes, because Witkacy's catastrophic philosophy of history, when taken seriously, clashes with both Marxism and Catholicism. Secondly, in this view, Witkacy's thoughts are out of sympathy with the concerns of today's audiences. They may well be as vitally interested as he was in the problems of democracy and freedom, but approach them from a totally different perspective. And thirdly, the present generation has read neither the books which were popular in Witkacy's times, nor his own theoretical works, and so often has difficulty in understanding what motivates his characters. Witkacy's thinking belongs to a past era, argues this particular young critic, and today we have much more important and pressing problems than attempting to unravel it.

There is much truth in this viewpoint. Witkacy did not — could not — anticipate the threats facing us today, whether ecological, demo-

graphic or nuclear. We also have a crisis of democracy, spreading totalitarianism, disappearance of old cultures, growing uniformity and rampant technology directing our lives. Thus, Witkacy remains highly topical on all these questions and his diagnoses and forecasts remain uncannily accurate. Mushrooming dictatorships and their downfall, terrorism, political fanaticism, sudden economic crises and equally sudden and short bursts of prosperity such as the Arab oil boom of the early seventies — Witkacy would have seen all these as the death throes of a 'magnificent beast of the old ages; an Age of Transition'. It has lingered on longer than Witkacy thought possible but then a century is but a short while in terms of our entire history.

If we accept that these aspects of the Witkacy vision retain their relevance, let us also remember that other processes contradict his forecasts and in fact seem to be a reaction to the phenomena he predicted. There is also growing interest in yet another world religion, Buddhism, noticeable in non-Buddhist countries and prompted by utilitarian consideration — an interest in meditation techniques. So, contrary to what Witkacy believed, 'metaphysical feelings' have not withered away; neither have individualism and great individuals, nor indeed has art fared as badly as he predicted.

We are not entirely thoughtless, nor have we turned into animals. Yet the prospect that everyone will be well fed is receding further and further into the distance and universal happiness looms very far away on the horizon. This thought may perhaps offer some comfort, though of a rather perverse nature, while encouraging us to seek truths relevant to today in Witkacy's writings.

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[Konstanty Puzyna is Editor of the Polish monthly theatre journal *Dialog*, published in Poland.]

# CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

## by David Shipman

AS I said last year, the London Film Festival has become a circus, a bonanza, with 161 movies being shown at seven different venues. I see the policy, that festivals shouldn't be confined to art house fare, but do those 161 items represent the best of anything? Much can be forgiven Derek Malcolm, the organiser, because of his genial, owlish presence throughout, either on stage or in the foyer of the National Film Theatre, but he makes it impossible for me (or anyone else) to report on the festival. I can only offer notes on the score or so movies that I managed to see in less than that number of days.

One I saw by accident, at a press show, *Underworld*. I can't imagine how it came to be made, let alone be chosen for this special presentation. A supposed parody of several different *genres*, it poses a lonely trench-coated hero searching for a missing girl among drug-crazed mutants, evil masterminds and suspender-belted whores. Unsurprisingly, it has (or had) no British distributor, though I imagine it might find a place on the midnight matinee circuit along with other amateurish, mindless classics like *The Rocky Horror Picture Show*. To remain bilious for the moment, I didn't care either for the film it replaced at the press show (when I eventually saw it), *Bliss*, which has just won a clutch of awards in its native Australia as the Best Film of the Year. Ray Lawrence, the director, and Peter Carey, who wrote the original novel, are responsible for a screenplay which lurches all over the place, trying to bring a John Irving-like larkiness to the big issues of life. It aims to show mankind (Australian variety) in ugly mood—not only dead or dying (the 'hero' dies in reel one, but manages to live on), but sexually crude, greedy, hypocritical and selfish. I think the piece is intended to put a boot into Australian self-satisfaction, but it aims badly. *Bliss—Purgatory* would be a better title—is a patchwork, with some of the patches so long and ill-conceived that it's not surprising that there were many walkouts when it was shown at the Cannes festival.

The bad news also includes Dustin Hoffman's performance in *Death of a Salesman*, and it's no good Arthur Miller claiming that Hoffman is physically closer to his conception of Willy Loman than most of the actors who have played the role. Willy has to have stature of some sort and Hoffman has none; worse than that, he's self-consciously acting even when he's being quiet—a misfortune compounded by the fact that he is surrounded by some superb performances, especially Kate Reid as his wife, John Malkovich as Biff and Charles Durning as Charley. This film is a transcription of the recent Broadway revival, made for television but they brought in no less a name than Volker Schlöndorff to give it a cinematic feel. I cannot understand, therefore, why the houses next door can be seen through the walls of the Loman home and the exteriors are so stagey. Despite that and despite Hoffman the piece is engrossing

for almost two and a half hours. Or perhaps that tells you something about me: I'm always being told that the play is self-indulgent and superficial, yet this is the tenth time I've sat through it, in one form or another, and I've never enjoyed it more.

I've also more than a passing acquaintance with *Silas Marner*, which in a well-ordered world I myself would have made years ago. Giles Foster has now done it for the BBC, on the principle that George Eliot's novel provided more colour than was usual amidst the current television versions of classics. But colour, literally, is what is missing: Foster has chosen drab tones, the Casses are hardly the roaring boys of memory and the set-pieces—the ball, the conversations in the snug—are lifeless. Yet I could not imagine a better weaver than Ben Kingsley, moving gently from misanthropy to its antithesis after the finding of Eppie.

Also made for television was *Unfinished Business*, a witty and humane Australian comedy written and directed by Bob Ellis, who had hitherto contributed to some screenplays of some good films. He is on form here, as a couple meet years after finishing their affair, which she wants to resume so that he can give her the baby that her husband cannot. The new affair is idyllic, sometimes erotic and sometimes awkward. The film worked for me on the big screen, as did *My Beautiful Laundrette*, a television movie diverted to cinemas after being praised at the Edinburgh Festival. Word was out that that praise was excessive, which may have affected my expectations, for it seemed to me neither brilliant nor dire but somewhere between the two. The direction—by Stephen Frears—and the acting aren't anything to write home about, but the concept, as you probably know by now, is fresh: a Pakistani boy (Gordon Warnecke) wants to make a success of his life in Britain and he does so by renovating his uncle's laundrette, assisted by an old schoolfriend (Daniel Day-Lewis) who becomes his lover. This seems somewhat like wish-fulfilment to me, especially when the white man becomes subservient to the 'boss': he had been a National Front member, and his 'mates' — all grossly overdrawn — hang around the place looking for trouble. That provides plot, but conviction tends to disappear—as in an otherwise amusing scene in which the youths are making love in the back room oblivious to the fact that the uncle and his mistress are waltzing in the laundrette (to 'The Nutcracker Suite'): but would the prospective customers have been waiting so patiently outside?

I'm not so sure that men, even today's youths, casually and without preliminary, slip into each other's arms, and therefore I have similar doubts about *Kiss of the Spider Woman*, though we all know that that sort of thing goes on in prison. In this case a flamboyant homosexual (William Hurt) entertains a heterosexual revolutionary (Raul Julia) with his fantasies of old movies in their shared cell; the gay man also cares for the welfare of the other to the extent that he is rewarded with a bout of love-making. A recent play in London (David Mamet's 'Edmund') concluded with a similar sequence, and I'm at a loss to know whether—in both instances—this is just a device with which to conclude a narrative

going nowhere or a subversive statement to the effect that all a good straight chap needs is an accommodating gay (or vice versa). In the film this sequence is followed by another involving love and loyalty, for the gay man had been betraying his cell-mate to the prison authorities. If you had seen Hector Babenco's previous film, *Pixote*, you may suppose him attracted to Manuel Puig's novel (it has also been a play) because of its attack on the authoritarian state—clearly in Brazil, where this was filmed—but I'm not altogether sure that such messages are best expressed in pieces as artificial as this. Still, it's an unusual entertainment, though the imagined old movies are even less successful parody than the one in *Purple Rose of Cairo.*

The eponymous hero of *Colonel Redl* was a homosexual, which was why, just prior to the First World War, the Russians were able to blackmail him into supplying important information about the Imperial Army. Since he was also of humble Jewish origin and yet rose to be head of intelligence, here are matters ripe for dramatisation, and the film credits John Osborne's play *A Patriot for Me* as one of its sources. For the director István Szabó and his leading actor Klaus Maria Brandauer this is a follow-up to their triumph with *Mephisto*, but where that was all passion and energy this is stately and controlled. Szabó seems to have been scared of Redl's love life and the exclusively homosexual set in which he moved, for he has given him both a wife and a mistress—oh, and yes, he does have guilty thoughts about a brother officer and he does finally go to bed with a young Italian. Further, Szabó seems even more embarrassed by Redl's espionage activities, which are reduced to a couple of mentions in the last reel. The film has no *raison d'être*, therefore, though it provides a satisfying history lesson on the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire—till it becomes apparent that Szabó's real purpose is to draw analogies between the Empire and the Soviet bloc countries today. That leaves the Redl story yet to be filmed correctly, but this version should be seen for Brandauer, certainly one of the finest actors in the world today.

This impression was confirmed in *The Lightship*, matched with another major talent, Robert Duvall, the first as the captain of the lightship and the second as an elegant but ruthless crook. It is clear from the outset that the crew will be pitted against Duvall and his two thugs, while the obvious nature of the enterprise is underlined by the presence of the captain's son, whose voice-over commentary is virtually a parody of a Williams/O'Neill hero reminiscing ('I've been many places since then, but I can still see the old ship'). In sum, the film is another disappointment from the director Jerzy Skolimowski; he handles action and atmosphere as skilfully as ever, but once again has chosen material unworthy of him.

Which brings me to *Plenty*, written by David Hare, based on his own play. Just before seeing this movie, I read an article trashing Hare and his work. It was a particularly irritating hatchet job, I thought, for is not Hare an associate Director of the National Theatre, which has staged

many of his plays? I felt differently after being subjected to Mr. Hare's half-baked ideas, intended (in his own words) 'to show the English their history'. His heroine does have a curious life, from working with the French Resistance to organising the Coronation celebrations to marriage with a diplomat, in between trying to get pregnant by a working-class man, at least one nervous breakdown and several fits of temper. But it's not a cohesive life, and I emerged knowing (or caring) about none of Hare's views except that Suez was a Bad Thing. Whether the heroine was supposed to be expressing some sort of ethos I failed to discover from Meryl Streep's inexpressive performance. I'm told that Kate Nelligan made the role work on the stage, while someone else told me that the film fails because the director, Fred Schepisi, from Australia, didn't understand the Britain of the post-war years. Maybe; but I know whom I blame.

Conversely, I'd never heard of the talents responsible for *Defence of the Realm*. The director, David Drury, hails from television, while the writer, Martin Stellman, is best known for his work on *Quadrophenia*. I gather the collaboration was not always easy, but if both are on form the British cinema will surely benefit: for this is not merely a home-grown excursion into Costa-Gavras territory but an exciting thriller and a well-expressed polemic on Britain today. It reveals its information slowly: a Labour M.P. (Ian Bannen) resigns, apparently for frequenting the same London dwelling as a Russian attaché now revealed to be a KGB agent, but a reporter (Gabriel Byrne) finds some odd links, including a dead Borstal boy and an evacuation of an American nuclear airbase in East Anglia. Drury overdoes the paraphernalia of suspense (shots of apparently suspicious bare windows), but he can make a subtle point, such as the helmeted figure seen behind a blind as the reporter leaves a Whitehall warning about his activities. This is not a political film, but since—in my view—this present Government would happily incarcerate all those who disagree with its opinions it is as timely as it's impressive.

It was overshadowed only by *The Tokyo Trial*, the result of Masaki Kobayashi's five years' shifting through old newsreels at a cost of $16 million. Four and a half hours is a long time to sit through it, especially as the material is often grainy and dully filmed. The judgement on the Japanese war criminals was also conducted at length, and Kobayashi sets forth at the outset the doubtful legality of the trial. His mission was to use the framework for a Japanese history of the two relevant decades, at least as far as it concerned Imperialism, aggression and cruelty. He makes his own point as the commentary speaks of the Japanese nation having to live till eternity with guilt for atrocities in Manchuria and is followed by a report on the first anniversary of the bomb on Hiroshima. I do not think you have to agree with him or be so ill-informed as I am on the matters in hand to find this documentary absorbing. In length and as an expression of guilt the only precedent is *Le Chargin et la Pietié*, but this has an inner force that that lacked. Kobayashi has since made *The Empty Table*, a study of a middle-aged

man (Tatsuyo Nakadai) and his refusal to accept the responsibility of the terrorist activities of his elder son. There are some unfortunate sequences, mostly concerned with the mother's insanity, and a ludicrous scene in a student café: in fact, this is far from the level of Kobayashi's masterpieces (*The Human Condition*, *Rebellion*, *Kwaidan*), but it is reflective and obviously the work of a master—which, alas, is more than can be said for the late works of Kobayashi's once-great contemporary, Ichikawa.

I imagine *The Tokyo Trial* will find a home on Channel 4 or BBC 2. If you could see only one film in this festival I would recommend—even more than *Defence of the Realm*—*Back to the Future*, which more than atones for the many childish scifi adventures sent from Hollywood over the last decade. Many of these bore the name of Steven Spielberg on the credits, and so does this. He 'presents' it; but *The Goonies*, also in the festival, is not only also produced by him but adapted from a story he had written; and he had apparently handled some sequences for the credited director, Richard Donner. *The Goonies* is a noisy, tensionless version of the sort of thing Enid Blyton used to pen, about a group of kids who go looking for buried treasure. In common with other Spielberg films the humour is either strained or non-existent; *Back to the Future* is lighthearted and sometimes hilarious—and one of its weaker jokes is the one you've probably heard about, incredulity in 1955 on hearing that Ronald Reagan is President 30 years later. Probably you also know the plot: as I write word is out, even in the backwoods, that this is an exceptionally enjoyable film. It only needs, it seems to me, slightly more incisive playing by the leads (Michael J. Fox is very young to carry a whole film, but he lacks the personality of some youthful players of the past): but even without that this may well be one of the few contemporary movies to be fondly remembered thirty years hence. Robert Zemneckis directed from a screenplay written by him and his producer, Bob Gale. I'm looking forward to their next film, but after *The Goonies* even less to Mr. Spielberg's.



## CORRESPONDENCE

### MUCH MORE THAN A HOSTEL

Dear Madam,

May I take this opportunity of reminding your readers of the activities of The Young Women's Christian Association? We continue to provide safe, reasonably priced accommodation. At the same time, we are tackling the major problems of unemployment and racial understanding.

We also run a wide variety of courses for unemployed youngsters and those wishing to return to work in later life. During 1986, given sufficient funding, we hope to embark on 'Project Springboard' which aims to assist 500 unemployed children of British Servicemen in Germany. In the North-West of England we have opened homes for girls who are homeless and have been brought up 'in care'. As well as emergency accommodation, YWCA supplies confidential counselling for parents.

It will be a pleasure to supply further information.

Yours faithfully,

YWCA, Hampden House, ELIZABETH SHARPLES
2 Weymouth Street, London W1N 4AX.

### FORMING AN OPINION

Dear Madam,

Most of the opinions we hold on public issues are derived from information which has been first filtered, albeit subconsciously, through many external considerations—advertisers; voting prospects; owners' interests; ratings; personal view; circulation; chances of promotion; and others. This is on top of the conditioning of our upbringing. The fundamental beliefs of the majority depend on the country of birth.

Common decency, human dignity and common sense demand that all sides of public issues are brought into the open. The nuclear-TV age and the modern information revolution demand that something be done now.

There are three ways in which a start might be made.

Every student on finally leaving school should be told, 'Consider all sides before forming an opinion on any public issue.' In international disputes the UN should issue a statement giving both sides, compiled by the disputants themselves. And on constitutional issues a plebiscite should be held in which all sides are brought out into the open.

In the recent Banff, Scotland, Plebiscite for the first time every elector was fully informed of the arguments of all sides on how Scotland should be governed: the organisers were not connected with any political party or group: and there was external supervision of the counting of votes.

This is the second annual plebiscite held in Scotland on this issue. The first was held in Lanark last year. Next year the plebiscite will be in the Borders; in 1987 in Fife, and so on annually in different parts of Scotland for an indefinite period. A small step perhaps, but a vital and necessary one.

Yours faithfully,

Uddington, Glasgow. PETER THOMSON

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## VERA BRITTAIN'S DIARY

*Vera Brittain — Diary of the thirties 1932-1939.* Chronicle of Friendship. Edited by Alan Bishop. Victor Gollancz Ltd. £12.95.

Many famous writers are best remembered for one of their books, quite often their first. Vera Brittain was a highly talented and quite delightful woman; a brilliant lecturer and journalist and the mother of a potential woman prime minister (Shirley Williams). But whenever her name is mentioned, there springs to mind *Testament of Youth,* the unforgettable story of what a woman suffered during the First World War.

All of this diary is very readable. For me, however, the most fascinating section comes early. In 1932, *Testament of Youth* had not yet appeared. A new writer, Phyllis Bentley, had taken by storm the book-reading public with *Inheritance.* Yet Vera felt sufficiently influential to 'take up' Phyllis. She brought her from Yorkshire to London and changed her from pince-nez to horn-rimmed glasses. She introduced her to the leading figures in the literary world. All too soon, however, the relationship went wrong. Phyllis Bentley, in her own autobiography has described the ill-fated friendship. 'Her account' says the admirable editor, Alan Bishop, 'is generous in shouldering blame for failure'. "In 1932 ... I was thoroughly provincial," she says, "simple, naive, credulous" and, like her fellow-Yorkshiremen, "both blunt and reserved".

But there came a moment when a relationship which included Vera's social patronage of Phyllis and Phyllis's literary patronage of Vera proved too much for both of them. Vera's diary for December 14-17, 1932: 'Feeling ill, tired and utterly miserable. Starting life & work again with wobbly feet and aching back. Phyllis insists on quarrelling with me for my silly letters — on Friday I got the coldest and cruellest of little notes from her saying she now regarded me quite differently and didn't feel she could resume our friendship again on the same terms. Of *course* I was in the wrong — but must this end everything? I can't think how she can let two foolish letters count more than all the things I tried to do for her in the spring and summer, all the other letters I've written her, and the conversations we've had about things so dear and sacred to us both.'

Vera's loving friendship with Winifred Holtby, to whom she owed much, was never clouded, but during the period of this book Winifred was seriously ill and died in 1935. Vera became an ever more ardent pacifist. During these years the idea of collective security enabled pacifists to renounce war without abandoning the defence of freedom. When this ambivalence became impossible, before and during the Second World War, Vera went all the way in a pacifist direction. Her integrity, in my recollection, was at all times total, a quality she shared with her husband and daughter. Both of them very able and ambitious yet distinguished, as she was, by a persistent unworldliness.

FRANK LONGFORD

## MAN WITH A MISSION

*Frank Buchman. A Life.* Garth Lean. Constable. £15.00.

Frank Buchman, evangelist and creator of Buchmanism, the 'Oxford Group' and the *Moral Re-armament Association* (M.R.A. to many people) was a

highly controversial figure in this country and also in his native country, the United States. He did not come from the far West or the *Bible Belt* and should not be confused with the rabble rousers and mob orators. He came from a rather special section of mid-Pennsylvania, which was full of Lutherans who had emigrated in the 19th century from Swabian Germany and Eastern Switzerland. His father and mother settled in Allentown. His parents were not poor; they owned a hotel and restaurant which served alcohol and their son had a normal upbringing in local schools and at a Lutheran College and was duly ordained in 1902 at St. Stephens Church, Allentown. It is said that he 'pined' to go to Princeton.

This last point is of interest because in 1926 a famous Princeton Enquiry forbad Buchman to preach or promote his mission work on the Princeton campus. But the controversy at Princeton is only one of many others which took place between highly placed personalities. It is a familiar feature of Buchman's life and work that he attracted Princes and Presidents, always it seems powerful and influential persons, for example Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenhauer, Lord Salisbury, a variety of leading theologians and some Trade Union leaders.

His appointed task was personal conversion of men and women: he favoured working in Groups or at 'House Parties'. These were carried on by picked student leaders who had themselves signed on as followers, which entailed a personal confession and commitment to Christ.

Perhaps this quotation from Sir Arnold Lunn gives a fair estimate of Frank Buchman: — 'He has no charisma that I can see. He isn't good looking, he is no orator, he has never written a book and seldom leads a meeting. Yet statesmen and great intellects came from all over the world to consult him and a lot of intelligent people have stuck with him full-time without salary for forty years when they could have been making careers for themselves. Why?'.

Here is a mystery which Mr. Garth Lean after 500 pages cannot unravel. Indeed I find his writing repetitive and many of his attributes tiresome and naive. But these are the traps of a friend and follower. The author has also written studies of Wesley and Wilberforce and jointly with Sir Arnold Lunn *The New Morality* and *Christian Counter-Attack.*

I met Buchman twice. The first time at Oxford in 1922. He invited me to attend a house-party which was held in the home of a rich banker at Putney Heath. I left with Harold Begbie the well-known journalist to explore the rhododendron garden after half an hour. The second occasion was in the Hotel Adlon, Berlin 1936 at the Olympic Games when I was staying with Count Bernstoff, who had been deputy German Ambassador in London and was now posted in disgrace to a Jewish Bank in Berlin and finally shot. Buchman called me over and tried to introduce me to Heinrich Himmler who, he said, sponsored house-parties all over Germany. A fuller account of this encounter is told by Tom Driberg in his *Mystery of Moral Re-armament* (Secker & Warburg 1964). I have developed a reserve about movements associated with Buchman. I am puzzled about his friendship with the Himmlers and about his superficial approach to the deepest and most sacred core of the individual's inner life.

KENNETH LINDSAY

## AN AMERICAN STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

*Ideals and Ideologies in Modern Politics.* Mark N. Hagopian. Longman. £9.95.

This is a not-untypical product of its *genre*, and of that *genre* it is a competent and concise example. It is an American text-book for introductory courses in comparative politics or political philosophy. The survey is organised into two sections, ideals and ideologies: the former — democracy, socialism, capitalism *et al* — have, the author says, "a chameleon-like variability", whereas the latter — anarchism, communism, liberalism, fascism *et al* — have "a richness and historical specificity." One could, of course, challenge such demarcations, while saluting the brevity and the skill of each essay, and the courage of the author in tackling (as ideologies) concepts like "Christian Democracy" and "Populism", and (as ideals) "Utopia, Revolution" and "Neo-Individualism" (including, even, a sub-section on "Radical Feminism"). Each summary the author offers is, as far as it goes, accurate and succinct.

The book, however, is an American text and seems to be of limited value in British colleges. Few of the books cited in the useful chapter book-lists, were published after 1980. The only British names mentioned are R.H.S. Crossman and Tony Crosland — names now somewhat out-of-date as guides to current ideologies; the discussion on "Conservatism" is especially dated, being no more than a few paragraphs on Burke and Santayana. Neither John Adams nor Alexander Hamilton gets a mention — indeed the real world of practical politics, where ideas and ideologies are translated into policies, is not here at all. More surprising in an American text, Friedman and Hayek are here, briefly, but the publications of and the strategies advocated by the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation not at all. The book may be of use to some first-year classes, studying some familiar standard primary sources. As a guide to the political ideologies or the complexities of the real world, parliamentary, republican or autocratic, as an analysis of Yugoslavia's self-management (to which it makes very vague references), or the political involvements of de-regulation or privatisation in our western 'democracies', this is no guide at all. But perhaps these are problems for graduate schools, not first year classes — like the analysis of the tensions for a government between unavoidable intervention in the affairs of private business (and its rescue), and the pledged need to stand back and hold the ring within which free competition can flourish?

ESMOND WRIGHT

## A BIOGRAPHY OF ORSON WELLES

*Orson Welles.* Barbara Leaming. Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. £14.95.

It is a sad comment on this rather pathetic biography that its subject would undoubtedly have approved of it (he died within a few days of the American publication). Miss Leaming, who devotes a gushing half-dozen pages as to how she came to meet the great man, is quite content to quote The Gospel According to Orson — heard also in the long BBC doctumentary which was repeated during the Christmas period. He was unquestionably fascinating to listen to, as modest as he was eloquent, as wise as he was genial — though I do wish Miss Leaming could have passed on his verbatim reminiscences without a couple of 'laughs Orson' on every page. She reduces this titanic figure not only by writing in showbusinessese (she knows not 'a leading Broadway producer' but 'top Broadway producer', without an article, definite or indefinite) but by

accepting his version of a controversial career. That may be as well, for when left on her own she refers to *Follow the Boys* as *3 Cheers for the Boys* or comments that the meretricious — except for one dazzling sequence — but always revived and much-written-about *Lady from Shanghai* is 'an extraordinary artistic achievement that, unfortunately, has not found its proper place in film history'.

A bemused Welles found it strange that he was supposed to live up to his reputation as a genius, since no one had called him that, or so he told the BBC: this account differs inasmuch as he was told he was a genius by family and friends from infancy onwards — and it was this factor, this desire to show off, which led to such horrendous works as *Mr Arkadin* and *Macbeth* — which hardly emerge from these pages as the artistic and commercial failures they were. Welles admittedly says so: sometimes he is gently reproached for his modesty, but the author brings no analysis to his comments, to the films themselves nor their reception by press and public.

She does shake her head several times over Welles's failure to stay around while his films were edited (and according to her, all but ruined) by other hands, and details at such length Welles's post-shooting indifference to *Touch of Evil* (till he saw the results) that it's clear to see why the film industry distrusted him. Having virtually proved that Welles deliberately would not finish his films, she observes that he had gained an 'undeserved reputation' for (not) so doing. Charles Higham elaborated on this in 'a destructive book', which must be Welles's opinion — or else she hasn't read it, for Higham (elsewhere an indifferent writer) pays full tribute to Welles's achievements and is much more perceptive on this mercurial, multifaceted talent. So, of course, was John Houseman, whose long association with Welles is explained here by the meanest of sentences, 'Orson figured Houseman could use the extra money'. The contribution of Houseman and others to *Citizen Kane* is, naturally, underplayed; and *Kane*'s overwhelming debt to *The Power and the Glory* (written by Preston Sturges) in both structure and subject matter is not only not discussed but not mentioned. Houseman's unflattering portrait of Welles in his own memoirs is explained as due to unrequited emotional passion — which didn't surprise this reader, who to this point in the story had noted the heterosexual Welles escaping the lascivious attentions of his fellows on almost every page. Perhaps it is the author who over-estimated Welles's appeal to homosexuals, but when she details Welles's move from obscurity to star roles on stage via a chance meeting with Thornton Wilder, a letter to Alexander Woollcott and an introduction to Guthrie McClintic she neglects to mention that these gentlemen were of that persuasion. That proves nothing, of course, except that this fawning tome is merely a sketch for the major biography that is still to come. The events surrounding the production and reception of *Kane* are so fascinating as to merit another going over. As is the man who made it.

DAVID SHIPMAN

## PHILOSOPHY AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

*Science and the Modern World.* Alfred North Whitehead. Free Association Books. £11.95 hardback, £4.95 soft cover.

*Science and the Modern World*, one of the assured classics of the present century, has appeared in reprint in England for the first time in the past decade. Almost a reaction against the high abstraction of mathematical logic, the book brings into focus the humanitarian and naturalistic concerns which philosophy

rightly possesses along with its more narrowly technical subject-matter. Yet it would be a superficial view of this great logician's work to suppose that he was in any way denying the abstract nature of pure thought or denigrating anything achieved by himself and Bertrand Russell, particularly in the book on which they collaborated to push forward the frontiers of scientific and mathematical knowledge, namely *Principia Mathematica*.

In the three centuries during which modern science has existed, it still eludes an exact description of its nature. A brilliant treatment of the subject is given by Whitehead who felt that our twentieth century science was somehow different from what had gone before. Built upon the foundations of Greek science, for without Euclid, Archimedes and Pappus, Newton's work would not have been possible, modern science is more in the nature of 'science-technology', almost as though the term referred to a unitary entity. Whitehead's analysis of this phenomenon is conducted alongside two major themes in support of its explication. One is a wholly delightful and imaginative account of the history of scientific ideas, in which they are unexpectedly linked with the insights of poets, writers of important novels and religious thinkers. The other is the technical explanation of logical functions; and in these passages the reader is suddenly plunged without much warning into very deep intellectual water indeed. Robert Young, in a most useful and illuminating introduction to the present edition, gives warning of the sections concerned, as well as showing the timeliness and relevance of Whitehead's book to the more urgent matters which now occupy the minds of scientists and scientific philosophers who could have been brought up on a view which Whitehead called 'mechanical materialism', based on an impoverished knowledge of matter.

Whitehead begins by overturning one of the assumptions commonly held in conventional scientific history: that the modern period began when men turned from the faith of the Middle Ages to a reliance on reason. The facts, he says, about the origin of science are quite otherwise. The theories held in the Middle Ages were characterised by a sweeping and 'unbridled rationalism'. The modern period began as a revolt against such rationalism and turned instead to 'the irreducible and stubborn facts' of experience. It was this thirst for 'facts', according to Whitehead, which set the new science in motion. This is partially true; but it does not wholly explain a science in which the earth is no longer the centre of the cosmos, — a view of the universe which, in its turn, would not have been possible without the revolutionary vision of Copernicus and Kepler. It is, however, certain that without Whitehead's 'organic mechanism', his ideas of organism and event, the modern phenomenological aspects of philosophy might have been lost sight of and a too rigid dismissal of metaphysics, already well advanced in 1925 when his book appeared, could have prevailed.

This volume contains a work of genius, copiously and beautifully supported by brilliant insights, stimulating in its comprehensiveness and the sweep of its theoretical scheme. It is a philosophy of nature and of hope, a concept which ecologists and environmentalists as well as philosophers will appreciate.

BETTY ABEL

## HISTORY OF THE CAMBRIDGE APOSTLES

*The Cambridge Apostles.* Richard Deacon. Robert Royce. £10.95.

The Apostolic succession, dating from the High Victorian days of Cantab, when Tennyson, Hallam, and Monckton Milnes set their seal upon the Society, is the subject of Mr. Richard Deacon's splendidly extended historical tract. Mr. Deacon, unequivocally 'phenomenal' (i.e. belonging to 'the rest of the world', as did all who were not of the 'Brethren'), although not *necessarily* 'unapostolic', has not, of course, been made privy to even the least of the secrets of the arcane apostleship, but, as one might expect of an author who has previously delved into the more remote corners of the espionage systems of Britain, Russia, China, Israel and Japan, sought the identity of Jack the Ripper, and celebrated biographically the identity of 'C'—Sir Maurice Oldfield of MI6—he has not permitted a mere undergraduate web of secrecy either to ensnare or totally deflect.

He provides documentation which demonstrates that there is, and has been, considerably more to the Society than the popular ascriptions of identity as the hot bed of Stracheyite Bloomsbury and the active recruiting bed of pro-Soviet sleepers limitingly suggest.

Always élitist, it was initially a debating society, whose Brethren trotted, each in dutiful turn, to the 'hearthrug' of a Saturday evening to deliver, as that night's 'moderator', his essay or reading elect; *praeludium* to a feast of wit and 'whales' (traditional temporal fare, sardines on toast).

From undergraduate generation to generation the Society has undergone Protean metamorphosis. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, Simonianism, exotic derivative of the cult of Claude, Comte de Saint-Simon, proponent movement of the exclusive establishment of novel social order through spiritual regeneration—pre-Buchmanite Buchmanism!—was all the fad.

Throughout the late 1850s and 1860s, the Apostles' creed was that of John Stuart Mill and his utilitarianism, replacing, through Henry Sidgwick, who trod in the directing footsteps of Frederick Maurice and John Sterling, the inspiration of extra-Apostellary Coleridge. Thus was progression from evangelical Tories to liberal Christians.

Victorian Apostleship gave way to the Edwardian rule of Maynard Keynes and Lytton Strachey, feathers falling from the flexing wings of Bertrand Russell all over the place!

All this Mr. Deacon meticulously documents and subjects to discreet commentary. Considering the lack of co-operation which he encountered, he has done extraordinarily well.

Approaching modern times, Mr. Deacon observes that in the 1970s the concern of the Apostles is reported to have been less with Marx and Communism than with the transformational grammarian Noam Chomsky and semiotics. But the structuralist controversy of the 'eighties barely touched the Society.

Unquestionably, *the* greatest revolutionary change in the venerable Apostolic ordinal has been the admission of females after 1970. In these days of overall equality it is, one supposes, a change to be expected. But welcomed . . .?

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

## A NEW HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

*The Cambridge Historical Encyclopedia of Great Britain and Ireland.* Edited by Christopher Haigh, Cambridge University Press. £19.50.

This is a useful and attractive handbook, the work of no less than eighty specialists. The emphasis — so the editor claims — is on patterns of continuity rather than on the dramatic features of invasion, conquest and settlement, and on giving due place to the role of the Scots, Welsh and Irish. Its main features are brief and factual, marginal notes (uniformly excellent) on topics in the text, biographical *Who's Who* of the 'great and famous', and many well-drawn maps, sketches and portraits scattered through but integrated into the text. It will be a handy historical lexicon to have on a bookshelf.

The penalty of using a galaxy of authors, however, is that real continuity and unity of theme are hard to sustain. Given also the emphasis on social rather than political history, and the occasionally obtrusive personal comments, one can end up bewildered rather than satisfied. The unity of the United Kingdom — though some contributors seem to question it — is in fact an achievement of a London-based kingship and Parliament, and to London the Scottish Stuarts and their nobility were as keen to go as any Englishmen. The emphasis on a distinct Scottish role is offset occasionally by derogatory phrases ('In North Britain the upper classes, had become and have remained a junior branch of the British ruling elite') reflecting the ambiguity that marks so many Celtic intellectuals (and politicians?) these days, wanting as in the past, to have it both ways, and remaining at once proud, sensitive and contentious. A critic might feel also that the price of the emphasis on the national components is, in the absence of space, to minimise (even ignore) the contribution of the British (and especially Scots, Welsh and Irish) to North America and to the Empire *d'outremer*. If not a Little England volume, this is a study of Little Britain. It is, however, factually correct, imaginative and fresh in its treatment, and rich in illustrative detail; it is readable, eminently look-at-able, and good for browsing.

ESMOND WRIGHT

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Maritime Affairs—A World Handbook** (Longman. £50). This is an important and extremely useful 'reference guide to maritime organisations, Conventions and Disputes and to the international politics of the Sea', compiled and written by Henry W. Degenhardt, with Brian Meredith as editorial consultant. 'The essential purpose of the book is to provide textual data on the various aspects of present-day maritime affairs'. The relevance of the sea in almost every context of a maritime state makes a volume of this kind of particular value over a very wide area. The work covers 'international maritime law, sea transport and communications, the exploitation and conservation of the marine natural resources, scientific research into the various aspects of the marine environment, maritime boundary disputes and military tension areas at sea.' It also covers the work of relevant international organisations. Obviously a book of this kind cannot pretend to cover in detail every matter. For example, it does not appear

to give the territorial sea limits of Bermuda. On the other hand the volume includes a large bibliography designed for further enquiry in greater depth.

**The Royal Way of Death** (Constable. £12.95.) This exceptional study by Olivia Bland is devoted to royal funerals. She starts with the elaborate ceremonies at the death of Queen Elizabeth I and ends with the funeral of Lord Mountbatten in 1979. Much attention is given to the obsequies of the Prince Consort and Queen Victoria. There is a valuable account of Charles II receiving by stealth the last rites of the Roman Catholic Church. Olivia Bland explains the development of grading in funeral rites according to the royal rank of the deceased. She justifies the subject as demonstrating the deceased's popularity by the degree of public sympathy evoked and as providing an opportunity for visiting statesmen to discuss privately matters of common concern. The book is very well produced with numerous illustrations both in colour and monochrome. The author has clearly done a great deal of background work for a study which makes interesting reading without being morbid.

**The Chartists** (Wildwood House. Paperback £6.95.) It is good to have a paperback edition of Dorothy Thompson's study on 'popular politics in the industrial revolution', which was first published in 1984. The year 1848, categorised as the Year of Revolutions, witnessed revolts in every European state except in Britain. Here the working class political struggle became epitomised in the Peoples Charter eventually published in 1838, with its famous six points. Dorothy Thompson has produced an extremely valuable introduction to this complex and deep seated movement during these years. Why did it fail politically? There are no short answers. She argues that already by 1850, the 'fundamental importance of the Charter had been undermined' by legislation. She also contends that the militancy of Chartism had to some extent been reduced by 'the attitudes and values of the middle class in England'. This is a study which attracts discussion.

**Standing Female Nude** (Anvil Press Poetry. £3.95) is the third volume of poems by Carol Ann Duffy, the powerful, versatile, and disturbingly matured young poet (born 1955) who has as her most characteristic mode a searing dramatic monologue. As her world-view deepens and darkens, she is increasingly less of a woman poet. She is elegiac — 'No one can hear the mulching of the heart, which thrummed/with blood or drummed with love.' Witty — 'All this eternally before my final breath and may/this find you as it leaves me here. Eventually.' There is unbearable pain — 'After I no longer speak they break our fingers/to salvage my wedding ring.' And a terrible poem entitled *A Healthy Meal* which should make vegetarians of us all. Eros is here, if sparingly. So are two prize-winning poems — *Words of Absolution* and *Whoever She Was*. A considerable poet, who must continue. (R.W-E.)

**The Image and Other Stories** (Jonathan Cape. £9.95.) Isaac Bashevis Singer, the Jewish writer who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1978, has brought together twenty-two short stories, which were previously published between 1965 and 1985. They are translated from the Yiddish, all approved if not translated by the author himself. His imagery is superb, with clarity and profound understanding of human nature. He brings his stories within his own definition of literature, 'the story of love and hate, a description of the mad hurricane of human passions and the struggle with them'.

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# Contemporary Review

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## PROTESTANTS IN BELFAST:

## A VIEW FROM THE INSIDE


**by Fred Boal and David Livingstone**


YET again the latest political initiative in Northern Ireland, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, has stirred up dark passions among the loyal sons of Ulster. Fears about the thin end of a Republican wedge have been enflamed as the political pundits have ransacked those wary words gingerly composed by Dublin and Westminster. With the enthusiasm of a literary critic tackling a Shakespearean sonnet, unionist partisans have perused the new document for any hidden messages it might contain about the Conference's administrative powers, its legislative authority, and, first of all, its omen for the future.

For all the interpretative overkill to which the Agreement has been subjected, no voice seems to have been raised about one assumption running the length and breadth of the proposal, namely, that Northern Ireland houses 'two communities,' 'two traditions,' each with its own distinctive 'cultural heritage'. If this seemingly innocuous vocabulary is designed to signal the gut-felt divide between Protestants and Catholics, then it surely is no more than conventional wisdom. But if it is further meant to suggest that Ulster society comprises two monolithic communities, that is quite a different matter. Indeed, it was precisely to assess the validity of that assumption that we recently undertook a study of church-going Protestants in the Belfast area.[1] By thus focussing on a segment of one of the 'traditions' we hoped to determine whether it even possesses the shared characteristics of a cohesive community.

At the level of popular culture, we already face a deep cleavage between church-going and 'secular' Protestants. The latter, of course, are not in scarce supply. The United Kingdom generally has witnessed a long history of working class defection from institutionalized religion and Belfast is no exception. Indeed it is the strong undercurrent of working class secularism that continues to give the appropriately named Belfast City Mission its 'mission'. On this Sybil Gribbon's depiction of Edwardian Belfast is pointedly appropriate:

> The blanket of sabbatarianism was deceptive. Behind the silence of the main thoroughfares lay areas where church attendance would have caused astonishment, where labourers were sleeping off the effects of a Saturday night of drinking, fighting or wife-beating and where mill women were gossiping or doing the weekly wash.[2]



And yet it would be mistaken to conclude that the working classes have remained completely untouched by the evangelistic thrust of the churches. In fact, as our survey makes clear, working class people who do go to church are more frequent attenders, and to that degree at least more committed to religion, than their middle-class counterparts. This in itself might seem insignificant were it not for the distinctive cultural traits that are the direct outgrowth of religious belief. Thus, to continue the example above, working-class church-goers staunchly adhere to a sabbatarian ethic, repudiating the buying of Sunday newspapers, voicing their opposition to Sunday opening, and generally lamenting the erosion of the traditional Ulster Sunday. Besides, they are, of all our respondents, the most attracted to the fundamentalist view of the world, emphasizing the prime importance of being 'born again', of reverencing the Bible as the unerring Word of God, and of affirming the absolute necessity of church attendance.

Initially, then, it is plain that even for the working-class there is no simple, monolithic Protestant culture. Indeed the unchurched working-class who find political Paisleyism congenial to their anti-Republican palates are unlikely to find the Doctor's religious fundamentalism much to their taste. For the religiously-committed working-class, the latter is likely to be central to his appeal.

If fundamentalism acts to produce sub-cultural differences within the working-class, it also signals significant cleavages within the Protestant church-going community more generally. For fundamentalism is merely at one end of a theological spectrum that stretches all the way to a liberalism which is as caustic about biblical literalism as it is dismissive of the hot conversionist gospel. This fundamentalist-liberal polarity, it must be emphasized, does not neatly follow denominational contours. True, the smaller denominations, say, Baptists and Brethren, display little theological latitude within their overwhelmingly fundamentalist constituency; but at the same time, the more liberal Anglican, Methodist and Presbyterian traditions have substantial minorities with conservative religious sentiments. More, whereas only one in four Anglicans can be described as fundamentalist, almost half the Methodists and Presbyterians find themselves on the conservative theological wing.

On the face of it once again, these doctrinal preoccupations, so crucial to many church-goers, might seem personally engaging but socially irrelevant. Such a dismissal, however, would be to ignore the symbolic significance of places of worship in Northern Ireland — obscenely exposed in the butchering of Pentecostal people at prayer near the border village of Darkley on the Sunday evening of the 20th November 1983 — not to mention the ramifications of religion on so many aspects of Ulster life. Take, for example, the differing attitudes towards relations between Protestants and Catholics. Certainly very few Protestant church-goers of any theological hue are much attracted by visions of church unity — a telling indication of how far the ecclesiastical top brass is out of step with grass roots opinion. And yet the vast majority of liberals expressed their desire for co-operation with the Roman Catholic Church on both religious

and social matters. Predictably, the more conservative evangelicals are not interested in extending relations beyond the social sphere, and as many as a third want no truck with the Catholic Church whatsoever. Such attitudes, of course, have further social implications, manifest, to take just one example, in the forty percent of conservative evangelicals (as compared with only one in five liberals) who want their children educated in an all-Protestant school. There are political repercussions too. Beyond the broad band of support across the theological spectrum for the Official Unionist Party, fundamentalists are decidedly more likely to cast their lot with Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party, while the liberals find the middle of the road Alliance Party more to their liking. The social forces that foster either conciliatory or inhospitable attitudes to cross-community relations, it seems, have roots deep in religious tradition.

By now certain stereotypical images of the Ulster Fundamentalist might well seem to be emerging — culturally isolationist, religiously anti-Catholic, and politically extremist. Indeed this picture might be reinforced by certain other findings. Three quarters of our conservative respondents are so self-assured in their own faith that they never entertain religious doubt; for the liberals, by contrast, doubt almost seems to be a way of life. If things unseen are, for fundamentalists, indubitable it is scarcely surprising that they are unflinching in their attitudes to the political realities of everyday life in Ulster. Nor is it unexpected that some two-thirds are assured that, from a theological standpoint, they are the chosen people of God. Convinced of its own 'divine election', this 'New Israel' shares the pugnacious territorialism of the ancient Jews. For just as they saw the holding of the 'land', and the prohibition of exogamous marriage as crucial to the maintenance of Yahwism, so in Ulster the preservation of the gospel in its purity seems to require the self-same protective measures. As one loyalist spokesman put it: 'I recognize as a Protestant that if a Protestant looses his Protestanism, then he looses all motivation for opposing a united Ireland'. Another concurs, adding that 'anyone who indulges in a mixed marriage is betraying the Protestant cause.'[3] In a very real sense, it is clear, the fundamentalist stake in politics stems from theological anxieties.

What is just as notable, however, is that this depth of political passion finds little expression in areas where questions of ethnic interest are not at stake. Indeed in assessing matters of moral concern, there is evidence to suggest that fundamentalists and liberals operate with very different principles of evaluation. Thus when invited to rank the greatest evils in the modern world, fundamentalists fastened on atheism and matters of purely personal piety like pride, whereas the liberals were far more exercised about social problems like unemployment and the nuclear threat. This fits in well with the fundamentalist emphasis on the supreme importance of the individual and his spiritual well-being — 'What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?' — as compared with a liberal focus on the injustices of society and the consequent need for political action.

At this point, to repeat, it would be all too easy to lapse into caricaturing fundamentalist culture. Extremism, obscurantism, and anti-intellectualism are the terms that readily spring to mind. Yet these evaluations are ultimately burlesque. For a start, in almost every facet of fundamentalist outlook that we have itemized, there are substantial numbers of conservatives who do not fit the prototype. Besides, the conventional images of fundamentalists as older folk because theologically conservative, and uneducated because biblically literalist, need to be questioned. In fact conservative Protestants enjoy far higher numbers of young people among their ranks than liberals, perhaps because they have developed highly successful strategies for retaining and attracting youthful membership, and because of the vibrant evangelical youth culture that has emerged in recent years to service their own community. Moreover, our survey reveals that there is almost no difference between conservatives and liberals so far as educational attainment is concerned; around one in six of each of the groups, for example, have had a university education. Clearly fundamentalists cannot be discriminated by demographic or educational criteria.

If Protestant church-goers can, with qualifications, be divided into fundamentalist and liberal religious cultures, the picture is even more complicated by the presence of a third group — about a fifth of our respondents — who can be described as liberal-conservative in outlook. To fully delineate the characteristics of this group is not germane to our present purposes. For the moment it is sufficient to note that these liberal-conservatives largely comprise people who, we suggest, have grown up in a fundamentalist tradition but who, perhaps through education and upward social mobility, have distanced themselves from aspects of that religious culture. Thus while they show many of the doctrinal and moral sympathies of fundamentalists, notably in their level of church attendance, their opposition to the World Council of Churches, and their feelings about abortion, they find themselves on social and political matters much closer to the liberal stance as expressed in their comparative openness to mixed Protestant-Catholic education, their relatively high preference for the Alliance Party, and their greater flexibility about Sunday observance.

For all the very real differences that our survey has brought to light, it would be folly to mistake these cleavages as evidence of wholesale fragmentation among Ulster Protestants. To the contrary, Belfast church-goers are very substantially united on a number of issues that revolve around the facts of political life in Northern Ireland. To begin with, the vast majority of our respondents, irrespective of theological conviction or denominational affiliation, expressed their belief that the Protestant opposition to a united Ireland sprang primarily from a fear about the role the Catholic Church would play under new constitutional arrangements. Take, as just one example, the acute difference of opinion between Protestants and Catholics on the abortion issue. The Catholic tradition, it is well known, gives precedence to the life of the unborn child over that of the mother. With Protestants it is the reverse. So here is a real point of divergence; not so much that Protestants are strongly

pro-abortion, but that they perceive anti-abortion legislation as state intervention in private morality. The abortion issue thus takes on symbolic significance because of its wider religio-political ramifications. Paradoxically, however, fundamentalists and Catholics, aside from the particular question of the mother's life, share a profoundly anti-abortion ethic even to the extent of pressing for appropriate legislation. And this suggests that the shared antipathy to a united Ireland across all shades of Protestant opinion, focussing as it does on uneasiness about the role the Catholic Church would play, ultimately stems from differing motivations on the part of fundamentalists and liberals.

If Protestants are, for one reason or another, united in their horror about the influence of Rome in a future all-Ireland, they are rather more positively bound together in their sense of national identity. The vast majority insist on seeing themselves as British. By contrast, very few think that people in mainland Britain see Ulster Protestants this way, some fifty percent feeling they would be regarded as Irish. This perceptual dissonance goes a long way to explaining why only a mere handful of Protestants feel that people in Britain have any real understanding of their reasons for wanting to remain part of the United Kingdom. Factors such as these have tended to exacerbate the widespread sense of isolation felt by Ulster Protestants. On the one hand they have never felt completely welcomed by British society, a society whose permissiveness they do not, in any case, wish to embrace; on the other hand, they have no desire to be embraced by a Catholic-dominated Irish Republic. So it is not surprising that they display a real ambivalence about where their ultimate political loyalties lie. If it came to choosing between loyalty to Ulster or to the British Government, some two thirds of our churchgoers — irrespective of religious sub-culture — would favour the former, leaving a substantial minority giving their primary allegiance to the latter. This note of collective equivocation is again struck in the fact that while the great majority of Protestants emphasize their British identity, a sizeable number felt it necessary to build an Ulster component into their self-designation by reminding us that they feel themselves to be Ulster-British. And yet, at least at the time of survey during the winter of 1983-84, a mere handful of church-goers (less than ten percent) disagreed with the statement that 'dealing with the security situation should be left entirely to the forces of law an order', thereby implicitly affirming, for all their pro-Ulster sentiments, their rejection of any armed defiance of the British government. Whether this sentiment still prevails in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement remains to be seen.

Given the complex configuration of Protestant society, it is imperative that the religious factor in Ulster be taken a good deal more seriously than it has been in the past. This is not to ignore the secularization to which Northern Ireland has been exposed during the sixty-five years of its existence. But it is to recognize that religious sentiments still colour the outlook of non church-going Protestants. Marginal believers and even unbelievers feel that, as Frank Wright puts it, belief is 'a good thing and

something to be valued'. Protestants, he goes on, recognize that 'the things they value depend on some people believing: that is probably why they are so concerned about their children's attendance at Sunday School.' The Rev. Martin Smyth, Grand Master of the Orange Order, captures the spirit of this diagnosis when he portrays the secular Protestants of Belfast's Shankill Road as 'Bible lovers if not Bible readers.'[4]

And so it is that the spirit of Reformation Protestantism lies at the headwaters of the Ulster unionist outlook, so much so that this religious core is the prime source of cultural identity even for those now on its periphery. The safeguarding of this core, of course, is of surpassing importance, for in it is enshrined — if only symbolically — the purest essence of the spiritual heritage of the people. To preserve their Protestant ideals, two strategies thus seem to be required. Protecting the theology demands safeguarding the geography. In this territorial imperative is the perception that the maintenance of the Protestant faith requires the keeping of the full forces of Catholicism beyond the borders of the state. Here, besides, lies the Protestant prevarication about the British commitment to Ulster; for the Protestant allegiance to the British Government has always been conditional on the capacity and willingness of the forces of the Crown to preserve, at all costs, that all-important border, while at the same time remaining suspicious of a nation whose moral laxity is itself a threat to the very spiritual core Protestants so desperately long to keep. The second strategy concerns marriage. Thus, just as the theological and the geographical are bound together, so too are the theology and the demography. Obsessed by the ideal of ethnic purity, the overwhelming majority of church-going Protestants object to Protestant-Catholic marriage, with the conservatives most emphatic in their opposition. The tenaciousness with which the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy insists on the bringing up of children of mixed marriages within the Catholic Church does little to alleviate — to the contrary heightens — the fears of northern Protestants.

Just as the spirit of religious compromise is repugnant to the Ulster Protestant temperament, so too is compromise on those matters directly related to the strategies needed to preserve that spiritual core. This perhaps sheds light on the fact that while eighty percent of our respondents feel that at some stage in the future there would be a Catholic majority in the population of Northern Ireland — with its obvious threat to the democratic basis of geographical defence — they appear unwilling to move towards any compromise with the current minority while they are still in a position of electoral strength.

What unites Ulster Protestants, it seems, is a determined sense of what they are not — they are not Irish, they are not Catholics, they are not Republicans. What divides them is what they want to promote: for some it is simply a purely secular society liberated from ecclesiastical dominance; for others it is a theocratic society governed by the principles of fundamentalist Protestantism; for others it is a more pluralistic society imbued with a spirit of Christian liberalism; for still others it is a simple,

emotional preference for the old Protestant traditions unhampered by the crusading voices of ecumenial liberalism or strident fundamentalism. And yet diverse though these visions are, Ulster Protestants are certain that none of them can flourish in a united Ireland whose institutions would be dominated by a Catholic Church inexorably enforcing its own societal imperatives — imperatives that are no less designed to preserve *its* theological core, the *depositum fidei.*

Dublin and Westminster, apparently, are only providing further pressure to keep the diverse fragments of Protestant Ulster glued together. Indeed they are even providing some of the glue.

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NOTES

1. This project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No. 0023/0025), was carried out by the authors together with Mr John Campbell.
2. Sybil Gribbon, *Edwardian Belfast. A Social Profile* (Belfast 1982), p. 22.
3. Quoted in Fintan O'Toole 'Fire and Brimstone,' *Magill,* Vol. 9, No. 3, (14 November 1985), pp. 16-27.
4. Frank Wright 'Protestant Ideology and Politics in Ulster,' *European Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 14, (1973), pp. 213-280.

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Together with J. A. Campbell, Boal and Livingstone are preparing a book for Blackwell on the subject of the above article.]

# NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

## by Lord Stewart of Fulham

THE Charter of the United Nations requires all members to refrain from interfering in each others' affairs. The same requirement appeared in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the UN's predecessor. Then and now, it was believed that nations would not be prepared to enter an organisation which infringed their sovereignty; and this belief was a correct assessment of world opinion on both occasions. Yet, from the outset, there has also been a belief that there are some standards of conduct which all nations ought to observe, and that failure to observe them could not be cloaked by claiming that failure was an 'internal affair'. The Covenant of the League, for example, forbade chattel slavery, and the League consequently had the right to enquire into the steps being taken by Ethiopia to abolish this institution.

To-day, members of The United Nations are required not to practise imperialism; and this means that those states — such as the United Kingdom — which still have some colonial possessions are subject to a running fire of criticism and are required to show that their treatment of these colonial possessions is 'in the interests of' the inhabitants. Moreover, many nations have by now gone beyond the Charter of the United Nations and committed themselves in other documents — notably the Final Act of the Helsinki Agreement — to grant their own subjects certain 'human rights'. It is now, therefore, possible to criticise the administration of justice, the behaviour of the police, the right of free speech, in almost any country and to contend that one is not thereby interfering with that country's 'internal affairs': one is drawing attention to an *international* obligation to which that country has made itself subject.

In consequence, we have a confused and anomalous situation. Demands for recognition of human rights are met by assertions that a sovereign country cannot permit interference in its internal affairs. South Africa is accused of denying to her black subjects political rights which some of her accusers do not grant to any of their subjects: the United Kingdom's security measures to Northern Ireland are criticised by governments which give far wider arbitrary powers to their police: accusation of 'double standards' are made from all quarters.

We have to recognise this confusion as a necessary stage in human progress. If we laid so much stress on each nation's sovereign right over its own affairs as to rule out all criticism of tyrannies, these tyrannies would finally result in an explosion having world-wide effects. If, on the other hand, we all indulged an unlimited passion for attacking each other's shortcomings we should find it hard to keep the peace of the world. We have to accept that each of these problems has to be dealt with on its own merits and to strike the best balance we can between the

need to keep the world at peace and the desirability of preventing injustice. The point was powerfully made by Henry Kissinger:—

> When nations are able to inflict tens of millions of casualties in a matter of hours peace has become a moral imperative. No one entering office could evade this fundamental responsibility. But the root dilemma of our time is that if the quest for peace turns into the *sole* objective of policy, the fear of war becomes a weapon in the hands of the most ruthless; it produces moral disarmament. How to strive for both peace and justice, for an end of war that does not lead to tyranny, for a commitment to justice that does not produce cataclysm — to find this balance is the perpetual task of the statesmen of the nuclear age.

The Psalmist perceived the nature of the problem when he prophesied the time when 'righteousness and peace have kissed each other': but we have not reached that situation yet, nor does he tell us how to get there.

The problem is not a new one. When the French Ambassador paid his first visit to the English Court after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, he found everyone dressed in black and all the ladies averting their faces from him. Ploughing his way through to the presence of Queen Elizabeth I, he tried to tell her that the French Government had been obliged to take stern measures against a dangerous conspiracy. He was, in fact, representing what had been done as an 'internal affair'. The Queen, having first enquired why it was necessary, for security purposes, to kill so many women and children, then went to the heart of the matter. If the King of France could treat his own subjects in this fashion, how could foreign rulers be expected to trust him? The implication is that if internal tyranny reaches a certain degree of horror, it cannot be left out of calculation in international affairs.

The problem facing mankind, then, is a conflict between two duties — a duty to promote justice and a duty to preserve peace. The problem appears in so many and such varied forms and circumstances that if we search for a single formula to resolve all difficulties we shall be disappointed. We may make better progress if we examine some particular examples.

The exercise by the United Kingdom of colonial rule over Gibraltar, the Falkland Islands and a few other territories has been criticised in the United Nations as an example of unjustifiable colonialism, but the attempt by Argentina to alter the situation in the Falklands by force was rebuked by the Security Council. The Charter of the UN lays down the principle that in such circumstances the paramount consideration must be 'the interests of the inhabitants'. The UK points out that there is no doubt whatever that these territories want to remain British: to which the reply is made that the *wishes* of the inhabitants while they are under British rules are one thing, their long term *interests* may be another: the maintenance of a situation to which Argentina and Spain are irreconcilably opposed may prove to be contrary to everyone's interest. There is no way of proving or disproving this contention about interests: meanwhile, the present wishes of the inhabitants are well known and indisputable. The conclusion which all of us seem to have reached for the present is: none of the parties to the disputes should act in such a way as to exacerbate them; all parties should be prepared to go on discussing the dispute,

despite the fact that the United Kingdom maintains that sovereignty cannot be transferred while Argentina and Spain insist that it must be. To say that this is an illogical and messy solution is not an argument against it: on the contrary, it is the kind of solution which the world must often be ready to accept — to keep the peace and to hope that time and discussion may ultimately provide the generally agreeable solution which at present eludes us.

Let us look next at an example of wider scope and more explosive character. The Union of South Africa maintains that the different treatment which it accords in political and social matters to different groups of its citizens, according to their race, is a matter for its own internal jurisdiction. World opinion, however, has now come round to the view that the discrimination against black people is a legitimate matter of concern to all nations: and the demand for sanctions against South Africa becomes steadily more insistent. South African *apartheid* is not, of course, the only example in the world of racial discrimination: but there are few countries in which such discrimination has an established status in law. South Africa also attracts particular attention because of its power, and the size of its population, and its avowed intention that denial of full political rights to black people should be permanent. We have also to consider the relation between South Africa's problem and the largest of all world problems — the balance between the Communist Countries and the nations which belong to NATO. South African statesmen have argued that their country, and the maintenance of white supremacy in it, is a bulwark against Communism, and that Britain, the USA, and Western Europe should recognise this. The fact, however, is that as long as the NATO countries sympathise, or appear to sympathise with South Africa they are in danger of estranging the countries of the 'Third World' and encouraging those countries to make approaches to the Soviet Union.

South Africa's racialist philosophy does not only determine the way in which that country treats its own subjects: it produces also behaviour towards Namibia which defies the authority of the United Nations. There is, therefore, justification for the use of sanctions against South Africa. The question which the countries of the UN have to ask is whether such sanctions could be effectively organised and whether they would bring about a change in South African policy without an upheaval which would be more terrible than the continuance of *apartheid*. It is relevant to notice that in the last few years various types of boycott against South Africa have been increased, while at the same time the severities of *apartheid* have been reduced. It may be, therefore, that the right answer is not a sudden fanfare of unversal sanctions, but a gradual, increasing and unremitting pressure.

The South African Government and its apologists repeatedly argue that there is no reason why they should be singled out for hostile action since they are by no means the only government which denies political and civil rights to some, or even all, of its subjects. The same criticism

could be levelled against a number of African States, and more significantly, against the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. This proposition broadens the whole scope of the argument and obliges us to consider the whole nature of human government the world over.

There is no doubt that Soviet citizens who engage in criticism of their government, of a type which would be freely permitted in the West, can be and frequently are subjected to heavy penalties. Western Governments, and individuals, can contend that this situation is a defiance of human rights: but they are, of course, aware that the Soviet Government cannot relax its rigour in this field without exposing itself to great risks and calling into question the whole nature of the Soviet State and the Communist system of government. Defenders of the Communist system will maintain that the 'human rights' about which the West professes so much concern are only shadows, and that liberty and human rights really depend on the people's ownership of the means of production, which is guaranteed in a Communist State.

Communist argument may, indeed take the matter a stage further. Are there not some countries in which the private ownership of the means of production is concentrated in so few hands that the majority of the population enjoy no real liberty or 'human rights' at all? If the spokesmen of the West demand freedom of speech in Russia, are not Communists entitled to champion revolutionary movements in Central America? Indeed, the Soviet Government has repeatedly maintained that its duty not to interfere with the internal affairs of other states does not preclude it from helping those forces in other countries which are, in the Soviet view, working for progress and freedom. One is reminded of the declaration by the French First Republic, shortly after the Revolution, that it would seek to help, everywhere, people who were struggling to be free.

There is clearly no way of reconciling, in any permanent general way, East and West views of the matter. The periodic meetings held to discuss the progress of the Helsinki Agreement have become occasions for a recital by the West of the infringements of free speech in Communist countries. Various committees of the United Nations hear complaints of the tyranny of such governments as those of El Salvador and Haiti. In Poland we see a country where an attempt to establish a free trade union movement has failed, but where freedom as it is understood in the West can at least be advocated though not achieved. Meanwhile, the whole world scene is complicated by the mutual fears and strategic anxieties of the super-powers. Central America, Poland, Afghanistan and South Africa are centres of tension not merely because of arguments about freedom of speech, human rights, and national sovereignty, but because of the strategic importance of these areas.

However, in the absence of any general formula, are there any particular rules which nations — especially powerful nations — ought to observe if the world is to preserve that balance between peace and justice which Henry Kissinger rightly described and advocated?

First, it is surely incumbent on the Western nations, and those that share their attitude to democracy and human rights, to be jealous for their own good name in these respects — to search for and remove any forms of discrimination or infringements of freedom in their own dominions: without this they will not attract the support of that large section of the human race which is still not sure whether Communism or Democracy carries most promise for mankind.

Second, they should use to the full whatever international forum exists for promoting their own attitude to freedom. Britain and the USA were both ill-advised to desert UNESCO: profoundly unsatisfactory as it was, it was a platform.

Third, they must view with great suspicion anything that smacks of a 'crusade' — that is to say, an attempt to convert other people to their own belief by the use of force: and fourth, they must be prepared to defend at all costs the territories they now hold and the peoples who, in these territories, enjoy freedom and human rights. To take a clear example: the Western nations were right to defend West Berlin by organising an airlift and making clear their readiness to do all that was necessary: conversely, they would be criminally foolish to think of 'liberating' East Germany, however much we may reprehend the denials of liberty that are practised there.

The reader may feel that the whole approach of this article is remarkably un-heroic. He is invited to show respect for each nation's right to control its own affairs and at the same time to assert certain standards of behaviour which all nations ought to respect; and to try to reconcile these two attitudes as best he may in each particular case. He is invited to condemn racial discrimination and to take steps to get rid of it, but with caution. He is invited to praise human rights and to defend them; but to be careful about which steps he takes to extend them. However, in the fourth maxim set out above — the need to defend the 'free world' — there is surely enough scope for heroism. Carried beyond that point it would become self-destruction.

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1. Henry Kissinger: *The White House Years*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1979 — Page 70.

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[Michael Stewart was member of Parliament first for East Fulham and then for Fulham (1945-79). He held junior posts in Clement Attlee's 1945-51 Government. In Harold Wilson's Government of 1964-70 he was Secretary of State for, successively, Education, Foreign Affairs, Economic Affairs and Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. In 1979 he entered the House of Lords as Lord Stewart of Fulham: he speaks on international affairs and education. Books include *The British Approach to Politics* and an autobiography, *Life and Labour at Lisbon.*]

# HONG KONG AND THE PACIFIC BASIN

## by Paddy Ashdown, MP

THERE is a theory that the history of international relations is best described in terms of oceans. For the first 3 millenia international affairs were essentially Mediterranean and Adriatic; the middle years of the last century centered on the Indian Ocean; since the first World War it is the Atlantic which has dominated world affairs. If the analogy holds, we may now be moving into what future historians will look upon as the Pacific period.

This is, of course, a purely Eurocentric view of affairs. Far Eastern international affairs have always been Pacific based. Nevertheless there is a real case for considering the fact that world power is shifting and will continue to shift towards the Pacific Basin.

It was often said by my Victorian predecessors that 'Trade followed the flag'. In reality history shows matters the other way round, a fact for which Hong Kong itself is elegant proof.

International political power has, in practise, always developed as a function of commercial strength. And it is in terms of growing commercial strength that the nations of the Pacific basin are showing their importance for the future.

The figures are startling. Whilst world GDP has grown 14 times since 1950, the GDP of China and New Zealand has increased 25 times, that of Australia 33 times, that of Hong Kong 53 times, that of Korea 100 times, and that of Japan 148 times in the same period. Singapore's GDP has increased 10 fold in the last decade alone.

Similar figures show up in percentages of world trade, with Hong Kong's share, along with that of Malaysia, up 50% in the same period, Japan's share doubling and South Korea and Taiwans share increasing 5 fold. All this, when Britain's share of world trade halved. The major nations of the Western Pacific rim now enjoy ⅛th of all the worlds trade, having increased their share by almost ⅓rd in the last decade and by a factor of 2 since 1950. And these figures do not include the astonishing growth of industrial and trading power of California and the other Pacific seaboard states of America. But if trade and commerce comes first, and political power second, then the nations of the Pacific basin are clearly in the early stage of the process.

A good judge of political power in the international field is the amount of money a nation feels it necessary to spend on defence. In terms of percentage of GDP, many of the key Pacific basin nations have actually reduced defence spending in the last decade, the most marked being Indonesia (down 40%) and the Philippines (down ⅓rd). Only Malaysia of the major far eastern nations has markedly increased the percentage of GDP it spends on defence.

Perhaps we can draw from this the conclusion that the Pacific Basin is becoming a centre of world power, but hasn't recognised it yet. This

is bound to change and how it changes will be a matter of the greatest significance for the rest of the world. Already we are seeing a subtle shift in the attitude of Western Europe's principal ally, the United States as a result of the growing importance of the Pacific area. This is not just a function of the fact that we have a Californian in the White House. The whole industrial centre of gravity of the US is shifting to the Pacific states of the Union and away from the Atlantic ones — and for a businessman or a politician in San Francisco or Los Angeles, the nature of US relations with Manila and Tokyo are, frankly, just as important as those with London and Bonn. Indeed there is now growing in the United States a view, held only by a minority at present (though some are high up in the present administration), that Europe is feckless, effete and of no further use; that America's real future lies in the Pacific, not the Atlantic. All this is not helped by a view in Europe, again happily a minority one, which regards the United States not as a friend and ally, but as a source of threat to us as worrying as that from the Soviet Union.

We in Europe are now slowly becoming attuned to the fact that, whilst the Atlantic relationship is not, hopefully, in real danger of being broken, we can no longer expect to enjoy the old exclusive and 'special' relationship with the Americans which we had in the past. The US is turning, turns its attention more and more to the Pacific — a clear, and for Europeans painful, early sign, of the emerging importance of the Pacific nations of which I have spoken. But our problems are minor in comparison to the importance of a greater question — if the Pacific basin is to be a new centre of world power, what will its nature be? What will the most common political structure be — democratic or totalitarian? Or some pragmatic mix of both? What will the dominant commercial system be — capitalist or state planned — or a synthesis of the two? What will the prevailing mood be — that of confrontation or co-operation?

Above all what role will the emerging Pacific powers play on the international scene and how will the rest of us have to change to accommodate this?

In a real sense, what happens in Hong Kong may be a touchstone to answering those questions. Here we have, being worked out under our eyes between now and 1997, the meeting of the opposites. It may be that the solution we are struggling to achieve in Hong Kong will produce a new Pacific variant of the old European systems — a resolution to the old problems which, at great cost of blood and turmoil, have proved so irresolvable in Europe and the old world.

There are those who claim that the PRC may be using Hong Kong as a role model for the solution of the Taiwan problem. It may be a signpost for much more than that. If the transition of Hong Kong is seen to work then it could make the bridge to bring together two so far irreconcilable systems in a way which transfers to each side some of the benefits and a good deal of the knowldege of the other; it could also establish a pattern for the resolution of problems in the region which we might all be grateful for in the future; especially we in Europe whose record in such matters is

so lamentable.

If, however, the Hong Kong experiment is seen to fail through turbulence, economic catastrophe, oppression, or more likely a conjunction of all three, then that failure will have far reaching consequences for the region as a whole. We will have re-affirmed, in this new area, the old European antagonisms; we will have re-established competing political and economic systems; and we will have re-enforced the climate of conflict which has prevailed in Europe and which has so blighted this century.

Hong Kong has always provided a two way window to see into and out from China. It may now have a new role, to provide a door-way into the future so far as this region is concerned. And more than that.

The world has been caught this last 40 years in the intractable conflict between the super powers. We in Europe, by which I mean both East to West, have been squeezed between the two sides of the super power nutcracker — we have been trapped in the tunnel of the East/West confrontation. Elsewhere in the world the super power conflict, unable to resolve itself in Europe because of the nuclear stalemate, has been fought out by proxy on other peoples' territory. Europe is now becoming increasingly concerned to break out of this old myopia and develop our own identity and a degree of independence of action outside the superpower conflict. The world, too would be a safer place if we could all escape the dominance of the US/USSR confrontation. The development of a new power centre in the Pacific, which refuses to align itself with either side and will not be a theatre for conflict by proxy, could break the deadly stalemate. If the nature of Hong Kong could be decisive in determining the nature of the emerging shape of the Pacific area, the new shape of this area will also be decisive in determining the new pattern of world affairs.

For Europe, success in breaking out of the entrapment of East/West conflict will depend crucially on establishing alternative and independent links with other areas outside the Atlantic axis. The key ones could well be with China and the nations of the Pacific Basin. For us, therefore, what happens here is of crucial importance.

It is not easy to understand why the Western free, democratic community is not taking more notice of what is going on in Hong Kong between now and 1997. The Sino British Agreement was good enough as far as it went; but we could have gone much further. My own discussion with PRC officials has led me to believe that they would have been perfectly happy to see us do more to provide some long term insurance policy for BDTC passport holders if this helped to reassure and create stability over the period. Britain could not have done this alone, of course, but we could have at least investigated the possibility of an international plan to do it. Such a plan which would, in my view, be very unlikely to be called upon, would have reassured the population of Hong Kong and thus helped stability. More importantly, however, it would have provided a wider international dimension to the Agreement and expressed the commitment of the international community to the success of the Hong

Kong experiment in a way which would have been advantageous to all three parties most closely involved.

Similarly, could we not have done more to assure the stability of the local economy in an increasingly volatile world economic climate? Maybe the answer to this is 'no'. But we still need to ask ourselves whether, in view of the importance of the Hong Kong experiment, we would actually stand by and watch the whole project flounder because of a caprice of the international money system. The amount of money now hurtling around the world money-go-round has grown 100 fold since 1976 — with volumes changing hands every 24 hours equivalent to three times the annual GDP of Great Britain. The money-changers, accountable to no-one, nevertheless have immense power to de-stabilise — what if they tried it on Hong Kong? Who would stand by you? Britain clearly will not after 1997 and probably cannot or would not even now.

There can be no doubt that the Peoples' Republic of China values will increasingly value Hong Kong as an economic institution. There will doubtless be some changes to the economic framework of the colony to take into account the new situation after 1997. But it must surely be the case that the PRC will not wish to threaten Hong Kong's role as an *entrepot*, financial exchange and provider of services for the mainland. We can, therefore, probably expect the Chinese Government to take some action to protect the status quo if the economy of Hong Kong is threatened — though how far this would go is open to question.

What is less fully realised, however, is Hong Kong's importance within the larger context of the region. The expanding commercial and trading power of the Western Pacific area will need to be provided with financial services — although Tokyo will always be a major source of these, Hong Kong's role as a secondary provider will still be crucial — after all, Europe needs the Paris Bourse as well as the London Stock Exchange.

In a strange way, Hong Kong's role in the region may well be similar to that of the 14th century Hanseatic City states of Europe, such as Hamburg and Bremen — always subject to a greater power, but so essential to the economy of the whole region and to most parties in it, as to be permitted a hybrid existence and special independence.

Whilst the process of economic metamorphosis may be difficult and delicate, it will be easy in comparison to the political changes which are now in prospect. Inevitably, the drive to make money or preserve prosperity will provide good reasons for adapting to change, especially in Hong Kong, where the skill of making profit in changing circumstances has been elevated to a high art. I have no doubt that, given a reasonable run of luck and a little help from its friends, Hong Kong will economically adapt and survive — indeed prosper.

I am much less certain about political changes. Here there is neither the incentive to get it right, nor the past experience to know how to do it. Nor, indeed, will we have a tangible method of measuring progress or identifying where we are going wrong. We in the House of Commons tend to take for granted our one thousand years of experience of the

democratic process and arrogantly assume as self-evident the supremacy of our form of democracy over all alternatives, in all situations. In fact, the British parliamentary democratic system is now far from perfect, even for our own country — as I, a member of a 'Third Party', so monstrously under-represented in the House of Commons, know only too well. In practise, democracy in Europe is under challenge from increasingly powerful pressure groups such as CND, Greenpeace etc who, having found the formal system too insensitive and unresponsive, have moved outside the democratic structure and onto the streets to make their point. I should be very chary indeed about exporting such a system, warts and all, lock stock and barrel to anywhere else, let alone somewhere as delicately positioned as Hong Kong.

As we have recently seen, the issue of democracy is a very sensitive one indeed — and rightly so, too for we cannot afford to get it wrong. My purist Liberal colleagues will not thank me for saying it, but it will be best to make haste slowly and cautiously. Lydia Dunn has recently said that creating a consensus may be more important than achieving pure democracy. In a fascinating and pungently expressed speech to the Hong Kong Management Association Seminar in September, John Walden similarly suggested that what we wanted was accountability first and then, maybe, democracy later. These are interesting ideas which, who knows, might give rise to a 'Pacific' variant of the old European shibboleths. The key will be to move pragmatically, not ideologically, taking account of the sensibilities of the larger forces looking over our shoulders, whilst matching the special needs of the community of Hong Kong itself.

Turning from the microcosm to the macrocosm, the future shape of the Pacific basin area, its institutions, its political climate and its role in the world will be formed by the conjunction of three major forces — Japan, China, and the US. The violent clash of nations in the European and Atlantic eras have been between nations with almost everything in common. We all had the same culture, background and, for the most part, institutions. It was not for nothing that Mao Tse Tung referred to the two great wars of this century, not as World Wars in our arrogant phrase but, more accurately, as European Civil Wars — so perhaps also accounting for their ferocity (civil wars are always more brutal and terrible than external ones).

But if the Atlantic era was dominated by the clash of the similar, the Pacific one will be formed by the conjunction of opposites. Indeed it would scarcely be possible to get more dissimilar nations than the US, China and Japan. Two Oriental and one European; two free markets and one state planned; two continental states and one island; two 20th century powers and one very ancient one. Any way you play the changes, you end up with different ingredients in different combinations; but each is separate, distinct and, in its own way, a world leader. It looks like a recipe for conflict, but may be just the opposite. Much will again depend on the extent that we are able to deal in pragmatism not ideology.

It will be essential to get the US so economically locked into the area

that there will be powerful reasons against her capriciously risking the disturbance of the *status quo* for a passing advantage in the play of world politics. It is a good sign that the level of US investment in Hong Kong stayed high and rising, when others were withdrawing theirs, in the period of maximum uncertainty before the Agreement was signed. Paradoxically the US experience in Vietnam may, in retrospect, produce a knowledge of regional realities and an instinct for caution which will be valuable in the future.

On the other side of the divide, it is also a question of locking in — only in this case our effort must be to draw the PRC into international politics, rather than regional economics. China has a major part to play in world affairs and the more she is encouraged to do so the better for all of us in general and for the stability of the region in particular. In this process the outcome of the Sino-British Agreement, which has the standing of an international treaty, will be important. Success will enhance China's standing and confidence in international affairs — failure will have the opposite effect.

And what happens when Japan converts economic power into political action? Sooner or later this must occur again. My fear is that, as before, Japan will become actively involved in world politics in order to relieve impossible pressures generated by our developed world attempts to restrict her trade. Japan is having to cope to-day with the problems of too much success in trade, which the rest of the region will have to face tomorrow. Indeed Hong Kong has already had to deal with similar difficulties over, the MFA negotiations. How will this change after 1997? The character of the region, in particular its relations with the rest of the world could well be considerably influenced by the way that the world trading patterns change to accommodate the new facts of Pacific economic power of which Japan and Hong Kong are only two examples.

I have deliberately asked questions — not provided answers. That is easily explained — I don't know the answers. What I do know is that Hong Kong features as a key ingredient in each of the key questions which now confront us.

What is now happening in Hong Kong is, therefore, vital not only for Hong Kong and the Peoples Republic, but for the region and for the new shape of world relations too. Hong Kong is, perhaps, a bridge, a role model for the way the region will develop in the future. If world power is moving to center around a new ocean, then what happens here may be a considerable factor in deciding whether the era of the Pacific Ocean is Pacific not just in name but in nature too.

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The above article is in part devised from a lecture given in Hong Kong in December 1985.

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[Paddy Ashdown is Liberal Member of Parliament for Yeovil.]

# WESTLAND WATERGATE?

## by Paul Rose

THERE are those who have compared the Westland Saga to Watergate. It may have resulted in the chopper for a crusading Michael Heseltine and a sudden end to Leon Brittan's ambitions but it is more likely to be seen as a Watershed than a Watergate for Mrs. Thatcher. Water Boards are now another scene of conflict as two themes emerge from the internicine strife and restiveness in the Conservative camp. One is the desire to retain a specifically British industrial base within the European context and the other is the ideological versus the pragmatic approach to privatisation. In these divisions there is a marked similarity of personnel to the Dry versus Wets argument over unemployment, the figures for which brought even more bad news to Mrs. Thatcher's beleaguered supporters in the wake of the Westland wrangle.

Disasters rarely come in pairs and the inept proposal to sell out British Leyland was swiftly shelved by Mr. Brittan's successor, Mr Channon, after the horrified reaction of everyone from Fleet Street (or Wapping) to Tory backbenchers. Nevertheless, certain sectors are at risk and here again the issue related to an American multinational takeover. If the rationale for joining the EEC was largely promoted in terms of pooling technology along with sovereignty, the arguments put forward by Michael Heseltine must carry a great deal of weight with 'Europeans'. By the same token, the Channel Tunnel is an anathema to the Little Englanders as well as those concerned for the Kent countryside and Sealink. Personally, I do not see why the Hovercraft and Ferry cannot be made more attractive; and they are flexible in respect of destinations. Nor is there a conflict in expenditure, if we are to believe Mrs. Thatcher, since the project is to be privately financed.

The curious nature of politics is underlined by the willingness of Monetarist Margaret to give a plug to Mitterand's Socialists in the run-up to their election campaign. However, returning to Westland, there is little doubt that just as the Falklands Factor torpedoed the opposition in a wave of post-Imperial patriotism, the credibility of Mrs. Thatcher herself and her quasi-presidential style of premiership has been severely undermined. So much has been written that, as with groundnuts or Profumo, it will take a substantial time and a supreme effort on the part of the Conservative Party to undo the damage. It has, however, had the immediate result of responsiveness to public, press and political opinion in relation to British Leyland; it has opened the way for public debate at the highest level in the governing party; most importantly, I believe that it will go a long way to restoring a consensus approach to Cabinet meetings.

Quite clearly, divisions have opened up between the 'caring capitalism' of Heseltine, Walker and the Wets and one speculates on the power that Mr. Pym may gain if the polls continue to show the Tories in third place.

It has opened up a whole new debate on the relationship of civil servants to their ministers and other departments. Even the Right Honourable James Callaghan — who, readers may recall, was Labour's last Prime Minister — has belatedly come round to the view that the Official Secrets Act should be scrapped. It has for years been a nonsense but Sarah Tisdale served her time in Holloway for acting on conscience while others, acting on dishonest ministerial dictat, have been immune. Ponting was more fortunate in his jury while Leon Brittan's protector at number 10 made the supreme sacrifice of laying down his political life to save her own. The whole affair was so sordid and lacked the credibility which hitherto had been a major asset to Mrs. Thatcher, that public opinion swung violently away from her as quickly as it had rallied to her in the days of Goose Green.

What must not be forgotten however, is that the Government is in mid-term. After Crosby during the last Parliament its fortunes looked similarly bleak, when the Alliance broke upon the political scene. Nevertheless, on the more solid basis of local Elections there is a clear pattern of Alliance gains, primarily at the expense of the Tories, while Labour's pattern is a net standstill and, with all its solidity in its bastions, its internal contradictions have only temporarily been overshadowed by the rotating blades of Westland helicopters. Kinnock & Co. have been as pragmatic as previous leaders and have accepted that the British public want realistic answers to immediate problems. Socialism has been shelved and many of the faithful will raise hell about this as they see Red Ken turning pink for a Parliamentary Election in which a respected sitting member may spoil his chances. The cry of Witch Hunt is raised as Militants are unceremoniously bundled out of the party, only to seek the protection of that instrument of the decadent establishment — the High Court. Politics has indeed its ironies.

Thus, as the Wets are joined by the moderate tones of John Biffen, the hardliners will group around Norman Tebbit and spurious displays of unity will cover divisions formerly reserved for the annual or more frequent slanging matches that made the Labour Party so much more interesting to newspapers covering sex, violence and verbal bloodsports. There are signs that the latest dramatic increase in unemployment and in inner city tensions have made their mark and the police have been taking a battering from the media over incidents almost solely confined to these areas. Indeed, extrapolating from personal experience I find a completely different atmosphere between police and public, finding mutual respect and trust as soon as I leave the Metropolitan area. A visit to some Courts in areas of high deprivation will reveal a corresponding mistrust and polarisation. Government and private investment, more emphasis on self help for ethnic minorities and greater sensitivity in policing, with a complaints procedure that commands public confidence, are in the interests of the whole of society.

Meanwhile, polarisation on a limited scale of the sort we saw during the miners' strike has occurred in the wake of the wholesale transfer of

staff and equipment from Fleet Street to Wapping and the consequent isolation of the old craft unions. Having long supported the concept of industrial unions I can only feel a sense of sorrow that the refusal of the Chapel Fathers (an illustration of the worthy but outmoded print unions) to move with the times, or indeed *The Times,* has led to some of the finest workers in British industry, who built up the fortunes of a man like Rupert Murdoch, being left stranded with neither redundancy payments nor compensation; while the opportunist but realistic Electricians have left their brother trade unionist in the cold. Change had to come and the same disease of confrontation rather than consensus that afflicts British industrial and political life has produced more profitable newspapers and more human misery. The two need not go together if reasonable men and women come to terms with modern technology and employers and employees see themselves as partners in an enterprise. Such concepts have been rejected by most industrialists and unions but, thanks to the advance of the Alliance, the concept of co-determination may well become as fashionable as the perennial argument over the limits of private and public ownership.

Thus, it is likely that the privatisation of water, if it happens at all, will be confined to certain profitable Boards. The accusation that the Government is selling the family silver, especially to 'foreigners', is balanced by the wider spread of shares and home ownership. It is so, however, within a context of the very rich becoming relatively richer and the very poor becoming poorer. This move away from the One Nation concept is also geographical; and the impact of the Alliance on the southern conscience must give greater force to the voices of Conservatives in the less dry category. By the same token, Mr. Kinnock and his colleagues recognise — as indeed do the Eurocommunists — that Society is quite different from the one seen by the warped vision of that longtime professional revolutionary, the other Red Ted in Lambeth, or the incongruous figure of Mr. Hatton in Liverpool, a Militant who appears unconcerned about the plight of blacks, women, or indeed other minority under-privileged groups in a philistine, white male, socialist utopia which the National Front itself might not find too distasteful. Never was there a time that I can remember when the fabric of a caring, tolerant society was challenged from so many diverse quarters. The question that Yeats might well ask today is whether the centre will hold. All the evidence is that it will, if it has the guts and intelligent leadership that embraces every statesman from Healey through Heath via the two Davids.

Certainly, the centre has not held in Ulster where rampant Unionists face an inescapable paradox. In their desire to display their Britishness they challenge the legitimacy of the Government of the UK in the Anglo-Irish agreement. Their inability to compromise is perhaps more dangerous than the threat posed by IRA violence upon which they feed. The success of the SDLP in taking another seat would have been trebled, were it not for Sinn Fein. There, the centre has not held and one wonders whether future British Governments will wish to go on subsidising this unruly

province whose elected representatives look increasingly like mutineers and where so-called loyalists manhandle Conservative Ministers. Perhaps this is another example of group failure to come to terms with the realities of the modern world.

Our EEC complications are added to by the less developed Spain, albeit rectifying the Parliamentary imbalance with a shot in the arm for European social democracy and the demand for greater democracy. The Danes could force the Community backwards but the veto ought to be reserved for fundamental constitutional issues if the concept of the Community is not to be lost in the sterility of outmoded national selfishness. By the same token, the Community would enhance its prestige throughout the world if the mountains of grain were released to those in need, and narrow political vote-catching from the farming community was modified by a regard for the social needs of declining areas, allied to the world perspective.

However, it is not from Europe that the great stories have been flowing into the columns of the press and the horrific episodes upon our television screens. Gorbachov and Reagan chatting like old school buddies and Scharansky embracing his wife, smiling broadly, have relieved the general horror and given hope to millions. Mounds of bones in Uganda; killing after killing in an increasingly embattled and isolated South Africa, heroic rescues from bloody civil war in the Yemen; members of the dreaded Ton-Ton Macoute stoned to death in ill-fated Haiti, the farce of the Philippines election as yet another of the US's unsavoury clients clung on to power and privilege — the mirror image of mock elections in Poland; these are the images that rush into the mind as the poor and homeless in Mexico and Columbia survive after tragedies that were mainly made by nature albeit added to by man.

Thus, we watched in fascinated horror as seven fellow human beings were consumed in a catastrophic fire ball as we looked outward to space. And it is in space that our destiny may be settled; for the insistence on the star wars programme and the Soviet reaction is the key which may lock us in mortal combat or unlock the door to a new dawn for mankind. When the dust has settled after Westland and the fate of Marcos is decided, the gestures of Gorbachov and the response of Reagan, influenced by their own national needs, could be modified by a Europe which, if it speaks with one voice, could influence the super powers. That is why I am, like Michael Heseltine, saddened at the long term implications of the Westland deal. I am now less concerned with the incredible stupidity of Government secrecy which I have criticised for years and which played a major part in my decision to leave Westminster in 1979. In retrospect, with the rise of the select committees and a new campaign for freedom of information, these may be more fruitful times for a backbencher. But we are still a long way from Parliamentary control of the executive, as far away as ever from penetrating the fortress of Home Office bloody mindedness and only a few inches nearer to the European idea.

# SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIAL PROBLEMS

## by Colin Style

JAN Smuts was once asked: What is the solution to the racial problem in South Africa? He brusquely replied that there *was* no problem since every problem entails a solution. This piece of persiflage was, of course, Smuts's metaphor for its enormity. And to put the question in its correct form requires some emendation—what is the solution to the racial problem in South Africa that is satisfactory to all races? Apartheid is a solution, but one that only the whites can live with. Total surrender to the black majority is also a solution; except that a great many whites would rather die first. If the whites were only a small minority then history would have to take its course, as in the case of Rhodesia, where whites there never constituted more than 3% of the population. However, white South Africans constitute about 20% of the population and hold the monopoly of power and skills. Also, they have been tending to maintain the population ratios, augmented by immigration. Something like 50,000 Britons have migrated to South Africa over the past four or five years.

It is the sort of situation that encourages a paucity of outlook, a contradictory blend of uneasiness and complacency. The formidable strength of the South African army is a comfort. However, military strength is only meaningful in the context of protecting a viable nation state. The army cannot compensate when civil life starts to disintegrate.

In the baffling South African log-jam there is, I believe, a 'solution.' In fact, it is one that might eventuate without long-term planning. Planned for, it might avoid much bloodshed and desolation; but, unfortunately, it is one that the whites would reject out of hand at the present time. The irony is that it entails pursuing apartheid to its logical conclusion. In theory, apartheid, in its bare sense of meaning separate development of the races, is blameless provided all races agree to it. The moral obliquity of the system lies in the whites having too great a share of the cake and in impoverishing and suppressing the black majority. What I think might happen will come as a result of a bloody stalemate. This is the emergence of a type of federation. The black areas of rule will be the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and Zululand; the whites areas, that of the Cape Province and Natal. Whites will be vitally necessary to the economy of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, but those living there will have to bow to black rule. It is a wrench, since it implies surrendering the goldmines—but is not Johannesburg a black city already? In return for white management of the mines, there could be a division of mining profits between black and white South Africa.

This drastic carve-up will at least ensure the survival of the whites in their new nation state. It will satisfy black aspirations to rule themselves and share in the country's wealth. It is a division that reflects something of existing population dispositions. The whites actually outnumber the blacks in the Cape. The new South African constitution provides separate chambers for Indians and Coloureds, and the Coloureds are mainly centred in

the Cape and the Indians in Natal. So it is natural that they should be incorporated into the new white state without, however, being subjected to the present apartheid paraphernalia.

As the coming conflict in South Africa escalates, the present population dispositions could be confirmed as the whites start drifting into the safer area of the Cape where they are more numerous. It is a grim scenario, but it is better than having nothing. The consolation is that they will make their new, truncated nation state flower. For the Afrikaner, it will represent a Great Trek in reverse back to his roots.

I once wrote to the late Arnold Toynbee asking for his prognostications on South Africa. His view was highly pessimistic, seeing an end where the whites are totally overthrown and expelled. He picked two historical precedents. Firstly, that of the Assyrians. Even their policy of calculated frightfulness could not prevent them being swamped and destroyed. His other was *élitist* Sparta, overwhelmed, eventually by the majority Helots.

This sort of *dénouement* will not occur, I believe, because, after years of conflict, the whites will still have enough aces to force an accommodation. Similarly, blacks will have forced whites to acknowledge their rights.

It all raises the old question: why can't solutions be achieved before black and white fight each other to a standstill and the country becomes a shambles? Alas, pious pleas get nowhere. Power cannot be shared and divided. Those who hold power will keep it for as long as they can, and those seeking it will strive for it as long as they have to—or can. The countdown to majority rule in next-door Rhodesia demonstrates the uselessness of moderation and reason. It provides a blueprint on how South Africa will be doing it the hard way. Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Rhodesia in 1961, promulgated a constitution with a qualitative franchise. He envisaged a fifteen year evolution to majority rule. During this period, black education would be vastly expanded, white privilege dismantled, and a black middle class created. In 1976, the whites would hand over a prosperous, stable Zimbabwe in a liberal democracy where the whites would have a real place. But neither the whites nor the blacks would have any of it. The blacks rejected any transitional period. The whites wanted to perpetuate the privileged system. Sir Edgar was defeated at the polls as the whites turned to Ian Smith and UDI. The result: handover in 1980 after an eight year escalating war.

It is interesting to speculate whether Botha could be replaced if he pursues a policy of gradualism. Not that it makes any difference to the predicted final result: long war, stalemate, and a federal accommodation in a new era. Not, I fear, the end of the story. It will end the acute deadlock but probably presage a long period of grumbling, low-key crisis, rather similar to Ulster. The end result of this strains the powers of prophecy.

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[Colin Style has recently completed a history of Zimbabwean Literature for BBC3.]

# A POOR DEAL FOR THE PENSIONER

## by G. W. Stevenson, MEP

IT may come as a surprise to many people in the United Kingdom that the EEC is, daily, producing policy and taking decisions that will affect in some degree all our lives and that of our families. The degree of influence will, undoubtedly, vary but nevertheless it is happening. Regulations and Directives covering almost everything from public transport, the environment, working conditions and, in some cases, pay, are but a few examples. The European Parliament is subsequently involved in this process that covers major areas of our economic, industrial and social activities and records its opinion which is then given to the Commission and Council of Ministers who, ultimately, decide.

This reflects a growing recognition that major problems are more likely to be solved by addressing them on an international basis. High technology and developments in space are examples; but whilst these major issues which are regularly in the public's attention and rightly portrayed as vital to our future, are important, many less glamorous issues are being raised and debated at European level. I believe we are becoming increasingly aware that such matters as social provision, problems faced by minority groups in our society, together with the elderly and disabled, should also be seriously considered in their international and, certainly, European context.

Many believe — and I am one of these — that the degree of importance afforded to such issues reflect the values and basis of society. We all have a responsibility which transcends national boundaries to learn from and to influence widely disparate attitudes. If we believe that we should measure our society in the United Kingdom by the priority we give to the problems of the disadvantaged, then surely that philosophy should govern our international relationships which presumes that dimension must be part of any progressive action. I would wish to highlight this point by concentrating on requirements of the elderly and disabled and, in particular, a report submitted to the European Parliament concerning retirement provision and special facilities that the report urges the EEC to support as part of a policy devised to regenerate the economy in depressed regions of the Community. These proposals are described in the Report as 'settlements for the elderly and infirm'.

Increased mobility available through modern transport services and wider holiday provision — especially abroad — are proving more and more popular and this is reflected in the rising interest shown by the elderly and disabled. This increased mobility, particularly at international level, has provided the vast majority with opportunities undreamed of a relatively few years ago. Although these wider horizons have been available to the elderly and disabled mainly through the growth of off-peak and organised holidays, it has by no means been sufficient. Therefore, the already unacceptable gap of opportunity has tended to grow and

not keep pace with the proportion of elderly in the community.

There is now in excess of one million more people of pensionable age in the United Kingdom alone than 10 years ago and in 1982 some 18% of the population were over normal retirement age. This is, of course, only one aspect albeit an important one of the more fundamental issue of social provision and opportunities for these particular groups. But this situation and, indeed, the more fundamental aspects, should be examined on two broad fronts. National governments must be prepared to give far greater priority to the needs and resources available to the elderly and disabled. This national objective and argument must be pursued at international level. Facilities and attitudes are not only relevant at home. If opportunity is to be extended with greater mobility, and overseas holidays and tourism are to become a reality to these groups, then we must seek to build on the best practices and provisions in Europe. Active all-Party pressure has been established in the European Parliament which is seeking international co-operation, harmonised and improved provision and Commission initiatives that will encourage increased awareness and which are designed to promote improved facilities. Any such measures as may, finally, emerge will depend upon the necessary resources being available and these must be additional to national funds and not a substitute.

The success or otherwise of this twin national/EEC approach must to a large extent depend on continued pressure on the relevant authorities. This pressure should continue to be based on well-researched practical measures and initiatives. Convincing national governments is vital to this process — without their enthusiastic involvement any EEC initiative is doomed to failure. I would also suggest that well-meaning and, no doubt, sincere initiatives unless well thought through run a high risk of being counter-productive. Unfortunately, such a proposal is now being promoted and, in fact, has received majority support in the European Parliament by a member from Greece.

The proposal urges the establishment of retirement settlements for the elderly and infirm which would be segregated, inevitably exclusive, and very expensive to provide for and operate. Before dealing in more detail with the proposals, I would suggest that the Report confronts us with a basic principle of general policy. Although the main motivation behind the Report is a desire to stimulate economic activity in the less-developed regions of the Community (i.e. Greece, parts of Italy and Spain) by establishing comprehensive facilities to attract the elderly is understandable, the method proposed is in my view unacceptable and I suspect will be to the majority of elderly and disabled.

The basic notion that elderly and/or handicapped persons should seek or, by some policy designed to promote economic growth and activity, be encouraged towards separation and segregation and, as a result, become cocooned in isolated, specially-provided communities is socially regressive and should be rejected.

I am not suggesting that special problems do not exist for the elderly and handicapped that require provision and facilities accordingly, but I

am equally convinced that society should and must develop policies based on a process of integration wherever possible and not segregation. Far too often we see these groups as being each in their own way as one group. There are, in fact, many groups of elderly and handicapped whose needs can be very different. These differing needs to promote development of potential can best be attained by maximising contact with the mainstream of society supported by much-improved health care and specialist expertise.

The importance of this issue is widening. Growing numbers of people are living to over 75 years of age and improved health and greater physical mobility are prime factors. National governments in co-operation with the EEC must plan for the situation, otherwise the 50 million elderly within the EEC will feel an increasing sense of alienation.

A minimum and much-improved basic pension and benefit provision is vital to this process. The ability to take advantage of much increased opportunities is directly related in this particular context to the resources being available. Many elderly and disabled people do not understand the wide variations of benefit provision in the EEC Member States, especially when the United Kingdom in many comparisons appear low down the league of overall provision.

The European Parliament will, in the near future, be considering such initiatives as equalising retirement age of men and women. The recent case brought before the European Court which held discrimination on this issue as wrong has added importance to this matter. Flexible and earlier retirement must also be considered alongside the general issue of discriminatory retirement provision.

Any multi-national approach to these issues must have, as a prerequisite, comparable conditions of income and facilities. Travel, tourism and holidays is an area that should be promoted and availability to the retired and disabled of these activities must be examined in the context of growing demand. The Transport Committee of the European Parliament has taken the initiative and is preparing a detailed Report of problems faced by the elderly and disabled in these areas. These steps and others are welcomed and should be seen as part of an on-going process. Progress has been slow and, perhaps, this reflects a continued lethargic approach by society in general. Nevertheless, well thought out plans can be useful not only to improve actual facilities but in positively influencing attitudes.

It is this very progress, fragile as it may be, that could be jeopardised by the Report that seeks to establish retirement settlements in the EEC, however well-intentioned.

The increased use of areas of the world such as Florida in the United States and the south of England by retired people to live in are cited as examples of this principle in operation. Whilst it is true that retired people have chosen to live in these areas, two points should be noted. Both areas are, basically, mixed and have widely based communities but for a number of reasons — climate for example — have attracted elderly and disabled people to live in them. Secondly, only a tiny minority of pensioners is able

to afford to take advantage of these opportunities. The settlement proposed in the Report would be very different.

Special communities would have to be built incorporating houses, shops medical and social facilities. They would be sited away from the main centres of population. Not glorified holiday camps but whole communities of elderly and disabled people would be created. A sort of geriatric phoenix rising from the ashes of economic depression. Exclusivity would, clearly, be established. Being sited away from the main population centres would ensure this and would mean a large degree of isolation. Some people may welcome isolation. However, isolation seeking some form of serenity is one thing; isolation which leads to insularity in an environment of separatism devoid of the richness of life that contact with society can provide, may result in an overpowering sense of depression and resignation.

The Greek member who initiated and presented the Report was aware of and sensitive to this controversial aspect surrounding the issue. Indeed, a section of his Report specifically points to the need for care being taken to avoid such settlements being perceived as 'ghettos'. Although this observation is made in the Report, no indication whatsoever is given or practical measures suggested which would avoid such a horrendous prospect. When exclusivity is the central attraction for disadvantaged groups in society, the 'ghetto' mentality will, inevitably, develop.

Perhaps a much greater danger inherent in the logic that proposes such separatist measures does not lie in the numbers of people who may be in a position to use the facilities which, I believe, will be relatively small, but the potential presented for society to bury itself in a mentality of insularity. Incredible, you may say. Impossible — it will never happen. The European Parliament representing twelve nations and 320 million people has approved the Report which will now be presented to the EEC Commission. It is in these circumstances that such regressive logic can gain a further foothold.

We must now consider the question of 'who pays'. Where is the finance to come from to construct such settlements? Massive amounts of capital would be required to establish what, in effect, would be 'specialist new towns' in areas of regions that would be devoid of any previous development and, therefore, require comprehensive infrastructure. Although no attempt has been made specifically to identify sites which may be suitable or to estimate costs, it is made clear in the proposals that private capital would provide the bulk of the finance. It is proposed that public capital from EEC structural funds should also be made available.

To attract private investment, the proposed settlements would have to be large enough, not only to be viable, but to generate economic activity in the depressed regions selected. Otherwise, the objectives would be unattainable. The reality is that if all the structural funds were used I doubt there would be sufficient to provide one such project. This would also ignore other priorities and projects that depend on the EEC structural funding for existence. This point seems to have been completely ignored

by the protagonists of the developments.

My previously expressed concern about exclusivity, segregation and isolation is enlarged by sections of the Report that, quite blatantly, promote social and economic divisions.

The prerequisite for private capital assumes a profitable return on investment. Retirement settlements would have to be run on a completely commercial basis. This requirement forces the author of the proposal to admit that facilities in the settlements would only be available to those retired people who are 'prosperous and relatively wealthy'. It is not clear what is meant in this context by 'relatively wealthy' but I am quite certain that the vast majority of elderly and disabled people would not fall into this category. Thus, a situation of exclusivity would be added to social division, based on economic selection. My view is that most elderly and disabled people would not be attracted to such projects based on unacceptable principles — even if they could afford such luxuries. They will treat these proposals with indignation and, quite rightly, wonder why the EEC is not paying more attention to real and immediate concerns.

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[George W. Stevenson is Labour Member of the European Parliament for Staffordshire East.]

The May issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Through Armed Struggle to the Negotiating Table* by Prince Norodom of Sihanouk in conversation with Dr. Cedomir Vucovic, *Keeping the Wheels of Development Turning* by J. B. Wood, *A British Dilemma* by James Avery Joyce and *Forty Years of Modern Art 1945-85* by Muriel Julius.

# CRISIS IN THE PRISONS

## by Robert Maclennan, M.P.

THE time cannot be far distant when prisoners in this country will seek redress under the European Convention on Human Rights for the degrading treatment and punishment to which they are undoubtedly subjected as a result of overcrowding and insanitary conditions.

Within the prison system, conditions vary greatly from one establishment to another, but particularly in local institutions and institutions holding prisoners on remand there is gross overcrowding, with about one-third of these prisoners required to spend most of the twenty-four hours of the day locked up three to a cell.

The particularly sharp rise in the numbers of prisoners on remand, by 5,000 in the first ten months of last year, means that escort duty takes up a disproportionate amount of prison officers' time. There is consequently less time for supervising the rehabilitive programmes of education, employment and open regimes. Even where, as in Holloway, there is extensive provision for teaching prisoners, the educative process has been all but abandoned. The internal regimes of the overcrowded prisons are degrading for the prisoners, demoralising for the staff and are, quite simply, unacceptable in a civilised society.

In the face of this crisis, the Government is embarking on a major prison-building programme. It has made clear that it does not anticipate a fall in our prison population apart from the normal month to month fluctuations. Lord Glenarthur (the Minister in the Home Office responsible for prisons), speaking to the Boards of Prison Visitors Annual Conference last September, indicated that prison planning would be based on August's peak of 48,000 and 'possibly beyond'.

In the long term these new buildings will provide some relief. Nevertheless, there is evidence that not only is Britain confining a larger proportion of convicted offenders to prison than other comparable European countries but that the use of imprisonment is increasing. These trends are disturbing. They are doubly so when the re-conviction rates of those who are sentenced to imprisonment are considered. Whatever may be the purpose of imprisonment, there is little evidence to support the view that imprisonment of itself is achieving the purpose of preventing the commission of crime by those who have experienced it. It may be that reform of the prisoner is by and large an unobtainable purpose of imprisonment or it may be that reform is impossible in the kind of institutions in which prisoners are incarcerated in this country. Even those whose sole interest in penal establishments stems from the principle that they may play some part in preventing the commission of crime cannot feel confident that our prison system today is achieving that purpose.

In approaching this subject, I have been dismayed by the lack of conclusive research findings about the effectiveness of alternative forms

of punishment. Back in March, 1957, Mr. R. A. Butler, (afterwards Lord Butler) the newly-appointed Home Secretary, justified the establishment of the Home Office Research Unit in terms as compelling today as they were when he spoke. He said:

> We need to find out by systematic research much more than we know about the results of the various methods of treatment which are available to the Courts, and to place that knowledge at their disposal. We need also to put ourselves in a position of furnishing the Courts with the fullest possible information about the offenders before them, so that in all proper cases they may be able to select the treatment appropriate to each individual on the basis of an expert diagnosis of its history and personality. If we are to do this, which is exploration work, we need proper tools.

Although valuable work has been done by penologists over the last thirty years, it has to be said that their conclusions offer little help to legislators who are concerned to establish the basic principles which should govern the use of imprisonment. I quote from two books published in the course of last year in illustration of the general point.

Andrew Rutherford, in his campaigning treatise, *Prisons and the Process of Justice,* stated:

> The paucity of detailed information regarding the composition of prison populations is remarkable. The only survey to be undertaken in England was a small sample of sentenced prisoners of the South East Region in 1972 which found that 30% were sentenced for petty or minor offences.

More recently, Nigel Walker, in his recently published and authoritative book, *Sentencing: Theory, Law and Practice,* speaking of the efficacy of different penal measures, concluded:

> In short, we are not yet in a position to estimate the absolute efficacy of any English penal measure. As for comparisons of the efficacy of two or more measures, very few have been satisfactory.

In the absence of firm academic foundations, it is scarcely surprising that the proponents of a reduced prison population, and I am one of them, are hard put to base our case upon unassailable sentencing principles. Conversely, however, considerations other than the efficacy of imprisonment in the prevention of crime may reasonably be invoked in support of the reduction of the prison population. In these circumstances, it is relevant to look at the final cost to the taxpayer of imprisonment as opposed to alternative penalties. It is also reasonable to consider such matters as whether or not society's purposes would be better served by giving greater emphasis to reparation for injury to an individual or the community in its sentencing policy.

Imprisonment is usually justified by reference to four aims: to particular or general deterrence; to the reform of the convicted person; to the need to safeguard society from the threat posed by the liberty of a dangerous convicted person; and finally, to society's perception of the retributive appropriateness of a particular sentence. The last justification, depending as it does upon public opinion, is difficult to quantify in many cases. Undoubtedly, it influences politicians. Opinion polling has been rudimentary although the Prison Reform Trust carried out a most important survey in 1982 which suggested that imprisonment was regarded by rather fewer members of the public as an appropriate penalty,

particularly for lesser offences, than might have been imagined. An indicative poll recently asked the question 'Would it be better to spend more money to build prisons or should prison numbers be reduced by giving non-prison sentences for minor crimes?'. The answers were:

| | |
|---|---|
| More prisons | 40% |
| Non-prison sentences | 53% |
| Don't know | 7% |

Undoubtedly, further evidence of this kind, to which MP's pay particular attention, would strengthen the perception that Britain's imprisonment practices ought to be reviewed. With whatever emphasis the individual may regard the mix of objectives of imprisonment, however, rehabilitation and reform remain, despite all the discouragement of the evidence of lack of success, the objectives to be pursued within the prison system. It is quite clear that the surge in the numbers of convicted and remand prisoners has in many institutions diverted the prison resources of men and money from education and employment within the prisons to mere containment.

The Courts themselves have been advised to take account of the situation by the Court of Appeal in the Bibi case in 1980. The advice is worth quoting although there is little evidence that the exhortation is having a material effect.

> It is no secret that our prisons at the moment are dangerously overcrowded. So much so that sentencing courts must be particularly careful to examine each case to ensure if a minimum custodial sentence is necessary, that the sentence is as short as possible, consistent only with the duty to protect the interests of the public and to punish and deter the criminal.
>
> Many offenders can be dealt with equally justly and effectively by a sentence of six or nine months in prison as by one of eighteen months or three years . . . What the Court can and should do is ask itself whether there is any compelling reason why a short sentence should not be passed.

Notwithstanding this, the Home Office has reported that the recent increase in prison population has been 'mainly due to a larger number of offenders being dealt with by the Crown Court, and a large proportion of them being given a custodial sentence. There is also some evidence towards the end of 1984 of an increase in the length of custodial sentences being imposed by the Crown Court for some types of offences, which may be a contributory factor.'

When Lord Whitelaw was Home Secretary he made two speeches in 1981 seeking to persuade sentencers to make less use of imprisonment and to shorten sentences. His successor, the controversial Mr. Brittan, was less clear. The present Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, in his New Bridge Lecture, spoke of the need for a balance between the treatment of the more and less serious offenders, commending the sparing use of imprisonment for the less serious. It must be doubted, however, that such qualified and cautious exhortation will alter the picture, and the substantial prison building programme to which the present Home Secretary remains fully committed is testimony to his own expectation of a rising prison population.

It ought to be the aim of penal policy sharply to reduce the numbers

of prisoners in three particular categories. These three groups are: prisoners held on remand; prisoners held for short terms of imprisonment; and fine defaulters. While the average time served in prison by those held on remand exceeded the average time spent in prison by convicted prisoners, almost one-quarter of those received into prison in 1984 were fine defaulters.

The remedies to the prison population crisis are in part in the hands of the Government, in part in the hands of the Courts, and in part in the hands of Parliament. I propose to look briefly at the role of each in turn.

There are those who argue that the situation is so serious that it calls for what might be described as mechanistic solutions limiting the number of those in prison to the prisons' proper capacity. They pray in aid the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 which allows the Home Secretary to exercise a power of executive release. I do not believe that that power was intended by Parliament to be used to deal with endemic overcrowding. In any case, its use for such a purpose would not in my view accord with the public's perception of what is an acceptable use of executive discretion in the criminal justice system. It is quite untrue and unhistorical to suggest that there are no circumstances in which Home Secretaries can intervene to effect changes in sentencing policy at their own hand where a sentencing practice has become completely out of line with public opinion.

I quote from a speech of Sir William Harcourt, Gladstone's Home Secretary, made in the House of Commons on 24th April, 1888:

> Over and over again the Executive Government in England by the power of the Home Secretary, has restrained the action of magistrates and of Courts where it was thought their practice was falling into a system that was injurious to society and to the community. I may be forgiven if I refer to a class of cases with which I was myself connected as Home Secretary. I found that magistrates, no doubt from not having sufficiently considered the matter,, were sending children of tender age to prison by scores. I found to my horror and surprise that many children of eight were being sent to gaol, and were confined to a solitary cell. Well, what did I do? I remitted the sentences, and the practice soon disappeared without any change in the law by the action of the Executive, and a practice which everybody recognised as injurious to the community was practically restrained.

Nonetheless, an across-the-board intervention by the Home Secretary prompted less by considerations of justice to the individual affected than by the lack of resources of the prison system to contain the prison population would, I believe, be unacceptable. Nor do I believe that we should follow the Dutch example of postponing entry to prison of convicted prisoners until such time as there is suitable space available. The disruptions to family life and work created by the looming uncertainty of the date of imprisonment would be intolerable. Nor am I attracted by the argument that a block should be placed upon the prison building programme for fear of the further expansion of the prison population to fill it. There are certainly prisons and parts of prisons in constant use which ought to be demolished and replaced and my only objection to the prison-building programme is that it is pre-empting scarce resources from a limited Home Office budget which should not be seen as a substitution

for expenditure upon the much cheaper alternatives of imprisonment. It is with regard to these alternatives that the Government can most effectively make some impact upon the problem. Perhaps the single most important step would be the provision of additional bail hostels. Their provision is under review by the Home Office. It is clear that the geographical location of the existing hostels as far from adequate and urgent action needs to be taken to provide this alternative to remanding unconvicted accused persons in custody.

There is also a powerful case for the establishment of a nationwide bail verification scheme along the lines of the 1975 Camberwell Green Magistrates' Court experiment which investigates the community ties of those arrested and held overnight in police custody. The experiment has shown that the more closely an arrested individual is linked to the community, the less risk there is in granting bail.

Many defendants appear at remand hearings without legal representation. Notwithstanding the cost, I would advocate a statutory right to legal representation at such hearings. To the extent that the number of prisoners remanded would be reduced following proper legal representation, those costs would be offset.

It is also open to the Government, through its public expenditure priorities, greatly to influence the range of non-custodial options which are available to the Courts. I believe that both Community Service Orders and 'package deal' Probation Orders would be perceived to be a more attractive option than imprisonment by the public for minor offences. Sentencers ought not to be constrained by the non-availability of hostel accommodation, day centres and centres for the treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction. As the costs of the supervision of these non-custodial sentences are a fraction of the costs of incarceration, it is almost incomprehensible that the Government should not have given a higher public expenditure priority to their development.

I turn now to the possible role of the Courts in tackling the present prison crisis. I confess to some scepticism as to the likelihood of the Courts responding to mere exhortation by flustered Home Secretaries. I have no desire to see the sentencing discretion fettered by ad hoc executive action. Nonetheless, I do think sentencers are not always sufficiently informed about the practical consequences of particular sentences in particular localities. I have been struck on visiting prisons around the country to learn how infrequently they are visited by sentencers other than Magistrates. The initial training of sentencers provided by the Home Office is no substitute for the continuity of contact with the penal system which ought to be a feature of judicial duties. In France, this is institutionalised by the appointment of a *juge de l'application des peines* who is appointed by order for three years renewable and supervises the serving of sentences, custodial conditions, permission to work outside, granting of 'semi-freedom' (e.g. week-end leave), and release on licence. He keeps in touch with persons on suspended sentence and may enforce a sentence or relax a restriction.

In Austria there is also a close involvement of the sentencing judges in various decisions on the implementation of sentences including such matters as release on parole. I do not advocate for this country a system in which the sentencer will be obliged to follow the progress of each person whom he has sentenced until discharged. The administrative burden on the judges plainly rules this out.

It was Aristotle, in his *Politics,* who stated that:

> In many places one magistracy has the custody of the prisoners, while another executes the sentences. It is well to separate off the gaolership and try by some device to render the office less unpopular.

Nonetheless, I do advocate that criminal judges should, in rotation, be given responsibility for reviewing and reporting upon the practical consequences of criminal sentencing. I would also urge upon the Government the attractiveness of establishing a Sentencing Guidelines Commission, along the lines of that set up in Minnesota whose purposes were described by the Commission 'to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are proportionate to the severity of the offence of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history.' It is also important to notice that the Minnesota legislation requires the guidelines to be implemented in a manner consistent with the resources of the prison system.

The responsibility of Parliament, however, for the present condition of the prisons cannot be ducked and there is a pressing requirement for legislative action which can only be introduced by the Government to alter the sentencing climate. Although I do not believe the public is ready for an across-the-board reduction of prison sentences, there are amendments to the law which could be introduced which would, I believe, be politically acceptable. *Justice* has drawn attention in its 1980 Report, 'Breaking the Rules', to the extraordinary fact that in England more than 7,000 acts are described as criminal. More than half of these involve strict liability with no regard being given to the state of mind of the individual. A systematic review of these offences is called for with the purpose of substituting civil remedies for criminal penalties in all practicable cases. The Inland Revenue, for example, eschews criminal proceedings in cases of tax evasion, preferring civil proceedings. A second innovation which Parliament must authorise is the introduction of the concept of the 'day fine' relating the level of penalty to the earning capacity of the individual convicted. Without that there seems little prospect that Courts will greatly reduce the coercive use of imprisonment. Thirdly, Parliament must grasp the nettle and remove the option of imprisonment for certain petty offences. I do not believe that it would be difficult to find a broad consensus across the political parties as to which offences should be so classified and in a matter of this kind it is clearly desirable that there should be all-party agreement as to how to proceed. The advice of the Criminal Law Revision Committee could be sought as a first step.

Reform of the present system cannot be directed only to reducing the

prison population. It requires also changed attitudes towards the treatment of prisoners. I was dismayed by Mr. David Waddington's Answer to my Parliamentary Question last year which indicated that the Government had decided to abandon the codification of prison standards. I recognise that it is bound to take time to raise the standards from the abysmal conditions in many existing prisons, but standards there must be and the timescale must be set.

The treatment of prisoners' grievances is not satisfactory and the prison rules ought to be codified and made enforceable. A Prison Ombudsman should be appointed as an independent and impartial public authority empowered to decide upon the rights and freedoms of prisoners on matters such as correspondence and visits. There should be a duty solicitor available at each penal establishment to advise prisoners on their rights. Administrative decisions affecting prisoners, particularly their categorisation, should be open to appeal.

Finally, once a prisoner is taken into custody it should be recognised in the nature and organisation of the prison regime that its purpose is to prepare the prisoner for re-entry into the community at the end of his sentence. The particular example of self-regulation within the Barlinnie Special Unit is one which should be imitated in the English penal establishments. Such preparation is plainly impossible in many of our prisons today and may well explain the dismal record of re-conviction of offenders which must call into question the pointfulness of our penal system.

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Robert Maclennan became a founder member of the Social Democratic Party in March 1981, and is currently its parliamentary spokesman on Agriculture, Home and Legal Affairs, Europe, Scotland and Northern Ireland. A former member of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, he now serves on the Public Accounts Committee.]

# OLAF PALME 1927-1986

## by Clive Archer

THE MURDER of Olaf Palme tragically deprived Scandinavia of its foremost international leader.

Palme was a somewhat unusual Swede. Born into an upper class and Baltic exile family, his student experience of poverty in the United States converted him to socialism. He was cultivated in the 'fifties by Prime Minister Tage Erlander, first as a staff assistant then in 1963 as a minister. When Erlander retired in 1969, Palme was his chosen successor. Palme was outspoken about American activity in Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Pinochet regime in Chile and on South Africa. At home, Palme faced middle-class disillusionment with his more aggressive version of socialism than the fatherly Erlander, and lost the 1976 and 1979 elections to the centre-right parties. During the opposition years of 1976 to 1982, Palme became more of an international figure, joining Willy Brandt's international commission on North-South problems, chairing his own commission on Common Security and becoming the United Nations mediator in the Iran-Iraq War. Returning to power in 1982, he pressed ahead with a wage-earners' fund which will eventually buy up parts of Swedish industry for the trade unions. After winning last year's election with a decreased majority he persuaded his party to swallow a certain amount of economic entrenchment.

Palme's killing shocked the Swedes who believed that such seemingly pointless violence could not happen on their streets. Politicians in Scandinavia are seen as ordinary people carrying out every-day jobs, can be seen in public, mostly unescorted, and are rarely disturbed by their fellow citizens. Of course, Palme was an international figure — and this could have been his downfall. However, even accounting for the outrage felt at his assassination, the response to Palme's death was remarkable. The Soviet Party Congress stood in silence. President Reagan, the United Nations Secretary-General, the Queen, the Pope and other world leaders sent their condolences and other political figures — Yasser Arafat, Edward Heath, Teddy Kennedy, David Owen and Willy Brandt — paid more personal tributes to a man whose work for peace they had seen at close quarters. Palme had always elicited strong feelings from his fellow Swedes — some detested his seeming arrogance and his policies — but at midday on 10th March, all Sweden silently came to a halt in his memory. The previous evening over ten thousand Norwegians had marched in Oslo in a torchlight procession in Palme's honour.

Palme's sudden and violent demise saddened people and made them realise the stature of the man they had lost. He was intellectually gifted and a persuasive speaker. Most of all, he was tirelessly wedded to causes, especially those of peace, freedom and humanity. His name will be entered by the side of Count Bernadotte, Raul Wallenberg and Dag Hammarskjold as Swedes who died trying to serve not only their own country but the wider world.

*Dr. Archer wrote on Sweden in Contemporary Review No. 1442, Vol. 248.*

# CHRISTIAN AND JEW

## by Laurence Tanner

LOOKING back at life in the suburbs of a large city fifty years ago, I can remember Jew and and non-Jew living in complete amity and socially mixing freely. They danced and played tennis together at a time when such clubs were in their hey-day. Generally, but not invariably, people married within their denominations. Some Jews went to the synagogue and some did not. No comment was made about this and certainly there was no attempt to proselytise. Whether this was equally true of other towns I do not know. It was not true of the East End of London where there were Jewish streets and Christian streets. However, it was not until the Fascist marches of the Thirties that there was any great tension. And then the blitz broke down such partitions and possibly also, shock at what was happening in Europe. From 1933 had begun the systematic persecution of Jews in Germany, which was based not on religion but on ethnic origin. Other nations were not blameless for they were to play their part in the transportations.

The history of Judaism and Europe is a sad one. Christianity began within Judaism and the first missionaries went to the Jewish communities dispersed. Soon hostility on both sides prevented social integration. In the Roman Empire, especially in the time of Constantine, conversion to Christianity was encouraged by law. When conversion did not happen persecution followed. This continued with the Middle Ages, though there were occasional voices of dissent. One can mention Bernard of Clairvaux in the twelfth century whose moving thought was *fides suadenda, non inponenda.* In the sixteenth century the policy of persecution became intense with the Spanish Inquisition. It is not always realised that the Inquisition lasted until it was put down by Napoleon, and even after then reappeared for a short period. From the time of the Counter-Reformation in Rome with varying intensity, conversion was encouraged by the Jesuits. In Rome between 1634 and 1790, 2,430 Jews were baptised. This may not seem many. Jews were herded into ghettos and it was not until the nineteenth century that new efforts were made by societies of Christian Jews. The story of the holocaust is recent history. Of those who escaped it many went to America and about half of the people of Jewish origin in the world now live in the United States. Some came to Britain and with their culture and skills enriched the national life.

In the last fifty years Britain has become not only multi-racial but also multi-religious. As far as Christianity is concerned, in spite of the fact that scripture knowledge is the only subject which by statute must be taught in schools and in spite of various crusades, numbers of people regularly attending churches have dwindled. In addition, when serious matters are discussed religion has not played, in this century, the central part which it played in Victorian times. This may be changing. It is realised that Christianity shares with Judaism and Islam belief in a uni-

versal God, Creator and source of goodness. Many Christians lately have tended to think of their faith as a matter for exploration. They have admitted doubts and cencentrated on a few main lines rather than attach themselves line by line to creeds.

In the Report of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England (1976) pages 73-74, J. R. Lucas, Tutor of Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford makes important statements.

> 'Christianity differs from Judaism and Islam in that God reveals himself not primarily in a code or message, but as we believe in a person.' And '... we wrongly make our response one of simple obedience rather than a sharing of love.'
>
> And '... although we must be always telling the truth, we must beware of thrusting it down peoples' throats or we destroy its peculiarly Christian character.'

Though they could not articulate it, many devout Christians feel like this, and for them mission should never be aggressive. The faith is no longer seen as a package of beliefs to be delivered and accepted. From this has resulted a capacity to listen.

On February 2, 1986, the BBC broadcast a Songs of Praise from the West London Synagogue and evidence of new attitudes could be seen. Either by design or chance it happened to be the Feast of the Purification or the Presentation of Christ in the Temple, a festival that reminds us how much of Jesus is Jewish. Those interviewed, some Christian, some Jewish said that it was their intention to discover in a world of suffering what beliefs could be shared. Both were exploring the culture they have in common and regarded the event as a celebration of dialogue. Anglicans, Methodists and Roman Catholics were present. The psalms are a common heritage. They were able to sing together a setting of the Jubilate Deo, and the hymns 'The God of Abraham praise' and 'Tell out my soul', based on the song of Hannah. The Dean of Westminster and a Rabbi joined in giving a blessing. And especially encouraging was a group from a black Pentecostal Church. Some black people as members of a race which has suffered persecution no doubt feel a special affinity with the Jews, and certainly Jewish leaders recently have shown sympathy with their problems and have suggested ways forward which could lead them out of any ghetto mentality. The whole event seemed to be ecumenism in its broadest sense. In the last few decades, in spite of setbacks when visible unity has been attempted, Christian denominations in Great Britain, apart from Northern Ireland, have got on quite well with one another. The new question is how they are to regard other faiths. It was of interest to read, on almost the same day, the Pope in New Delhi emphasising his desire to pay honour to Indian culture and to promote 'inter-religious dialogue and fruitful collaboration between the indigenous faiths and the Christian Church'. These words were addressed to the great mass of Hindus whose general attitude is one of tolerant pluralism. They would have little effect on the fundamentalist Hindus who opposed his visit and made their demonstrations.

The best known Society for promoting good relations is the Council of Christians and Jews, founded by Dr. James Parkes, an Anglican

priest. It bans missionary activity. Another Society, the Church's Ministry among the Jews, does engage in open evangelism. Outside these two, however, it is claimed that other groups are using questionable methods. Their targets are the old, the sick and students. Christian missionaries, often supported by American money, have attempted to infiltrate Jewish communities in London. In their defence it is said that they are Christian Jews who have continued in their old culture.

Certainly there will be Christians who will consider it their duty, based on scripture, to spread their faith with vigour. For them toleration means indifference. As far as the present controversy is concerned it can be said that students come across all sorts of ideas, political and religious, and should expect to. It is part of the experience of a University, and it is not unreasonable for approaches to be made to them. The sick and the elderly, however, are another matter and missionary methods must always be beyond reproach. Above all they should never be inspired by the false idea that the Jews as a race are responsible for the killing of Jesus. Few Anglicans nowadays would associate themselves with the third collect for Good Friday in the 1662 Book of Common Prayer. For this we can be grateful.

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[The Rev. Canon L. E. Tanner was formerly Sub-Dean of Guildford Cathedral.]

# CINDERELLA

## by John Elsom

THE most popular subject for pantomime in Britain is *Cinderella*, and has been so for the past hundred years, a fact which should alarm feminists, masculinists and monetarists alike. In a recent television programme, Marina Warner traced the history of *Cinderella* back through centuries and cultures ending up, if I remember correctly, in ancient China in either the eighth century AD or BC, one of the two. But the many local deviations, such as a topknot for a glass slipper, cannot conceal the familiar outline, rags to riches via the nuptial suite, and the underlying morality which affronts every tenet that the modern world holds dear. If ever a work of fiction (and I am assuming that it is pure make-believe, not fact made palatible through fictitious elements) were designed to 'deprave and corrupt' and thus be liable for prosecution even under the existing Obscene Publications Act, let alone one of Mr. Winston Churchill's shopping lists, it would be this unfortunate mixture of fantasy and fetichism to which a good proportion of British parents annually drag a good proportion of their children.

It may, of course, be impossible to prove that any particular child has been corrupted by *Cinderella*, but the steady drip-drip of unhealthy sexual optimism must take its toll. What, after all, is the point of *Cinderella*? That if a girl debases herself humbly and modestly, and performs such menial tasks as cleaning hearths and sweeping floors with besom brooms, she may be rewarded by a trip to the palace, where she may have the chance to meet a prince who, if she is pretty enough, may fall madly in love with her and may propose marriage, having searched through the kingdom to find the exquisite little foot which fits the delicate glass slipper.

We do not have to rely on left-wing librarians to spot the sexism in this little farago. Young girls are being encouraged to think small and dream big. Cinderella would never study for an Open University degree. Men don't like clever girls, only pretty ones with small feet. Cinderella learns how to wait for her big chance by ignoring Buttons, her natural ally. Buttons is traditionally kind and caring, a good companion, and all that disqualifies him from being the kind of husband whom Cinderella does not really deserve, is his lack of wealth and privilege. So, by flirting with Buttons and keeping her hand in that way, Cinderella waits for the ball and her prince, whom she will meet but once, before decisively sliding her foot in the slipper and plighting her troth. It is not the kind of example which should be offered to the coming generation. They may come too quickly.

If the tale affronts feminists, it holds out little comfort for male chauvinist pigs either. The only thing that we know about the Prince is that he's not Clint Eastwood. He's just rich, young and impressionable: standard beefcake, a centrefold for girls. One may assume that he is a physi-

cally well-endowed, although the story is ambivalent on this point, but we do know that he's powerful. It is status, rather than bodily characteristics, that distinguishes the Prince — although he has one other dubious quality which he shares with the dirty raincoat brigade. He's easily obsessed and will stop at nothing to get his own way, which is all very flattering if you like that sort of thing, but frankly I would prefer my daughter, if I had one, to go out with a normal man in a normal way. We only have the Prince's word for it that Cinderella *is* the girl for whom he has been searching. He could simply have run out of excuses for toying with the feet of the young women in his kingdom. After a month-long orgy of fondling ankles and caressing shrimp-like toes, the Prince rushes to the confessional where the Archbishop counsels him to take the next pair of insteps which crosses his path as wife, abandoning all others, solemates if not soul mates, and Cinderella was the lucky girl, or not, as the case may be.

In the light of Britain's poor performance in the many international economic league tables, what should really worry us, however, about *Cinderella* is its impudent challenge to all kinds of political orthodoxies. If the British people are really hooked on the *Cinderella* story, as they give every appearance of being, then it should be treated as a dangerous drug. Anyone caught sniffing *Cinderella* should be sent to the Milton Friedman Remand Home for Lazy Housekeepers, the only prison in the country where you have to pay for your lunches, while shops selling *Cinderella* kits, consisting of the familiar one pumpkin, two white mice and four rats, to which you only have to add a fairy godmother, should be liable for prosecution under every relevant act on the statute book, from Cruelty to Animals to Fraud and Wilfully Misleading Advertising — for what after all is the economic lesson to be drawn from *Cinderella*? Here is this poor girl, slaving away in a low technology industry, hearth-sweeping, whose days are obviously numbered with the coming of central heating, earning pitiably low wages and denied proper opportunities to retrain upwards.

It is all very well to object that her feckless father is Baron Hardup not Lord Muck, and that education costs money. It is money that he can ill afford not to spend, for otherwise he must write off one-third of the labour force of his daughters, potentially the most profitable sector of the domestic economy too, for Cinderella has at least proved that she is prepared to knuckle down to work, unlike Griselda and Lumpkin. As things stand, Cinderella is stuck in a useless job without prospects or decent union protection, with only Buttons, who (God help us) must be a wishy-washy Liberal, to stand by her when things get touch.

The moral is obvious. Baron Hardup must invest in a programme of domestic expansion and retraining, to get the household ready for the twenty-first century; and the key feature of this policy must be the education of his under-used and undervalued work force. That is what the moral should be. But what do we get? A fairy godmother. I have nothing against fairy godmothers in principle, for they come in all shapes

and sizes, and where would we be without them? But if they do generically have a fault, it is that their magic operates according to certain mysterious laws which can only be appreciated by reading the small print very carefully, which few of us have time to do.

Take this little matter of being home by midnight. It sounds sensible enough, good advice for a young girl, still unversed in the ways of the world, but in Cinderella's case, it was nearly disastrous. Very well, she was careless, but let us suppose that the fairy godmother was not so scrupulously well-disposed towards Cinderella as her behaviour suggests, that she had invented ways of delaying Cinderella until after the last fatal stroke, so that she was reduced to rags in the eyes of the world court, without any chance of redress through the courts by means of a glass slipper. Let us suppose that Cinderella in her low technology field was in fact something of an expert, who had invented a better mousetrap — which was of obvious use to the Fairy Godmother with her skill at turning mice into flunkeys. By dressing up Cinderella in finery for a few hours, in time for something like a courtship or an election, the Fairy Godmother had secured Cinderella's secrets, such as they are, for her own purposes, knowing that after midnight they would be hers, all hers.

What if the Godmother turned out to be the God-father?

I must make it perfectly clear at this point that I am not really writing about Westland Helicopters or British Leyland, or any other British company saved from bankruptcy by the miraculous injection of US capital. Perish the thought. I could be accused of anti-Americanism, of implying that Mrs. Thatcher might stoop to selling off the cutlery to buy a new dress for the election, and of all sorts of weasel-words which Mr. Norman Tebbit would rightly deplore. No, I am merely hinting that the habit of looking for fairy godmothers is one more honoured through the breach than the observance — and if I had a daughter, even one so well-trained in the domestic disciplines as Mrs. Thatcher, I would strongly advise her against accepting wardrobes and magic coaches from strangers who appear and disappear in clouds of smoke. 'There is no such thing as a free landau-and-four,' I would say, wisely scratching the side of my nose, 'Beware of Greeks bearing Gifts from the Gods. Look before you leap. Does the glass slipper really fit? Do you like wearing glass slippers anyway, once the initial thrill has worn off? Don't they often trap you in escalators? Going down as well as up.'

To which Mrs. Thatcher might well reply in her customary fashion.

At which point I would hurriedly beat a retreat to less slippery ground, by stating that what really incenses me about *Cinderella* is its bigoted attitude towards Ugly Sisters.

Dammit, we weren't all born beautiful and humble. Some of us are naturally vain and ugly. However hard we try to squeeze our misshapen feet into Standard Size 10s, there is always a toe left hanging out or a corn on the heel that nobody in their right mind could have anticipated. Go a size larger and we are left slopping around the floor as if we were wearing rowing boats. We trip over tables and bump our heads

on low beams. Sometimes we can justify our existences by brute force — by forcing open a door or lifting a cart from the mire, but for normal domestic chores, Cinderella is much better equipped than we are, with her hair that looks even prettier when towzled and whose satin cheeks are enhanced by a smear of soot.

At the beginning, we tried to compensate for our natural defects by volunteering. 'Here, Cinderella,' we said, 'we'll light the fire,' but it wouldn't light, and 'Here, Cinderella, we'll clear out the grate!' but we dropped all the ashes on the carpet, until finally Cinderella with that infuriatingly sweet smile of hers, the one that makes you want to kick her in the teeth, said, 'That's all right, Grizelda, I'll do it!' and Buttons, who should be embrocated, said, 'That's right, Griselda, leave it to Cinderella. She knows how.' And Lumpkin would giggle, the bitch, but nervously, knowing that she would be the next in line for some lethal snub. And the payment for our misfortune is to be parodied down the ages by fat comics who like dressing in knickers and fluffing the pillows on their chests, as floppily out of control as those great dangling bags with which a mischievous God has endowed us — and all for the infinite delight and internal corruption of those snotty-faced brats who have yet to learn the anguish of continual humiliation and have no sympathy, none at all, with the pathetic airs and graces through which we try to hide our evident inferiority.

For there are no godmothers for us, none at all, no princes. If we go to the ball, we do so on forged invitations and spend weeks rather than seconds in choosing the appropriate dresses, in colours which always mysteriously clash with some part of our colour scheme, our ginger hair, mauve eyes and green lips, and when we get there, the prince has just left for a previous engagement and the only person who wants to talk to us is a drunken stockbroker who has mistaken us for someone else, twice our combined ages, and the supposedly flat dance floor is pitted with little dips and ledges, where our shoes stick or slide, and we are reduced to jerking up and down, more or less in time with the music, though not synchronised, alas, with our partners, having lost the knack of matching up with up and down with down, until finally the Last Waltz comes when we are drained and dripping with unladylike sweat and quite unfit for what, we are told, could follow, in the moonlight outside, although in our cases never does.

And all that compensates us for our ungainly lifetimes and inconsequential deaths is that, thank God, we were not like Cinderella. We are our own self-made boobies, neither transformed by a godmother nor redeemed by a prince. We have nobody to thank and nobody to blame but ourselves, and we look for no miracles. Stubbornly self-reliant, we try to learn from our mistakes and battle through the world as best we can, and when we fail, as we usually do, we curse our fate and start again.

Pantos after all are for winter. Cinderellas melt with the snow. But Ugly Sisters doggedly stick it out to the spring, and the summer, and the autumn, year after year, after year.

# FROM THE MINIMAL TO THE NEW MONUMENTAL: A REFLECTION ON RECENT AND CURRENT ART TRENDS

## by Philip Vann

LONDONERS now enjoy two beautiful, bright new spaces: the recently re-opened and renovated Whitechapel Gallery and the Saatchi gallery, a much-converted warehouse, opened in March 1985. The New Year show at the Saatchi encapsulated a major, past trend: that of minimalism, antithesis of present mood. The large white gallery is most suitable for such a showing. There is no sign outside, advertising the gallery founded and funded by the clever, advertising Saatchi family; only a bell and entry-phone, admitting one into an all-white passageway. The gallery, at 98A Boundary Road, St. John's Wood, is only open on Friday and Saturday afternoons from 12 to 6, otherwise by appointment. The large, tall rooms, all-white, possess a sealed-off, exclusive, meditative air. The atmosphere is concentrated enough for perfect attention. It must be admitted that the room containing Carl Andre's 'Aluminium and Zinc Plain' (1970) — 18 aluminium and eighteen zinc squares laid out, alternately, in one large square, the infamous Bricks, 'Equivalent VI' (1966), 120 piled up firebricks, and other geometric sparsities (to coin an apt word) — has a certain restrained vitality. This is not the restraint of Oriental art; it is not nearly so admirable; but it has a certain value as an aesthetic of sensory withdrawal in frenetic times, a kind of artistic drought which is provocative and, especially in this near perfect setting, serene in a disturbing way. It demands all the concentration of the contemplator. Otherwise, it is nothing, which is of course what it is anyway.

The room containing Robert Ryman's all-white canvases, with their barest variations of tone and texture, poses all the questions that the notion of minimalism begs to ask. Is it art? Outside this intimately austere setting, could any of these works stand up on their intrinsic strength? The answers are debatable and, perhaps, the questions are invalid. Such works maybe lead us altogether outside the territory of art into realms of philosophy and the science of perception. They are absurd, meaningless, vacuous, it is true, but certainly, as so marvellously shown at the Saatchi, they make one look, refine one's perceptions, maximise one's responses to what is in effect beautiful emptiness.

London offers a multitude of exhibition spaces, allowing myriad opportunities for the most diverse forms of looking. This is of course a good thing, although sometimes bewildering; which is no disadvantage. For those in search of handy art historical outlines, for gallery goers into sheer convenience, what is happening on the scene (to use 1960s jargon) is that painters are practising what has become known as expressive or gestural figuration. They have returned to the decencies of the human figure, and

of houses, everyday objects, cats and dogs and lizards too, albeit on a mythic, superlative scale, fit only for museum-size canvases. Op, pop, minimalism, sharp-edged, documentary and all the other isms, was-isms, and would-be-isms of recent years have been superseded by the latest approach. As always, art history is being re-written so that the present trend is seen as the inevitable apogee of past tendencies. So, in gallery after gallery, giant human beings, of unprecedented gaucherie, stomp their inelegant ways across vast landscapes of natural wonders: magical mountains, symbolic streams, allegorical wastelands. These hunks wear at least size fifty shirts and indescribably big boots. Their bunions must be the size of an average fist and a painful problem too, not only artistically. When naked, the men are Hemingway-hirsute and the women of sofa-like proportions. Dressed, the men wear tweedy suits, hairy as their birthday suits. The women are rarely other than undressed. Limbs are usually flailing about, and make one grateful, in Hockney's phrase, that the figures 'are completely safe; this is only a still'. These people may be doing anything: lounging about, climbing mountains, grappling with life or each other. But what, firstly, characterises this kind of painting, whether good, bad or indifferent, is that it aims to inflate and belittle everyday life. All emotions become quite tremendous and faintly ridiculous too. The second characteristic is that the painting must be badly painted in deliberate fashion. This is not the same as the practice of *faux-naivete;* that is reckoned, rightly, too wimpish an occupation. The paint, rather, is aggressively and strenuously applied, to evoke lumpishness, cloddishness, the lack of synchronisation of characters too consumed by their epic emotions to care whether their grand passion knocks over the furniture, lays waste the patio, assaults the spectator. The bad painting, as, in my view, in the case of the upside-down-representationalist, collosally rich, neo-International School, may be simply bad. Deliberateness doesn't come into it. In other cases, sheer, crude monumentalism may give rise to a definite primitive power which effectively confronts the onlooker. Of course, this lumping together of so much good and bad 'lumpish' painting into gestural figuration category is too catch-all, but it does indicate the current major trend: away from the ascetic towards the most indulgently human.

'Ken Kiff: Paintings 1965-1985' at the Serpentine Gallery is an exhibition which is peculiarly difficult to assess. On a superficial level, the work may be said to anticipate and fulfil most of the constituent demands of contemporary figuration. But Kiff, a solitary fantasist, has been painting for more than two decades on his own, regardless of fashion. The world of Edward Burra's art is that of each and every detail, animate or inanimate, made sensuous and, more often than not, minatory. It is a similar case with Kiff. His large expanses of raw, often sickly colour, are those of direct feeling. He has imagined a world in which, as in a fairy tale, everything speaks, feels, sees, responds. The lumpy, bogey, helpless humans, landscapes which is purest inscape, houses, the moon, unbelievable creatures — all actively contribute to the Kiff (un)reality. In 'Acceptance'

(painted in 1967 and in 1975-8) a naked, bald man walks over a yellow landscape to greet a green creature (an iguana?) surfacing from a blue pool. Psychoanalytic interpretation is possible and useful, but it is secondary to the integrated meaning of the work. The colours are at one with and expressive of the weird, happy gestures of man and beast.

These paintings are akin, in sensibility, if nothing else, to the strange artistic creations of some Eastern European solitaries — hallucinatory works whose childlike magic is closer to ancient fairy tale and folk lore than to post-Freudian dream and Surrealism. The deliberate stylistic crudities of Kiff's painting are evocative, mostly of unrefined oddities that lurk deep in all of us. Sometimes good bad painting fails, and becomes simply crass as in the depiction of a blood-spouting severed neck in 'The Feminine as Generous, Frightening and Serene'.

The Whitechapel Open for artists living in London's East End has a minimum of minimalism. That era has passed — so quickly. What is here reflects the natural catholicity of the eighties and of diverse artists of all ages and backgrounds living in one area where there is affordable studio space. Such variety, in such a well-turned-out gallery, makes for a pleasurable, if seldom revelatory, exhibition. Good paintings, undoubtedly influenced by very recent master examples, are here in plenty. Andrew Heard's painting of a London scene, with skinhead in braces metamorphosing into the ecstatic (or in this case, angry, perhaps) posture of a Blakean 'Glad Day' in a Theatreland street complete with 88 bus to Clapham, is reminiscent in both technique and its pretty/rough boy hero, of Gilbert and George, though Heard's work carries its own individual critique and energy. The 'schools' of Kitaj and Auerbach are evident here, though the 'pupils' are more than wooden imitators. But it is the ambitious 'new painting' of figuration, admittedly a wide category, that leaves the strongest mark. Against the grain of Cork Street and of the International School of Baselitz *et al*, these varied works within a category of our own convenience are painted not too deliberately badly, and sometimes movingly well.

The 'Domino Hunters' of Denzil Forrester's large painting are Rastas playing the game, while dancing around the table in a state of post-post-midnight ecstasy. Their purple and orange bodies, abandoned as they are joyful hedonism and *ganja*, contrast with, in the background, two faceless, helmetted policemen, rigidly onlooking. This is a political picture which works on that level and on formal and imaginative levels too.

The different levels of sea sky and beach in Maria Chevska's 'In the Raven' are well differentiated. On closer analysis, one sees the same yellows, reds, blues, purples, in their very different combinations. The painterly luxuriance here is very impressive and rare. A male head, with an impassive mannequin loveliness, lies on the shore, with what is possibly another head, or a rather ambiguous rock. A raven caws alongside. This is the realm of dream and myth, but dream alive with and possibly overwhelmed by romantic colour, wonderfully achieved.

'Tomm is King' by Jock McFadyen depicts a heavy skinhead in a

wheelchair, fist turned towards a wall, on which the graffitti includes the words 'WEST HAM' and a drawn penis and balls. Primitively, bluntly painted, the picture exudes a sickly, crude air. It's subject is sickness and emotional crudity, and the means of expression closely parallel the end, which is not without critical insight into warped 'manliness'.

The works of two pupils from Templars School, Stepney on show here, show how rightly and generously open the Open is. Bill Bayley's ink and pencil still life of flowers has the charm of immediate insight. The lovely splashes of colour are freely delineated. The competent, but certainly not over-academic works by Prabjhot Singh — one of red trees set against a patchwork-colour rock — have a real sense of the mystery involved in the right placing and relationships of objects. There is no reason why these works by schoolchildren do not compare well with the best works on display here. This is not said cheaply, nor with the intention of belittling or dwarfing the stature of sophisticated professional artists. It is a statement complimentary to all.

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A selection of work by minimalist artists is on view at the Saatchi Gallery until July 1986.
'Ken Kiff: Paintings 1965-85' was at the Serpentine Gallery, London until 23rd February and may be seen at the Ferens Art Gallery, Hull from 22nd March-20th April and at the Arnolfini, Bristol from 10th May-15th June.

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[Philip Vann is a journalist and arts writer. He is also Assistant Exhibition Organiser of the RONA Gallery, London.]

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## DALTON'S WAR DIARY

*The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton 1940-45.* Edited by Ben Pimlott. Jonathan Cape. £40.00.

Ben Pimlott attained an immediate reputation with his official life of Hugh Dalton. He won "general acclaim" to use the phrase beloved of publishers, in his case well-deserved. There was a sharp contrast between the assessment of the author and his subject. Pimlott emerged as one of our striking new biographers, Dalton as a deeply flawed character.

Ben Pimlott claims justifiably for these Diaries, that they are on the whole a remarkable contribution to an understanding of the Second World War. There are obvious gaps some but not all to be applauded. It would seem that Hugh Dalton's marriage was temporarily at least disintegrating during this period, but we are given no insight into his feelings on that side of his life. The most significant decision affecting Dalton during the years 1940-1945 was his transfer in 1942 from the Ministry of Economic Warfare to the Board of Trade. He reports a conversation with Churchill on the telephone.

P.M.: "I want you to take the Board of Trade."

H.D.: "This is a bit of a surprise . . . very well I will take it but on one condition, can you tell me that you have confidence in my capacity to do it well."

P.M.: Yes I have complete confidence . . ."

H.D.: "Very well, I accept."

What is pathetic here is that Dalton hero-worshipped Churchill but Churchill could not stand Dalton. There is no trace of this situation throughout the Diary.

"Dalton's startling combination," says Pimlott, "of energy, irreverence, imagination and wit on the one hand and of cunning, vile and preposterous conceit on the other make his Diary intensely readable." Further on he attempts to explain the reasons why the Tories viewed him with such suspicion. "Partly it had to do with style. Where others would attack the political enemy, Dalton would deliberately provoke, touching raw nerves. Style was linked to class. Dalton could rile his opponents because he knew the customs of the tribe. His manner — booming voice, rolling eyes, excessive heartiness — together with a taste for jesuitical plotting, aggravated the Tory dislike, behind which lay, of course, a profound distrust of his political beliefs. 'If he was a horse, I wouldn't buy him', was a typical Tory jibe."

True enough, but suspicions were not confined to the Tories. No leading politician ever took more trouble to assist the careers of younger men he believed in. But recently I was talking to two such beneficiaries now elderly. One of them, after expressing gratitude to Dalton and admiration for his performances, concluded dismally "one could not like Dalton".

I would not myself put it so starkly. I was never one of his proteges. Nevertheless a bad moment for me, when I had been defeated in the 1945 election, he went far beyond the line of duty to help me. Later in the House

of Lords I enjoyed a happy relationship with him. By that time he had become much gentler. In my case his fanatical hatred of the Germans and his chronic suspicions of the Catholic Church were a personal barrier.

But, that apart, the preposterous "conceit" referred to by Pimlott made it difficult to warm to him. But his record contained many fine features. He was a patriot who laboured strenuously to convert the Labour Party to a sensible policy in regard to re-armament before the war. Above all he should be remembered as the man who, as President of the Board of Trade and later as Chancellor of the Exchequer, did so much to redeem his promise that there would be no distressed areas after the war. "Only after 1979", says Pimlott, "was the regional structure erected by Dalton in the mid-1940's substantially undermined". Few Cabinet Ministers can say as much of their achievements. He was fundamentally a greatly gifted, genuinely idealistic, but lonely and insecure man. He deserves a better place in history than seems likely to come his way.

FRANK LONGFORD

## BROWN AND GREEN

*Blood and Soil: Walther Darré and Hitler's "Green Party"*. Anna Bramwell. Kensal Press £12.95.

Hitler was a demonic opportunist. In his rise to power he pledged restoration to the monarchists, Christian values to the churches, great armed forces to the militarists, armaments and profits to industry, jobs to the workless. He tapped the nationalism that lay within German socialism. He was all things to all men of pure blood. The *Führer* used them all.

R. Walther Darré differed from the run of Hitler's disciples and adherents. He sought to use National-Socialism and the Third Reich to apply his own racial theory and policy of "biological-dynamic" farming and a fostered peasantry. He came lately to the NSDAP. He joined when offered a Party post. He made the mistake of underrating the SS. When Hitler angled for the peasant vote in 1930 Darré believed that the way was open. He became pre-eminent in agrarian circles, passionate, energetic, optimistic. He was Hitler's Minister of Agriculture and Peasant Leader from 1937 to 1942. The Führer used him as necessary. When revolutions are made ideologues became expendable. They devour their children.

In the early thirties Darré's themes were widely acclaimed. They were "intensive peasant farming, localised autarky as a step towards national autarky, defensive and eugenically-oriented racialism and a defensive racial nationalism". His vision of the sturdy Nordic peasant, strong source of creativity, as an élite, with his Chamber of Nobles and peasant capital of Goslar, a pagan shrine, was clouded by his sense of the threat of cities, capitalism, industry, war economy. Darré hated the war even when Germany was sweeping from victory to victory. He was against a new imperialism. He wanted the Poles to be given a sound land law. Poland was Germany's Ireland. He compared the yeomanry who enjoyed Ulster tenant right with the tenants of Southern Irish landlords. He was even willing to protect Polish Jewish tenants.

Darré was not ruthless enough for a Party that had been peasant-supported in Protestant, proletarian-supported in Catholic Germany and had a strongly petty bourgeois basis. Himmler had been his friend; but the SS Darré had thought "unimportant" moved in with its settlement projects and its vision,

or nightmare, of a supra-national "Aryan" pan-Europe, a SS state with roots in the soil but mastering and exhibiting technology. There was nothing idyllic about the Eastern plans of this "Praetorian Guard led by a Jesuit". Darré quarrelled too with both Goering and Goebbels.

But he survived. The victors' sentence was, all considered, lenient. Darré, who shared some of his ideas with the Soil Association in England, was a proto-"Green". Organic farming is no longer written off as "muck and mysticism"; and this fascinating study has its up-to-date importance. Mrs Bramwell writes well, despite some lapses into the jargon of sociology and minor slips such as "Royal Air Corps" for "Royal Flying Corps" and the omission of "BUF" from the list of abbreviations. Younger readers may not know of Mosley.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

## WISE WORDS FROM BRUSSELS

*Making Sense of Europe.* Christopher Tugendhat. Viking £9.95.

This is a good title and so is the title of the first chapter *Rhetoric and Reality.* The word *Europe* has never meant much to the average British voter. For historians, for men and women concerned with the Arts and Sciences, Europe is a genuine conception; for the rest, individual countries, particularly Spain, France, Italy and Switzerland and to a lesser extent the Scandinavian countries and Germany are realities — they have been visited and toured by thousands of British citizens. However, as Mr. Tugendhat shrewdly observes, some rhetoric is needed at times, if only to act as a seasonal stimulant to overcome dark and depressing moments when everything seems to be going wrong and the vision of European Unity grows dim.

After all, Mr. Tugendhat, whom I remember as the M.P. for the City of London and Westminster, has spent eight years in Brussels, four as a European Commissioner and four as the Vice-President of the Commission. His reflexions on the working of the Community machine — Council of Ministers, Parliament and Commission (a new political animal to British eyes) are thoughtfully expressed in a clear and readable prose style. I warmly recommend this book not only to students but to thousands of men and women who are confused about the butter mountain; about the long drawn out Ministers' Meetings or the precise meaning of the words *European Vision.*

The author points out the special nature of the *Nation State* in Europe. Each has its distinctive history, cultural background and language, not to mention economic system. Some, like Britain, France and Spain have had far-flung territories overseas, some are monarchies, some republics. He finds phrases like United States of Europe dangerously misleading to those in authority. Time after time he returns to the solid construction work of the Founders, Spaak, Schuman and Adenhauer in building the Coal & Steel Community. Nation-States do not disappear but tariffs, customs, prejudices and fears are broken down so that a balance can be struck between nation-states and the Community.

Forty years ago I had the good fortune to see the beginnings of the European Assembly and wrote a little book called *Towards a European Parliament.* These were the days of Spaak, Schuman and Adenhauer; their successors together with the British and now the Spanish and Portuguese have made significant progress. Here I quote a passage about the existing European Parliament from Mr. Tugendhat's book: —

> "The election of Simone Veil, who as a girl had been taken with other French Jews to a German concentration camp and on whose arm one can still see the tattoo mark of her serial number, as President of the European Parliament, with German and French members dividing for and against her on party rather than national lines would have been unimaginable in 1945. . . . Too often the British, untouched by so many of the horrors of war 1914-18 as well as 1939-45 still find it hard to comprehend."

Progress has been made: the reader may well ask: 'Progress towards what?' Mr. Tugendhat's last chapter is entitled: *Journey to an unknown destination.* This also, I think is a good chapter heading. After suggesting a number of institutional and constitutional changes the author proceeds to look for promising signs of European co-operation or even partial co-operation, and growing habits of consultation. He gives some examples of partial co-operation such as the Air-Bus, Tornado Military Aircraft, the Falklands experience, combined efforts to confront world famine or disasters. He quotes Jung: — "The danger of Europe becoming a mere hyphen between America and Asia".

In a word Europe's survival may compel the Council of Ministers to act more and more together and to combine resources in order to match for example the output of research and production in the United States, who, owing to their Union can produce better results with lower costs. A specific example here is telecommunications, where European companies had spent ten billion dollars developing ten different digital switching systems. The same phenomenon can be found in several other industries concerned with high technology. Where possible Europe needs a partnership with the United States.

I am sure Mr. Tugendhat is right to stress the importance of the imponderables as well as concrete achievements. European Ministers are constantly meeting, especially foreign secretaries and Treasury chiefs: habits of co-operation grow yearly with exchange of confidential information. The Atlantic Alliance is the reality. Perhaps the participants do not realize that they are engaged on constructing a new dimension in Western politics. Such indeed is Mr. Tugendhat's analysis and I, as an early European, agree with him.

KENNETH LINDSAY

## A.I.D.S.

*AIDS — The Deadly Epidemic* by Graham Hancock and Enver Carim. Published by Gollancz, London, 1986. Hardback edn. £9.95.

During the 1980's a massive literature has accumulated on the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). It is right that this should be so because of the mounting incidence of the condition in many parts of the world and the profoundly disturbing nature of the disease in terms of public health. For example, in the UK the number of people currently infected with AIDS could be as high as 20,000 with another 20,000 likely to become infected during 1986.

The causative agent of AIDS has only recently been identified. It is now known to be a retrovirus but as yet the precise origins of the organism are not clearly understood. However, certain facts about AIDS have now been definitely established. The mortality rate from the disease is high, about half of the patients dying within a year of diagnosis. The condition ranges widely throughout the world affecting both developed and developing countries and in some areas of the planet the condition is assuming epidemic proportions. AIDS has a very long incubation period, sometimes in excess of 6 years and this renders diagnosis a matter of very great difficulty. Surveillance and control of the infection have proved to be exceptionally complex and its pre-

vention by chemotherapeutic means is not yet feasible. No specific therapy for AIDS currently exists and the development of an appropriate vaccine could well take several years.

This book is written for the general reader and describes the social implications and worldwide impact of AIDS. Early chapters discuss the global dissemination of the disease pointing out that although the majority of cases have so far been identified in the USA, significant numbers exist elsewhere including parts of Europe, Africa, Asia and the Western Pacific particularly Australia. There are interesting and enlightening comments on the maintentance of the international chain of infection particularly by individuals at high risk such as homosexuals, haemophiliacs, drug addicts using syringes and prostitutes. A chapter is devoted to the question of the origins of AIDS and the rancour amongst African scientists about repeated claims that the disease emanates from their continent is duly noted. That differences in the pattern of AIDS distribution exist between North America and Africa is now generally accepted. In the former the majority of cases are still amongst male homosexuals, whilst in Central Africa particularly in countries like Zaire, Rwanda and Uganda the disease affects men and women almost equally. This fact might suggest that the AIDS virus is transmitted in Africa in a different way, but the authors wisely conclude that the origin and epidemiology of the condition remain matters of acute controversy on which scientific opinion is split. It is obvious that this area is one in which the need for further research is both desirable and clamant.

The section dealing with the pathology and symptomatology of AIDS and with methods by which the disease can be contracted follows conventional lines and provides little or no new information. A well written chapter describing the personal and sociological implications of the diagnosis and including factors such as life insurance, marriage, employability and even burial is a notable feature.

As regards the treatment of AIDS a variety of approaches are considered including a battery of drugs differing widely in origin and mode of action, holistic healing and self help. It is concluded that current therapies solve few problems and extend life at best by only a few years.

The authors conclude that AIDS must be regarded as one of the major problems facing humankind in the final years of the 20th century. They state that governments have reacted too slowly to the spread of the disease, that further education is an urgent necessity and that increased funding for research in the field should rapidly be made available at the global level.

This book, although somewhat sensationalist in some parts and repetitious in others, makes a worthwhile contribution to a field of great contemporary interest and significance. For those interested in the global distribution of AIDS, the recognition of symptoms and the effects of the disease on the structure of modern society it is essential reading.

JOHN A. LORAINE

## HELEN WADDELL: A THWARTED LIFE?

*Helen Waddell. A Biography.* D. Felicitas Corrigan. Gollancz. £16.95.

The view of Helen Waddell held by those who knew her was of a thwarted life, during which she battled internal and external difficulties, enemies of promise, and ought to have achieved even more than *The Wandering Scholars, Peter Abelard, Medieval Latin Lyrics* and her other considerable writings. To

this view, now, her sympathetic and scholarly biographer largley subscribes, in a Life which is in some ways magnificent, and clearly the fruit of exacting research: the tone is a shade emotional and rhapsodic, but then Helen Waddell was an emotional person.

The first dynamic impediment in Helen Waddell's life, after the death of her missionary father, was, apparently, the malign influence of her relict step-mother who fed upon her like mistletoe, incongruously becoming, as Dame Felicitas Corrigan reveals, a dependent inebriate, and bound her to a hated, tall, narrow house in Belfast, when she should have proceeded from Queen's to Oxford. Instead, then, she found solace in a literary career, which, in fact, although she was always a scholar, better suited her temperament than a collegiate career, as she found when, released, she went up to Oxford. She was ten years late, and her hair was streaked with white. One of the most heartening aspects of her story, however, is the way in which her academic brilliance and originality were fully recognised, from the time when she was a very young woman. She was sought after and honoured, and hobnobbed with Baldwin and Queen Mary, who tried, in vain, to decline *mensa* for her. A remarkable episode was her well-documented taming of the dragon of G. G. Coulton, who was, quite simply, jealous. Other medievalists, such as the reviewer's greatly missed friend, F. J. E. Raby, whom she under-valued, with uncharacteristic sharpness, were more generous.

Another fetter on Helen Waddell's powers was her lack of an assured income — so that she expended 'lost' hours on examining, or publishing commitments. Even this is not unambiguous, nevertheless; large tracts of white time could have been counter-productive, although Dame Felicitas is convinced that Helen Waddell was a writer whose creative flow ill tolerated a Person from Porlock. A more telling hinderance was her own personality — self-immolatory and prone to the making of neurotic choices. Rejected suitors fell in packs by the wayside, her affections never deeply engaged, until she fastened upon the fatherly publisher, Otto Kyllmann, but denied him her embraces, which deprivation he avenged in old age by installing himself aloft in her house and exacting a penance of chains of meals on trays. It was this house, a rickety pile in Primrose Hill, reminding her of her childhood in Japan, which was the object of her final neurotic choice. Even here, the picture is confused by the illness — some form of pre-senile dementia — which indisputably thwarted a good decade or so. Born in Tokyo in 1889, Helen Waddell died, entirely lost, in North London, in 1965. Once she had been lauded as the most distinguished woman of her generation.

MOLLY TIBBS

## JOHN MIDDLETON MURRY, CRITIC AND REFORMER

*Beloved Quixote: the Unknown Life of John Middleton Murry.* Katherine Middleton Murry. Souvenir Press. £14.95.

The portion of John Middleton Murry's work which best exhibits his gifts and remains the most respected by writers is his literary criticism. Whilst editor of the *Athenaeum* and later of the *Adelphi* he was able to influence contemporary writers between the wars in a way which now appears out of all proportion to his own small output of novels and plays. He seemed in matters of style and Arnoldian high seriousness to be a Quiller Couch of the twenties. Perhaps the worst inhibitor of his creative output was the haunting effect on him of certain other writers such as his short-lived but powerful

wife, Katherine Mansfield, and his close friend and would-be mentor, D. H. Lawrence. He did, nevertheless, carry on the tradition of great criticism in the steps of Coleridge, Shelley and Keats, particularly in his book entitled *Keats and Shakespeare,* a work full of deep poetic insight.

It is of the personal tragedies in the writer's life that his daughter writes in her moving, frank biography. Katherine Middleton Murry is the inheritor of bitter experiences directly attributable to the strong inclination which her father felt to carry out at least one of Lawrence's more improbable social ideals. In his third marriage Murry lived in a remote Norfolk rectory with a wife who was apparently a simple country-woman but was in reality demented, an ex-housekeeper called Betty. She managed to turn this pastoral retreat into something approaching a living hell. The young Katherine, Murry's eldest child, whilst loving her step-siblings, was victimised by Betty: in her constant efforts to mediate, Katherine almost destroyed herself; and for thirty years thereafter she was unable to speak of her life in childhood and adolenscence.

Murry's daughter by his second wife, Violet le Maistre, Katherine was born barely two years after the tragic death from tuberculosis of her father's first wife, the talented but cruel Katherine Mansfield. Violet also died young of the same disease. Her daughter entered therefore upon a life of accumulated sorrows with Murry who was then, as later, profoundly influenced by his love for Katherine Mansfield and was still suffering from both her cruelty and her loss. The child became in imagination a surrogate for the one they both had hoped for before Katherine's illness. Indeed, years later the daughter found a note penned by her father which read, 'I always felt quite simply that Violet's daughter was Katherine's daughter and I named her accordingly'.

With remarkable powers of recall, not to mention astonishing courage, she recounts the events of a truly terrible life which she endured for her beloved father's sake, until his third, most disastrous, marriage was played out. The constant emotional turbulence ruined Murry's health; but it revealed to her his capacity for sustained, detached thought and for writing seriously in spite of it. Tilting at windmills meant for this Don Quixote pursuing successive 'perfect' theories in a continuing endeavour to change society for the better.

To his loyal daughter the overwhelming difficulties of daily personal encounters prevented both the fulfilment of his dreams and the public accord of his just deserts. Many extracts from hitherto unpublished journals show his dedicated pursuit of lost causes. Katherine Middleton Murry, no mean writer herself, has presented a vivid portrait of her father and has recalled to mind much of his achievement.

BETTY ABEL

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**War In Space** (Hamish Hamilton. £10.95.) This is a valuable study by Christopher Lee, the B.B.C.'s Defence and Foreign Affairs Correspondent. He is concerned with the development of the military use of space since the early fifties and the continual rivalry between Russia and the

United States. The other nuclear powers are not forgotten. He points out that 'Space development has been a curious mixture of the military and the laboratories working together'. Although there have been tremendous strides forward in the civilian sector, 'space is now dominated by the needs of the military' and 'today it can be shown that about three quarters of all satellites are used by the military'. He has a useful chapter on the Strategic Defence Initiative. He argues the technical difficulties in treating SD1 as a purely defensive and effective weapon, visualised by President Reagan. On the other hand he does not condemn the project. 'There is enough science and engineering to prove that SD1 could work in some *limited* form... By the end of this decade (barring international catastrophe) the world should know where the USA has reached with its programme'; and whether 'it is worthwhile developing the idea any further'. Equally we must watch the Russian progress in this field.

**Visionary Spires** (Waterstone. £16.95.) This is a volume largely of architectural drawings, edited by Sarah Crewe, with many excellent illustrations. She deals primarily with designs and plans which were rejected in the building or alteration of many of the great cathedrals and churches. She has reproduced many of these and discusses how they came to be turned down. An example is Christopher Wren's St. Pauls, when the Royal Warrant for the cathedral was not followed. Among many churches dealt with, Sarah Crewe includes St. Peter's Rome, Milan, Lille, St. John the Divine, New York, Truro, Edinburgh and Liverpool Cathedrals. This volume will appeal particularly to those interested in the history of these great edifices.

**Dickens and Women.** (Dent. £5.95.) Deserved paperback edition of Dr. Michael Slater's excellent study of 1983, bearing the same title. Going beyond mere stereotypic interpretations of the female characters in the novels, as related to the women who figured in Dickens' life, Dr. Slater examines his apperception of femaleness and of the rôle of women in Victorian society. A work of remarkable insight and deduction, which illuminates and revivifies every point that it touches. (M.T.)

**Master Crime** (Dent). This is a new paperback series of old and recent whodunnits. The first is Margery Allingham's *The Fashion in Shrouds* (£3.95), a story of high society in the thirties, and first published in 1939. *Head of a Traveller* (£3.95), is one of Cecil D. Lewis's enthralling thrillers published in 1949 under his pseudonym, Nicolas Blake. *The African Poison Murders* (£3.95) by Elspeth Huxley was published first in 1939, under the title, *Death of an Aryan.* A more recent crime novel included in the series is Simon Brett's *A Shock to the System* (£3.95). More titles are to appear later this year.

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# Contemporary Review

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## THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

by Keith D. Suter

'IF Mrs Aquino wins, things may get better or worse. But if Marcos wins, we know things will not get better.' This was the assessment that greeted me when I arrived in Manila on February 1 for the February 7 election. The events surrounding the election represent a turning point in the history of the Philippines. As I write, things have certainly started to get better. It remains to be seen whether they can continue that way.

Even if Mr Marcos had won the February election, his nation would still have headed into a post-Marcos era. His own ill-health, widespread political opposition, growing economic problems and the growth of guerrilla warfare would all have eventually driven him from office. His political party would have found it very difficult to maintain both its internal unity and its grasp over the machinery of government.

The achievements of Mrs Aquino include her transformation from being on the periphery of politics to being an astute, articulate political campaigner. She and her colleagues secured a comparatively smooth transfer of power and thus saved her nation a further protracted and violent struggle against a decaying regime. However she progresses as president, her place in history is secure. She has leapt from relative obscurity to being one of the world's most inspiring leaders.

Ferdinand Marcos, alas, has earned himself a place in history very different from the one he anticipated. If he had retired when, under the then constitution, he should have done, he would now be regarded as one of the fathers of his nation. Some of his current critics were among his early supporters. Much of the progress he made at the beginning he himself later undermined.

Marcos, aged 68, has had a very full life. Until January 1986, he was regarded as his nation's most decorated World War II soldier. On the eve of his final election, his record was found to be a fake (as was much of his later political activity). But, leaving aside his wartime experience, he certainly did begin his political career at an unusually young age (32) and made rapid progress. He had a remarkable capacity for hard work and self-discipline. He completed a law degree while in prison (for murder) and defended himself in court. He scored one of the highest marks in Filipino law examination history. He also trained himself to

withstand pain and fight ill-health. Prior to the February 1986 election, it was assumed that the only threat to his reign was his kidney ailment, which he fought against as hard as his human competitors. By the early 1960s, he was seen as an inevitable president. He won the 1965 election and, contrary to the previous pattern of elections he secured re-election in 1969. (One other person did that — Carlos P. Garcia — but he had assumed office in March 1957, months before the election, having been Vice President when President Ramon Magsaysay was killed in an air crash). President Marcos was, therefore, a popular politician, widely recognized for his policies in developing his nation's economy and making the nation a leading Asian power. Having developed a taste for power, he did not want to surrender it as, under the constitution, he was obliged not to seek a third term in office. To avoid the required stepping down from power in 1973, he declared martial law in 1972 and suspended the constitution.

The February 1986 election was, in a sense, a competition between a dying man and a dead man. Mr Marcos's 'opponent' was a man murdered on August 21, 1983: Benigno Aquino. The President had, directly or indirectly, created the martyr who was to destroy him less than three years later. Not even Jeffrey Archer could create a novel based on a plot in which this man's widow avenged the murder!

Ex-Senator Aquino, widely tipped to be President Marcos's successor, was gaoled in September 1972 as part of the martial law programme. He was charged with subversive activities, murder and the illegal possession of firearms. None of these charges could be substantiated. At one point, in 1977, he was sentenced to death by a military tribunal (which had little interest in the rules of evidence). But international pressure, especially from the United States, stalled the carrying out of that sentence. Nonetheless his continued imprisonment, accompanied with the prospect of death (through judicial decision or 'accident') eroded his health. In May 1980 he was released and flown to the US, ostensibly for medical treatment. In or out of prison he was the de facto leader of the Filipino opposition. (Incidentally, since it is now so fashionable to be critical of President Carter, it was notable that Mr Aquino credited him with his eventual release).

After three years' medical treatment, reflection and research, Mr Aquino decided to return to his nation. His flight was one of the most publicized trips by an out-of-power politician. President Marcos informed the media beforehand that certain groups planned to kill him if he did return. Undeterred, Mr Aquino flew in, knowing that his ultimate fate would be either the presidency or assassination. He was shot dead within seconds of touching the Manila Airport tarmac.

Rolando Galman was blamed for the killing. He was immediately shot dead by the guards that were there to protect Mr Aquino. Mr Galman, alleged by the President to be a communist agent, had been taken into military custody four days earlier. There was little doubt that both he and Mr Aquino were killed by the guards. The question was not so much

one of his guilt but, rather, who organised the killings and to what extent was the President directly involved? The opinions I got while in Manila indicated, ironically, that Mr Marcos was unlikely to have planned the assassination — he would have had done it more efficiently (such as by arranging a motor accident). But it was evident that he gave the general instruction for Mr Aquino to be killed and left it to his former car driver and later army chief, General Fabian Ver, to do the planning.

The assassination transformed Filipino politics. The President by his own errors was by this time in a no-win situation. Mr Aquino's imprisonment had made a politician into a folk hero. His assassination made his cause the rallying point for many middle class Filipinos who had previously taken little interest in politics.

But the opposition was far from united around any individual. Filipino parties are not as fixed as in, say, the UK. Family rivalries and personalities are much more important than platforms. Most of the politicians (including Mr Marcos) have changed parties in their careers. The front runner was Salvador 'Doy' Laurel, who promised a platform not greatly different from the President's, except with less corruption.

Sensing the confusion among his opponents and realizing that the economy was heading for a continuing decline, the President took the gamble of his life. Meanwhile President Reagan, whose approach to human rights is less strident than President Carter's, reacted to domestic US pressure by encouraging President Marcos to prove that he had the widespread popular support he claimed. He brought forward the presidential election by 15 months. True to form, the method of calling a premature election was illegal even under his own (1981) constitution and he refused to stand down for the duration of the campaign (as he was supposed to do). The election was going to be vintage Marcos: corrupt and with an assured victory.

The decision to call the snap election was announced on November 3 1985. His re-election seemed assured. But all that confidence disappeared in five weeks. Throughout November the opposition candidates stood down in favour of creating unity. He was left with Doy Laurel and a very reluctant Mrs Aquino. On December 2 all the 26 military personnel who had been implicated in Mr Aquino's assassination were acquitted. On December 3 Mrs Aquino shed her reservations and declared her candidacy. On December 12 Mr Laurel withdrew his candidacy and agreed to stand as the vice-presidential candidate for Mrs Aquino. Many Filipinos enjoyed one of their happiest Christmasses for years.

Living in Australia gives a person a certain insensitivity to political corruption and a high degree of cynicism for most politicians. Election week in the Philippines represented a visit to another planet. People were taking politics seriously. They really did believe that the election could see the end of the Marcos nightmare.

But the chances of an Aquino victory still seemed slight. The election was the most corrupt in Filipino history. The first stage consisted of a dirty election campaign run by Mr Marcos, in which the electronic media,

largely controlled by him, ignored Mrs Aquino in their news programmes. The television and radio election advertisements were downright fraudulent. (Mrs Aquino, of course, could not afford the advertising campaign of Mr Marcos). One Marcos advertisement consisted of footage of guerrilla fighting in Cambodia and Vietnam and a woman imitating Mrs Aquino's voice saying that she ('Mrs Aquino') could not defeat the communists because she was only a woman. The second stage, on election day February 7, consisted of some Aquino supporters arriving to vote and finding their names omitted from the electoral rolls. Meanwhile coach loads of Marcos voters were being transferred from one precinct to another, thereby following the motto of voting early and voting often. The third stage consisted of miscounting the ballots and, for the senior staff of the Marcos-controlled electoral commission, trying to award the election to Mr Marcos.

The country plunged into virtually an ungovernable state. Foreign investors were nervous lest he fled the nation before they, too, had a chance to go. The Armed Forces were divided between those who owed their positions to Mr Marcos and so had a vested interest in keeping him in power, those who supported Mrs Aquino, and those who were reluctant to declare their hand before they knew for sure who was going to come out on top.

The US government itself was unclear what to do. My assessment is that the embassy officials and the C.I.A. looked to Mrs Aquino as the preferable victor. Americans have an addiction for 'third forces' — apparently clean candidates who are not identified with the ruling conservatives but are not communists. From 1954 onwards, for example, this formula resulted in Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam, who was not identified with the French colonial masters and yet who could unite the new territory against the communists. The longer Mr Marcos remained in power, the greater was his liability to the US because his regime was, in effect, driving people into supporting the communists.

Unfortunately the Reagan White House had put itself out on a limb in supporting Mr Marcos. President Reagan distanced himself from President Carter's human rights policy and he welcomed Mr Marcos' re-election in the June 1981 presidential election, which had been boycotted by all his principal opponents. Vice President Bush, at the Marcos June 30 inauguration, stated enthusiastically that 'we love your adherence to democratic principles and to the democratic process, and we will not leave you in isolation.' There was, therefore, a need for an internal American Government debate in which eventually the officials convinced the White House that the time had come to leave him in isolation. The White House evidently hoped that the Marcos electoral margin of victory would be so large that allegations of cheating could be discounted. The immense scale of the blatant cheating, alongside the figure that Mrs Aquino still managed to achieve, ended that hope. Mr Marcos no longer had any claim to govern.

But Mr Marcos still clung to power. Like an old gambler with a record

of successes, he somehow expected to pull something out of the hat at the last moment. The Reagan Administration's dithering gave him cause for hope. Isolated in the palace, surrounded by his appointees who evidently assured him that the nation still needed him, and unable to rely on outside assessments from the electronic media (which he controlled and so they were not purveying impartial information) he was confronted with increasing chaos. A brilliant career was in tatters. His mark on history would consist of more attention to his downfall than to his initial achievements. He fled Manila on February 26.

President Aquino has inherited immense Filipino goodwill, instant international political superstar status, and a nation which is on the verge of collapse. She has achieved one seemingly impossible mission: spearheading the popular campaign to remove her predecessor with minimal bloodshed. She has earned her place in history. But the prospects are gloomy. First she has got a cabinet containing some figures who lived well under Marcos. Defence Minister 'Johnny' Enrile, for example, was a firm Marcos backer who has, as an opportunist, changed sides but retains his old job. She has had to retain some Marcos appointees since they know how the nation operates. There is, especially for the White House, a reassuring degree of continuity. But the influx of new members, some of whom (not least the President) suffered at the hands of the old guard, will create problems for President Aquino in maintaining unity.

Second, the economy will need to be rebuilt. The Marcos electoral campaign will result in a new round of inflation because so much money was printed to cover the Marcos electoral campaign expenses. The international banking community has already indicated its willingness to provide further assistance with the repayment of foreign debts. Nations which in early February, were preparing to cut off foreign aid to the Marcos regime, are now preparing to pour money into the Aquino Administration. But the problems are not simply ones of borrowing money. There has to be — as President Marcos recognized two decades ago — a major restructuring of the economy, such as land reform. This will bring her (as it did him) into a head-on collision with the traditional ruling families (such as her own), which will try to thwart major reforms. The Marcos strategy avoided land reform and went, instead, for export-oriented commodity production, with transnational corporations being promised cheap labour and docile trade unions. The foreign tourist industry converted Manila into one of the world's leading centres for prostitution, with the creation of 'sex tours' to Manila. President Aquino will have to develop economic strategies based on land reform, economic justice and an end to sexploitation.

Third, the communist New Peoples Army will fight on. It has lost its main recruiting sergeant, Mr Marcos, and potential or actual supporters may want to see what President Aquino can do to help them before supporting the NPA further. But the NPA will not disappear. It faces a tough period, with Mr Marcos gone, but as disillusionment sets in with the Aquino Administration — all governments fail to produce the results

their supporters hope for — then it can expect an eventual upturn in business. It currently controls about twenty percent of the country. Talk of an 'impending civil war' is therefore wrong — it has been underway for years.

Fourth, the Muslim Moro Liberation Front will fight on. By the time the Spanish arrived in the sixteenth century, the southern islands were already well linked by the Muslim religion, miscegenation and trade to the rest of Islam, and shared a sense of identity within an international system. The Spanish built up their control in the northern islands and never fully controlled the southern islands. The Americans inherited this challenge. A noted Indian-fighter, General Arthur MacArthur (father of General Douglas MacArthur), was transferred to the new American colony to tackle this problem. The Americans, too, failed fully to break the Muslim resistance. All the post-independence Filipino leaders have also failed. The resurgence of a militant Islam (as manifested in Iran and Afghanistan) and the prospect of Arab oil money (especially from Libya) mean that President Aquino will probably be no more successful in this matter than her predecessors.

The Marcos nightmare is over. I believe that Mr Marcos himself will not live for much longer; two decades of rule have worn him out. But his nation's nightmare is far from over. President Aquino has scored a remarkable triumph. But the underlying problems which her predecessor could not solve — and often made worse — will haunt her for the rest of her presidency. However, she is a tough, resilient and charismatic leader. She has given her people a sense of hope that life can be made better. In an era of international doom and gloom, that alone is a good foundation upon which to rebuild the nation.

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# THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE

## by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (in conversation with Dr. Cedomir Vuckovic)

*Cedomir Vuckovic:* The people of Kampuchea have been fighting to restore freedom and independence. What can you tell us about the present situation in Kampuchea and the outlook for the fighting men of Democratic Kampuchea in the year 1986?

*Prince Norodom:* It is a fact that our soldiers are fighting heroically; they are extremely courageous, penetrating deeper and deeper into Kampuchea to attack the Vietnamese; they are fighting guerrilla fashion, using the tactic of strike and withdraw. Our fighting men are not in Pnom Penh but they are all around it; they are all over Kampuchea; they can carry out acts of sabotage and attack the Vietnamese throughout the country. But the question is: can we count on a military victory over Vietnam? It is true that the majority of the people in Kampuchea are helping and supporting us in fighting against the Vietnamese. The people realise that the Vietnamese have come in order to remain in Kampuchea, to 'vietnamize' Kampuchea and not to saving the people of Kampuchea from the Red Khmers and Pol Pot. The people see that there are over half a million Vietnamese settlers in Kampuchea, who have come to take our land, to exploit our natural resources. The people also know that the Vietnamese do not want to give them independence. The Kampuchean people are not free; every day brings violations of human rights in my country. All this the people see very clearly. New soldiers are joining us all the time. The young people are ready to fight against the Vietnamese. China is giving us more weapons and military equipment. But, I repeat, the question is: can we count on a military victory over Vietnam? We must admit that the Vietnamese are very powerful. It cannot be said that the situation for them now in Kampuchea is the same as it was for the Americans in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. The Vietnamese have been in Kampuchea a long time, since the 1940s. They know Kampuchea well; they have been there since the time of the war against the French occupiers. But it is also true that neither can the Vietnamese break the Khmer resistance. The dry season lasts from November to June and the Vietnamese are preparing a big new offensive against us and against the resistance fighters. In spite of this, in February I shall return to the free zone in Kampuchea, near the Thai border, to meet with the military forces of Democratic Kampuchea, with my followers, with my people. I shall preside over a working session of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea and we shall consider the new situation. I do not think that the Vietnamese will be able to destroy the forces of resistance even by a new offensive. But, I still wonder, can we beat them?

Frankly, I do not think we are in a position to do so. That is why I say we must conduct a war of resistance against the occupation forces in order to compel Vietnam to sit down with us at the negotiating table.

*Cedomir Vuckovic:* Most of the countries of the world extend moral support to you and your fighting men, and some of them material assistance as well. Are you satisfied with that support and assistance?

*Prince Norodom:* Yes, I am very satisfied. I do not complain. I am grateful to China, Yugoslavia and all the countries supporting us in the United Nations. Each year we win more votes in the UN, this year more than last. Two years ago we had only 105 votes, and at the last session 114. The number of negative votes and abstentions is diminishing. The majority supported the United Nations resolution asking the Vietnamese to leave Kampuchea, to permit the Kampuchean people to live in freedom, to be the masters of their fate. This puts strong pressure on the Vietnamese to agree to a political solution. But the Vietnamese understand only the language of force. Even if the United Nations resolutions were passed with I do not know what kind of majority, they could not compel the Vietnamese to agree to a political solution. So we must continue the war. We must step up military resistance in order to persuade Vietnam and the Soviet Union to agree to the convening of an international conference. When we get such a conference we can expect it to solve essential problems, not all problems perhaps, but at least the essential ones. We receive humanitarian assistance from many countries, from Europe, the ASEAN, Japan, China and the USA. We are highly appreciative of this. We have diplomatic relations with many countries, which gives us great encouragement. Yes, all in all, we are satisfied with the support and assistance. We do not complain.

*Cedomir Vuckovic:* You have always advocated the peaceful settlement of controversies and conflicts. Are there any chances of the Kampuchean problem being solved through negotiations between the parties concerned? What kind of a formula could be used for such negotiations, in your view?

*Prince Norodom:* The so-called Kampuchean problem is not a problem created by Kampuchea. We are victims of confrontation between the big powers. Vietnam has occupied us and behind Vietnam is the Soviet Union. I think that China should not only give us weapons, ammunition and money to enable us to fight against foreign occupation but also should help us in the search for a political settlement. I ask China, American President Reagan and political figures in other countries to help us in this process of seeking a political solution. Talks about Kampuchea between China and the Soviet Union would be highly useful or, if it were possible, between China and Vietnam or between the United States and the Soviet Union or the United States and Vietnam. I believe Yugoslavia

could also play a very important role as a country that is not involved in the controversy but generally hopes to see Kampuchea once again an independent and non-aligned country, neutral, like Austria. That would be a good thing for everyone. After the Second World War, East and West agreed that Austria would be neutral; the Austrian people were ready to be neutral and so Austria became a neutral country. This solution has been and remains a great contribution to peace and stability not only in Europe but beyond. Austria, like Switzerland, is a bridge between East and West, between the socialist and capitalist countries. We, too, would like to play such a small but important role for the benefit of all peoples, including the big powers. As a buffer, we could guarantee peace and stability in our region. As a non-aligned country, we could offer guarantees to both sides. Vietnam and the Soviet Union do not want Kampuchea to be a satellite of China. China says she does not want Kampuchea to be a satellite of hers, but neither is she willing to see Kampuchea belong to Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Thailand wants a neutral Kampuchea as a link between Vietnam and Thailand. A neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea would be useful to everyone, the United States and China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam, Thailand and the other countries of the ASEAN. As a neutral country, we would be ready to cooperate with everyone, not only with one side. We would permit all countries to open embassies and consulates in Kampuchea. We want relations not only with our great neighbours the Chinese but with everyone. But for the present Vietnam and the Soviet Union do not want us free because the Soviet Union has strategic interests in this region.

*Cedomir Vuckovic:* What is your view of the present situation in the non-aligned movement and of its prospects for the future?

*Prince Norodom:* I am not satisfied with the present situation among the non-aligned. In this movement there are many countries such as Yugoslavia, Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and a number of African, Arab and other countries of the Third World who continue to support me, Sihanouk, as a founder of the non-aligned movement, and who are helping the endeavours of the Kampuchean people to become free again and Kampuchea to be a truly non-aligned country. But having said this I must add that the non-aligned movement did not serve its own interests or raise its prestige when it kept Democratic Kampuchea away from its conferences. We were kept out of the conferences in India, Luanda and elsewhere. This is in contradiction with the principles of justice, freedom and peace; in direct opposition to the ideas of Panch Sheela, the Bandung Conference and objectives of the non-aligned. How did it come to this? Because, among the non-aligned countries there are some who are very much aligned. I do not ask that they be expelled from the movement, but why did they seek to expel us, Democratic Kampuchea? We are the victims of aggression, Vietnam is the aggressor. Why is an aggressor received at non-aligned conferences, and the victim barred? Countries supporting Kam-

puchea wanted me, Sihanouk, present at the non-aligned conference in New Delhi and to speak; but I was not allowed to go to India. I was among the heads of state who were present at the Bandung Conference. And recently, when the 30th anniversary of that conference was celebrated, Suharto invited me to come, but the Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong and the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said they would not attend the conference if I did! If a great country, a symbol of non-alignment such as India, does not want to recognize my government it should then be neutral and neither should it recognize the government of Heng Samrin, who was ensconced in Pnom Penh by a foreign power, namely Vietnam. India in particular should not support the aggressor against the victim. If it wants prestige and to serve peace and freedom in the world, the non-aligned movement must respect its own ideals.

*Cedomir Vuckovic:* The Yugoslav people have always felt warmly toward you and your country. What can you tell us about the ties between the peoples of the two countries?

*Prince Norodom:* Officially, my country joined the other founders of the non-aligned movement after the Tito-Nehru-Nasser meeting on Brioni Island. There, at Brioni, I signed our 'accession' in the name of Kampuchea. Since then we have been cooperating closely with Yugoslavia, while it was headed by President Tito, and after Tito with the new leadership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I should like to stress that, for us, the role played by the Yugoslav press is extremely important. Yugoslavia is far from southeast Asia but it is nonetheless a member of the third world community. It is also a European country. Every year I go twice to Thailand and to the liberated region of Kampuchea in the vicinity of the Thai border. Last year, Yugoslavia sent its ambassador in Bangkok to our liberated territory to present me with the letters of credence of the ambassador to Kampuchea. Yugoslavia is very well aware that events in Asia, Africa and Latin America influence events in Europe and vice versa. In pursuit of our struggle for freedom, we Kampucheans also must take a lively interest in what is going on in other parts of the world, particularly in the UK, Europe and the USA.

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# A BRITISH DILEMMA

## by James Avery Joyce

IN the 1950s, lawyers were calling for a Justice Department. In April 1952 I contributed an article to *Contemporary Review* on 'Do we need a Ministry of Justice?'.

I based my positive plea on the ideas of Lord Haldane, which I said 'had gone much further than any of his predecessors' had done.' After describing the current controversy I attempted to explain why Lord Haldane had 'pressed for a Ministry of Justice to remedy this chronic state of overlapping and overwork', and how 'trends in national law-making have served only to strengthen his plea.'

Lord Haldane is dead. We are still without a Ministry of Justice. It is now time—in fact has been for years—for a British Bill of Rights. The judges' debate is in full swing—on both sides, of course. Here, we can look at only a few of the things that they are saying. There has not yet appeared any sign of a consensus.

> It is nearly three centuries since the last Bill of Rights was passed in this country,

declaims Lord Scarman, and he continues:

> The enactment of a modern one, which would take account of the social, political, legal, and cultural changes in our environment since 1689, has many attractions. But it also raises a number of problems of content, of form, of enforcement, and of the manner and degree of the constitutional protection to be given it.[1]

Britain's present concern owes much of its intensity to the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights and especially to the unexpectedly large number of adverse verdicts delivered by the Strasbourg Court. A quarter of a century has now passed since the Convention was signed. Unlike in some countries (Austria, Belgium, France and Italy, for instance), the European Convention does not become, as lawyers say ,'self-executing' in English domestic law. Special legislation would be needed to transform the provisions of the Convention into directly applicable law in this country. This has already happened with Common Market law, but not with the European Convention on Human Rights.

For this and other reasons a wide public debate has developed in Britain —and not among lawyers only—as to whether the European Convention, which has come down so heavily on Britain, should not find its way onto the Statute Book. A number of public enquiries have already been set on foot. But the issue—a revolutionary one in British constitutional practice—is by no means near settlement. For example, a leading layman protagonist for enacting the European Convention as part of English law, so that the courts can enforce it directly at the suit of all citizens, sets out the positive case as follows: 'If conflicting claims to rights are to be resolved in ways that are just, and are seen and felt to be just', says Tom Sargant, the redoubtable former Secretary of Justice, the British branch of the International Commission of Jurists, whose interventions in cases before the Strasbourg Court have been many:

> there must be just laws, and just courts in which they can be asserted, and enforced. An independent judiciary, and a fearless, honest and independent legal profession are essential prerequisites for the Rule of Law—all the more so now that there is an appeal to International Human Rights Law to determine whether domestic laws are just laws . . . and each nation must find the most appropriate means for achieving that end within its territory.[2]

As Lord Gardiner, a former Lord Chancellor, has pointed out on more than one occasion, the European Convention is still not part of our domestic law, though it is more than a quarter of a century since we became bound by it diplomatically. The consequence is, suggests Sargant, that our own courts, unlike those of many other European countries, cannot apply the Convention, and our citizens cannot go to them to seek redress for its infringement, but must go to Strasbourg instead.

As the British Institute of Human Rights has stated, this situation has nothing to do with a written constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament or administrative law. We could have a Bill of Rights (for example, in the form of the European Convention) without a written constitution. We could have a written constitution without having a Bill of Rights. We could have either, or both, without fettering the sovereignty of Parliament. This might seem to answer the worries of those opponents of a Bill who are more concerned, in recent letters to *The Times*, to defend the British Constitution than to advance the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mr. William Yonge writes (19 January 1985):

> Under a Bill of Rights, the very rigidity of its statutes renders them more liable to abuse. The establishment of one particular set of laws, intended to cover all eventualities, would probably lead to confusion rather than to better organisation. Under our unwritten Constitution the adaptability of our conventions makes it far easier to give rulings suited to each individual case.

There is no doubt that this variety of constitutional choices has slowed down any governmental or Parliamentary decision on so vital a subject—quite apart from the preceding 300 years of non-action. Some constitutional lawyers, of course, believe in 'letting sleeping dogs lie.' But others, shaken by the succession of adverse Strasbourg judgments, in the over 80 UK cases that have already gone into the European process, suspect that that faithful English mastiff, the Law, can no longer be left to slumber peacefully in a seventeenth-century nostalgia.

The tenacious Lord Justice Scarman warned us in his provocative 1974 Hamlyn Lecture of new challenges. He has likewise stated:

> A few years ago there was almost no English legal literature on the subject. The unwritten constitution enshrining the sovereignty of Parliament was the basic assumption of English legal thinking. All is changed: the volume of literature is now impressive. The English, who are in one of their revolutionary phases, are questioning all their institutions and assumptions—including their constitution and the efficacy of their legal system to protect their fundamental rights and freedoms.[3]

'The question is no longer', asserted the Lord Justice: 'do we need a Bill of Rights?'

> but, what sort of Bill of Rights do we need? Bearing in mind that we as a people prefer our revolutions to be painless, I think the answer must be an ordinary statute based on the European Convention and limited to the regulation of the relations between State and citizen.

Meantime, warnings against expecting too much from a Bill of Rights have been falling thick and fast, delaying still further any positive action by the authorities. Are we not taking on too much by thinking that where the Continent leads, Britain can safely follow? Another Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, delivering the annual Richard Sullivan lecture, thought that it would hardly be worth the trouble of having a British Bill of Rights, except as part of a basic constitutional change.

Lord Hailsham expressed lukewarm support for a British Bill, but he insisted:

> A Bill of Rights is no panacea. It will not wash woollens. It will not meet the growing pressure for local assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. It will offer no protection against our present system of voting, if protection is required.

In his view:

> It will offer only a limited safeguard against the misuse of Parliament's unlimited power of legislation by a temporary junta of jacks in office. It will do nothing to supply the want of an acceptable and effective second chamber. It may do little or nothing to prevent oppression by large corporations or unions.

'By itself,' Lord Hailsham concluded:

> it is only marginally worth the trouble and the labour. As part, however, of a radical overhaul of our constitutional arrangements, a Bill of Rights entrenching the European Convention on Human Rights, is a modest but desirable addition to the armament of liberty against populist or bureaucratic intrusion and oppression.[4]

There are admittedly considerable difficulties ahead. British judges have little experience in interpreting rules as vaguely drawn as the Convention. The TUC is uneasy at the picture of still wider judicial discretion. So are certain Cabinet Ministers. The United Kingdom's forces of order in Northern Ireland wonder what limits the Convention would put on their own powers, especially over holding suspects.

The fairness of judges in being given yet greater power to interpret social legislation was strongly attacked at a recent National Council for Civil Liberties Conference called to debate whether Britain should introduce a Bill of Rights. 'Our judiciary has a long and continuing record of fighting progress and of opposing Parliament's reforms', was a typical comment by Mr. Stephen Sedley, a Labour barrister, arguing against a Bill:

> Once the courts are presented with a choice of interpretations, the field is open to the judges to decide according to their own predilections and prejudices, and every practising lawyer knows what they are.

The list of examples was endless: the Rent Acts, slum-clearing legislation, factory safety legislation — all had a long history of judicial obstruction:

> causing Parliament to legislate to repair the damage done by lawyers and judges. How much more obstruction could they create with the backing of a Bill or Rights, that set them in judgment on Parliament?

These are strong views. The danger of British judges becoming linked with politics if a Bill of Rights were introduced was discussed at a recent seminar at the Annual Conference of the Law Society. Lord Justice Scarman, whose Hamlyn Lecture, cited above, had been instrumental in revising the call for a Bill, presided over a panel consisting of Dr. James Fawcett, who had been President of the European Commission of Human Rights, and Professor Harry Street, Professor of English Law at Manchester

University. Professor Street asserted that there were many areas in which the citizen was being unfairly treated by the executive. The balance between the state and the individual was not a fair one. But would the judges correct this imbalance under a Bill of Rights?

Lord Justice Scarman naturally disagreed that judges might become unfairly political if a Bill of Rights were introduced. As he said:

> The courts are already in the arena of politics. Yet, instead of being the bold matador looking the bull in the face, they are running away. But they are still in the arena. Dr. Fawcett, with his European experience, took the view that a Bill of Rights would not make British judges 'political.'

Another Barrister, Mr. Anthony Lester, with long experience of the European system and Chairman of the recently-formed Interrights Group in London, sums up the uneven 'balance' of legal opinion:

> In 1978, a Lords select committee recommended incorporation, albeit by only six votes to five. Later that year, he select committee's report was debated in the Lords. Lord Wade, whose original Bill had resulted in the setting-up of the select committee, successfully moved an amendment urging the Government to introduce a bill of rights to incorporate the convention into our domestic law. In 1979, after the change of government, Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor, attempted without success, to interest the political parties in holding constitutional talks on incorporation. Understandably, he has referred to his 'growing sense of despair and exasperation at the appalling conservatism of the legal profession' and at 'the appalling inertia of the political machine . . . in anything which is in the nature of structural change.'[5]

So what is the state of play at this date? Ranged on the side of incorporation are two Lord Chancellors (Hailsham and Gardiner), Lord Scarman, two Home Secretaries (Leon Brittan and Roy Jenkins) and two Attorneys-General, Sir Michael Havers and, probably, Sam Silkin). Ranged against incorporation are former Lord Chancellor Elwyn-Jones, Lord Diplock and Lord Denning. They are supported by a majority in the Labour Party and presumably by a majority in Mrs. Thatcher's Cabinet.

Outside Europe entirely, the record of the first year of strong Labour government in Australia makes an interesting comparison by showing 'the extent to which political determination can transform the legal systems, which both countries have in common.' Says Geoffrey Robertson:

> Most importantly, top of the legislative programme [for 1984] is a Bill of Rights, incorporating the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights into local law, and supplementing it with an enforcement machinery which includes a Human Rights Commission and Human Rights Task Force.[6]

So perhaps we had better leave the British dilemma where Lord Templeman left it in suspense in his address to *Justice* last year, when he had to confess that 'the strong majority in favour of incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law had diminished in recent years. It raised two areas of particular difficulty: the right to enjoy property and whether judges or Parliament should have the last word.' He added:

> The Indian constitution enshrined the right to enjoy property. While the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was silent on property rights. Should people whose property has been taken over by the State be compensated? If so, how much should they get and who should decide? The second difficulty was whether Parliament or the judges should be the final arbiters. In the USA, the Supreme Court had arrogated this power to itself in 1803. The Indian constitution left it with Parliament, provided there was a two-thirds majority in each

> House for any constitutional change. However, the Indian Supreme Court subsequently decided that it had the final say. In Canada, the only inalienable rights were for the electorate to choose the legislators at least once every five years, and to require them to meet at least once a year . . . [7]

So the debate continues, the dilemma still unresolved. That faithful mastiff can go on sleeping a little longer.

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NOTES

1. Quoted in pamphlet by Michael Zander: *A British Bill of Rights* (1975).
2. *Justice*, Annual Report for 1972 (Lndn).
3. The Law Society *Gazette*, 29 September 1976.
4. *The Times*, 26 May 1977.
5. *The Times*, 6 November 1983.
6. *The Guardian*, 30 January 1984.
7. *Justice*, The Annual Report for 1984 (Londn).

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[For some years, Dr. Joyce has served as a Consultant on Human Rights at the United Nations in Geneva. His new book, *Human Rights Today: A Realistic Appraisal*, was published by Allen and Unwin during the summer of 1985.]

The June issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Gorbachev and the 27th Party Congress* by Martin McCauley, *The European Parliament: A Progress Report* by Baroness Elles, MEP, *The Mandelstam Experience* by A. L. Rowse and *Council House Sales: The Rights and Wrongs* by Mark Cook.

# KEEPING THE WHEELS OF DEVELOPMENT TURNING

## by J. B. Wood

THESE days a lot is heard about the ever-growing need for new loans and capital investment to maintain the viability of a number of countries on the one hand, and the worries about the international debt problem on the other. In all this, the art of keeping what is already there in operation is not a topic. That art, more commonly known as maintenance has become a forgotten dimension of development.

There is more to maintenance than the old concept of someone puttering around machinery with an oil can. In industrial societies, it is an integral part of feasibility, cost-benefit and general profitability calculations and is an item appearing in the annual budget estimate of industries and enterprises. This has to be so since the whole impetus of industrial complexes is to produce more goods at less cost. Unplanned down-time, below capacity operation or breakdown of supporting infrastructure, raise costs in relation to output. In recent years cost reductions have generally been achieved through increasingly sophisticated technology to off-set rising labour costs. The maintenance of such sophisticated plant and equipment has called for corresponding increases in the skill levels and in the range of skills of maintenance staff, leading in many cases to a policy of component replacement rather than repair and maintenance.

One of the historical factors of development in the industrialized countries has been the ability of a reasonable percentage of its citizenry to maintain and repair their infrastructure and means of production. The trend towards greater sophistication to maintain a competitive edge while keeping costs down has meant that the percentage of the citizenry capable of maintaining the means of production has decreased and there is an increasing reliance on what might be termed technological elites. These changes and challenges have largely been met, albeit not without some headaches, in the industrialized world but for the developing countries of the Third World their effects have been far more destructive. Very little of the Third World's means of production and infrastructure in the modern sector are the artifacts of their own societies but of external ones. Consequently the proportion of their population capable of maintaining such exotic products is minimal. Little wonder that many observers of the developing world comment on the lack of interest in the upkeep of plant and infrastructure in general.

Some idea of the scale of the problem can be gained from the capital flow from industrialized donor countries to the Third World reflected in the figures of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, which in 1983 totalled US$27.5 billion, of which approximately 15-20% is spent on some form of plant or equipment requiring maintenance. The service life expectancy of such items forms part of the investment and loan

calculations; failure to provide for and carry out effective maintenance often reduces the service life to a fraction of that provided for, with all the ensuing losses of investment and of production.

Taken at the level of theory and principle, there is general agreement among governments, institutions, donors and employees that maintenance is desirable and should be encouraged. There is consequently nothing new in the concept. It does not even have to be raised as an issue in the industrialized countries where it is accepted as a fact of life. In many parts of the developing world, however, it is not an ingrained concept. There has consequently been no particular consistency in its application or recognition of the important role it plays in economic development.

The question also needs to be seen in the perspective of history and of social relevance. Many nineteenth century European living rooms were hung with prints in the romantic style showing peasants living in huts set among decaying greco-roman edifices. The enquiring mind would ask why those fine buildings were not restored and put to use. The answer is that the massive buildings had no social relevance for the later population who had other life-styles and who had lost the maintenance skills. The art of brick-making was lost in England for almost 500 years after the departure of the Romans. Wattle and daub, thatch with some stonework were more socially relevant and suited to the skill levels of the population at the time. Along with social relevance there is also the process of aculturation that has to be taken into account. For the past several generations, children in the industrialized countries have been introduced to technology, not only through living and growing up with it, but also in the form of playthings, such as meccanos, construction blocks, chemistry sets etc and by good science teaching in the formal education system. Thus, even those children who received a general, non-technical education have known about the principles of electricity and physics, the operation of various engines, reduction gears, hydraulics and so forth over the last hundred years or so. In this way a kind of empathy has often been built up between operator and machine, perhaps best epitomized in the English language usage of calling ships and cars 'she' rather than 'it'. Furthermore, along with the industrial revolution in the mid nineteenth century there developed in Europe and North America a work ethic that equated hard material work to spiritual virtue. This, linked to the production rhythms of industrialization, enhanced the value of time and the utilization of time.

Virtually none of these things applied to the non-industrialized world. It is therefore against this background that the questions of maintenance and technology transfer in all its related concepts must be seen. Almost all the development that had taken place in the Third World, particularly in Africa and Asia, had been labour-intensive, but in order to build up an industrial base and create a modern state most developing countries have had to make use of capital-intensive models and notably equipment designed for the capital-intensive conditions in the country of manufacture. In this way many of the valuable original skills and non-industrial

techniques came to be looked upon as outmoded and therefore less prestigious. Furthermore the processes of retraining to handle the new technology had to be undertaken outside local traditional channels. It was quite some time after the industrial revolution in Europe and North America that technical education was built up as part of the formal education system to cope with the demand for new skills. The same proportional time-lag can be observed in the developing countries. Rather than the competitiveness of the industrialized societies, utility and employment in the modern sector conferring 'status' tend to prevail as motivational factors in developing countries. Since only a small percentage of the population was involved in the modern sector, general attitudes towards time and the utilization of time remained that of the traditional sector, with its more relaxed world view. Since under those conditions high production at low cost was not seen as essential to survival, maintenance as a concept was not seen as a priority. This tended to mean in practice that nothing needs to be done until disaster strikes in the form of a breakdown; in other words, preventative maintenance is not seen as a necessity.

Social relevance also plays a part in the context of developing countries but due to external factors, in a rather negative way. Social relevance also implies social involvement. That involvement will create a 'value' in respect of an item of plant or equipment. That 'value' may be seen either in terms of accrued prestige (the new car syndrome) or in terms of opportunity cost (other things sacrificed to get it). In many instances this type of involvement has been blunted, not only by a predominance of centralized state control that has a 'depersonalizing' effect, but also, paradoxically, by ample provision of foreign aid. This tends to reduce the element of sacrifice, national or individual, involved in the acquisition of plant or creation of infrastructure and also leads to a belief that the cornucopia is there to stay, making it simpler for the recipient to get a new plant or piece of equipment than to repair an existing one. This view is, perhaps unintentionally, reinforced by the requirement of most bilateral and international aid donors that all equipment supplied under their programmes must be in the form of new equipment.

If then, there is no general awareness for the need for maintenance at the national level, and aid agencies do not make it a precondition, planners and ministries of finance are under no pressure to make provision for it in budget allocations. Even if it does appear in a sectoral budget estimate, it is one of the easiest items to cross out as it has no vociferous supporting lobby. Lack of financial resources means in turn that maintenance has no socio-economic prestige. Indeed, it will be found on closer inspection that the allocations of duties in various undertakings and the relative remuneration and status of the persons concerned with maintenance is often little other than that of an office cleaner or factory floor sweeper. This state of affairs was quite pertinently expressed in a report of a Colombo Plan meeting on technical education held in Singapore in November 1982, in which it was said that 'maintenance and training

have suffered due to the fact that they frequently conveyed a rather poor image in many persons' minds. It was associated with low-level skills such as greasing, oiling, cleaning up etc and due cognizance was not paid to the increasing sophistication and complexity of equipment. This poor image has led to a poor status of maintenance training programmes and... is a serious inhibiting factor in attracting students to such programmes'.

These considerations are reflected in practical terms in many developing economies. It usually requires some searching through various ministerial or institutional budget figures in order to locate the budget head for maintenance. When not specifically identified, which is all too often the case, it usually appears under the heading of 'miscellaneous' or 'other recurrent expenditure' along with uniforms, brushes and soap. Until quite recently external funding agencies have done nothing to change this state of affairs. Loan and project agreements with developing economies generally go into considerable detail about the various types of inputs required and various in-depth enquiries made to establish the borrowers financial credibility and so forth, but anything to do with maintenance of the equipment and plant to be supplied under such agreements — beyond perhaps an initial supply of spare parts — was looked upon as a recurrent cost item and therefore a recipient government responsibility. No indications were given, however, as to how the government was expected to or was likely to, discharge that responsibility. Recently, however, due on the one hand to decreasing availability of foreign aid finance and on the other to the donor agencies' concern about losses due to maintenance problems, attention is beginning to be paid to the means by which governments and recipient institutions intend to meet recurrent costs of this kind and are even prepared in some cases to find means of assisting them, as for instance through financial provision for manufacturers' service contracts over an extended period. The World Bank had become aware of these various problems by 1983 as indicated in their World Development Report for that year in which it was stated that 'planning agencies have tended to concentrate on new projects rather than completing half-finished projects and financing the maintenance needs of completed ones. In six out of ten of the World Bank's borrowers in the early 1980s, this bias has assumed serious proportions. In several countries many projects are not being completed because of insufficient funds...' '... use of plant and equipment is often extremely low, sometimes only a quarter or third of the rates achieved by the best maintenance organizations. Of a sample of seventeen countries, ten had utilzation rates of 35% or less'.

The perception of maintenance as a low priority ad hoc operation by many authorities and institutions leads to accurate costings or cost forecasts rarely being available to planning authorities and to the problems indicated in the World Bank report. At the same time planners are under pressure to modernize and thus to press for new equipment. There is also pressure from manufacturers and dealers to sell new equipment in

preference to maintaining what exists. All these pressures obviously tend to downgrade the importance of maintaining existing plant and encourage artificial or premature obsolescence. It also has to be borne in mind that investment in expensive equipment represents a much greater relative sacrifice of available resources in a developing economy than in a fully industrialized one. Similarly, a low ratio of actual output to rated output tends to have wider implications for the whole economy and its development than a mere lack of competitiveness of a particular plant in an industrialized country. In the 1970s it was calculated that the fertilizer complexes in India, even with her relatively well developed maintenance facilities, were working at not more than 50% of their rated capacity; that is to say the output on which the planners had based their assumptions. Not only did this have self-evident negative effects on food production and the green revolution, but also the less evident economic effects in the sense that the loss of output had to be compensated for through additional government funding which in turn would mean less resources being available for other possibly vital sectors.

As indicated earlier most of the equipment delivered to developing countries has been designed to meet the capital-intensive requirements of the manufacturing countries, but to maintain anything near the rated output requires supporting infrastructure. This is not merely a question of the physical infrastructure in the form of road and rail services, access, storage and so forth, but also administrative and managerial infrastructure, inventorying, stock-keeping, ordering of supplies and spares with allowance for delivery time, establishment of routine maintenance schedules, allocation of responsibilities, forward budgeting for maintenance contracts and spare parts ordering and so forth. None of these things are likely to happen if there is no general awareness of the importance of maintenance and no pressure on financial authorities and funding sources to provide the resources. There is little point in striving for results in a single plant or item of equipment if the supporting infrastructure is not available.

To bring about a better general awareness of the need for, and ramifications of, maintenance is a task covering a wide range of activities. The dissemination of information on these topics presents no particular difficulty in the industrialized economies since there is an abundance of technical literature available to the general public. Few developing economies have developed this kind of press. Cost and language factors limit the circulation of imported journals, consequently different approaches have to be devised. Good possibilities exist through the educational system (school broadcasts, adult education, technical schools etc) which up to now has not taken cognizance of these questions. Even in technical schools and polytechnics, maintenance is not a curriculum subject in its own right. Even at the purely technical level, there is very limited dissemination of information. Although most manufacturers of equipment supply operational and service manuals with the equipment it will be found in practice that a number of different problems arise. The

operators may not understand the language the manuals are written in, the administration may have received only one copy to be kept safely locked up, relevant sections of the manual to each category of operator may not have been distributed, translated or even explained. Sometimes also manufacturers add to the problems by stipulating that any repair or servicing must be carried out by their agents — assuming, of course that there is one just around the corner.

It should not be assumed from all the foregoing that responsibility to improve the situation lies solely with the developing countries, rather the contrary. The industrialized countries themselves have considerable problems with maintenance. In the United Kingdom, the National Audit office in a 1985 report on Motorways stated that a backlog on repairs would take seven years to clear and would cost £40 million more than if the work had been done in time. A survey carried out by the Midwest Institute for Research and Training in the USA showed that an average of 45% of maintenance workers were 'taken-off-the-street' (i.e. unskilled) while only about 10% came from Trade Schools or other training programmes, indicating that even in the USA maintenance workers enjoyed little status. How much more difficult then is the task for the developing economies.

Logically, since the industrialized countries have taken the lead in providing their equipment and their know-how to assist a number of developing countries to establish their modern sector operations, it should follow that they should also provide the means of upgrading the perception of maintenance and of its implementation. This could be accomplished without particular effort or expenditure. The concerns expressed in the World Bank report of 1983 could be followed up by their and other donors' insistence that questions of maintenance and the provision of funds for it, from one or other source, be included in any loan or project agreement. Once financial authorities become aware of its importance and funds begin to be provided, its status will automatically be enhanced. The status aspect could be further enhanced through inclusion of the subject in educational programmes, particularly in those of technical education, technical teacher training, vocational and adult education. The preparation and distribution of manuals also plays a significant part, not necessarily by manufacturers of equipment but rather by public authorities. An interesting example is provided by the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty of Central American Economic Intergration (SIECA) which published a detailed manual for the maintenance of road networks in the five member countries. It was developed between 1971 and 1974 in consultation with the governments and technical departments of the countries and provides standard terminology, detailed maintenance norms and procedures, together with levels of responsibility of the officials concerned and their relation to other national authorities. A rather similar publication in the Ivory Coast was published by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.



# THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

## by Benno Wassermann

There has been prolonged discussion in *Contemporary Review* and elsewhere on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

There have been five Arab-Israeli conflicts since Israel became a sovereign state on 15 May 1948. The first was the War of Independence of 1948-9 when, after the British withdrawal from Palestine, the armies of the surrounding Arab states invaded Israel and threatened the fledgling state with extinction. They were beaten back and Israel achieved frontiers considerably in excess of those allocated by the United Nations Partition Plan. The second was the Sinai War of 1956 when Israel in collusion with Britain and France (Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal) launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt in the Sinai to counter Egyptian harassment of its settlements. This war was brought to a halt by the United Nations with the United States and the Soviet Union combining to force Britain and France to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone and Israel from the Sinai, after a United Nations Emergency Force had been placed at El Arish as a buffer between the Israeli and Egyptian forces. The third was the Six-Day War of 1967 when Israel again launched a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and the Arab states, this time occasioned by Colonel Nasser's closing of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, following the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Sinai. In this war Israel gained natural frontiers on the Suez Canal, the river Jordan and the Golan Heights and recaptured the Old City of Jerusalem, which she had lost in the War of Independence. The fourth Arab-Israeli War was the Yom Kippur War, when President Sadat, unwilling to accept the natural frontiers established by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War, launched an invasion of Israel across the Suez Canal on 6 October 1973. This caught the Israeli cabinet completely by surprise and the Egyptian forces overcame the Israeli defences on the Bar Lev line before General Sharon recrossed the Suez Canal and surrounded the Third Egyptian army. The war was again brought to an end by the United Nations and in the peace settlement between Egypt and Israel which followed at Camp David, Israel agreed to evacuate the Sinai Peninsular in exchange for recognition by Egypt. The fifth Arab-Israeli war broke out with the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon in 1981 in an attempt to dislodge the concentration of PLO forces on Israel's northern frontier and is now coming to a close with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

If this cycle of five wars in 33 years or one Arab-Israeli War every 6.6 years were to continue for the rest of the century, then we could expect another three Arab-Israeli Wars before the year 2000. However, the indications are that the cycle has come to an end and that all the protagonists have become war-weary. In the Lebanese War the Israeli army over-extended itself and incurred 600 unnecessary fatalities. On

the other hand, the war resulted in the dispersion of the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and finally rendered as unrealistic its hope of destroying Israel. Israel has decided that the time has come to withdraw its forces from Lebanon both because of the casualties and because of the economic situation, and Yasir Arafat has been making overtures to King Hussein, realising that the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank is his only remaining realistic option. It seems therefore that a situation of equilibrium is emerging which holds out better prospects for peace than that which has existed so far in the long history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This equilibrium arises from the over-extension of the Israeli forces in Lebanon, and the dispersion of the PLO's forces from the Lebanon. Thus, both sides appear to have become war-weary and ready to negotiate a settlement.

The optimum expansion of Israel's frontiers was probably reached after the Six-Day 1967 War. After this war, Israel had natural or secure frontiers to the South (the Suez Canal), the west (the Mediterranean Sea), the east (the river Jordan from the Suez Canal to the Golan Heights) and lacked only a natural frontier in the north on its border with Lebanon, for here the only natural frontier was the river Litani, which runs from the Golan Heights through south Lebanon to the Mediterranean. Israel would have been well-satisfied with the status quo achieved after the Six-Day War, had President Sadat been willing to accept it.

The war in the Lebanon has exposed the limitations for expansion of the Israeli army. Although that war has finally thrown into chaos and anarchy a country long blessed with peace, the Israeli withdrawal should reassure the Arab world, which had up to then feared unlimited potential expansionism and imperialism by Israel. For Israel, the war in Lebanon has been an unmitigated disaster, not only in terms of loss of life but in bringing about a thousand per cent inflation in the economy. Nevertheless, it achieved its objective in dispersing the PLO and rendering it incapable as a force for destroying Israel. The PLO now have no realistic alternative but to hope for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the west bank of the Jordan, possibly in association with Jordan, the majority of whose inhabitants are Palestinians. Despite recent horrendous events, the prospects for peace are better than they have ever been and, if grasped, might well bring to an end the long cycle of Arab-Israeli Wars.

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# THE SEARCH FOR PEACE—THE BASIS OF ZAMBIA'S REGIONAL POLICY

by Stephen Chan

IN Southern Africa, South Africa is clearly the regional power. Along with its strategic naval position, its possession of minerals vital to the western alliance, and its image as a bulwark against communist expansionism, South Africa is seen as a desirable ally by the west because of its regional weight, and because of its readiness to exercise the vocation of regional power.[1]

At the same time, South African regional policy is an embarrassment to the west. The continuing existence of apartheid and its higher manifestation in the creation of bantustans is widely perceived as unjust and inhumane. Notwithstanding the imposition of mild sanctions, the western alliance and particularly the US, have decided that the merits of having South Africa as an international ally outweigh that country's demerits.

For the surrounding independent or majority-ruled states, the existence of South Africa as the regional power is a troublesome and undermining reality. South Africa has tried to treat some of its small neighbours, such as Lesotho,[2] and Swaziland,[3] in the same manner as it treats its bantustans—attempting to create an environment in which recognised states and artificial states cannot be differentiated. Towards its larger neighbours, South Africa has behaved in a manner that has sought their destabilisation, the neutralisation of anti-South African elements within them, and has sought to escape western censure by constantly indicating Soviet influence and the Cuban presence in the region.[4] Even states with democratic governments and mild foreign policies are not exempted from the South African regional programme. This was made clear when South African commandos attacked Gaborone, the capital of Botswana, on 14 June 1985.

The fact that South Africa successfully allies herself with the west means that the majority-ruled states of the region have immense difficulties in formulating effective foreign policies towards their troublesome neighbour. Some states have continued to associate themselves with the Soviet sponsorship that helped create them—as was the case with Mozambique and Angola. While this sort of alliance might be seen as a counterweight to South Africa's alliance with the west, the result has been that Mozambique and Angola have been the particular targets of South African destabilisation and neutralisation.

All of this has resulted in a pronounced absence of peace in the region. Even should the conflict between the western-backed South Africa and the Soviet-backed former Portuguese colonies be resolved—and South Africa has sought to dictate the terms of resolution with such devices as the Nkomati Accord—the prospect for continuing conflict

over Namibia, the bantustans, and the existence of apartheid, remains very large.

The history of South African policy towards its neighbours is matched by the history of Zambian regional policy. Zambia became independent in 1964, slightly ahead of Botswana (1966), Lesotho (1966), and Swaziland (1968). It was more than a decade later before the Portuguese colonies gained independence; and Zimbabwe had to wait until 1980. Of those Southern African states that came into being in the 1960s, Zambia has been, and is, the one with most of the attributes one would seek in a regional power. It has been the state most likely to act as a counterweight to South Africa's regional policy. Even so, when measured alongside South Africa, Zambia's attributes of power match up very poorly—particularly in the key areas of economic and military might. Zambia is also at a geographical disadvantage, being landlocked. Even if Zambia had more attributes of power, her neighbours could still be easily destabilised and Zambia's right of access to the sea through them disrupted or withdrawn at South African convenience. Because of this, two images have emerged of Zambia as a regional actor. The first is of a noble and long-suffering nation that has resisted South Africa as much as possible, and since more is not possible its moral lapses are forgivable.[5] The second is an image which is ignoble—a nation commandeered by a comprador or collaborationist class that has sought to tailor foreign policy, particularly economic foreign policy, to its own benefit, and welcomes collaboration with South Africa as an instrument for achieving this.[6]

These two contrary images have flourished because Zambia has a record both of resistance to South African regional policy, and of survival in the face of South African power. I wish, however, to present a slightly different image of Zambia as a regional counterweight to South Africa. The first point that needs to be made is that nobility and opportunism are not mutually exclusive, and have not been so in the history of Zambian regional policy. The second point is that South African regional policy is not one-dimensional, but recognises a hierarchy of nations within the region, and seeks to act differently according to the nation at hand. The third point is that the western support of South Africa is not exclusive; that is, the west will support, although in lesser degree, other nations in the region; certainly the west may support a majority-ruled nation to the extent that it does not collapse under South African pressure. In any case, both South Africa and the west need a contact point in the region which will help them measure the extent and impact of their policies, and whether they continue to bring benefits of a cost-effective nature.

Zambian regional policy has combined a morality—as based on the ethics of humanism, its national philosophy—and an opportunism that has been finely tooled to take advantage of all those points I raised in the paragraph above. Rather than seeking to match South Africa's power in any conventional sense, Zambia has sought to seem powerful by amassing

influence. Here, the role of humanism is a major one—as embodied in the Zambian President and his political diplomacy. Rather than foreign policy being tailored by an internal Zambian elite, foreign policy is designed to propose Zambia as an elite nation in a troubled area. This takes place as follows:

1. The image of moral suasion, as embodied in a humanist President, by precedent and protestation concerned with dialogue and arbitration.
2. The Zambian role in international groupings. Not groupings of a conventional sort such as the UN; but groupings which emphasise summitry among heads of state and government—such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Commonwealth—again so that a national image may be personified.
3. The image of predictability. Zambia is portrayed relentlessly as a unified nation and, thereby, stable. Its government is consistent, persistent, and may be counted upon.
4. The image of potential alliance. Although non-aligned, Zambia has always let it be known that it values its relationships with western nations; demanding, in turn, to be informed, if not consulted, by western powers on Southern African issues.
5. The chaperon image, or the image of older brother, elder statesman, by which it is considered that Zambia can control liberation groups stationed on her territory, and condition the approach of their leaders.

These images of Zambia and the Zambian President cannot be projected on behalf of any other black Southern African state. The widespread recognition of this exclusive position has made Zambia seem a natural host in previous years to summits of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth. It has also meant that, in a regional diplomacy of isolation from its neighbours, except to destabilise and neutralise them, South Africa has been persistently ready to conduct a dialogue with Zambia, both in formal summits and in terms of continuing informal links.[7]

The weakness of the Zambian approach is, of course, that it is so dependent on the President, Kenneth Kaunda. The critical assessment of the Zambian approach is to ask whether it has only protected Zambia from the South African regional policy, or whether it has contributed to the protection of the region; whether it has advanced political solutions to the region's problems; and whether it has laid any foundation for peace in the region.

These, of course, are somewhat unfair questions. Zambia has responded to South African policy. Its response has been imaginative and has made best use of those few resources available to it. It acts as a regional counterweight to South Africa at least as far as general imagery is concerned. It is not a counterweight to South Africa in more concrete terms because South Africa has an effective monopoly of the concrete attributes of power. But the Zambian example is one where a search

for peace is uppermost. The majority-ruled nations of the region cannot conduct their development without peace. The lack of peace is dictated by oppositions based on principles of justice, and by South Africa's determination to protect its unjust structures. In a confrontation of a search for justice by nations without power, and a defence of an unjust situation by a nation with much power, the basis of Zambia's regional policy has a contribution to make.

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NOTES

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# ROLES OF THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRAL IN DISARMAMENT

by Kari Mottola

ARMS control and disarmament negotiations constitute a strategy for achieving basic goals of the international community — peace, security and structural change. In many ways, this strategy is in crisis today — not only because of the lack of tangible results but also because of increased disillusionment and doubt about the ways and means used so far.

The basic guidelines for disarmament policies can be outlined as follows:

(I) The principles — as reflected in such international documents as the concluding document of the first special session of the UNGA on disarmament or the report of the Palme Commission — emphasize equality: that is to say, equality of the right of participation in debates on disarmament and arms control.

(II) The concrete demands, proposals and programmes put forward stress the special responsibility of the great powers, in particular nuclear-weapon powers. The start of any meaningful disarmament is in the hands of those powers; in practice, in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union.

(III) Basically, arms control and disarmament are seen as a programme of action, a comprehensive but step-by-step process on all 'fronts'. Disarmament diplomacy is an everyday, even routine aspect of the conduct of international relations. This has led to the expansion of disarmament machinery, in particular in the deliberative UN system, whereas actual negotiations continue to be essentially bilateral (US-Soviet; NATO-WTO).

(IV) Arms control and disarmament are seen, in this context, mainly as a process of technological imperative or as a reaction to ever-expanding arms technology and to the dynamics of the quantitative and qualitative arms race. This has led to ever more complicated arms control, proposals, treaties and draft treaties.

This approach — it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s — presupposes a continuing flow of results in order to be credible. At first, such results were achieved both at bilateral and multilateral levels; but since the latter part of the 1970s, the disarmament process has been virtually at a standstill and this has resulted in a credibility gap surrounding the whole enterprise.

Politically, arms control negotiations have been an important factor in the US-Soviet relations, both in detente and in renewed tension. In times of détente, arms control has been an important vehicle for verifying the strategic military balance, as well as a central channel for the dialogue between the two great powers. In times of tension and hostility, failures and disruptions in arms control have become the focal point of disagreements and mistrust.

Within the United Nations machinery, all states have been able to contribute to arms control and disarmament. Resolutions and programmes of action have been produced. Under the umbrella of the functioning great-power dialogue, the multilateral process seemed to become productive as well; but today a kind of saturation point has been reached, with the great-power negotiations in deadlock the arms race spiralling, and with no clear connection between words and reality.

At present, there are a few signs of attempts to revive the arms control and disarmament procedure, above all in the US-Soviet domain, basically on the same principle as before. The multilateral process, although there are no new openings, continues to provide a great number of states and groups of states with an opportunity for expressing their demands. A good example was provided by the third NPT review conference in August-September 1985.

There are certain new trends, however, in the international debate on disarmament and in actual policies. These trends do not offer substitutes for the great-power centred debate but they do create circumstances where alternative strategies may be considered. These provide new opportunities for the multilateral discussions in the UN, as well as for those outside the East-West domain. These new developments could lead to the emergence of an alternative structure of arms control and disarmament, containing different and more significant roles for the non-aligned and neutrals.

Firstly, unfortunately if inevitably disarmament has become politicised. Peace movements, the increased role of general polity, the higher profile of science and research, the public debate and the raising of public awareness — all these factors affect government policies domestically. Internationally, non-governmental and semi-governmental bodies such as the Palme Commission, the Socialist International Disarmament Council and numerous working groups have had a significant impact not only within their own groups but more widely: even influencing the decision-making of governments.

Secondly, there is a new emphasis on regional and other indigenous solutions. States, groups of states and regions wish to act on their own. Nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace have been in the arms' control and disarmament vocabulary for a long time, but there is a distinct new power as well as appeal in the current debate. Yet such an indigenous approach is at once faced with a dilemma. Originally, it reflected efforts to solve important issues of peace and security outside the great-power framework. On the other hand, the attitude and reaction of the great powers towards such efforts were vital for their success.

Thirdly, in the arms' control and disarmament debate, non-technological or political solutions are presented with increased fervour. These are measures connected more with political will and commitment than concrete armament 'hardware'. Such proposals include no first-use of force, refraining from the use of force, common security, principles guiding relations between states and various programmes for disarma-

ment. Thus, the entire concept of confidence-building in the broad sense is steadily gaining ground. In many ways, these activities are reactions to the failures and disappointments of the technological, great-power centred arms' control and disarmament programmes, providing no real alternative to the original process, which continue; but they do indicate that changes are needed in national, bilateral and multilateral disarmament policy.

The present situation poses a challenge as well as an opportunity for small and medium size countries, and in particular for the non-aligned and neutral countries. There are two basic strategies for solving national security problems: arms' control and political resolution.

When speaking of small or medium-sized countries, or the non-aligned and neutrals, one should also include groups of countries and sub-regions. Naturally, security issues are often connected with geo-politics; but there are also common security interests that transcend geographical proximity. They will not of themselves solve the issue of the great-power arms race, but could, prevent military confrontation at least as far as it threatens the security of a particular sub-region or region. The political role of regional solutions may even change attitudes and lead to corresponding iniatives in other regions. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are a case in point. Regionalism and the efforts by small countries might create an international system that is less rigid and hierarchical.

One can think of several groups of countries 'like-minded' in specific or broad issues. They would have common interests and be strong enough to act together over security and arms' control issues. Non-nuclear-weapon countries undoubtedly form the largest group. Neutral and non-aligned countries co-operate in the European context, where the East-West dimension otherwise dominates the security scene. The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm is preparing second-generation confidence-building measures.

What are the roles and functions that such security regimes could have? Disengagement from the nuclear arms race is the first and most widely sought after goal. Proposals for non-proliferation as well as for nuclear-weapon-free zones originated in the sphere of neutral, non-aligned and small countries. The idea of a 'club' of non-nuclear-weapon countries is still valid. Non-proliferation as a regime, despite its weaknesses, offers a forum for the pursuance of common interests. The third NPT review conference, held in August-September 1985, proved that this forum can effectively be used by signatories in many ways. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed in August 1985, is a new test case for the viability of the zone idea, as is the proposal for a battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe.

Breaking the old rules and practices of the arms race and creating new ones may well be one of the effects of regional influence. The South Pacific plan is also important. The issue of visits of possibly nuclear-armed ships into New Zealand ports is not unique.

Preventing 'horizontal escalation' is another important function. Be-

cause of the global nature of the arms race, in particular among the military alliances and the two leading military powers, there is a threat of conflicts spreading horizontally from one region to another as a kind of counter-measure. Disengaged regional security regimes would act to prevent such escalation. There could even be a network of regional organisations form a pattern that would strengthen international security.

Regional conflict regulation is an obvious goal in an attempt to de-escalate and limit the regional arms race and introduce political rules and commitments. Proposals have been made to improve security and co-operation in the same way as in Europe within the Conference on Security and Co-operation. Collective security represents the idea that controlling the use of force — alongside arms' control and disarmament measures — will eventually enhance security. Military force as a policy instrument will not disappear but it will be constrained.

As has already been noted, programmes for arms control and disarmament continue to proliferate. The crucial issue is how to turn quantity into quality. There will have to be new approaches to arms' control and disarmament that are intensive rather than extensive. And this is where the non-aligned and neutral countries can make a real impact. They will need to continue to be critics of the great-power arms race; but they should also find new, indigenous ways of confidence-building and arms limitation that can strengthen their own security and that may, in the end, break the existing pattern of military policies and enhance global security as well.

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# THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS: AN OPTIMISTIC REVIEW

by S. G. Rainsford

AS one who has been responsible for many years for the treatment of boys suffering from haemophilia, it would appear to me that the alarm and despondency concerning Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is out of all proportion to the facts and conflicts with the available epidemiological and immunological evidence.

It is now accepted that AIDS is caused by infection with the virus HTLV:III. This organism reacts with the cells of the immune system of the body, thereby depleting the normal immune response and thus predisposing the body to unusual opportunistic infections and it is these infections which kill. In most cases these opportunistic infections are due to organisms which are not usually regarded as being very pathogenic to humans and are therefore seldom seen in patients other than those suffering from AIDS.

AIDS appears to be a disease which with few exceptions affects only the male homosexual, the haemophiliac and the drug addict. It was first reported in male homosexuals in the USA in the late 1970s. It has to be explained why the virus HTLV:III, now accepted as the cause of AIDS and which appears to have the potential to destroy the human race, has not made its appearance until now. Since homosexual behaviour has probably always existed, the probable explanation lies in the recent legislation which permits homosexual activity between consenting adults. Prior to this legislation homosexual activity was a private affair between two people and each partner became immunised against the other's bacterial and viral florae. Following the legislation a plethora of 'Gay Clubs' appeared and casual liaisons and promiscuity increased enormously. Those promiscuous individuals were therefore exposed to many more infections than before.

AIDS was first recognised in a haemophiliac about one year after it was first identified in male homosexuals. It is now accepted that AIDS in haemophilia is the direct result of the transfusion of blood or blood products infected with the virus HTLV:III, in all probability provided by a blood donor from the USA. To fully appreciate the epidemiology of AIDS and for a greater understanding by the general public it is necessary to review the historical development that has taken place with regard to the treatment of spontaneous haemorrhage in haemophiliacs. The bleeding of haemophilia is due to the absence of one of the essential clotting factors, namely factor VIII. Prior to the 1960s the only treatment for bleeding in haemophilia was the intravenous transfusion of the plasma from normal blood, plasma being the liquid part of unclotted blood after removal of the blood cells. This treatment was often not successful because the concentration of factor VIII in plasma was too low to allow an adequate dose of factor VIII to be given. In the 1960s Juliet Poole discovered that most of the factor VIII in plasma could

be precipitated by the slow thawing of frozen plasma, thus concentrating the factor VIII many times. This method of harvesting the factor VIII was referred to as cryoprecipitation, and the product as cryoprecipitate. Unfortunately it was later discovered that any virus present in the blood was also concentrated by this method into the cryoprecipitated fraction. There is no doubt that the advent of cryoprecipitate revolutionised the treatment of bleeding in haemophilia for with this material it was possible to administer an adequate dose of factor VIII.

The demand for cryoprecipitate always exceeded the supply and in the 1970s commercial firms using more sophisticated methods based on the principal of cryoprecipitation started to produce concentrates of factor VIII which then became available in adequate amounts. However, these commercial products were prepared from very large pooled samples of plasma separated from many hundreds of blood donations. As a result, haemophiliac patients who had previously been treated with single-donor products were now exposed to potential infection from many thousands of donors. One of the many dangers that accompanies any transfusion of blood is the transfer of disease from donor to recipient. Is is therefore not surprising that the incidence of viral disease in haemophiliacs rose dramatically following the introduction of the factor VIII concentrates and that a case of AIDS was recognised in a haemophiliac not long after its initial identification.

The most common viral disease to arise following transfusion of blood or blood products has been viral hepatitis. Although there are many viruses that can give rise to hepatitis the cause in the majority of cases has been identified as the hepatitis B virus. Following the identification of this virus it then became possible to identify both its antigen and antibody when present in blood. In order to remove some of the misconceptions which exist, particularly in the media, it is necessary to understand the significance of and the differences between antigens and antibodies. Antigen is the term applied to a specific chemical structure of an organism and antibody represents the body's immune reaction to that antigen. The presence of antigen, therefore, indicates that the organism itself is present and if in the blood then that blood is potentially infective. The presence of antibody in the blood merely means that the body's immune system has been stimulated by the organism sometime in the past. The presence of antibody is usually protective and beneficial. The fact that both antigen and antibody of the hepatitis B virus could now be detected in any blood specimen made it possible to obtain much valuable and precise information concerning the virology, immunology and epidemiology of hepatitis B virus infections.

In the first place it made it possible for the National Blood Transfusion Service to develop a screening test for hepatitis B antigen in the blood of all prospective donors and to eradicate hepatitis B infections due to blood transfusions. It also made it possible to determine the incidence of carriers of the virus in the adult blood donor population which in the UK is now known to be 1/1,000. The carrier rate in drug addicts

has been found to be much higher; there is no equivalent figure available for homosexuals. Investigations were carried out into the immunological response to hepatitis B infection among a group of 50 severely affected haemophiliac boys at the Lord Mayor Treloar College at Alton in conjunction with the Central Laboratory of the Public Health Laboratory service at Colindale, and it is believed that this is the only investigation of its kind. The boys were all severely affected haemophiliacs aged 11 to 17 years, and all requiring frequent transfusion of factor VIII concentrates to control bleeding. Blood specimens from these boys were examined at three monthly intervals over a period of 18 months for the presence of both the antigen and the antibody of hepatitis B virus. Six of the boys showed a positive response to antigen; all the remainder who were antigen negative were antibody positive. The most remarkable finding was that no antibody was detected in the blood of those boys showing antigen positive. The boys that were known to be antigen positive were never isolated in any way from the other 150 disabled boys at the College as they were not regarded as infectious or as a danger to their companions, only to such Medical Staff, nurses and dentists who might come into personal contact with blood or other excretions.

It is noteworthy that over a period of ten years no case of hepatitis was ever identified amongst staff members or other pupils apart from those suffering from haemophilia. It has, however, been reported that some wives of haemophiliacs who are carriers of hepatitis B virus have been infected. It has been taken for granted that the infection in these cases was the direct result of sexual intercourse since it has been found that the semen of such carriers is polluted with the virus, as is the case with AIDS. However, the number of haemophiliacs' wives who have contracted hepatitis in view of the number of those at risk, has been very few. These wives have also been exposed to another source of infection in as much as most adult haemophiliacs are now self-treated at home and are often assisted by their wives who are then exposed to infection from the therapeutic materials used. Furtherfore, since there are about 25,000 carriers of hepatitis B virus among the adult population of the UK the incidence of hepatitis would be very much higher among women if heterosexual intercourse was highly conducive to the spread of the infection. There are only two possible explanations: (a) that those exposed to infection in this manner become immunised, or (b) that normal heterosexual intercourse does not provide a suitable portal for entry of the virus — possibly the vaginal environment is lethal to viruses. The very low incidence of AIDS in women would seem to support the fact that AIDS is very unlikely to be spread by normal intercourse and, with the exception of drug addicts, is a disease confined to the male sex.

Epidemiological evidence would appear therefore to indicate that normal heterosexual intercourse is most unlikely to transmit HTLV:III virus. Any danger of an epidemic of AIDS can therefore be discounted. Neither is AIDS any more likely to cause a public health problem than any other venereal disease. It is to be hoped that the number of cases of

AIDS reported in the future will fall when the male homosexual has become adjusted to his newly-found freedom and comes to realise the inherent danger of being promiscuous.

The hepatitis B virus has shown itself to be a highly pathogenic organism and in the past has caused severe illness and even death in many cases. Most infections have followed the transfusion of blood or blood products but infection has also followed both intradermal and subcutaneous injection when a hypodermic needle has become contaminated with blood or tissue fluid from a carrier of the virus. Hence cases have also followed tattooing, the subcutaneous injection of convalenscent serum, e.g. measles antiserum, and of course there has been a high incidence among drug addicts who share their syringes and needles. It will be seen, therefore, that the epidemiology of hepatitis B virus is almost identical to that known about HTLV:III, with one important exception, namely that in the majority of cases hepatitis has followed blood transfusion.

Since 1980 when AIDS was first reported in the UK many thousands of blood donations have been transfused in patients following severe trauma or to replace blood loss during surgery but no case of AIDS has been reported, although there must be a considerable reservoir of HTLV:III carriers among the donor population. The incidence of HTLV:III antibody reactors in haemophiliacs approximates that of hepatitis B virus antibody which makes it difficult to explain why more cases of AIDS have not yet been reported. It would appear that by comparison with the hepatitis B virus HTLV:III is a relatively non-virulent micro-organism, which only exerts a pathogenic effect in those whose immunological system has already been over-extended by prolonged and continuous exposure to many different infections or in infants who rely for protection from infection during their early life on a passive immunity provided by maternal antibodies. The HTLV:III virus appears to be incapable of pathogenicity in normal healthy subjects in whom its presence merely evokes an immunological response, suggesting that the age of the lymphocytes may be an important factor.

AIDS appears to be endemic in some African states and in the island of Haiti, where both sexes are equally affected. There, infection does not appear to be related either to sexual activity or to blood transfusion. The environment of these primitive communities is so different from that of more advanced civilisations that it is not surprising that a very different epidemiology should prevail. Exotic disease is rife and the most probable cause of infection is the transmission of the disease by blood-sucking insects. It is well known that the Sand Fly and mosquito are capable of carrying viruses such as those causing Sand Fly Fever, Dengue and Yellow Fever so why not AIDS? Because of poor hygiene, a lack of sanitation and of a pure water supply and milk the population is generally unhealthy and exposed to and suffer from many infections usually associated with such conditions. This renders the people a most fertile environment in which the AIDS virus can flourish and exert its

pathogenic effect.

There is another more remote explanation for the high incidence of AIDS in both sexes in primitive societies, namely that the HTLV:III virus exists as a normal commensal in the gut and, like all commensals, is harmless in that environment. Only if the virus succeeds in invading the tissues or blood stream as a result of a break in the epithelio-mucosal barrier is it treated by the body as a foreign substance and an immune response evoked. Intestinal disease is rife in primitive communities and mass infestation of the gut by many different parasites is almost universal. Many breaks occur in the epithelio-mucosal barrier thus favouring the invasion of tissues and blood stream by these commensals. Such a hypothesis perhaps could also explain why AIDS is predominantly a disease of the male homosexual in other societies.

Although some of the conclusions concerning the epidemiology of AIDS may have been unduly influenced by an extensive study of hepatitis B virus infections it is still difficult to understand how many of the alarming forecasts concerning AIDS can indeed be justified. Most of these forecasts have been based on insufficient evidence provided by tests for HTLV:III antibody alone since for technical reasons it has not yet been possible to develop a screening test for the antigen as was possible with hepatitis. Most of these forecasts have therefore been grossly inaccurate, e.g. S. H. Landesman[1], in a special report in 1985 after analysing data from six studies concluded that 19% of antibody sero-positive cases would develop AIDS within a period of five years. It is now more than five years since AIDS appeared in the UK and as approximately 70 to 80% of haemophiliacs in the UK are sero-positive the number of reported cases in this country should be several hundred, whereas the incidence for the whole five year period has not exceeded 0.5%. In those cases of AIDS where it has been possible to isolate and identify the HTLV:III virus no antibody has been detected. It is unfortunate that forecasts like that of Landesman have been readily accepted by the authorities as the implications are so alarming. It would now appear to be official policy in the UK (*Lancet*, 1985[2]) to regard all those who are sero-positive for HTLV:III antibody as being potentially infectious and they are advised to abstain from normal heterosexual intercourse. Such a policy would be a major impediment to all haemophiliacs wishing to have children. In some areas blood donors who have been found to be sero-positive for antibody are being warned that they are potentially infectious.

It is not surprising therefore that the number of blood donors presenting has fallen dramatically and in the USA has already fallen below a critical level. If there was any truth in the hypothesis that antibody sero-positive reactors were potentially infectious then wives of haemophiliacs would be expected to be affected by AIDS; as far as the author is aware no such cases have been reported. It should not be too difficult or expensive to investigate an adequate number of haemophiliacs and their families to obtain concrete evidence to allow the authorities to review the present policy with the greatest urgency. In the UK the

DHSS has already made funds available for the screening of all prospective blood donors for the presence of HTLV:III antibody. With the evidence presently available it would seem that this test will not detect the carriers of the virus. It might be thought that the cost of this investigation can scarcely be justified, but if it formed part of a much wider investigation in which every endeavour was made to determine how, when and where any positive reactors came to be immunised, such information would more than justify the expense. Any such study must include the spouse and any children of a reactor. It is obvious that many of the facts concerning AIDS cannot be determined until a suitable screening test is developed which will identify the presence of HTLV:III virus itself or its antigens. The development of such a screening test should have the highest priority in any future research programme.

It is hoped that the above article will help to allay some of the anxiety concerning AIDS that at present exists among the general public and especially among those courageous patients with haemophilia. Finally, it is hoped that it will persuade the authorities responsible for the control of AIDS that (a) it is not the menace that it has been made out to be and (b) that some modification of official policy with regard to its infectious nature is urgently required, and (c) that the authorities will initiate some kind of publicity campaign to correct some of the misconceptions concerning the disease which are at present held by the medical profession and hence by the general public.

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[S.G. Rainsford, MD, ScD, FRCP, FRC Path, DPH, had a long career in the Royal Navy from 1922-1956. He was awarded the North Persian Forces Memorial Medal for his work on Mediterranean fever, the Gilbert Blane Gold Medal for work on brucellosis and typhoid vaccine and the Chadwick Gold Medal and Prize for research into the prevention of typhoid. During World War II he created and became the first Director of the Royal Naval Blood Transfusion Service. He retired from the Royal Navy in 1956 when he took up the appointment of Consultant Pathologist to the Ministry of Labour.

After 10 years with the MOL he was appointed research fellow to study haemophilia and other coagulation disorders, and later applied his experience to the study of rheumatoid arthritis. His published work includes papers on Mediterranean fever, typhoid fever, cholera, glanders, haemophilia and rheumatoid arthritis, which have appeared in *B.M.J., Lancet, J. Hygiene, B.J. Haematology, J. R.N. Med Serv, J. Clin. Path, Thrombosis et Diathesis* and many others.]

# REBECCA WEST IN YUGOSLAVIA

## by Lesley Chamberlain

REBECCA West had an extraordinary mind. It was most extraordinary on this island because it was continental. It had a largeness and a breadth which invited her to take vast, seemingly impalpable subjects, like the Western mind, as something she had a personal duty to explore and decide upon. Her readiness to wear exotic intellectual clothes, her blending of historical, literary, political and psychological observations, her promptness to ignore established intellectual and academic boundaries, and the unashamed personal enthusiasm and energy she poured into her work, which was at once active and speculative, were all odd qualities, however brilliant. They turned *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*,[1] the 1,150-page record of her travels in Yugoslavia, into some vast opera of the spirit, lacking only the music. It was an undoubted achievement, but one which had a touch of the Germanic about its vastness. When she made the trip with her husband in the Spring of 1937 West prepared with Gibbon's *Decline and Fall* to see the evidence of an eclipsed Empire. But she quickly became fascinated at the other end of the spectrum by the experience of occupation, a shock English intellectual life has yet to know. This Yugoslavia proved to be at once an historical and a personal revelation. West discovered that she, the daughter of an Empire, was in truth a friend of indigenous national cultures, a promoter of individuality and of infinite difference amongst small groups of men. The insight turned her view of history and twentieth-century political events in general. She believed thereafter that strong national culture was the only kind which could protect men against the evils she saw looming, mass movements and totalitarian powers competing to exploit a rootless, traditionless proletariat.

Starting from Zagreb she discovered at the same time the nature of Imperialism and the nature of Cicily Fairfield/Rebecca West. The two were linked by the peculiar nature of Yugoslav history, which provided her with an extensive, living allegory of her spiritual make-up:

> Nothing in my life had affected me more deeply than this journey through Yugoslavia. This was in part because there is a coincidence between the natural forms and colours of the western and southern parts of Yugoslavia and the innate forms and colours of my imagination . . . But my journey moved me also because it was like picking up a strand of wool that would lead me out of a labyrinth in which, to my surprise, I had found myself immured . . . The experience made me say to myself, If a Roman woman had, some years before the sack of Rome, realized why it was going to be sacked and what motives inspired the barbarians and what the Romans, and had written down all she knew and felt about it, the record would have been of value to historians. My situation, though probably not so fatal, is as interesting. Without doubt it was my duty to keep a record of it.

She roamed around Croatia and Dalmatia with extraordinary dutifulness, making her excited discoveries. She was paying dues to history and to herself, and the former mission struck the odder note. But its ways are gripping. West's husband, banker Henry Andrews, at first seems a

retarding factor in the narrative, a character a judicious author would have cut out on second draft, but gradually he becomes the ideal companion, against whose solid presence she can bounce her ideas. He is there, like many husbands, as an anchor, to stop her being swept away by too much reality too keenly sensed.

The tour was a study of the consequences of Hapsburg rule, now that the two-hundred-year-old Empire was gone. West and Andrews travelled in all weathers and by all means through Croatia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Old Serbia, and Montenegro, clutching letters of introduction. From her conversations, her vast reading, her sympathy with the landscape and the people, she assembled a picture of a civilisation in eclipse and blamed it on 'the tendency of Empire'.

The history was one of occupation and suppression. To the territory of modern Yugoslavia came first the Romans, then the Turks who stayed for 500 years. Islam reached as far as the medieval limestone walls of Dubrovnik. West was excited by the fact that the South Slavs had, in absorbing Islam, protected the West from an alien creed. It seemed a supreme Christian gesture of self-sacrifice whose effects were still evident. They saved the Christian West, she said, from 'what a people must become if it suspends all intellectual life and concentrates on the idea of conquest', but they paid the price in years of retarding servitude. The national idea was never born.

300 years after the Turks came the Austrians who shared their power with the Hungarians and weakened the occupied lands, especially the most Western-oriented province of Croatia. Finally Italy took long-sought possessions on the Eastern Adriatic, including the entire Istrian peninsula. The Italian poet D'Annunzio's storming of Fiume (Rijeka), long the rival port of Venice, was in 1937 recent history. There was no moment when the Yugoslav peoples and the territories had been wholly free.

Imperialism was a violation of destiny. Looking at Rome, at Austro-Hugary, latterly at Great Britain, Rebecca West defined 'the general tendency':

> Capitalism at its greediest is thus given its head, and labour is kept brutish, so the general level of civilisation and culture sinks. This must be the tendency of Empire, in so far as it is founded on the occupation of countries settled by another race, and time has not medicined it as might be hoped.

Yet she found, wherever she went, a native heritage which had survived. Her mind ran from the embroidery she found in the market place to marriage customs, from politics to food, from psychology to architecture, from Paris fashion to African Christianity. Much was beautiful and fascinating.

In part it was beautiful because Yugoslavia had indeed a mixed and complex heritage, but in part because West idealised objects which excited her imagination and made themselves in some personal sense necessary to her. How everything was *visible* in Yugoslavia! she would exclaim, seeing her own reflection, though I do not mean for a minute that hers was a case of intellectual narcissism. The forms of self-reflection are many and many of them lead outside the self, to something more

productive than self-fascination.

West needed an object equal to herself in extent and complexity to explore and analyse, and found it in Yugoslavia where East met West, and nationality met empire. She was happy, for *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* is without doubt a happy book, to find herself in a world that 'took for granted poetic intensity', particularly in Croatia, where in cafes men and women showed 'raging polyglot intellectual curiosity' and in church worshipped 'with a unique sort of healthy intensity'. In such a world of rich and varied experience, shaped by natural talent, she felt she could be herself.

Tireless, turbulent, occasionally overwhelming with its magnificent generalisations and analogical leaps, the Westian mind was hyperactive on that holiday. H.G. Wells said of the young Rebecca (she was in her early twenties when she met him and had his child, 50 when she finished this book in 1942) that her mind was perpetually 'disturbed'. The judgement was essentially unsympathetic. He could not forsee her use of her talent: how with the instinct of literary genius she would convert endless trouble in the head into essential insight, and how the effect of her mind would never be tiring on the reader, even if it were so on the lover. We have to keep looking at that mind, beyond the woman who nurtured it. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon,* still an invaluable tourists' companion, took the 'inventory' of the country with an approach at once imaginative, quirky, emphatic and superbly wide-awake. But its true merit, and an explanation of why it remains a brilliant guide whilst being out of date, is that it is a masterpiece of writing about the relations between ideas and ordinary life. It never flags or loses its way, so strong is the guiding personal inspiration and its sense of connection.

For literary England both the approach and the style were, as I have suggested, rare: and West sensed she was breaking new ground.

> 'The intellectual world is largely of English creation, yet our authors write of ideas as if they were things to pick and choose . . . as if they could be left alone, as if they cameinto play only as they were picked and chosen. But that ideas are the symbol of relationships among real forces that make people late for breakfast, that take away their breakfast, that make them beat each other across the breakfast table, is something which the English do not like to realize. Lazy, bone-lazy, they wish to believe that life is lived simply by living.'

She would have none of that laziness.

She travelled in the spirit of the great French sociological pioneer, Montesquieu. The result was a vast intellectual omnibus. Rarely, I think, have there been between two soft covers so many prompts for the novelist, and so many plots. The outline of the last novel she published in her lifetime, *The Birds Fall Down,* is contained on page 354 . . .

Her informative tableau of Yugoslav history was grand, passionate and contentious. She wrote about thought and feeling as closely intertwined, dominating the active life as much as the reflective, and felt the strangeness of her intellectual manner in English. Poetic inwardness without loss of clarity is perhaps one way to describe her achievement.

It is a demanding but not unrelieved style. The concentration on 'relationships among real forces' for instance includes hers with Henry.

Some of their dialogue is irritatingly starchy and stylised, but much of it is comic. One morning in Split they were visiting Diocletian's temple when she regretted not having brought along Adam's engravings of the site. The book was heavy. To Henry's surprise she gave its exact weight. The day she realised she knew the weight of nothing save herself and joints of meat, she had put it on the scales. For some 600 words they toyed with the idea of pushing the overweight tome round Split in a wheelbarrow, wondering if the Splitchani would find them unacceptably eccentric. She was, as the dialogue shows, a very confident woman, in every way, and the habit of needing to know for herself ran consistently through her life, beginning in the kitchen and leading unwaveringly to the Temple of Diocletian. If the account of her travels had a single historical core, it was the *attentat* at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, which killed the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife the Countess Sophie Chotek, precipitating the First World War. West analysed the characters of the victims and their assassin. As she saw it the deed was an accident in the sense Tolstoy suggested all history was, the product of confusion, half-conceived aims, sliding bowels and unconscious traditions. The Austrian couple seemed to go willingly to their deaths. The assassin, Gavrilo Princip, who was just a boy, had seen his fellow-conspirators all fail to shoot as planned, and had gone in despair to drink coffee and pull himself together when the royal motorcade halted immediately before him. A misunderstanding occurred over the route the couple should take to avoid the threat of a terrorist attack, a confusion which West felt they brought upon themselves in a death wish. They were stationary for minutes before the barrel of Princip's gun.

Rebecca West assembled a massive, hostile case almost to justify the murder. However contentious the judgement, the Freudian quality of her psychological analysis of Ferdinand and Sophie and indeed of much of the rebellion against Austrian power was supremely apt. Psychoanalysis was born in that Viennacentric world, and expressly designed to explain its maladies.

She hoped then Yugoslavia would be free. But King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated in 1934, and as she studied the country's history over the next years that slaying seemed to her to have been fatefully written into Yugoslav history since the time of the Turks. Then, after she had returned from her journey to England, came Fascism. Watching from London, West saw her beloved country and her Yugoslav friends either killed or newly enslaved. She watched with equal pain as London burned, and found in what seemed to be the death wish of the whole of Western Christian civilisation her title:

> 'Again the grey falcon had flown from Jerusalem, and it was to be with the English as it was with the Christian Slavs; the nation was to have its throat cut as if it were a black lamb in the arms of a pagan priest. We were back at the rock. We were in the power of the abominable fantasy which pretends that bloodshed is particularly pleasing to God, and that an act of cruelty to a helpless victim brings down favour and happiness on earth. We, like the Slavs of Kossovo, had come to a stage where that fantasy becomes a compulsion to suicide. For we had developed enough sensibility to know that to be cruel is

> vile, and therefore we could not wish to be the priest whose knife made the blood spurt from the black lamb's throat; and since we still believed the blood sacrifice to be necessary we were left with no choice, if we desired a part in the service of the good, but to be the black lamb.'

Christianity seemed to bear within it the ultimate death wish, and as it was once destroyed in the territories of the South Slavs by the marauding Turks, so now it succumbed to Hitler and Mussolini. Dame Rebecca, so deeply Christian in her outlook, yet rebellious against the terrifying morbidity she found at the heart of the faith, aligned the political dilemma with the religious, and the psychological. In her surely Russian-influenced understanding she saw Christian man as deeply divided between his instinct to live in happiness and his love of pain and despair:

> 'Only part of us is sane: only part of us loves pleasure and the longer day of happiness . . . The other half of us is nearly mad. It prefers the disagreeable to the agreeable, loves pain and its darker night despair, and wants to die in a catastrophe that will set life back to its beginnings and leave nothing of our house save its blackened foundations. Our bright natures fight with this yeasty darkness, and neither part is commonly quite victorious, for we are divided against ourselves and will not let either part be destroyed . . . This fight can be observed constantly in our personal lives. There is nothing rarer than the man who can be trusted never to throw away happiness . . . We ignore this suicidal strain in history because we are consistently bad artists when we paint ourselves . . . it seemed that choked with victory in the last war, we now have an appetite for defeat. The new states were full of life, Yugoslavia shook its clenched fists and swore it meant to live. Therefore England and America and France turned away, for what lived disgusted them; they wanted a blanched world, without blood, given over to defeat.'

Yet she refused, and I hope I don't make her sound trivial by drawing attention to it, to end on a gloomy note. As it were postscriptum *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* celebrated Yugoslav resistance to Hitler in 1941. In Marseilles, on the spot where King Alexander had been shot, people strewed flowers; the news 'travelled like sunshine over the countries he (Hitler) had devoured, promising Spring'. The rhythm is telling. West had faith in something she called culture and, like her energy, that faith was ever ready to be renewed. She possessed a robust constitution, of the kind which governs spiritual temperament as much as physical health. That may not be un-English, but in combination with an analytical mind and an imaginative, literary pen it remains very rare.

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NOTES

1. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* was first published in two volumes in 1942 and revised in a single volume edition in 1955. Macmillan re-issued it in paperback as a single volume in December 1984, unfortunately without the photographs or the maps so necessary to the original.

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[Lesley Chamberlain was a Reuter correspondent in Moscow, 1978-79. She has since written independently.]

# FORTY YEARS OF MODERN ART 1945-1985

## by Muriel Julius

TO the average Englishman or woman the very title of this new exhibition is alarming. All those daubs, those darned bricks, the broken plates — who can understand all these things?

The considerable achievement of Mr. Ronald Alley, the retiring Keeper of the Modern Paintings Collection at the Tate Gallery, is to have gathered together, in logical sequence, a disarmingly agreeable and quite unalarming display. And as David Hockney explains — 'Art teaches seeing'.

Brian Sewell wrote succinctly if not quite accurately: 'If you want to know what has happened to art since the war, all you have to do is walk through these rooms and your eyes will tell you.' In fact, with very few exceptions, all the art is either American, British or French.

The early part of the twentieth century was a time of unprecedented artistic inventiveness. Fauvism, Cubism, Abstraction, Dada, Surrealism and Expressionism were all spawned in France, Germany or Russia. With the war many artists sought haven or were rescued from Europe. Among those who arrived in America were Chagall, Leger, Mondrian, and many important Surrealists, Max Ernst, Marcel Duchamp, Dali, Yves Tanguy, Matta. The impetus and influence they exerted was crucial to the first great new art movement to emerge after the war — American Abstract Expressionism.

I encountered it first in Milan. A touring exhibition in the early sixties held in a glass pavilion in the public gardens. Fascinated but uncomprehending I remember still Rothko's horizontal, soft-edged rectangles hovering in front of their contrasting grounds. I was equally floored by the huge colourfields of Barnet Newman, the invisible harmonies of Ad Reinhardt, the enigma of Jackson Pollock. These aggressively large paintings had enormous impact. They seemed to say 'Like us or not, here we are. We are now.' It goes without saying that almost without exception these artists were ignored by Museum Directors in Britain.

Of the four Jackson Pollocks in the present exhibition three are on loan from his Estate, and one was purchased through the generosity of Mr. H. J. Heinz of the 57 varieties. None does the artist justice. Anyone lucky enough to have seen the big retrospective at the Centre Pompidou in Paris a few years ago will recall the amazing beauty of the room in which the works called 'Les Drippings' were gathered.

In the same gallery is one of the paintings known as 'Veils' by the Washington artist, Morris Louis, a magical painter. He is one of the few artists whose work can be said to have changed the course of modern painting. His unprimed, unstretched cotton duck canvases are soaked with overlapping layers of thinned acrylic paint which he controlled by moving the canvas. This created a stained surface that excludes any tactile paint surface that might interfere with the purity of the colour.

Recognition came to Morris Louis tragically late in life. Born in 1912 his work was barely known until 1954 when it came to the notice of the influential and encouraging art critic, Clement Greenberg. His first one-man show in New York in 1957 flopped. Success came in 1959 but he died of cancer in 1962. For years his wife, Marcella, taught school to support him. Now his costly works have pride of place in many of the world's greatest museums. I remember gratefully the beautiful Arts Council exhibition of 39 of his paintings at the Hayward Gallery in 1974.

An altogether different painter was Clyfford Still. He was famous long before he died. He is known for brilliant intensity of colour, rich blue here, in heavy oil impasto, into which jagged shaped islands of contrasting colour are introduced. (Confronted once with thirty or so of his immense paintings all over 7 feet high by 5 feet, I found them menacing.)

Another one who works big is Louise Nevelson, one of the few women in this show. Rather ungraciously I thought, the vast wood construction she presented to the Tate, entitled 'An American Tribute to the British People 1960/64', has been languishing in the Tate cellars for years. Where does one hide something 10 feet high by 14 feet wide? It consists of a collection of wood off-cuts, chair legs, parts of picture frames and other wooden detritus enclosed in a series of open-fronted rectangular boxes painted all over gold this time instead of her invariable black.

In the late sixties a Mayfair Gallery gave Miss Nevelson a one-man show. Simultaneously the bright window designers at Jaeger also constructed some Nevelsons. They used them in the Regent Street shop windows as a background for their sweaters and skirts. The fury of the gallery may be imagined.

Meanwhile France had again become a mecca for artists, and the Ecole de Paris became very fashionable in the fifties. Not that many of its number were actually French. Serge Poliakoff, born in Moscow, studied for two years at the Slade in London before settling in France. Riopelle of the vivacious colour came from Montreal; Viera de Silva from Portugal. Hans Hartung was a German who served in the French forces under de Gaulle and became a French national, while the most gifted of them all, Nicolas de Staël, was born in St. Petersburg.

The Tate owns three beautiful examples of his work. 'Composition 1950' — his best period — is a series of abstract planes in exquisitely pale grey-blues and grey-whites pierced by a streak of luminous black. That perceptive dealer, the late Dudley Tooth was the first to show him in London shortly after de Staël's suicide in 1955. I remember still those paintings hung casually on the staircase walls leading to the main gallery. In those days one could have had one's pick at £100 a time.

A whole room in this exhibition is given to the works of Jean Dubuffet. Possibly the most influencial painter of the school of Paris, but one whose art, based on graffiti, I cannot learn to love.

Meanwhile the early fifties saw a unique upsurge of sculptural talent in England. Henry Moore blazed the way when he won the International

Sculpture Prize at the 1948 Venice Biennale. And then, possibly to his own surprise, for he trained as an architect, Reg Butler won the competition for the monument to The Unknown Political Prisoner which had attracted 3,500 entries. Today his working model for it looks much like a conglomeration of high-tech aerials. But back in 1956 such things had not yet defaced our skylines. Reg Butler, a brilliant talker with an original domestic life, went on to make many statues of young girls, arms raised in the act of removing their vests — sub-Marini figures.

Other sculptors who flowered at that time were Kenneth Armitage, Lynn Chadwick, William Turnbull, Paolozzi and my personal favourite, the late Robert Adams, whose elegance of style is an unfailing pleasure. Ben Nicholson and his then wife, Barbara Hepworth went to live in St. Ives at the outbreak of the war. In the fifties this small Cornish resort became the centre for British Abstract Art. The Tate shows Nicholson's 'August 56 (Val d'Orcia)' a majestic still-life composition. Alongside hangs a work by Terry Frost who began painting when a prisoner of war in Germany. He too settled in St. Ives and his tall, handsome painting of angled half moons against a greenish ground represents the movements of boats upon the sea.

About this time Victor Pasmore, one of the founders of the Euston Road School, forsook the subtle dreamlike landscapes and interiors for which he had become famous, and embraced abstract painting and later constructions in the manner of Gabo. Frankly these are rather awful, so one is happy that he has forsaken this style and for the past many years has done beautiful prints and paintings.

Mary Martin and her husband, Kenneth Martin, never wavered. Pure abstractionists, their clarity and lack of pretension are admirable.

Op or Optical Art and Kinetic Art were both launched in the sixties. Joseph Albers, German born, studied and later became a teacher at the Bauhaus. He went to America in 1933. His explorations of optical phenomena, such as the interaction of colours, effects of dazzle and perceptual movement began in 1949 with his series of paintings called 'Homage to the Square'. In these he used a standardised format of two or three squares within a square to explore effects of advancing and receding or expanding and contracting colours.

The Hungarian artist, Victor Vasarely, who works in France has been a notable practitioner. Bridget Riley who has won international acclaim is British. Her 'Hesitate' (1964) exhibited here is a fascinating work.

Alexander Calder was the daddy of kinetic art which is based on the idea that light and movement can create a work of art. This joy-giving American trained as an engineer but became an abstract painter and a sculptor. His main inventions were Stabiles — so named by Arp — which stand; and Mobiles — named by Duchamp — which move.

Most men and children at this exhibition delight in the noisiest of kinetic artists, Tinguely, whose works vibrate and hammer with the aid of integral motors. For myself I prefer the elegant work of the German, George Rickey, whose group of slim silver shafts 'Horizontal Hanging',

poised above our heads sway ever so gently on their delicate springs as we pass beneath them. The reaction against the force of Abstract Expressionism is known as Minimalism. Since these works are apparently so very uncomplicated it is strange that they are the only ones in this exhibition to be roped off from the visitor. One of the works treated thus is a near black square canvas by Ad Reinhardt. The trouble with Mr. Reinhardt, as I once told him myself, is that he makes the spectator work. To see what he's about you have to look hard and long. After several minutes you discover the black painting isn't black at all. It is four wine-coloured squares intersected by blue-black and grey-black lines.

Frank Stella's aluminium painting of 1960 called 'Six Mile Bottom' also looks deceptively simple. It is composed of pale bands of uniform width which jog to one side and then turn again to resume their original direction. In the centre is a small white rectangle. The execution is perfection which is what fools you. This work is roped off also.

There are two fine examples of the work of Don Judd. One is in copper, the other, ceiling high, is of a series of slim, spaced silver projecting rectangles with blue facias so meticulously made by industrial craftsmen that they become impersonal. In their company, Carl André's 'Equivalent VIII' — the 'bricks' to you — just look conventional.

British artists have always excelled in figurative painting. Difficult and sometimes shocking his work may be; after his great exhibitions in Paris and more recently at the Tate and in Stuttgart, who would dispute that Francis Bacon towers above most painters in the world today? In sharp contrast the work of our pop and post-pop artists is jokey, sexy and smart. Richard Hamilton, Peter Blake, Tom Philips and especially R. B. Kitaj and Howard Hodgkin are enormously talented. My vote however goes to David Hockney — tireless innovator, brilliant draughtsman and printmaker, interesting painter, and the youngest living British artist to be honoured with a one-man show in one of France's great national museums. In 1974, when only 37, all Paris flocked to admire his wit, charm and talent.

I leave to the last two exhibits that create a magic all their own. The room containing nothing but seven of the paintings that Rothko gave to the Museum shortly before his death, has the serenity of a chapel for contemplation. There is also the space containing ten sculptures and five drawings by Alberto Giacometti. These attenuated figures, so slight in scale, project a powerful presence mysteriously wrought.

There is much to admire in this exhibition which represents less than a quarter of the Tate's collection of modern art. It has been acquired from a budget ludicrously small. Modest and charming, Mr. Ronald Alley has been responsible for much of it. May he have a very happy retirement.

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[Muriel Julius was for some years Art Critic of the *Evening News.*]

# CORRESPONDENCE

## CORNERED WRITERS

Dear Madam,

Once again taking up my sporadic role as unofficial spokesman for unventilated writers, may I draw your attention, as Editor of *Contemporary Review*, to the plight of us helpless victims of Smallfellows Paranoia?

We Smallfellows are well aware that the big syndicates have the upper hand in decision-making with regards to potentially publishable authors —that a manuscript which is not of wide appeal, which is not obviously going to sell say, eight or nine thousand copies instantly (that is, a blockbuster), is rarely considered. Fair enough; these are, as they say, hard times; yet we are not altogether daunted for there remains the hope, the chance—however slim—that that product which will purchase the required appeal of so-many-thousand readers will be none other than one's own. Diligence and Toil might then be considered our prospective redeemers.

However, the odds are still more heavily weighted against us Smallfellows if we are to accept that our manuscripts are frequently not only rejected but ignored.

As a matter of course one receives a photocopied rejection slip, stating something like, 'The editor wishes to thank you for . . . but . . . '. Again, fair enough. A more genteel periodical or publishing house may even take the trouble to have its editor, associate editor or director sign the said slip. All well and good.

The rejection slips are by-the-way now, but of increasing importance is the fastidious examination, having first riven asunder the nauseatingly familiar self-inscribed A.4 envelope, of the stapled corners of one's manuscript, be it thick or thin, short story or novel, article, play or poesy, to see if the leaves thereof have actually been folded one behind another. This indicates that the Ms has actually been read. More often than not one finds that the carefully prepared pages remain without blemish—unscathed, unmarked, unfolded—and, yes, beyond doubt, unread.

My colleagues from the Society of Smallfellows are not bitter, not vindictive and can, I think, accept criticism, not to mention the rejection to which they are so well accustomed. However, as we unfettered our common corner causerie we could not help but wonder if the editors of today still operate in the courteous fashion which was the pleasure of our precursors; the recipients of whose manuscripts normally replied, explaining—albeit in brief—why the material was unsuitable for their several publications. In other words, offering a few tailored words of advice.

True, there are a lot more writers these days and there is a lot going against such writers. The publishing business is speedily being engulfed by corporate capitalism and even ventilated writers find it increasingly difficult to place work that promises only a modest sale. Nevertheless, we

Smallfellows (swallowingly) insist; the idea of a snappy commentary on one's work—whether encouraging or to the contrary—does seem desirable and constructive. Then one would at least know that the cussing thing (object of hours) had been read or even speed-read.

Of course, while accepting the photocopied rejection slips, we could be wrong. This could all be Smallfellows' Paranoia; in which case we apologise from the depths of our sinking hearts. But if we are right, please, please at least give those corners a sound pummelling before shoving our manuscripts back into postage-paid envelopes and slotting them into Never-Never-Land.

Yours faithfully,

Comber, County Down. G. L. WESTON

## HONG KONG'S CLOSED AND OPEN CENTRES

Dear Madam,

Good news from Hong Kong! Just before the publication of my article 'Hong Kong's Closed and Open Centres' (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1439, Vol. 247) late in 1985 the Home Office agreed that 500 more Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong would now be allowed to join their families who are already in Britain. There will also be a 50% increase — to a total of £390,000 per year to be prolonged for an extra year until 1988 — in expenditure for the benefit and support of Vietnamese refugees in this country.

Yours faithfully,

Sevington, Kent. ADELINE HARTCUP

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## THE STATE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

*World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence* by Walter Laqueur, Weidenfield and Nicolson. £25.

Walter Laqueur, profiting from his editorial and academic posts in London, Washington, and Tel Aviv, and his years as Editor of the *Journal of Contemporary History*, here tackles the daunting subject of Intelligence, overt and covert, human and economic, diplomatic, military and technical. He is primarily concerned with the U.S. and the C.I.A. since World War II, but writes with almost equal authority but greater brevity on Britain, Germany, Israel and the U.S.S.R. The range of his experience and knowledge as well as his research (the book is thoroughly buttressed wih 50 pages of notes) prevent his overstating the case for intelligence as the major factor in war or in crisis-management. Nothing is quite as valuable as political and military experience, and in this analysis the years of Eisenhower and of the brothers Dulles on the whole prove superior to those of Nixon, despite his interest in foreign policy, and those of Kennedy and of Carter, despite their voracious reading of the all-too-many briefs. Indeed, if there is a special menace these days it is less that of enemy infiltration than of the danger of defeat by domestic, media-haunted committees and by *paperasserie* — the production and dissemination of paper. 'The watchword of bureaucracy' he says, 'is authority without responsibility and responsibility without authority'. Situations can become surprises and then crises not because they were unreported but because the warnings were swamped by the sheer mass of other warnings. And the 'essential reading' is mountainous: the U.S. produces 72 billion documents each year.

The central problem is that a closed society like the U.S.S.R. (and the Russia of the Tsars before it) can operate with obvious ease compared to the dangers that attend the democratic process in open societies. Russia spends infinitely more on spies, on hardware and on defence because it is irresponsible, and if 'accountable' is so only to a selected Congress meeting once every five years; it can easily penetrate the potential enemy, if only by subscribing to every known American journal, and by purchasing all available government documents. It employs thousands of collection officers, passing as attachés or journalists, trade officials or academics. When curbed, it can operate via its geographic satellites — the size of the Cuban intelligence Organisation is twice that of British and French Intelligence combined. Against such an opponent, the free world is permanently handicapped by its own freedom. And this includes commercial freedom: the U.S.S.R. is linked up, by computer penetration, to some of the world's most advanced computers in Britain and in the U.S.

The fascination of Walter Laqueur's study lies in his constant attempt to probe the closeness of what the 'trade' would call 'I' to 'G' — what difference did the information make to operations, whether it was obtained by human skills or by technical expertise, whether the result was peace, crisis-aversion or political/military action. He recognises the role of the 'spy', but sees it as minor nowadays — although the knowledge obtained of a closed society by a vigilant observer with a good memory (the characteristics which the Soviets would of course call those of a 'spy') would nowadays be valuable. Dr. Laqueur



says less of the problems raised by the defector, and thus avoids the vexed question of human motivation, of K.G.B. 'converts', of plants, and of the problems of 'disposal' and re-location after de-briefing. Of the human agents, he sees the 'typical' Soviet spy not now as an 'apostle' converted by ideological persuasion or by dreams of justice, but as a tortured or greedy spirit or a victim of blackmail because of character weaknesses that can be exploited. Nor can one here exclude sheer chance, the opportunity seized on, the 'walk-in' with an opportunity, like Cicero in World War II.

In today's terms, it is primarily 'Sigint' that matters i.e. information obtained by signals or radio intercepts, or by photo reconnaissance from near or far. Such was the importance of American radio or air surveillance of the U.S.S.R.'s missile-testing sites from its bases in Iran that it minimised, or even ignored, the reports on the internal situation in Iran, on the rising tide of Shi'ite fundamentalism and on the weakness of the Shah's position. Professor Laqueur recognises that human judgement matters too: in 1956, Anthony Eden's (all too well-informed) reading of Nasser's plans, and in turn of Ike's reading of Eden's; and in 1962 the readings of each other's minds by Kennedy, Castro and Gromykoy. So with Israel's views of the strength of Egypt in 1973, and with the early American bewilderment over the role of Saudi Arabia. Laqueur is perhaps, like most analysts, over-captivated by the brilliant work of Bletchley and of the importance of Ultra. Even in the early days of World War II, the 'new' devices of radio monitoring and sigint were already replacing the role of the spy or the coded message; if Ultra transformed the 'high strategy' and gave confidence to the allied G.H.Q.s, technology was also complicating the task of decipherment at the tactical level, and of 'Y' in the field. Codes that were breakable in theory depended too often on the stolen or captured code-book, or on the traitor, the coward — or the lucky or inspired break. And all had to be done at high speed. In the field, however, as distinct from cabinet offices, it was on that information that troops were moved, and battles fought.

This is, however, a superb and penetrating analysis. Even his 'asides' are valuable: as in making the point that America suffers from the 'parochialism of bigness': just because it is a large country, it is possible to survive without any acquaintance with a foreign language or having any interest in the world outside its borders. And this despite the diversity of its peoples, the crash courses in foreign languages of recent years, and the mainly graduate quality of the C.I.A. And the conclusion? The American intelligence agencies in all their variety are probably unsurpassed, but the Russian are longer, and more thoroughly, trained. Everything turns there as elsewhere, on the art, and it is an art, of intelligence assessment, and on political judgement. And for Britain?: this book should be 'required reading' in the House of Commons and at G.C.H.Q.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## THE KILLING GROUNDS

*The Long Fields*: *Zimbabwe since Independence*. By William Spring. Pickering Paperbacks £2.50.

William Spring is a brilliant journalist and a Christian — who knows the true worth of the World Council of Churches. Of Pentacostalist background, he reported for the *Catholic Herald* on Zimbabwe, where he served for the first five years of independence.

This short but well-informed book shows compassion towards those who suffered from the occupation of Rhodesia by the British South Africa Company and in the revolt of 1896 that followed; those who endured the repression of the beleagured Rhodesia of Ian Smith; and those who have known the terror of the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of Robert Mugabe's National Army and the tortures of investigation. Someone who shines from these pages is Mr Justice Dumbetshena who fearlessly and honourably acquitted the accused in the Air Force sabotage case. It is to Mr Mugabe's credit that the Judge was later appointed Chief Justice.

Mr Spring acknowledges the virtues and benefits of white-led Rhodesia, which made Zimbabwe possible. He also praises the godly Bishop Abel Muzorewa, admitted by Lord Carrington to be "the most selfless" participant in the Lancaster House Conference. In 1979 the Bishop had held elections in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. They were pronounced as free and fair as elections could be in the circumstances by the commission headed by the late Lord Boyd, a statesman of integrity and African experience; and, according to its manifesto, the Conservative Administration had "the duty to return Rhodesia to a state of legality". The celebrated six principles had been met.

Lancaster House and new elections in 1980 were the fruit of Commonwealth and international pressure. The last Governor, Lord Soames, could not prevent intimidation from Mr Mugabe's ZANU(PF) or indeed other quarters. Mr Mugabe triumphed.

Was all this inevitable or a regrettable necessity? Mr Spring does not think so. What if "Mrs Thatcher had stuck to her guns, kept her election pledges, and recognised the Muzorewa regime?" The author replies that Robert Mugabe was "on the ropes" but rescued at Lancaster House; that US would have followed British recognition; that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would then have received arms and aid; that Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda each had his candidate; but the "front line states" were very weak. Thus, in Mozambique, "Machel was unwilling to face any further damage through Rhodesian air strikes."

Mr Spring denounces British and, to a lesser extent, American, "spinelessness" in 1979, one of the "hinges of history". A promising state "entered the long fields" (Shona for the secret prison camps in which Ndebele and other dissidents are re-educated).

This version of the tragedy is a melancholy vindication of Winston Churchill and myself. We left Mrs Thatcher's Front Bench team because we voted, as in previous years, against the Labour Government's renewal of sanctions. The official Opposition insistence on abstention, despite what had been promised, was harbinger of betrayal.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

## POWER POLITICS IN WAR & PEACE

*The Audit of War: The illusion & reality of Britain as a great nation.* Correlli Barnett. Macmillan. £14.95.

With such a title and 342 pages this book really demands a second book to review it, to cope with the author's damaging criticisms and to restore the reader's balance of mind. A conscientious reviewer would need to have a unique knowledge of our major industries; a specialists' knowledge of our whole education system and a rational understanding of the working of British Government. Mr. Barnett is primarily a military historian, but as in an earlier book, *The Collapse of British Power* (1972) makes it quite clear that he is

utterly opposed to the British Public School system as it has existed for the last 100 years, with its classical and religious background and its ignoring of science and technology. But just as he is unbalanced on Education, so is he, in my opinion, unbalanced on the relationship between the Economy and Government, or to put it simply, between economics and political power. However, I must congratulate him on his profound research; the extensive use he makes, under the thirty years rule, of Cabinet papers and of other official documents; and the wide reading of over 200 books recommended as *secondary sources.*

Quoting almost entirely from official documents, he attacks the condition of our coal, steel and shipbuilding and aircraft industries in short and separate chapters, noting especially obsolete plant, untrained managers, unnecessary strikes and general backwardness in technology. The same criticism is applied to British tanks and to the motor-car industry. What is worse he shows how our war economy was dependent on the United States and argues that the 'War Socialism' was artificial and no guide for post-war planning. In a word, he blames the Attlee government and Labour members of the Churchill government for encouraging the Welfare State, including Housing & Town Planning policies and most certainly the Butler Act; instead of concentrating on a major industrial revival, which of course would have needed a sort of military operation. Perhaps a 'victorious' nation in modern war is at some disadvantage, because the industries of a defeated nation may be and were more seriously destroyed and need a fresh start, but Mr. Correlli Barnett fails to understand that the morale of people also counts and also that you cannot make a bonfire of war-controls on Victory Day. Moreover the 'British disease' as Mr. Correlli Barnett calls it dates back much further than either World Wars and is briefly described in a misplaced chapter entitled *The Legacy of the Industrial Revolution.* Much of the author's outbursts against British technical backwardness can be traced to the 19th century, and to our neglect of technical and public education and social reform, in the early Victorian era after the Industrial Revolution.

But now we come to the author's main attack. Who are the real enemies? The author calls them *the New Jerusalemers* (an early chapter is entitled *The Dream of New Jerusalem* and another later *New Jerusalem or Economic Miracle* and who are *the New Jerusalemers*? In order of importance William Beveridge, Archbishop Temple, several Masters of Balliol College, Oxford and ex fellows, R. H. Tawney, Lords Fulton & Morris (later Vice-Chancellors of Sussex and Leeds) etc etc. But these worthies all stem from their Victorian mentors Dr. Arnold of Rugby, Charles Kingsley, John Ruskin and even Lord Shaftesbury. These are some of the apostles of Classical and Religious Education, who have opposed Mr. Correlli Barnett's pursuit of national power. He concludes with a detailed attack on Rab Butler and his Civil Servants and by implication all the Attlee Cabinet and the Labour members of Mr. Churchill's Cabinet — Arthur Greenwood, Hugh Dalton, Jowitt etc. and all in short who helped to introduce *The Welfare State.* (By the way those should include Lord Hailsham and Lord Thorneycroft when leading lights in the Young Conservatives at the time).

Now I must make a personal confession. I was, in my way, also a New Jerusalemer. Many of the above-mentioned were friends, some were my tutors, I have reviewed many of their biographies in this Journal. What is more, I was Minister of Education in the Commons 1937-1946 and I was advised by the

same Civil Servants as Butler 1941-44; some are mentioned by name in this book, Sir Maurice Holmes, Sir Griffiths Williams etc. There is an element of truth but a very small one in Correlli Barnett's attack; on the other hand there is a complete failure to understand the education system itself. It is true that the Butler Act, like the Fisher Act in 1918, failed to advance technical education and particularly Day Continuation Schools. It is also true that Butler and his officials spent long hours and weeks agreeing what was called a 'religious settlement'. Only if we had a *national* system of education then or now, could any government carry out the Correlli Barnett reforms.

In another chapter, he instances the 'highly talented planning which evolved Operation Overlord' in wartime, and compares that with 'the rag-bag of politicians and civil servants, almost all of them Oxbridge humanists, and operating out of several Whitehall departments through the medium of overlapping committees, that dealt with post-war employment or industrial problems or location of industry' — this comes from a chapter entitled *'Tinkering as industrial strategy'*.

Perhaps Correlli Barnett's idea of national interest can only be pursued in time of war and then by some form of national government. His prose style is punishing and he deploys it against what he considers wishy-washy, woolly-minded people. But the men he attacks have a moral attitude towards life and of course they dream. Is there not a fundamental difference of outlook between the Correlli Barnetts and the Rab Butlers? This is nothing to do with party politics. Let me quote the final sentence of the book. Speaking of Britain's post-war decline he writes: —

> 'As that descent took its course the illusions and dreams of 1945 would fade one by one — the Imperial and Commonwealth role, the world-power role — British industrial genius and at the last, New Jerusalem itself, a dream turned to a dank reality of a segregated, unskilled, unhealthy, and institutionalised proletariat hanging on the nipple of state maternalism."

This is very strong language and typically backed up in the notes by a page of references to a wide selection of related books and studies. But perhaps polemic rather than prose in style.

In an earlier number of this journal I reviewed a book called *English Culture & the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850-1980,* written by an American Professor of History, Martin Wiener. His concluding paragraph was: "The causes of British economic decline remain beyond the sole grasp of economists." I would add that the collapse of British power is not yet explained by a certain military historian, named Correlli Barnett.

KENNETH LINDSAY

## THE PLATONIC DIALOGUES

*Acastos: Two Platonic Dialogues.* Iris Murdoch. Chatto & Windus. £8.95.

Iris Murdoch's two dialogues are cast in dramatic form, easily transferable to the stage in either a modern setting or one based in fifth century Athens. The device points up the moral, religious and artistic dilemmas which we continually face in our own time and demonstrates the fact that Plato and Socrates foreshadowed most of them. It is a book at once entertaining to read and enlightening as to Plato's method of argument by question, originally attributable to Socrates whose prime teaching technique it seems to have been.

Both philosophers figure as main characters in the cast, Socrates as an older man of about sixty, Plato an eager youth of about twenty. Acastos is 'a serious

questing youth' and Callistos, as his name implies, 'a young man of great beauty'. In the first dialogue, 'Art and Eros', the characters have returned from the theatre and they argue about the old quarrel between philosophy and poetry. Here Plato states his familiar objection to poetry — and even to its continued existence in his ideal Republic — as a deceptively easy way of thinking that problems of morality can be solved by reference to fantasy, for fantasy is a form of lie. The beguiling aspects of 'good art', if there be any, can only lull the beholder into assuming things which are untrue in the 'real' world. Art actually prevents people from becoming better, he affirms, by presenting them with an imaginary solution to an imaginary situation. Art copies life but life can never emulate art.

Likewise, a moral reason is produced for not extolling human love (even Agape, the more all-embracing variety, and not only Eros, the mere physical kind) as one of the greatest goods because, says Plato, it is so selfish. Art does not teach and neither can Eros for both may inhibit the process of learning by providing a false sense of security, 'a half-truth'. 'Why then should we try at all?', asks the beautiful young Callistos, and is supported in his question by the elderly Socrates. Because, replies Plato, truth and goodness, being inseparable, are elsewhere than in the 'resting place' of art: for fiction cannot be fact, however close the imitation. Only half the equation is therefore capable of being set into an artistic projection. The recapitulation of the familiar Platonic argument has its uses here, if only to remind the unwary of the direct antecedents of Mrs. Whitehouse who, in her strictures on television plays, deploys only a small fragment of the philosophical position held by Plato. Socrates takes the milder line, with equally strong grounds for it. He is convinced that we need the comfort of a pretended world as a fundamental means of explanation that is intelligible. We should not judge ourselves too harshly.

The second dialogue explores the relation between religion and morality, first assuming that religion is simply an expression of absolute good. To Antagoras religion is nothing of the kind and, indeed, is an instrument of positive harm for it can stand in the way of efforts to improve the lot of people under its dominance. It too is an imagined solution to real problems. Out of a confused cross-argument comes a solution in which religion is seen neither as simply magic in an authorised form nor as another kind of art: it is a means of making concrete our notion of good: reality and solidity have to 'exist' in some other than abstract sense. Iris Murdoch has elsewhere argued in detail the case for this particular way out of the perennial dilemma, in her earlier book, *The Sovereignty of the Good.*

Not unexpectedly for so excellent a novelist and philosopher, the author brings to life the characters in her cast and presents their conversation in a lively, telling way. Her book is a vivid, readable introduction to philosophical thinking.

BETTY ABEL

## MURDER METROPOLITAN AND MANCUNIAN

*Murder Guide to London.* Martin Fido. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. £9.95.
*Memories of Murder: The Great Cases of a Finger-Print Expert.* Tony Fletcher. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. £10.95.

It is the charming thesis of Mr. Martin Fido's geographical study of Metropolitan murder that the character of each borough is writ scarlet in the

prevailing tone of the homicides which it begets. This beguiling variation on the pathetic fallacy stamps Belgravia as the area wherein bloody-minded servants who know their proper place perform the domestic duties expected of them with due despatch. By the same conceit, the East End is the approved terrain of gangland slayings and Holloway and its privet and laurel-girt equivalents the discreet killing-ground of the petty bourgeoisie, the poison in the parlour brigade.

There have been several previous A-Z guides to the capital crime spots. In 1964 David Cargill and Julian Holland brought out their *Scenes of Murder*. It was rapidly burked by a libel-happy publisher. The book has since its withdrawal become one of the scarcest of the criminological collector's literary desiderata. Nine years later, Ivan Butler's *Murderers' London* was published. And, also in 1973, R. Angus Downie's *Murder in London* — a somewhat unsatisfactory contribution. Mr. Fido's volume is a welcome updating of the Metropolitan murder sites, for it includes such recent noteworthy landmarks as Mr. Nilsen's operational headquarters in Melrose Avenue and Cranley Gardens, James Pope Hennessy's Ladbroke Grove locus, and the unhallowed shrines of such socially variegated clientele as Lord Lucan and the brothers Kray. An interesting statistical claim is that more than half the memorable murders of Britain have been perpetrated in London. Quantitatively, this brooks no argument: qualitatively, as a Scotophile, I doff my bonnet to Glasgow and Edinburgh. Cases unfamiliar and cases commonplace have been designedly omitted by Mr. Fido. To include all would clearly have been impossible. Even so, one misses the Battersea doctor (D. Castillo), little Willie Starchfield, and the Sidneys and the Duffs of East Croydon. Despite it updating, Mr. Fido's book remains second to Ivan Butler's, the more so because its standard of accuracy leaves a great deal to be desired. One has a number of bones to pick with Mr. Fido.

Neither, sadly, does Mr. Fletcher's *Memories of Murder* in the dark fields of the Greater Manchester area fulfil the promise of its subject. The writing is curiously flat and fails to capture the excitement with which many of the cases were undoubtedly invested. It is a worthy book, but a dull one. Something of the lead-grey Mancunian sky contrives to cloud its pages.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**The Hardy Guides** (Penguin. Vols. 1 and 2. £4.95 each). In 1913, the Wessex Edition of Thomas Hardy's works included a volume by Hermann Lea devoted to the countryside in the novels. Hermann Lea was a friend and travelling companion of Hardy, being devoted to photographing and identifying places and buildings referred to directly or indirectly by Hardy. Gregory Stevens Cox has now edited two volumes of Hermann Leas Guides in the original text. Each chapter is concerned with a particular work. In Volume 1 these include *Tess of the D'Urbervilles, Jude the Obscure, The Woodlanders, A Pair of Blue Eyes* and other works. The main novels covered in Volume 2 are *Far From the Madding Crowd, The Mayor of Casterbridge, Under the Greenwood Tree, The Return of the Native, Wessex Tales, The Trumpet Major.* There are numerous photographs, with cap-

tions brought up to date where necessary by the Editor. These volumes cover a double purpose, as companion to reading the novels and as a guide to tours of the sites.

**The Disinherited Family** (Falling Wall Press. £18.50: £7.50 paperback). Eleanor Rathbone, the outstanding champion of women's status and financial rights, published in 1924 her powerful argument in favour of state support for the mother and family, and not leaving support wholly to the whim of the husband and father. Her book became a powerful influence in moulding public opinion, but it was not until 1945 that the campaign, which she led, achieved a real measure of success. As an Independent M.P. she piloted through the Commons the Family Allowances Act, 1945. She was obliged to compromise in many ways, but the Act was a break through for women's rights. Unhappily she died the next year. Now her book has been republished, edited by Suzie Fleming, who has written a long Introduction of over 100 pages, in which she assesses Eleanor Rathbone's career and achievements. She is not concerned in any detail with the wider women's movements since 1945.

**Roderick Hudson** (Penguin Books. U.K. £2.95: U.S.A. $6.95.) This is one of two Henry James' novels published in the Penguin paperback Classics Series. Geoffrey Moore has contributed an Introduction to this first novel, published in 1875. Mr. Moore has chosen the 1878 text which is 'more faithful to the spirit of the original' than the New York revision for the New York edition of 1907. He rates *Roderick Hudson* very highly, 'Here, in this "first" novel, he was in the fullness of his talent'. The second is *The Wings of the Dove* (£2.95: U.S.A. $6.95). John Bayley, who writes the Introduction has followed the definitive New York version of 1907. Mr. Bayley recognises that this novel, together with *The Ambassadors* and *The Golden Bowl* 'are the crown of Henry James' achievement as a novelist'. Perhaps these two novels will be republished in this series. In both the reprinted novels, Patricia Crick is responsible for Notes on the texts.

**The Key of the Chest.** (Souvenir Press. £8.95; paperback £4.95.) The Scottish Arts Council has provided financial support for this edition of Neil M. Gunn's famous novel, first published in 1945. Particularly well known for his interpretation of life in the Scottish Highlands through his novels, Neil Gunn in this work is concerned with strife and tension within a small fishing and crofting community. It is a penetrating story.

**Years of Wrath, a Cartoon History 1932-1945.** (Gollancz Paperback. £5.95.) Michael Foot M.P. has contributed a short Introduction to this new edition of about 300 cartoons by Sir David Low, whom he describes as 'the greatest of his time or his century'. The volume contains more than 300 cartoons published mainly in the London *Evening Standard* during the years leading to the war and up to the Nuremberg trials. In the original edition of this collection in 1949, Low wrote extended captions, which indeed serve to confirm his withering cartoon commentaries on the events and politicians and leaders at the time. He had, writes Michael Foot, 'a worthy suspicion of pur-blind English snobbery and Blimpism' as well as being against appeasement and all forms of fascism. He enjoyed enormous influence politically here and abroad, whence from time to time came protests. There is no doubt that Low's cartoons have a place in the political history of the time.

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# GORBACHEV AND THE 27th PARTY CONGRESS

## by Martin McCauley

FOR the first time since 1979 the Soviet Union has a national leader. This was clearly demonstrated on 25 February 1986, the first day of the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Mikhail Gorbachev dominated the day's proceedings, not only by speaking for over five hours, but by his every gesture. He looked, acted and spoke like a man in charge. He was present during all nine days of the Congress — held every five years — but he only spoke on the first and last days. There was a hush of expectancy as he prepared to speak. All 5,000 delegates in the Palace of Congresses in the Kremlin strained to hear his every word, delivered in a slight southern accent.

With the strawberry shaped birthmark on his forehead appearing larger than ever before in the glaring television lights, and sipping fruit juice from time to time, Gorbachev, delivering the main report, laid bare the deficiencies of the Soviet system. The Secretary General claimed that the Soviet economy and society, when he took over, were stagnant. Such a confession from the lips of a Party leader required courage but then he was condemning, not himself, but Brezhnev. He conveniently forgot that it was the same Brezhnev who had called him from his post as first Party secretary in Stavropol-krai in the north Caucasus to Moscow in 1978. Promotion to full membership of the Politburo followed quickly and by Brezhnev's death in November 1982 Gorbachev was in the running for the Party leadership. Surely then, Gorbachev bears some of the responsibility for the lamentable state of the Soviet economy he inherited on becoming Party leader in March 1985? True, but then one of the rules of Soviet politics is to increase one's own authority by pilloring the record of one's predecessor. (Andropov and Chernenko were only interim leaders.) Everyone in the hall was expected to forget all the honeyed words Gorbachev had uttered about Brezhnev while he was alive.

The Soviet Union was now a super power but would it still be one in the year 2000? 'Yes', said Gorbachev, 'but only if scientific-technical progress is speeded up and labour productivity accelerated'. This was the stark challenge facing the Soviet Union. What a change from the halcyon days of the early 1970s when détente underlined the recognition of the USSR by the US as an equal super power. Military parity, it was hoped in Moscow, would lead to economic parity. But it was not to be as Soviet growth

rates steadily declined. In foreign affairs the years 1979-85 were marked by diplomatic defeat after diplomatic defeat. Afghanistan, the Polish affair, the disastrous shooting down of KAL007, the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe, to name only a few. Domestically the same period was also very disappointing. Why had all this come about? Gorbachev put his finger on several key factors:

i) the bureaucracy: the centrally planned economy was holding back rather than accelerating growth. With 44,000 enterprises to administer, the central planners were hopelessly overburdened. Planning had to be streamlined with factories being permitted to take more day to day decisions themselves. There were far too many officials, and government ministries, especially, had to slim down.

ii) scientific-technical progress in industry and agriculture was too slow. In other words, the gulf between the USSR and the advanced Western countries was growing not diminishing. (This state of affairs had, of course, important implications for defence industries.) Accelerating scientific-technical progress had to become the key concern of the Five Year Plan 1986-90. To this end more investment had to be channeled into machine building, electronics, computers and so on. An end had to be put to factories producing goods only fit for the scrap heap. 'Why should we pay workers to produce rubbish?', asked Gorbachev.

iii) corruption: this was so endemic that it had become a national scandal. Gorbachev did not spare the Party's blushes. Indeed, Party officials were among the worst offenders. He even went so far as to say that one republican Party only knew one principle — lack of principle. Party officials had to stop regarding their jobs as a ticket to privilege, preferment, nepotism, scarce goods and housing, and so on.

The overall tone of the Secretary General's speech was critical, exhortatory but optimistic. However, even though he called on everyone to perform great deeds he did not explain how the transformation of the economy was to be achieved. Perhaps that was to be the task of Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Prime Minister, who delivered the main economic report. He continued the critical line of the Congress, slamming ministries and enterprises for wasting vast quantities of resources. The vista he sketched before the delegates was grandiose. Speaking at a phenomenal speed, as if to underline the urgency of the task, he foresaw the doubling of national income and industrial output by the end of the century. Labour productivity was to rise even faster. Again, those eager to hear how this state of affairs was to be brought about listened in vain; but Ryzhkov did say something which was very significant. He stated that the Party would never 'fulfil the hopes of the bourgeois ideologues' by moving away from the 'fundamental principles' of economic planning. This was a clear signal that no Hungarian-style reforms, involving greater use of the market mechanism, were envisaged. The Soviet Union was going to stay with tried and trusted methods, even though these had been proving less and less effective over the last decade.

Delegates from over 100 foreign communist and workers' parties

attended. Fidel Castro chose to attend the Congress, indeed the only notable absentee was Samora Machel, the Mozambique leader. The Communist Party of China and the Albanian Party of Labour, as usual, ignored the event. The sprightly Gorbachev was in marked contrast to the East European leaders, all of whom except General Jaruzelski of Poland, were much older. Kádár (Hungary) and Honecker (GDR) looked their age and spoke accordingly. Ceausescu (Romania) looked quite robust for a man who is rumoured — at least in the Western press — to have one foot in the grave!

Only two foreign leaders chose to address the Congress in Russian. The Israeli delegate spoke so well that he appeared to be a native speaker — he may have moved with his family to Israel shortly after that state was founded. The other Russian speaker was the leader of the Mongolian Party but at times he was incomprehensible. Just why he attempted to read his speech in Russian is hard to fathom, especially when other leaders who speak quite good Russian such as Husak (Czechoslovakia), Zhivkov (Bulgaria) and Mies (West Germany) spoke in their native tongues.

Much of the second part of the Congress was given over to addresses by fraternal leaders and this provided an opportunity for many foreign delegates to escape from Moscow and to see something of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev followed the speeches of the foreign delegates with the aid of an interpreter, as did Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister. Gromyko took in the remarks of delegates speaking in English directly.

The new Central Committee (CC) was elected on the penultimate day and revealed that about half of the full members were new. The Congress only formally elected the new CC since its composition had been agreed beforehand. Just how this is done is unknown. The new CC's first important function was to elect the new Politburo and Secretariat. Just who would be a member of the new Party leadership was awaited eagerly. Gorbachev began by reading out his own renomination as Secretary General in a slightly embarrassed manner. The only new full Politburo member turned out to be Lev Zaikov, formerly a candidate (non-voting) member. There were four new candidate members. Five new secretaries were added to the Secretariat, the engine room of the Party. Much to everyone's surprise a woman was elected, Aleksandra Biryukova. If her name was a surprise to the delegates — she had not spoken at the Congress — she was also apparently unknown to the Secretary General. He first announced her name incorrectly! One significant addition to the Secretariat was Anatoly Dobrynin who had served 24 years in Washington as ambassador and was reputed to understand the psychology of American leaders better than anyone else.

Besides adopting a new economic plan the Congress also took on board a new Party Programme and new Party Statutes.

Gorbachev looked very tired on the last day but was he satisfied with the Congress, the highlight of his first year in office, and the progress he had made in consolidating his position since the death of Chernenko?

A new CPSU leader inherits limited power and authority. The new man's task is to consolidate his position by removing the previous leader's appointees and replacing them with his own. He attempts to do this not only in the Politburo but also at all levels of Party and government. On this score alone Gorbachev has been remarkably successful. His two major opponents in the Politburo, Romanov and Grishin, have gone. He has appointed his own Prime Minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov, and his own Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. As Andropov's blue eyed boy Gorbachev played a key role in sacking Brezhnevite appointees and replacing them with much younger cadres. He was able to continue this process under Chernenko and Ligachev now carries it on. Since Brezhnev's death over two thirds of first Party secretaries at the oblast or provincial level have been replaced; four republican Party secretaries have changed as have nine republican second secretaries. At the republican Party conferences, held just before the Congress, the turnover of those elected to the bureaux (the Politburo at the republican level) was about 43 per cent. At the government level about one minister in four is new. Despite these changes Gorbachev has not had everything his own way. He failed in his bid to limit the term of office of Party officials. Had he succeeded he would have swept away the remnants of the Brezhnev generation in the near future. The first wave of changes is over; the second will take much more time and careful planning.

Besides choosing his own team a new leader must advance economic, social and foreign policies which not only attract support but are also achievable. Success here builds authority. Gorbachev's goal is quite clear but it is not apparent how he is going to attain his target of retooling industry, stimulating rapid growth in labour productivity and filling the shops with food and consumer goods. He is a puritan at heart, he neither drinks nor smokes and has continued the anti-alcohol campaign, begun under Andropov, with some vigour. Something drastic has to be done to prevent Soviet, especially Russian, men from drinking and smoking themselves into an early grave. Whereas in the mid-1960s the average Soviet male could expect to live to the age of 66, it is now down to 60. Alcohol is at present the single biggest killer, contributing to about half the deaths from heart-related diseases — now the chief cause of death in the Soviet Union. Medical care for the average person is inadequate. This is not wholly the fault of the medical profession as medical and social services are certainly underfunded.

A major problem facing the present Soviet leadership is how to reshape civilian industry while maintaining priority for defence contracts. Defence is the most favoured sector as regards labour, qualified scientific staff and material inputs. Gorbachev has hinted that defence expenditure may have to be checked to allow more resources to flow to the rest of the economy.

In agriculture Gorbachev has given some tantalising hints about his intentions. To start with, farm income will rise in 1986 as a result of recent increases in the prices paid by the state for farm produce. About

one quarter of agricultural output is lost through bad storage and inadequate transport facilities. In his Congress speech Gorbachev used the term *prodnalog*, last used by Lenin in 1921. Then it meant the tax private farms had to pay the state, about 15 per cent of output. Gorbachev may envisage charging the farms — all socialist — about 75 per cent and allow them to dispose of the rest to the highest bidder. The family unit was mentioned several times by the Secretary General in his speech. It is possible to conceive of several families forming a cooperative and selling their produce to the state and the private market. However, a thorny problem has still to be resolved by Gorbachev. If the farms are paid more for their produce where is the money to come from? Will Gorbachev grasp the nettle of increased prices for basic food products? Prices have remained more or less static for twenty years and are uneconomically low. He could become very unpopular overnight if he raises prices sharply.

Gorbachev's greatest impact has been in foreign policy. Here the astuteness of his move last July when he pushed Andrei Gromyko, the formidable Foreign Minister, up into the state presidentcy and replaced him with a close confidant, Eduard Shevardnadze, has now become evident. Shevardnadze, although an intelligent man, had had no experience in diplomacy. Gorbachev wanted to dominate foreign policy formation and presentation himself. As a natural TV performer, he has seized every opportunity to enunciate the Soviet position on arms control. The Secretary General understood that the Soviet view should be articulated with a smile and transparent sincerity. 'Grim Grom' was clearly ill-suited to this role.

Gorbachev is by instinct neither a radical nor a liberal but a conservative. He wants to leave the Soviet power structure basically intact but to revitalise it with the techniques and technologies of the late 20th century. This is particularly evident in the use to which computers are to be put. There are only a few in private hands; they are used by research scientists, almost certainly working on military contracts, and are linked to a main data base in the respective research institute. The dream of the central authorities is to use computers to check more effectively on performance and to make it very difficult for anyone to hide behind others and avoid responsibility. Software will be very closely supervised with no programmes remaining in private hands. Hence the goal of computer literacy, to be achieved in the years ahead, is to streamline central government and Party control, not to devolve decision making power or information flows to the periphery.

Gorbachev is still in his honeymoon period — accompanied by his charming wife Raisa who is now clearly politically the most important woman in the country — but the real test will come when his tentative policy changes fail fundamentally to improve economic performance. The economy will grow faster in 1986 than in 1985 or 1984 but this in itself will not signal success as the performance of the last two years was so very poor. Even agriculture will improve since the Soviet Union, after

seven successive poor harvests, must soon experience a good one. Gorbachev will most likely have to face the prospect of more radical change and given the type of man he is he would be willing to take risks. He can only contemplate such risks when his power and authority are very high since to act beforehand would be to jeopardise his own position. Most likely, he will give the present system a few years to prove whether it is capable of achieving the desired economic results. If not, he must act. However, radical economic reform in the past has led to chaos and this is the most important lesson Gorbachev can learn from Khrushchev. Gorbachev at present gives the impression of being a careful, sober politician weighing up all the options before acting.

In foreign policy Gorbachev is playing for high stakes, appealing to Western audiences over the heads of their governments. Lenin did this after 1917 and failed. The Secretary General may also fail since arms control agreements have to be negotiated with governments and not with the general public.

Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is on the move but it may resemble a waltz with those in charge coming back to the same problems they are now confronted with. Then and only then will a fundamental reform of the Soviet system be on the agenda.

The explosion at the nuclear power station at Chernobyl on 26 April 1986 was a disaster from many points of view. Besides the human tragedies, it highlighted some of the deficiencies of the Soviet political system. It also revealed that there had been no forward planning for such an eventuality and the civil defence system, which should have acted after a nuclear leak, did not do so promptly. Agriculture and industry also suffered. In fact the disaster could not have occurred at a more inopportune time for Gorbachev and has affected his standing both inside and outside the Soviet Union.

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[Martin McCauley is Senior Lecturer in Soviet and East European Studies in the School of Slavonic Studies, University of London. Together with Stephen Carter he edited *Leadership and Succession in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China* (Macmillan 1986). His next book is *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev* (forthcoming). He will shortly contribute an article on the impact of the Chernobyl disaster on Soviet politics.]

# THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT — A PROGRESS REPORT

**by The Rt. Hon. Baroness Elles, MEP**

IT is one of the hall-marks of modern pluralist democracies that bureaucracies are subjected, in their actions, administration and decisions, to scrutiny by bodies composed of representatives elected by those on behalf of whose interests the bureaucracy is purported to act.

The primary and most important task of the European Parliament is to scrutinise the activities of the European Council of Ministers and the European Commission, whose decisions may have direct consequences for the interests of the 320 million people living within the twelve member-states of the European Community. It has a specific function in relation to the other institutions of the Community which cannot be exercised by any other body in the same way. It is in effect complementary to the national Parliament, which scrutinizes and criticises the acts of national Ministers, whether in relation to national or European policies. But national Parliaments cannot scrutinise or criticise the acts or proposed decisions of twelve national ministers, or of the European Commission. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome, in which the European Parliament (or Assembly as it was then called) was established, provided that the Commission was answerable to the European Parliament, thus seeking to ensure the Commission's independence from one or more governments.

The means by which the Members of the European Parliament exercise this scrutinising role are those used by national Parliamentary members — questions, both written and oral, debates, correspondence with Commissioners and ministers of national governments — not always of the same nationality as the MEP and representations on behalf of organised lobbies. Although the postbag of an MEP is dissimilar from that of an MP, considerable numbers of letters are received from individuals within a Euroconstituency on a wide variety of matters — agriculture, social security problems, inter-Community trade, customs procedure, student exchanges, competition policy, grants and loans from Community sources, advice on technological development — to mention only a few.

The use of the procedure of putting questions to the Commission has grown to such an extent that some measure of control will have to be exercised if the short-staffed Commission is going to be able to handle this particular form of scrutiny. By the end of 1983, the number of questions addressed to the Commission totalled 2,583, including both oral and written questions. By the end of 1985, for the same period of one year, the number of questions was 3,675. Since the total number of Commission staff, including translators and interpreters, remains at somewhere around 13,000 people, considerably less than, for instance, are employed by the Manpower Services Commission (about 23,000) in the United Kingdom alone, it can be appreciated that the burden is becoming intoler-

able.

While this scrutinising role remains an essential role of the MEP, Parliament's role in relation both to the European citizen and to the other institutions of the Community has evolved, strengthening its limited powers within the decision-making processes of the Community and in extending its influence, inside and outside the Community.

Following the first international direct elections in June 1979, with 410 members being elected from nine different countries to the European Parliament, recognition of its 'democratic legitimacy' was acknowledged by the European Court of Justice. In a case known as the Isoglucose Case (joined cases 138 and 139/79), the Court upheld the claim made by two producers of isoglucose that a regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers be declared void as the opinion of the European Parliament had not been obtained before its adoption. In a number of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, the Council has a duty to consult the Parliament before making legislative decisions. In accordance with the Court's judgment, this consultation by the Council 'reflects at Community level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly.' Although the Court did not hold that the Council was in any way obliged to agree with the opinion of Parliament, it was made clear that the opinion must be received by the Council before a decision was taken. This fact was perceived by Parliament as being a means of exerting influence over both the Council and the Commission by the introduction of a procedure which would delay the opinion of Parliament being forwarded to the two other institutions. Withholding a vote on amendments to draft legislation until the Commission has given its undertaking to review its draft texts has been used by Parliament with varying degrees of success, but it has, by virtue of the Court's decision, succeeded in taking a short step towards sharing in the legislative processes of the Community.

A further step in this direction has been achieved by the Parliament, when it decided to take the Council to the Court for failure to act on a common transport policy, after searching to find a subject matter within the Treaty of Rome which might have a chance of success. The Treaty has provided a unique opportunity for international lawyers, with its provisions covering procedures, policies and long term prospects, as well as containing directions for the implementation of certain policies within a specific transitional period of time. The Transport Committee of the European Parliament considered that the provisions relating to a common transport policy should have been introduced within a specified period. It thus happened that for the first time the Court was to be asked to give a decision for failure to act by one institution, at the request of another Community institution — the Parliament. Parliament claimed that not only had the Council failed to introduce the common transport policy, but it had also failed to take decisions on the several relevant proposals forwarded by the Commission.

Understandably, the Council claimed that the Parliament's case was

not only unsustainable, but inadmissible. The Court decided otherwise. The Advocate-General, Dr Lenz, forcibly argued that, contrary to the view of the Council, Parliament's case should be admissible. He stressed that 'according to the Treaty, the applicant exercises the advisory and supervisory powers which were conferred upon it by the Treaty', and he continued: 'Advisory and supervisory powers are only of use if the institution to be advised and supervised takes action with regard to which it can be advised and supervised. If it does nothing, advisory and supervisory powers are ineffective.'

The outcome of the case (13/83), while not confirming all the claims made by Parliament, nevertheless established its right and obligation to scrutinise the acts of the Council of Ministers and its right and obligation to scrutinise those matters in which the Council had failed to act in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Parliament has once again, through the decision of the European Court, been given further scope for developing its powers in pressing for decisions on Community policies.

Parliament's concern for its role in the legislative processes of the Community has not confined its activities to the European Court of Justice. In 1980-1981, a series of reports was drawn up, setting out the relationship between Parliament and the other institutions of the Community. Many of the provisions of these reports have since been implemented, but they have not fundamentally changed the status of the Parliament to a co-decision maker with the Council. It was left to Signor Spinelli and the newly formed Institutional Committee to draw up a Draft Treaty of European Union, which sets out, in constitutional form, proposals for a new role for the Parliament. It would no longer be merely consulted, but would take an active part in the adopting of legislation. The Council of Ministers, after ten years of the new Treaty being in force, would no longer be able to deploy the use of the Luxemburg agreement by application of the veto. Parliament would have a greater role in the ratification of international agreements between the Community and third countries.

Parliament then pressed the Intergovernmental Conference, set up at the Milan European Council meeting in June 1985, to consider and adopt the Draft Treaty. There was reluctance on the part of most governments to increase the powers of the Parliament though some concessions have been made in what has been named the Single European Act, signed by all member states, but not, at the time of writing, ratified by national Parliaments. The European Parliament — and if there is any advance of recognition of its existence and authority, it is that the term Assembly is no longer used, but is replaced by Parliament — is being given the right to assent to accession Treaties under article 237 and to international agreements under article 238 of the EEC Treaty.

The reluctance of the Council to accord greater powers to the European Parliament is not surprising. Throughout history, the Executive has only given way to elected representatives by the efforts of the latter, by the expression of a democratic will. Powers are not given to Parliaments. They are seized. In this regard the European Parliament is no exception.

If its attempts at co-decision making have not yet succeeded, by means of a new Treaty, there are some opportunities for greater cooperation set out in the new Single European Act, though the precise consequences of the procedure laid down is not absolutely clear. The European Commission, however, has repeatedly recognised that if it is to have any greater influence over the Council, it needs the Parliament as an ally. More than once, the President of the Commission, M. Delors, has offered the Parliament the opportunity to propose draft legislation in two major fields, to be selected by the Parliament. This would be a major departure from the Treaty provision which lays down that it is for the Commission to initiate draft legislation. This is an opportunity to which Parliament has not yet responded.

The perceptions of the public towards the European institutions are generally limited to 'Brussels' or, occasionally, to the European Parliament, when some foolish proposal is given maximum publicity or a sensible one distorted, (although similar aberrations by members of national Parliaments are not generally accorded the same kind of publicity). It is perhaps the budgetary procedure of the Community which highlights the Parliamentary role, as one of the two 'arms' of the budgetary authority, together with the Council of Ministers. Each year, since the first direct elections took place in 1979, there has been conflict between the two institutions. In December 1979, Parliament, for the first time, voted to reject the draft Budget for 1980. One of the results of this rejection was to influence the proportion of the Community budget to be spent on agriculture in relation to expenditure on other policies that is, the proportion of obligatory to 'non-obligatory' expenditure. A measure of the success of Parliament may be gauged from the fact that in 1972, 96% of the Budget was spent on agriculture, with only 4% being left for the Parliament to have the 'final say', (within certain financial limits) compared to the 1985 budget in which about 67% was on agriculture, with the remainder on sectoral policies, including the social and regional funds.

The last two budgets have maintained the tradition of causing conflict between Parliament and Council. The 1985 budget was drafted to meet expenditure for only 10 months of the year. The conflict ended with national governments having to come to an inter-governmental agreement to raise the missing sums needed to meet Community obligations. The 1986 budget is not yet finalised. The unsatisfactory procedures, with failure to reach agreement between the Council and Parliament, have resulted in an injunction by the British government against the Parliament and further Court proceedings by the Council against Parliament later in 1986. Yet an analysis of these events shows a failure to recognise either the long term necessity for rather higher expenditure at Community level in order to save considerable sums at national level — at twelve national levels — failure to allow for the consequences of the enlargement of the Community agreed by the Council, as well as consequences of the effects of change in the value of the dollar on the Community budget.

Parliament has identified programmes initiated by the Council for which

not sufficient funds are being provided, and Council's unwillingness to meet this expenditure. The existing formula of 'own resources', the means by which certain sums are paid by national governments automatically to provide Community income, is proving inadequate to meet the demands being made. Parliament's action this year which sought to increase the size of the budget by about £380 million, has been met with a rebuff. It is to be seen, later in the year, what Parliament's reaction will be when the Council is forced to come to Parliament to agreement for a supplementary budget to meet essential expenditure, in the region of a minimum of £2.6bn. The irony is that the total of the Community's budget for 1986 is about £22bn, about £3bn less than the local authorities of the United Kingdom will be spending in 1986.

The budgetary role of the Parliament may cause annoyance and irritation to the Council. But there are some areas of policy in which the positive proposals of Parliament have been acknowledged, and if not always adopted without amendment, have provided a sound basis for action. The initiative of MEPs to insist on provision of aid for agricultural and rural development in developing countries, the provision of food aid and emergency aid to drought stricken areas of Africa, particularly in the Sudan and Ethiopia, greater financial assistance to non-governmental organisations working in the field and without whom food, medical supplies and other forms of aid could not be distributed are only some of the many proposals showing the concern of MEPs for the third world. Concern is not only registered for more distant parts of the world. Through Parliament's intervention, the Social Fund (of which Britain has received about 23%) was increased from 4.6% of the Budget of 1981 to 7.4% by 1983. Measures to promote the economic, social and vocational integration of the handicapped, proposed by Parliament were adopted by the Council in a resolution in December 1981. In June 1983, following a Parliamentary resolution, the Council agreed to special Community action in favour of urban renewal in Belfast and in Naples, resulting in a large flow of funds to Northern Ireland.

It is the formation of the Internal Market, making the Common Market a reality, providing thereby a unique market for the free flow of goods, services, persons and capital throughout the twelve member states which has resulted from pressure consistently brought to bear by the major activist group in the Parliament, known as the Kangaroo group, showing up the folly and expense of twelve fragmented markets compared with the cost-effectiveness of the one market. This is true of the costs of crossing the internal frontiers of the Community (estimated cost to business at £7bn per annum), and equally true of the failure of a technological market to meet the competition of the United States and Japan. The Commission has now adopted a scheduled programme for the completion of the internal market, agreed by the Council in principle. It remains to be seen how far national governments will be willing to go, when it comes to taking decisions on the approximation of VAT rates or the approximation of excise duties. Parliament will be giving its support and encouragement

to the Commission to complete the programme by 1992 (the agreed time limit) against the hesitations and reluctance of national governments.

Not only does the Parliament provide a focal point for internal policy, but more especially is identified as represenative of the Community in third countries. Delegations from Parliament have exchange meetings with eighteen other national Parliaments, including the United States Congress and Senate. These exchanges are an invaluable source of creating better communication and understanding of global problems which face us. The disunity which is apparent within the Community is no longer apparent to others outside the Community, as they have long since recognised that the Community is the world's largest trading block, the second largest exporter of food, the world's largest importer of food and hence a part of the world with whom it is of advantage to be in contact if not always in agreement. MEPs are the visible sign of this large trading block and as such can be the recipients of opinion and legitimate complaint as well as a means of building up better relationships with the 120 odd countries with whom the Community has association agreements.

It is specifically in the field of external relations that the Community has assumed competences which are no longer exerted by national authorities. It is therefore correspondingly of greater importance for the Parliament to control and scrutinize these areas of policy, covering international commercial agreements, which have financial implications for the Community. Following the Stuttgart Declaration of June 1982, the Parliament was accorded the right to be consulted on all major significant international treaties. This transfer of responsibility from national governments to the Community in the EEC Treaty has resulted until now in what is sometimes known as the 'democratic deficit', responsibility by an institution without corresponding democratic control. The new Single European Act, yet to be ratified at the time of writing, has conferred two new areas of policy on the Community — environmental protection and the strengthening of a technological base for European industry.

MEPs have the opportunity to learn and become aware of major scientific developments in the other eleven member states, and through their links with the major European industries can play a useful role in the debate on the future economic prosperity of Europe. Whatever criticism may be levelled against the Parliament by those who do not know the many useful fields of activity in which MEPs are engaged, the Parliament remains a unique body, representing the needs and aspirations of 320 million people and being able to influence the decisions affecting the future of this part of the world.

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[The Rt. Hon. Baroness Elles MEP is Vice-President of the European Parliament, Conservative Member for Thames Valley and former Opposition Spokesman in the House of Lords.]

# THE HILLSBOROUGH AGREEMENT: OBSTACLE TO UNITY

**by John Biggs-Davison, MP**

CARDINAL (he was then Archbishop) Manning rebuked 'Englishmen' of his day for the harm they did 'by a contemptuous, satirical, disrespectful, defiant language' about Ireland and the Irish. There are prominent Englishmen today who do harm by supercilious assertions that they will never understand the Irish (have they studied them and their history which is part of ours?) or that the Irish should fight it out among themselves — like the Kilkenny cats.

Lord Fitt has drawn analogy between Northern Ireland and the Falkland Islands. It appears to have been the wish of 'contemptuous' politicians and mandarins to get rid of territories that are bones of contention with foreign states. Writing in *The Times* of the 26th of November, Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien observed that the dissolution of the United Kingdom is the logic of the Hillsborough Agreement.

British and Irish Ministers go on about 'two traditions' in Ulster. These are neatly docketed as 'Catholic-Gaelic-Irish' and 'Protestant-British-Unionist'. (How many 'traditions' are there now in Great Britain?) In Ulster these 'two traditions' find more in common with each other than does either with the South. Mr Austin Currie of the Social Democratic and Labour Party sees fewer differences between Northern Catholic and Protestant than between the Catholic of Tyrone and the Catholic of Cork or Kerry. Craigavon felt easier with the Belfast Nationalist Joe Devlin than with that Southern Irishman Carson.

Ever since the abolition of Stormont and the imposition of direct rule from London successive governments have behaved as though bent on perpetuating the division of a divided society. They legislate for that division by measures that differentiate Northern Ireland from Great Britain. To every rapidly succeeding Secretary of State his very own 'new political initiative'. 'We can't go on as we are, Minister.' The last two initiatives have been seen as 'John Hume benefits'. It is seen as the duty of Conservative and Unionist Ministers to keep the SDLP in business, for fear of that 'something worse', Sinn Fein, and to avert 'Catholic alienation' (a phrase used by the brilliant propagandists of the republic movement to make the British feel guilty). Mr Hume praises the Hillsborough initiative which, according to Dr Garrett FitzGerald gives 'Dublin . . . a say in precisely those issues of greatest sensitivity such as political and security matters . . .' Mr Hume refuses to sit in the Assembly, product of Mr Prior's initiative; but Hillsborough is not a very thin end of the wedge.

Every such initiative alarms the majority and encourages the terrorist. Lord Hailsham warned us once against the eager problem-solvers. Parrot on about Northern Ireland being so 'different', as though Scotland, with

her distinct legal system, is not, and you weaken the Union. The desire of nearly every Protestant and nearly every second Catholic to cleave to Britain does not make Ministers glow with gratitude. More 'contemptuous, satirical' English politicians sneer snobbishly at Ulster's 'Thatcherite' virtues and boisterous patriotism. They deserve first prize for 'alienation'.

The Irish, North and South, are as 'British' as are the Scots, Welsh, Manx and Channel Islanders. Our islands form a natural geopolitical and cultural entity. Ulster is particularly close to Scotland. Partition tragically severed most of Ireland from the rest of the British Isles. Home Rule was imposed on Northern Ireland in the hope of reunification. That hope was dashed mainly by Southern attitudes to Crown and Commonwealth and by the declaration of a republic. De Valera's constitution of 1937 had already dishonoured the Free State's signature to the Tripartite Declaration of 1925 (deposited at the League of Nations) by claiming all-Ireland sovereignty. The Anglo-Irish Agreement (registered with the United Nations) has not changed that.

This one-sided accord distorts the principle of the existing Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council which is an East-West (London-Dublin) not a North-South organisation equipped reciprocally to advance the security and prosperity of the British Isles. Like every threat to the permanence of the Union, the Hillsborough Agreement will cause Unionists to recoil from cross-Border co-operation. Put the Union beyond doubt and they will co-operate even morecordially than in the past.

The Union can be put beyond doubt and terrorists discomfited by governing this province of the United Kingdom as truly part of it. It follows that in time provincial politics and parties should give way to those of the United Kingdom with their wider concerns. Party is the basis of our parliamentary system of government. The absence of the parties common to England, Scotland and Wales from one region of the realm places that region apart. The Tory-Unionist alliance is not dead yet; and what impedes the Labour Party from organising in Ulster save the old-fashioned United Irelandism of its front bench and the revolutionary separatism further Left?

Old Irish quarrels have died out in great British cities. So could it be in Ulster. Then the 'unique relationship' between Kingdom and Republic closer than any in Commonwealth or Community might become an association that unites Ireland by uniting these islands.

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[Sir John Biggs-Davison is Member of Parliament for Epping Forest.]

# MEDITERRANEAN CHALLENGES

## by Mladen Gavrilovic

MUCH has been happening during the past few months in the Mediterranean and the Middle East; in Lebanon in particular. First, the world was shocked by the hijacking of the Achille Lauro, and further disquietened by the news that American fighter craft had intercepted a plane of Egypt's civil airlines. Not long after followed the Palestinians' brutal terrorists attacks on the airports in Rome and Vienna, and the USA alert in NATO's southern defence wing, sending off an armada of warships in the direction of the Libyan shores. Once again peace in the Mediterranean has been seriously menaced in the immediate vicinity of the Levant engulfed in the fires of war over ten years ago.

Today's world is certainly beset by many trouble-spots. However, the events in the Levant and Mediterranean, continuing for decades, are certainly a formidable threat to peace in the world. Every day the winds of war in Lebanon sweep away countless innocent victims and cause untold material damage. On the other side of the Mideastern stage is the Iran-Iraq theatre of war. While the conflict in the Gulf is limited to two countries squaring accounts by force of arms, the Lebanese stage is the scene of many conflicting factors both internal and external. If it were possible to unravel this knot, an important process of pacification would open up in this hazardous region, a stone's throw from the rich oil fields of the Arab world. It would also mean a change for the better in the life of the Lebanese who for ten long years have been witnessing destruction and death from one day to the next. The seeds of discord were sown by Israel in 1967 when that country attacked and occupied Arab territories, some of which it still holds today.

The squadron of American warships was obviously not only a demonstration of power politics but of threat against an independent and non-aligned country of the Arab world. The first excitement over these 'war games' seems to be over for the time being at any rate. Colonel Gaddafi met this demonstration by part of the American Sixth Fleet quite calmly, although with warnings of dire results. On the other hand, the United States did not stop at mere threats. Washington announced an economic boycott of Libya, possible air-strikes from the UK and appealed for support to its allies in Western Europe. However, Reagan's appeal for sanctions against Libya failed to meet with much initial response, although a limited agreement now seems to be in sight.

Western Europe looks askance on any return to cold war policy. America's NATO allies have envinced different interests. The EEC countries and NATO members are loath to forfeit their position as Libya's trading partners: some because of their interests in Libyan oil purchases and others because of trade with this particular North African country. Italy purchases Libyan oil to the tune of over two and a half billion dollars per annum. There are about 16 thousand Italians working in

Libya, a former Italian colony, thus solving the problem of how to earn a living. Furthermore, Italy — with the Soviet Union — is currently the largest supplier of weapons for Gaddafi's army.

Great Britain's interests are twofold. First of all, one should recall that her diplomatic relations with Libya were severed in 1984 because of the action of Libyan students in London, in the course of which a police-woman died, although recently Britain sought for ways and means to repair the rift. Furthermore, British capital engaged in Libya has definite interests of its own. It has been estimated that there are over sixty British corporations and firms operating on Libyan territory. The British have entered into serious projects involving considerable investments but also promising high profits during the years to come. Libya's economic development at a time when the world is in the throes of an economic crisis was too formidable a challenge to British capital for it to throw it away just because Washington has decided to impose economic sanctions. Thus, each of America's European allies is determined to safeguard its own position, convinced that pulling out of Libya would only make room for rivals to move in, and these would mainly be the other members of the European 'Twelve'.

The Western Germans, like the French, are in no mood to follow in the footsteps of Washington's economic war against Libya. Paris and Bonn both have their own interests at heart, despite oscillations in relations with Gaddafi. It is, therefore, easy to see why Reagan's economic war, combined with threats by the US Navy, failed to produce the desired results. While Washington was losing the support of its allies, Gaddafi had good prospects of reapproachment with the Arab countries which he looked upon as enemies not so long ago. Any kind of rapprochement between Libya and the rest of the Arab world would undoubtedly help to improve the general state of affairs in the area between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.

At one time Great Britain had its own conception of Mediterranean policy, for the Mediterranean was part of the Empire's route to the Far East and Australia. The United States had no such policy, yet it has become the decisive factor among the Western countries in this part of the world.

American presence in the Mediterranean after the last war was always in the service of NATO. It inevitably led to confrontation with the Soviet Union and the doctrine of extending military, financial and technical assistance to America's Mediterranean allies — Greece, Turkey and Spain. The geopolitical location of these countries, the so-called southern defences of NATO, is inherent in the Alliance's strategic plans. However, economic interests are on a par with military objectives, especially in the South-East Wing of Atlantic defence — namely Greece and Turkey — both a stone's throw from the Gates to the Orient in the ante-room of rich oil-bearing regions.

On the other hand, the Soviet fleet is likewise present from time to time in the Mediterranean. The East Mediterranean expanses include, to some

extent, the Levantine coast and the adjacent Middle East which, as the Soviet Union sees it, is included in global Soviet-American relations.

In the course of preparations for the Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Geneva, there was a meeting of Soviet and American Middle East experts in Moscow. What was discussed at this meeting and what its results were remain a secret. However, after the Geneva meeting, both sides leaked the information that the two leaders had discussed various trouble-spots in the world, which obviously includes the Middle East crisis. Naturally these exchanges of views must have included talks on events in Central America, Afghanistan and even in South-East Asia. In the case of the Mideastern crisis, it is obvious that no solution can be sought without the directly interested parties' participation in the talks, including, on a footing of equality, representatives of the PLO.

Now, some seven months after the Geneva summit, the United States is facing a renewed challenge in the Mediterranean. Any wrong move which involved the US in a new conflict would ruin the labour of many months in anticipation of the Geneva meeting. One must admit that the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting did not produce any visible results — but did open sound prospects of a broader process for resolving the world's most vital problems and transforming the dialogue into a broadbased, universal process. Great hopes are now being pinned on a continuation of the Soviet-American talks. Should it take a lasting undesirable turn, the crisis in the Mediterranean will destroy the favourable atmosphere created in Geneva.

The Soviet daily newspaper, *Pravda,* recently published an article claiming that the danger of an American-Israeli attack on Libya has not passed and that the worst may happen at any moment. It remains to be seen during the next few months whether *Pravda's* fears are well-founded.

The World has denounced the policy of pressure, but it equally disapproves of terrorist activities. The entire international public has denounced the unprecedented acts of terrorism committed at the airports in Vienna, Rome and elsewhere. There is no justification for such acts of terrorism, but neither can one justify threats to independent countries, for these threats also constitute a menace to the international order and violation of principles contained in the United Nations Charter.

The US military attack on Libya on April 15th was not only unexpected; it was also a risky step in relation both to US allies in Western Europe and to the Soviet Union. The United States failed to adjust its own stands to those of its European allies and it put in serious doubt the proposed dialogue between President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Gorbachev. The US air raids on Libya have certainly caused feeling to run high. Western Europe manifested a variety of attitudes. Britain allowed the US aircraft to use its airfields, with resulting objections from a large section of the British public; France and Spain forbade them to fly over their territory, while other countries within NATO-Pact voiced condemnations with varying levels of intensity. But when the dust had settled, the West found satisfaction in a new rallying in the struggle

# TERROR IN THE SKIES

## by Paul Rose

AS I write Labour's *Freedom and Fairness New Look* has just been launched and a new professionalism appealing to society as it is reflects a demand which I first articulated in *Contemporary Review* before leaving Parliament and the Party in despair. The Libyan debate is already overshadowed by a new terror in the skies in the shape of a radio-active cloud blowing West from the Ukraine. News happens so fast that the headlines of a monthly become old hat by the time you read it. However, it is comforting to know that my themes are sometimes nearly a decade in advance of their time. The paradox being that this was the very reason for my political despair in relation to other matters ignored at the time I raised them.

In my last article, I considered the possibility that the Westland affair might be a watershed in the fortunes of Mrs. Thatcher. I also commented that problems rarely come in pairs. Indeed, it seems that once a Government slips on the proverbial banana skin, then all sorts of rotten fruit seems to fall about its ears and a period in a fall-out shelter will be needed before blue skies signal a General Election. Neither the penny off income tax nor the incredibly miserly increases in pensions and social security will have enhanced the Government's prestige on the home front, despite the fall in petrol prices and interest rates, — a fortunate bonus in the disaffected suburbs seduced by the Alliance in so many local By-Elections. The paradox is that the fall in oil revenue in turn limits the freedom of manoeuvre for a Chancellor anxious to cut direct taxation.

Many will argue that such cuts are the wrong option in that job creation is the priority and the message of Fulham is significant in more than one respect. Firstly, with a good candidate in a polarised inner London area Labour had its best by-election result for a decade. The solidity of the vote shows that the Alliance has failed to penetrate the urban and industrial ramparts of the traditional Labour areas where it is still seen as the only viable alternative.

The SDP has capitalised on Tory disaffection in the more prosperous areas, particularly in the south and suburbia but it has failed to deliver that great proportion of voters which has far more in common with Shirley Williams than Frank Hatton or Ted Knight and is not crying out for the prosperous Mr. Livingstone as he prepares his post-County Hall *Memoirs of a Newt Loving Man.* It was the disaffected Labour vote that it should have delivered to the Alliance, whereas the outcome is the Liberal success in selected and neglected inner cities, picked off by Simon Hughes and David Alton.

A reappraisal of this problem and the failure to attract the young or the most deprived is needed, but my own attempts to warn the Party were stifled. David Owen acknowledges the truth but fails to do anything to rekindle the original radicalism which gave birth to his party after the

ashes of the 1979 Election, the narrowing class base and isolationism of a Party increasingly infiltrated by undemocratic and intolerant parasites. Ageing, benevolent but comfortable, the new Party might have led the crusade so necessary to eliminate the dereliction of our inner cities and revitalise industry with its innovative ideas.

However, as events unfold, even allowing for future internecine strife in the Labour Party I would still put my money on a hung Parliament, unless the Conservative Party can be seen to be tackling unemployment or finds that strict monetarism can be put on one side for a while along with British Leyland in the final run up to a General Election.

As the Party of law and order, the current industrial action by prison officers in the wake of the teachers is clearly an embarrassment and one could do worse than reread Robert McClennan's excellent analysis in the March issue of *Contemporary Review*. An examination of alternatives to prison involving hostels and training could result in cutting the overcrowding by absorbing about one third of the prison population. Money spent on improving our infrastructure would influence the expense of social security and prison systems now cracking at the seams as a direct consequence of an economic ideology which ignores social costs. Thus, to manufacture tobacco or organise a takeove is wealth-producing while preventative medicine and expenditure on good housing consumes wealth. The yardstick of success is the amount of public borrowing and inflation, while the breakdown of social cohesion and the alienation of youth in our inner cities, not least among ethnic minorities, and the consequent violence and crime are not seen as factors in the equation.

It is clear from the restiveness on the Tory benches and announcements of senior Ministers not seeking re-election that the Thatcher style is not merely opposed on Party lines. Curiously, although this resulted in various climb-downs and compromises unthinkable before the Westland Watershed, it came to a head on the unlikely issue of Sunday Trading. On second reading the troops mutinied in unprecedented numbers, combining to kill the Bill as effectively as the talking out of Winston Churchill's ill-thought out attempt to curb the indigestible menu of violence served out to viewers. Trade Unionists and traditionalists mingled with many who reflected a much deeper malaise. The unfortunate result is that so many anomalies in the present law will remain and the poor old DIY man who wants to knock in a few nails during the afternoon after a morning Service will be deprived of his worthy pursuit while I can watch live Soccer action as I did at Wembley when humble Oxford United took my mind off our crazy world for ninety minutes of relative sanity.

However, neither soccer nor celebrations of the Queen's birthday could soothe my shock and sheer disbelief at the US reaction to Libyan backed terrorism. Nevertheless, it was our own role which was the factor that caused the greatest concern to our vulnerable nation. The irony was not lost on me since my opposition to the Suez fiasco had first propelled me into political prominence in my home city of Manchester, where I had led the student demonstration, with banners proclaiming 'Law Not War'.

I have little love for Colonel Gaddafy or his Syrian friends and I believe that Europe has dragged its feet in combating terrorism emanating from the Arab World, not least in relation to Libyan propaganda centres still operating after we had taken the right action after the death of WPC Yvonne Fletcher. Subtlety has never been a strong point in US diplomacy but the US had seen the reaction to the bombing of Port Said in 1956 and effectively ended the Anglo-French action. For Mrs. Thatcher to sanction the use of bases in Britain for the bombing of Benghazi and Tripoli raised serious questions that had caused unease since we accepted the dubious privilege of becoming a prime target by allowing Cruise Missiles to be housed here. The films of anti-personnel weapons coupled with the Prime Minister's admission that the type of weaponry was not questioned added to fears — not least about the reality of the dual key. In spite of assurances to Dr. Owen it seems that while we may be consulted, ultimate decisions will be made by those who control the weaponry.

The first objection to the Libyan episode was that it was counter-productive and enhanced the reputation of the man whom President Reagan, sounding like a prosecutor at a Soviet show trial, dubbed 'The Mad Dog of the Middle East'.

The second objection was that it would arouse such anger among the already fanatical followers of various groups that terrorism would escalate rather than decrease. Its sources would become more diverse and more difficult to combat. Above all, however, was the concern that retribution was likely to hit the UK, more readily than upon US targets. Even Rambo was scared to come here! The bodies of Britons in Beirut bore testimony to all those objections. However, for those concerned with a peaceful solution to the Arab Israeli conflict there is another more serious spin off.

Moderate States like Jordan and Egypt will find it even more difficult to open a dialogue with Israel while escalating terrorism will drive Israeli public opinion into the arms of the Hawks.

However, even the jettisoning of Socialism by Neil Kinnock, the local By-Election excitement and the Libyan episode itself are dwarfed by the catastrophe in the Soviet Union. Man's ability to control the Frankenstein of nuclear power is not merely in doubt but more than apparent as I listen anxiously to news of wind directions around Kiev. Beside the implications of that tragedy even Libya has ceased to be the issue of the day. As I scan the world from Capetown to Portadown; from Cape Kennedy to Kiev, I feel a sense of depression and despair but above all impotence in a world of starvation and saturation bombing; of unbounded wealth and abject poverty; and I mutter to myself the refrain of a protest song from years gone by — 'When will they ever learn?' For the fall-out is truly 'Blowing in the Wind.'

# UNFETTERING THE FOURTH ESTATE

## by Robin Findlay

WHEN William Caxton's foreman and successor, Wynkyn de Worde, moved from his premises in the almonry of Westminster Abbey to the Sign of the Sun in Fleet Street in the year 1500, it was a move carefully calculated to improve his business prospects. Westminster, home of the monarch and seat of the legislature, with its never-ending streams of visitors — the courtiers, the lawyers, the ecclesiastics — had been Caxton's primary source of custom since he installed the country's first printing press there in 1476. But after Caxton's death in 1491/92 de Worde decided that the only way to expand the business was to move two miles down the road — or down the river — to the City of London, centre of commerce and, more importantly, centre of the country's distribution network.[1]

Today, after nearly five centuries, the printing presses are leaving Fleet Street. And the printing process invented by Gutenberg and introduced by Caxton — cast metal type, inked and impressed upon paper — is giving way to what is termed new technology, though it is in fact a technology decades old. One American visitor, being shown round the composing room of a national newspaper, remarked wonderingly that he felt as if he had been transported to a working museum. Had he been able to attend a meeting of the printers' union, the analogy would have been confirmed, for the union is organised in office 'chapels', and the head shop steward is referred to as 'the Father of the chapel', terms whose origins are lost in monkish scriptoriums and the mists of time.

To mention this is not to decry an ancient and hallowed craft — there must always be room in a civilised society, however advanced technologically, for the pursuit of such an art, demanding care, skill and attention to detail. Every age since Gutenberg has produced printed works of great beauty, the message of the printed word enhanced by the skills which produced it — from the monumental and impeccable bibles of mediaeval Europe to the limited editions of Giovanni Mardersteig's Officina Bodoni in our own century. But the newspaper is an ephemeral product of the printing press. Its value is instant, its life short, its demise assured. And when the ingrained habits and restrictive practices of past times begin to have a deleterious effect on democracy, when the organs of public opinion and information are slowly strangled by the insane economics of their own production, then change is both essential and inevitable.

The craft of printing, more than any other, has always been hedged about with secrecy, its language archaic, its esoteric practices carefully nurtured. By the end of the 18th century the individual office chapels were being formed into unions which 'jealously guarded the high social status and rewards that a modern skill and full literacy conferred in an unlettered world.'[2] Trade union solidarity — some would call it intransigence —

was matched by commensurate obduracy on the part of the Fleet Street employers. John Walter II, son of the founder of *The Times,* anticipating trouble with his pressmen over the introduction of steam presses, had the presses secretly installed in a building next door ready to print the issue of 29 November 1814.

It is recorded that 'although rumours were circulating in the pressroom, no action was taken by the suspicious pressmen, who had been told to wait for expected news from the Continent. At six o'clock in the morning Walter entered the pressroom and astonished the men by telling them that the newspaper was already printed by steam; that if they attempted violence there was a force ready to repress it; but if they were peaceable their wages would be continued until similar employment could be procured.'[3] History was to repeat itself 170 years later under a new owner of *The Times,* Rupert Murdoch, over his new plant at Wapping, in London's docklands.

Much of the current troubles in Fleet Street can be traced back to the circulation wars of the Thirties. The country's first daily paper, the *Daily Courant,* had appeared in 1702, being printed near Ludgate, a stone's throw from Fleet Street. It continued for over 6,000 editions, and by mid-century had given way to five London dailies, each with an average circulation of 1,500.[4] The advent of today's popular press goes back to 1896, when the young Alfred Harmsworth, later Lord Northcliffe, launched the new half-price — at a halfpenny — *Daily Mail* and sold an astonishing 397,215 copies on the first day. As the national papers grew in power and circulations, throwing up massive edifices in and around Fleet Street, so too did the power of the print unions.

*The Daily Express,* in particular, made the running with a bounding circulation, using its profits not only to hire more journalists than any of its rivals, but also to raise pay levels among its workforce with the two-fold aim of increasing the financial embarrassment of less successful rivals while at the same time proclaiming to the world: 'The best newspaper pays the best.' Such self-aggrandisement may fool some of the readers some of the time, but it only served to make the print unions eager for more money all of the time. Thus began the short road to economic suicide which was to see the closure of many national papers, the consequent diminution in the diversity of opinions, and the concentration of the Press largely in the hands of conglomerates whose sympathies lay not with those who believed that true democracy required the free expression of views right across the political spectrum.

The most notable casualties of post-war years were the *News Chronicle* (originally formed by a merger between the *Daily News* and the *Daily Chronicle* in 1929) which folded in 1960, and the *Daily Herald,* which was renamed *The Sun* in 1964 and effectively lost all contact with the Labour Party which it had previously supported. The *News Chronicle,* controlled by the multi-millionaire Quaker Cadbury family, supported the Liberal Party. Its demise was a textbook example of the lunacies of Fleet Street finances. When it closed down its circulation was over 1,000,000, a figure

to be envied by the vast majority of papers elsewhere in the world — yet it was losing £300,000 a year. Which is where advertising comes in — or, as in the case of the *News Chronicle*, failed to come in, for without advertising to subsidise the cover price, no newspaper could hope to compete. The amount of advertising booked for a particular day largely determines the size of that day's issue. If advertising is down, papers are thinner, the news space restricted, the reader dissatisfied. Advertisers are guided by market research as to the best papers in which to sell their wares. The *News Chronicle* fell between two stools — not specialist enough for the upmarket company reports and prospectuses, not popular enough to ensure a substantial slice of the household consumer market. No matter that some 3,000,000 readers (at three per copy sold) preferred the middle-range Liberal *News Chronicle* to the right-wing papers. Neither was it the concern of the advertising industry that its closure would rob British democracy of a voice, however plaintive. But that was the consequence. And whereas in the earliest days of newspapers, advertisements had been introduced as an adjunct to the main business of retailing news and views, they were now a concomitant essential to the industry.

Advertising held the whiphand only because its revenue was needed to balance the outrageous costs of production. Cut those costs — and it would be possible to produce a viable national newspaper with a circulation of less than a million. The key was new technology, and at the root of the new technology — and the cause of the print unions' implacable opposition to it — was the system known as direct input. Hitherto a journalist's typewritten story would be passed to the composing room where a Linotype operator would 'type' it out all over again to produce metal type. But with the new technology it was possible for the journalist to type his story direct into the computer and the photosetting system, bypassing the Linotype operator. When it is realised that a Fleet Street Linotype operator can earn some £800 a week (a multi-national company recently advertised for an experienced graduate director of information technology in a key sector of British industry at the same salary) one begins to see the scale of cost savings that can be made. Hand in hand with the inordinately high pay levels went the restrictive practices and gross overmanning of the kind recently chronicled by Bernard Levin in *The Times* and which only reached the public eye because *The Times* had broken free of the claustrophobic confines of censorship imposed by the print unions throughout Fleet Street on articles critical of their activities. To all of this timid managements turned a blind eye, acquiescing in anarchy and dishonesty. Pay packets were provided for non-existant 'ghost' workers and then shared out among those present, untaxed pay packets would be handed over to casual workers in the names of Mr. M. Mouse or Mr. R. Reagan or any other ridiculous soubriquet which came to mind as they whiled away their time in the pubs and bars of Fleet Street. The motto of managements throughout Fleet Street was 'Anything for a quiet life'. Better to pay out an extra £500 a shift, no matter how outrageous the demand, than risk a night's production and the consequent

revenue loss. For the newspaper is a perishable commodity. With a shelf life of a mere 24 hours, its loss can never be recouped.

But the computer was coming. Indeed, in the provinces it was already there — to the chagrin, in some cases, of journalists who suddenly found that, thanks to some cosy management-union machinations, displaced printers were now appearing on the editorial floor and calling themselves journalists. In Fleet Street, however, union opposition — and the chapels there were virtually automotous, paying little or no heed to their national leadership — was total. Even where pilot schemes allowing a limited amount of 'cold' or photo-setting were negotiated, the savings were minimal. The question of direct input was never considered with any seriousness. Although the new owner of *The Times* and the mass-circulation *Sun*, Rupert Murdoch, drew up plans for a new printing complex in Wapping, he did so without any real hope of obtaining union co-operation.

Two events were to change this dismal scene. Fifty years before, the then Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, using words coined by his cousin, Rudyard Kipling, had publicly castigated the two leading Press peers of the day, Beaverbrook and Rothermere: 'What the proprietorship of these papers is aiming at is power, and power without responsibility — the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.' Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Government was concerned about another misuse of power — that of the trade unions. Legislation severely limiting trade union activity was introduced. Secondary picketing, in which workers from all over the country descended *en masse* upon a strike-bound factory, was outlawed. Secret ballots were introduced so that the true reaction of the man on the factory floor to a strike call could be ascertained. Union leadership faced draconian financial penalties for contempt of court if it was found that the new laws had been flouted. Margaret Thatcher's target was not specifically the printers. It was the miners who had brought about the downfall of a previous Conservative Government. Printers could stop the presses. They could not stop the country. But it was the premier print union, the National Graphical Association, which put itself in the firing line, making the first real challenge to the new laws.

The second event was the advent of the man who was to force them to take up that challenge — Eddie Shah. The owner of a small local newspaper publishing business in Warrington, near Manchester, Shah was not anti-union; but he was opposed to his workers being forced to join a union against their will. The NGA's attempt to enforce a closed shop ended in mass picketing and what a judge was to describe as 'a most disgraceful near riot'. The union was fined over £700,000 for its contempt. In addition it was ordered to pay further sums totalling nearly £200,000 to Shah for the damage done to his business. The final blow to the union came when the Trades Union Congress decided not to support the NGA's plan to escalate its challenge to Shah and the Government.

Shah determined to build on this victory. If he could run a local newspaper without the stranglehold of the unions, why not a national newspaper? Using new technology to the fully extent, the latest automated

colour presses, his own distribution system — the vision was dazzling. National newspapers with turnovers of million of pounds were counting their profits — if any — in tens of thousands, almost entirely because of the albratross of grossly inflated production costs which hung heavy round their necks. Shah set about raising the necessary finance of some £20,000,000 — and the rest of Fleet Street, particularly the popular tabloids from which Shah was hoping to attract his readers, hurriedly sat up and began to dust off the modernisation plans previously shelved as being totally impractical. They also had a convincing weapon with which to batter recalcitrant unions into line — they were going to have to compete with Eddie Shah on his terms, using the same technology, the same slimmed-down work force. And there was the profit motive: If Shah could hope to make £13,000,000 profit out of an annual revenue of about £50,000,000 and a circulation of 700,000, then the tabloids, especially, if they could maintain their larger circulation and their advertising revenue, were heading for the brightest future since the successful launch of the *Daily Mail* in 1896.

In January this year Rupert Murdoch plucked up courage and emulated the example of a predecessor at *The Times,* John Walter II. He told his workforce that his new printing plant at Wapping, idle for six years due to the refusal of the unions to negotiate, was going into operation, with or without their co-operation. Even at this late stage, as the walls of Fleet Street came tumbling about their ears, the print unions stood firm. Among their demands was a guarantee of 'jobs for life.' Murdoch rejected this, countering with a proposal for a legally binding no-strike agreement. The unions rejected this, came out on strike — and found themselves picketing vast empty buildings in and around Fleet Street. Overnight, Murdoch had moved — lock, stock and journalists — to Wapping, albeit behind the security of a barbed wire fence in case the bedraggled and bloody victims of the new technology revolution should launch a last desperate offensive. After all, had not one union representative told him: 'The best thing you can do to that lot is put a match to it.'

Francis Williams wrote that in the development of newspapers in Britain there have been, almost from the very beginning, two major themes: 'The Press has been seen as a weapon of freedom, a sword in the hands of those fighting old and new tyrannies, the one indispensable piece or ordnance in the armoury of democracy. It has been called, by Macaulay in honour and by Burke in despair, 'The Fourth Estate of the Realm', ranking only just, if at all, behind the Lords Spiritual, the Lords Temporal, and the Commons. But it has also almost always been more and less than this: A vehicle of entertainment, a medium for satisfying the common human appetite for gossip, an answer to the pleasure in news, not as an aid to forming opinion but for its own sake.'[5]

Therein lies the weakness of the mass circulation newspaper — the necessity, provoked by the demands of advertising, to be all things to all readers, while at the same time maintaining a degree of independence, of fearless opinion, where might is not necessarily right (except, of course,

when the subject is circulation figures). Francis Williams again: 'The real danger facing newspapers is that they will be pressed into a pattern that denies it all purpose other than the purely commercial one of attracting the largest number of paying customers by whatever means comes most readily to hand.'

The cheering message of the Fleet Street revolution is that not only is that danger receding, and that closures and mergers (eight in 25 years) will, hopefully, cease, but that new entrepreneurs will relish the opportunities afforded by a Press no longer shackled by outmoded machinery and a problem workforce. Eddie Shah's new paper, called *Today,* is a start. A brave venture, it has been beset by minor difficulties, not least of which is finding a competent editorial formula. Charles Dickens required £100,000 to launch the *Daily News* in 1846, and a similar sum had to be spent over the next ten years to bring the circulation up to a profitable size. The launch problems of *Today* are not new. Nothing daunted, Shah is reported to be looking at the possibility of setting up three new dailies, one of them a sports paper, and a linked series of evening papers in London, Birmingham and Manchester.

Four years ago the then general secretary of the NGA, Joe Wade, warned that the union could not remain 'the last bastion' holding out against direct input by journalists and advertising staff. 'Unless we are prepared to take on board the full implications of new technology and co-operate in improving productivity, we shall be engulfed in a tidal wave of technology which we will not be able to control.' That prophetic warning was ignored in Fleet Street.

In the year 1290 the monks of Whitefriars complained to the king about the stench of the River Fleet, which had become an open sewer, blocked by rotting garbage. Seven hundred years later the stench of corrupt and unbridled union power in neighbouring Fleet Street, compounded by the detritus of myopic, inadequate and inept managements, became too much. Today the tidal wave foreseen by Joe Wade is sweeping all before it.

The hope is that when it subsides there will remain, on the bedrock of democracy, a fertile plain in which the newly planted seeds of a truly pluralist press will sprout and flourish, encouraging honourable dissent, and strengthening the voice of freedom.

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[Robin Findlay was Chief Sub-editor of the *News Chronicle* on the night it folded in 1960. A member of the Printing Historical Society and of the Society of Genealogists, he is Deputy Night Editor of the *Daily Mail.*]

# SOMETHING HAPPENED IN SWEDEN ...

## by Francis P. Walsh

STOCKHOLM is not such a dangerous city as New York, London or Paris, but one does not thoughtlessly walk around the central area at night — and certainly not on a Friday near midnight. There are alcoholics lurching about, drug addicts looking for their fixes and, oftener these days, gangs of youths who attack easy targets and vanish into the dark.

Olof Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden and his wife had taken a subway train to a cinema 'like anyone else' and, after the show, they were setting off on a two-mile walk through the city centre to their flat in the Old City, still without a guard.

They had gone only 300 yards when Lisbet Palme heard two loud reports and turned to ask her husband, who was a step behind, if it could be children playing with fire-crackers; but he had collapsed on the pavement, blood pouring from his mouth. A heavy calibre bullet, fired into his back, had severed the aorta. A man ran around the nearest corner and disappeared up the darkest lane. Olof Palme was dead when the ambulance arrived 10 minutes later.

I drove along the murder street 15 minutes after this, at 11.40, on my way from the press club, but noticed nothing more than usual. A drunken man staggered after two hurrying girls, but Palme had been shot on the opposite side of the street, the ambulance had come and gone and the police had not yet set up their fences to rake the reddened snow for clues.

Ministers were hauled from their beds and rushed to the Government offices. Many policemen went to the hospital; scores of them drew a cordon around the inner city; but it was 2.15 a.m. before they sent out a nation-wide alarm and the ports, airports and frontier roads were sealed off to prevent the murderer from escaping.

This is an almost unprecedented crime in Scandinavia and the shock and consternation are great. No prime minister has been assassinated anywhere in Europe in recent times. The last comparable political assassination in Sweden was that of King Gustaf III at a masquerade ball in 1792.

For several days after the murder the Government maintained condolence books in its central office and many people queued to sign them. The Party organised torchlight processions throughout the country. TV kept on showing the bloodstained pavement. Day after day, the media drew reactions of grief from all sorts of people, but mainly from the 'man in the street'. In a typical TV programme a schoolteacher interviewed a class of 9-year-olds about their reactions to the Prime Minister's murder.

The feeling for Palme was whipped up by comments culled from the international press. The *Washington Post* had found a 'political opponent' who called Palme 'Sweden's gift to the world'. 'We mourn a great statesman' proclaimed Norway's *Dagbladet*. *Le Monde* wrote: 'He was a pilgrim

of the Third World and of disarmament', and West Germany's President, Herr von Weizsäcker: 'He worked in the service of humanity'.

The climax came when the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Presidents and Prime Ministers from all over the world arrived in Stockholm for the funeral. Olof Palme, whatever reservations some Swedes had entertained about him for his divisive polemics in domestic politics, had made his country for a moment the centre of the world. There, at the secular ceremony in Stockholm City Hall, sat Rajiv Gandhi, Robert Mugabe, Daniel Ortega, Kohl, Mitterand, Schultz, the Premier of the USSR and the King of Sweden. Kohl and Honecker, from the rival Germanys, were placed side by side in the spirit of Palme and world peace. The UN chief, Perez de Cuellar, said that Olof Palme personified the highest ideals of the Organization's Charter. Few men had such an influence on social developments and social changes. Willy Brandt spoke of the 'moral strength of this outstanding visionary and champion of peace and human rights'. It was a Social Democratic Party ceremony with a flatteringly large element of the United Nations. The coffin was draped in a red flag. A large UN flag formed the backdrop.

The foreign visitors used the rest of the day for discussions among themselves and with the Swedish Government. Representatives of leftist organizations and states, such as the ANC in South Africa, the 'front states' there, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and others high on the Swedish list requested further aid. The US Secretary of State had a cordial meeting with the Soviet Prime Minister; they agreed once more that they were doing all they could, each in his own way, despite the tricks and lies on the other side. Then, on the day after the funeral, and 16 days after the murder, they went their different ways to distant parts of the world, probably not to meet again until the next such occasion.

The 'Palme hysteria' had been developing — with a lot of help from the Social Democratic Party — for more than two weeks. To some people it seemed to be time for the country to calm down, regain a balance and return to normal on the domestic political scene. Not all those shown weeping in the streets had been Social Democrats; many were mainly curious or trying to fill a void or be where important things were happening. The apparent 'national mourning' did not mean that Olof Palme had been the nation's leader. Just before the murder, the Party's popularity in the opinion polls had dropped from 43% to 38%, because of its 'conservative' ideas about the redistribution of wealth. In the following weeks, a wave of sympathy swept it up to 44%, a record jump in such a short period. It was time for the opposition to curb this adulation and exploitation in aid of the Social Democrats. One of the first was the Conservative leader, Ulf Adelsohn, who perhaps had suffered most from 'Sweden's sharpest tongue'. He contented himself with recalling his scraps with Palme on many political occasions and hoped for a milder climate in future.

This hope may well be realised under the new prime minister. Ingvar Carlsson, the Deputy Premier, took over without opposition. In a specially

created post, he had been doing the tough jobs at home while his chief grew big on the international scene. Unlike the preceding four party chairmen, he has a working-class background. He began, like Palme, as assistant to Prime Minister Erlander and, always in the inner circle, has worked up through various ministerial posts during the past decade. Most recently he has been Minister with special responsibility for research and environment management. Carlsson is said to be an intelligent, well-organised, stubborn and correct man with a sound judgment. But he is little known abroad. Under this grey and conventional leader, Sweden will have a lower profile for some time to come.

Olof Palme came from a well-off family. His father was head of an insurance company, his grandfather an MP and he went to the best schools. An Ohio college granted him a BA in 1948 and Stockholm University a law degree three years later. A couple of newspaper articles about this attracted attention and he was taken into the administrative group close to the Premier, Tage Erlander. Moving up rapidly, he became an MP, Minister without Portfolio, Minister for Communications, Minister for Education and finally Prime Minister on the retirement of Erlander in 1969. At the age of 42 he was the youngest PM in Europe.

As early as 1965, when temporarily in charge of the Foreign Ministry, he became controversial for his line on Vietnam. He condemned America's policy and, in a demonstration, walked arm-in-arm with North Vietnam's ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Palme's attacks on America's role continued throughout the war in Vietnam. In a TV programme he compared the bombing of Hanoi to the atrocities at Oradour, Babi Yar, Lidice and Treblinka; and in the following years 'Pink Palme' did little to improve his image in the United States. Admittedly, he had criticised the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia but later he kept fairly quiet about Afghanistan — no comparisons with Oradour or Lidice — and even quieter about the situation in Poland, surprising for such a strong supporter of the trade unions. 'For every kick at the Russians and their friends, he aims two at the Americans and theirs', an opposition party man told me. A Social Democrat remarked: 'The Russians are too close for comfort. We're a small country with token defences, so we'll need a good record when they walk in here. They might let us keep a bit of our Western way of life'. Others seem to use a double standard: 'If we kick the Americans more, it's perhaps because we expect more of them'.

In the past decade, Olof Palme made a name around the world as a dove of peace. In the ongoing Cold War between East and West his appeals for disarmament were addressed to both sides equally, but those to the West seemed 'more equal'. He failed to meet the objection that, since his words were not allowed to reach the people on one side, they must relatively weaken the will to defence on the other.

In 1981 he became chairman of the so-called 'Palme Commission', which worked on security and disarmament problems. His mediation was sought in the war between Iraq and Iran. He took part in the recently

organised 'Five-Continent Initiative for Disarmament' with the leaders of India, Greece, Mexico, Tanzania and Argentina. These efforts brought him some friends. But not at home. In his own country Olof Palme made enemies. He polarised political opinion in Sweden. He was either disliked or admired. An intellectual and a Social Democrat by conviction, rather than by family tradition, he was not initially on close terms with the old guard of trade unionists and local politicians; but the gap narrowed as large sections of the population moved up the social ladder. He also compensated with the modest lifestyle of one who took the subway and walked the streets unguarded, like a man of the people. He was still polishing that image when he died.

He loved a fight — to be always on top — but his sarcasms sometimes went too far. 'No one in Swedish politics could make me angrier', the conservative party leader, Ulf Adelsohn, admitted on the day after Palme's death. Describing negotiations with the opposition, Palme, in a softer mood, said that he felt like an angler on a pier, looking down into a tin of worms. Those he looked down on hit back with epithets drawn from the zoo and ornithological worlds: Palme was an eager beaver with a snaky smile, an aquiline nose and various lovable traits of the wasp and weasel.

This was very different from the climate around his predecessor, Tage Erlander, who left an image of benevolence and conciliation. Palme, at the end, was still a long way from becoming a 'father of his people'. His Government's latest budget, presented in January, was attacked as a 'Conservative party product that took from the poor and gave to the rich'. The Social Democrats dropped from 44% to 39% in the opinion polls. Palme and his ministers hurried off into the provinces to stem the tides of revolt. Quoting the National Office of Statistics, *Dagens Nyheter*, 'independent newspaper', alleged: 'One household in three is unable to make ends meet; the numbers needing public assistance are steadily growing — while Government Ministers vote themselves a 17% salary hike'. 'I'm the lowest paid Prime Minister anywhere', Palme retorted — 'except maybe Tanzania. I'd be making more as the head of a medium-sized company'. Correct. His attacker was the 'royal Swedish envy', driving force behind the national principle of egalitarianism and the petty resentments that would pull the rich and successful back to the common level.

The murder of Olof Palme has brought troubling questions to the fore. The Swedes have long nurtured the notion that a crime such as this belongs in southern climes where there are sharp social and political conflicts. How could it happen in a traditionally cool and peaceful land like Sweden? A land where, foreign journalists complain, 'nothing happens'.

The people are still wondering why the Prime Minister could not somehow have been given protection on the murder night, even though he had declined the services of his guards. They are asking whether they can still maintain the ways of their relatively open society, with something of the atmosphere of a small town where the national leaders are as acces-

sible as local politicians in other countries; or whether a climate of suspicion will develop with drastically increased checks and supervision of all citizens. The answer clearly is that controls will be tighter, at least until the murderer is caught; then there may be some return to the old idyllic ways; but it is doubtful if top politicians will again be able to go out alone 'like anyone else' and the King will not be seen by startled tourists strolling with an adjutant along the quay near the palace, as his grandfather did, and over the busy bridge to the National Museum.

Meanwhile, the biggest man-hunt in Swedish history continues. A reward of about $70,000 is offered for the tip that leads to a conviction. However, the police have had a hard job so far. Lisbet Palme, who was with her husband walking home from the cinema, caught only a fleeting glimpse of the murderer running around a corner and up one of the darkest lanes in town. Ten thousand tips have come in. Several people saw several men running in that area at that time. A picture of the probable murderer was reconstructed from their descriptions and on that basis a man was questioned at an early stage. There were enough indications against him to warrant his arrest in mid-March. His lawyers appeared on TV and gave so many details about him that he could be widely identified. A newspaper went even further and published his name and a photograph. A debate about press ethics ensued, which was further fuelled a few days later when the man was released on the grounds that one link in the long chain of evidence against him had weakened. The man-hunt is on: but with the passing days, the chances of success are dwindling.

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[Francis P. Walsh is a political journalist living in and reporting in Sweden.]

# POEMS

## PRIVATE VIEW

The red, the white wine and the apple juice
Rotate in the fingered glasses, the voices
Seldom rise to emphatic statement though fifty,
A hundred maybe, are here. This is a ceremony
With its own unwritten rubrics, a ritual in which
Wine is no eucharistic vehicle but a lubricant
For social occasion. The private view
Is no ordinary, uncalendared event.
Marked down in diaries it is the moment for
The matching of shoes and handbag, the smart or casual-smart
Donning of the correct uniform. Acquaintances enlarge upon
The neglect of their friendship, friends gather in corners
Forming within the Brownian movement small nuclei
Of talk and laughter . . .
The pictures?
Well, of course, the pictures are, undeniably there,
Presenting the challenge of appropriate response,
Making their modest demands, recording
Idiosyncrasies of vision, mutely requesting
The favour of a reply or, ultimate compliment!
The definitive accolade of the red spot.

FREDERIC VANSON

## ICHIKAWA DANZO, KABUKI ACTOR

He dreaded being seen 'unpresentable'
As he expressed it. His own father had,
When failing, drifted off to sleep on stage,
Needed to be woken, prompted. Knowing age
Makes its advances imperceptible,
He played, while in full health, his final lead,
Paused in the wings, bowed to the empty set,
Removed his make-up in the dressing-room,
Never looked back but took the subway home:
At eighty-four, alert as in his prime,
Boarded a ship, picked out a midnight place
Over deep whirlpools, would not let his face
Be found disfigured by the crabs and slime,
Never seen unpresentable, no point for regret.

ROBERT GITTINGS

# COUNCIL HOUSE SALES: THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS

by Mark Cook

THE 1980 Housing Act with its 'Right to Buy' may be viewed as a watershed in council house sales. The figures indicate that around 800,000 people have made the commitment to purchase their own house since 1979 and indications are that the numbers will continue to grow. This factor, combined with the decline in the private rental sector and the general desire for home ownership, will see over 70% of households by the mid 1990's having purchased or in the process of purchasing their own home.

Does it matter that private ownership is rising and that there is a continued decline in the proportion of households in the public and private rented sectors? These problems, if there are any, may be magnified by what is happening in the public sector. As houses are lost from public ownership to the private sector there is a decline in local authority housing stock. If, however, new houses are being built to replace the lost stock then the problems of finding a house in the local authority sector are not increased. There may be advantages, too, if the new houses built are better suited to the current requirements of local authority tenants. The picture, however, on the aggregate level is one where housing starts in the local authority sector and has, since the 1980 Housing Act, failed to match sales. Furthermore the types and locations of the dwellings sold may lead to problems for those tenants currently in local authority housing.

The 'Right to Buy' is the culmination of a policy to allow council house tenants to purchase their own home which perhaps has its lineage in the period between the wars. The problems for a Conservative administration, particularly since the Second World War, have been the resistance of labour controlled authorities and some Tory authorities to council house sales. Nevertheless the period 1952-1967 saw between two and five thousand dwellings per year being removed from the public sector to the private sector. After this period sales oscillated violently, reaching 34,334 in 1973 and falling to 2,723 in 1975. Although council house sales varied rather dramatically year by year there was one thing they had in common, more homes were built in each of these years by the local authorities than were sold. The picture since the 1980 Housing Act is somewhat different with total housing in the public sector running at around 265,000, whereas sales easily exceed this figure. At the macro level the problems seem needless since in 1985 there were still six million households paying rent to councils or New-Town Authorities and another half million renting from housing associations. It is at the micro level that there is concern.

Council house sales are neither distributed evenly throughout the local authority housing stock, nor by tenant and local authority. The majority

of sales so far have been houses; there were few flats and certainly not those constituting high rise blocks. Of the houses the two and three bedroomed variety predominates, particularly semi-detached housing and those on the ends of terraces. Furthermore, they were mainly on the better estates. These results are not surprising given the period in the life cycle of the tenants who live in these types of dwellings. The typical purchasers after the 1980 Act are people in their mid-to-late forties and skilled manual workers — usually with a grown up family. Surprisingly, the characteristics of purchasers closely mirror the type of tenant who bought prior to the 1980 Housing Act. Multiple earning households are also clearly in evidence, though older and younger tenants are less likely to be represented. This perhaps dents the notion that the 'Right to Buy' would have advantages for all tenants.

It is the income factor which often prevents the older and younger tenants leaving the council house sector. This is a particular problem in the case of older tenants who through some of their previous moves within local authority housing may be in housing stock which does not match their requirements but may be in the choicest house sale areas. Furthermore, the people in their mid-to-late forties have two distinct advantages over younger tenants. Firstly, they are able to obtain larger discounts on the purchase price of the property because they have lived there longer, and secondly, younger tenants are less likely to want to purchase because they are in the wrong type of dwelling, perhaps a high rise flat, or they have found it difficult, until recently, to obtain mortgages on these types of properties.

Of course, the sale of a council house may have little effect on the opportunities for movement within the local authority sector if that house would have remained with the existing tenant making it unavailable for anyone else's use. This is not the case where, in the short-run, the council house might have become vacant if the tenant had purchased in the private sector leading to the usual mobility chains within local authority tenancies.

How does the purchase of council houses affect the local authority with respect to the tenants that remain? Does it mean that local authorities are left with the more difficult tenants and with those homes which are of the wrong type, in the wrong locations and which are badly in need of repair? The answer is 'yes' and 'no'.

The fact that councils may currently have some of the more difficult tenants does not mean that they will always have them. Research has shown that a number of recent purchasers of local authority houses would have been placed in the category of 'difficult tenants' at some stage in their previous tenancies. On the other hand, since it is the 2-3 bedroomed semi-detached houses which are the dominant type of sale, this therefore leaves local authorities with a growing proportion in their housing stock of 2-3 bedroomed flats with all their problems. Furthermore, in a normal cycle within local authority housing, those people on the worst estates and/or in high rise flats might have moved in the long-run into 2-3 bed-

roomed houses. If these are being sold then their chances of moving are somewhat diminished. It is also the housing stock in the best state of repair that has been sold, leaving the local authorities with an increasing proportion of their housing stock in need of renovation.

Currently, around two-thirds of capital spending is on maintenance and repair. To some extent this represents the bad use of design and building techniques foisted on the local authorities after the Second World War by the requirement of central government to meet 'manifesto' housing targets. By 1985 the English local authorities were estimating a figure of around £20 billion as the requirement over the next ten years if their housing was to be brought back to a good state of repair. Councils are unlikely to find this money from central government. Could the money obtained from council house sales be used to restart a building and renovation programme to replace the houses lost through neglect and sales? Receipts from council house sales and the sale of local authority land between 1981 and 1985 totalled more than £3 billion. Local authorities cannot, however, use all this money directly for housebuilding, being constrained to a maximum expenditure of 40% of sales in the current year and only 40% of the accumulated receipts the following year. The receipts were sufficiently large by 1983-1984 for the interest to be £494 million and totalling more than half the total government subsidy. Moreover, the money generated from sales is unequally distributed through the local authorities.

It follows that those local authorities with the poorer housing stock which have found a smaller take-up under the 'Right to Buy' have less money from sales and higher costs of repairs and maintenance. What are the options available therefore for local authorities with their inability to build and obtain finance for house repairs? It is possible that they could make better use of existing resources, particularly in tightening-up on rent arrears which stand at over £200 million. Another area where economies could be made is in the cost and efficiency of repairs. A Department of the Environment study felt that the local authorities would be better served if their repair work was put out to small sub-contractors rather than with their existing larger direct-labour organisations. Moreover, there are over 100,000 dwellings which are empty. Many of these may be in as poor state of repair. Nonetheless, there will be some dwellings vacant which for lack of co-ordination and the correct information could be put to use.

If local authorities cannot afford the repairs then privatisation may be the answer. On one level, privatisation poses problems both for central and local government. Labour councils may look at this idea with interest but find it hard to accept whilst a Conservative central government may have difficulty in helping left-wing controlled inner city areas. On another level, however, limited privatisation is already here, for example, the renovation of the Cantril Farm Estate, in Merseyside, renamed Stockbridge Village. Sometimes whole estates are refurbished and structurally altered, providing new dwellings both for the private developer and the

local authority. Furthermore the private developer may get substantial Urban Development Grants and even if they sell the repaired houses at below market prices will still make a profit. The local authorities, too, get advantages, often with a share of the refurbished houses together with new rate payers. The losers in this new development may well be the existing tenants. If they do not wish to vacate their property it is possible that local authorities may let the area decay slowly, forcing them gently out of their home. Tenants also complain of poor alternative accommodation and that by changing areas they lose out on friends and neighbours.

The picture for local authority housing does not appear to be a rosy one. They are selling houses at a rate unprecedented in earlier periods, and they have reduced council house starts, leading to short-run losses in the housing stock. Although the proportion lost is relatively small it appears to be in certain sectors of the market, for example, 2-3 bedroomed 'semis' and 'end of terraces'. The numbers coming forward, however, for house purchase seems to be declining, possibly reflecting the growth in unemployment among tenants who reside in local authority housing. It is the better tenants, however, who are not only more able to leave the local authority sector but do so with up to 60% discounts on the price and at the same time find that their wealth in terms of their house has increased. It leaves behind those tenants who cannot afford to move, such as the old, the single parent families and the ethnic minorities.

It has been argued, also, that council house sales limit labour mobility and in rural areas bring to the fore the questions associated with second homes and the relationship between housing and rural employment. Local authorities may well benefit in the short-run from sales but in the long-run they need to trade this one-off payment against future lost rental income. Although local authorities also gain with more people to pay rates and fewer numbers of houses to maintain, on a national level central government incurs losses because of mortgage tax relief plus the other benefits of owner-occupation.

In conclusion, it is difficult to separate the problems of council house sales from the overall problems facing local authority housing. Nonetheless, one thing appears certain, without any government policy to restore the private rental sector to its past heights, tenants who feel that it has been difficult to get off council waiting lists into their own local authority home may see that the current situation is one where 'they have never had it so bad'.

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

# WHAT THE ARTS UNIONS CAN DO

## by John Elsom

IT has been a difficult winter for all British trade unions, particularly the art ones; but last August the National Union of Journalists won a 'famous victory'. This is what happened.

Mrs. Thatcher was in Washington, visiting friends. The American television companies had been covering minute by minute the Beirut hi-jack, thus making President Reagan's task even more difficult, for everybody seemed to be giving him advice, from sobbing relatives to experts in psychological warfare, and the more they advised at peak-viewing time, the more credible the demands of the terrorists seemed to become. Accordingly, Mrs. Thatcher called on the media to observe an uncharacteristic self-control which would 'starve the terrorists of the oxygen of publicity'.

As she left her press conference, a quick-witted journalist, Mark Hosenball, asked Mrs. Thatcher what she thought of the BBC's decision to screen an interview with Martin McGuinness, who was widely thought to be the Provisional IRA's Chief of Staff in Northern Ireland, responsible (though not convicted) for many acts of terrorism. Mrs. Thatcher hadn't seen the programme, which had been scheduled for mid-August, but predictably she 'utterly condemned' it. Her remarks were given front-page headlines in *The Sunday Times* on July 28, which spurred on the Home Secretary, Mr. Leon Brittan, who hadn't seen the programme either, to write a strongly worded letter of complaint to the BBC's Board of Governors, asking them to ban it.

The BBC Governors also hadn't seen the programme and they then decided that they should do so, for to tamper with the BBC's schedules in total ignorance might have been construed as censorship. The Governors are appointed by the Home Secretary, who is the minister ultimately responsible for all broadcasting in Britain, to safeguard the public interest; but they are not supposed to be a mere tool of government, but to remain 'at arms length'. This is a device often used in Britain to prevent artists and broadcasters from being subject to political interference. In the past, the BBC governors have been chosen to represent many shades of political opinion, but it is a characteristic of Mrs. Thatcher's style of leadership that she regards such compromises as 'wet'. The governors had all been appointed by her government and were all, as far as one can tell, her supporters; and so it came as no surprise when they decided that the programme, *At The Edge of the Union* in the *Real Lives* series, was indeed irresponsible, and against the public interest, and would be withdrawn.

This brought them into conflict with the BBC's Executive Board, the people who actually make the programmes and run the shop. In every BBC Handbook, there is a reference to the Home Secretary's right

to veto any programme, but 'in practice', the Handbook states, 'this has always been treated as a reserve power, and the Corporation has enjoyed, and enjoys, complete freedom in the handling of its programme activities.' This may not be strictly true, for no broadcasting system in the world is completely free and the BBC is vulnerable to political pressure when its license fee comes up for review in Parliament. Nevertheless, it is comparatively free from political and commercial influences, and it is perceived by the British public to be independent, a fact of which it is rightly proud (for there is honour even among journalists, though not much), and which may account for two extraordinary statements from Mrs. Thatcher and Leon Brittan to the effect that there had been no attempt whatsoever to censor the BBC. They had just asked the BBC politely to change its mind and it had done so, or rather the Governors had done so on its behalf.

This left the Governors in an exposed position. If some great issue of public security had been involved, the Home Secretary would have been entitled to intervene. Since there was not and he did not, were the Governors wise to risk a mass resignation on the part of the BBC's Executive? In fact, there was only one resignation, of the Controller of BBC Northern Ireland, Mr. James Hawthorn, but the rest of the Executive gave the impression of being so taken aback by the Governors' decision that they might have done almost anything, even resign. The BBC's Director-General, Alastair Milne, was away on holiday in Northern Scandinavia and he very nearly cut his leave short, which shows how serious the situation was, but instead he sent a telegram begging the Governors to postpone the decision until he returned — but too late, the programme was banned; and it was some ten days before the BBC's Executive under Alastair Milne could get around a table with the BBC's governors to see whether an acceptable compromise could be reached.

In the meantime, various forms of pressure were being exerted. Mrs. Thatcher's political opponents attacked her for trying to stifle free speech, while the film was being shown privately to Fleet Street journalists, MPs and selected members of the public. The documentary turned out to be doggedly fair-minded in the best BBC tradition, in which the views of one hard-liner, McGuinness, were contrasted in cold clarity with those of another from the opposite camp, represented by the loyalist Gregory Campbell. Two small criticisms were raised to the film as it stood — that the public were not informed about the extent of the IRA killings and that, in one sequence, McGuinness was shown at home with his family, feeding the baby, which may have presented him in too sympathetic a light.

The third form of pressure was very dramatic. The National Union of Journalists organised a one-day strike and demonstration on August 7 which blacked out the BBC's news coverage and current affairs programmes on home and world services, something which had never happened before. The British government's attempt at censorship, if that is what they were trying to do, was given the widest possible international

coverage and the fact that it was an IRA spokesman whom they were trying to suppress must have given the IRA's cause enough 'oxygen of publicity' to burn up the island.

By August 10, a compromise had been reached whereby the programme was to be shown a little later in the Autumn with minor amendments intended, it seemed, more to save the faces of the governors than substantially to alter the programme, and the National Union of Journalists were claiming a famous victory. A blow had been struck for the BBC's independence and editorial integrity, very publicly struck, on the jaw of a heavyweight government. The extent to which the union's action contributed to this success can be much disputed — but at least an arts union if, for the purposes of argument, journalists can count as artists, was seen to be on the winning side, if temporarily, even if their triumph in retrospect did not amount to very much — particularly when this incident is seen against the background of what is generally happening to trade unions in Britain, and against the very rapid changes which are currently taking place in Fleet Street, and against the uncertain future of the BBC itself threatened by the introduction of both satellite and cable television and against the upheavals caused by the new technology which will affect, for good or ill, all artists. Nevertheless, a blow of some sort had been effectively struck somewhere, and I shall leave the National Union of Journalists temporarily to bask in the afterglow of something which may have been a famous victory and certainly cannot be construed as an actual defeat.

One permanent mark which Mrs. Thatcher's government will leave on the British political landscape, and perhaps the only one, lies in its treatment of the trade unions. Legislation was introduced during her first term of office which was intended to curb the power of the unions in certain key respects. The Bill was piloted through the Commons by James Prior, considered to be one of the 'wetter' members of Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet, who has since resigned from office, and it was originally considered to fall far short of what Mrs. Thatcher had intended and had promised her supporters. Nevertheless this Bill provided the legal framework within which several confrontations with the unions have taken place during her administration, the most notable being the Miners' Strike which ended more than a year ago. It has also affected Fleet Street by enabling the newspaper proprietors to meet the print unions head-on in the disputes concerning the introduction of new printing technology. In the long run, this technology may perhaps be to everybody's advantage, and certainly it should help journalists, but its immediate short-term effect is to throw thousands of print workers out of their jobs.

The Labour Party is pledged to repeal this legislation if it comes to office, but the Labour leader, Neil Kinnock, has indicated that he may retain or re-introduce parts of it, and most political commentators agree that no future government will wish to return to the situation of the 1970s, when uncurbed union power effectively brought down Mr. Heath's Conservative government and Mr. Callaghan's Labour government within

the space of a few years. It also destroyed the Labour party's plans for industrial peace, as expressed through its document *In Place of Strife*, and discouraged effective government attempts to control wage-led inflation. That is why, despite all rhetoric to the contrary, Mrs. Thatcher's stand against the unions will leave a permanent mark.

But the key features of this legislation are deceptively mild. These include compulsory membership ballots before strike action is undertaken, a rule which many unions in any case have traditionally observed and the government has offered to carry the costs of balloting members, and a legally enforceable ban against what is known as secondary picketing; that is, picketing which spreads beyond the original workplace where the dispute occurred to the ancillary firms which may be indirectly involved or not involved at all. These measures are enforceable through the courts, in that unions face heavy fine and the possible sequestration of their assets if they disobey them. Taken as a whole, they go a long way towards preventing those awesome displays of union power — the mass pickets, the inflationary wage demands, the governments held to ransom or forced to resign — which have been a rare but distinctive feature of British political life since the war.

The issues have to be singularly cut-and-dried, the government or the managements singularly inept, for union leaders to be able to rally their members behind them in that kind of corporate action which lends real power to collective bargaining. What we are now seeing is unions being obstructive, as the National Union of Teachers is being obstructive, rather than issuing ultimatums. The National Union of Journalists won its famous victory, if that is what it was, because the BBC Governors bungled, the government bungled and was seen to bungle (for Leon Brittan was shortly moved sideways and downwards and recently out), because it had public opinion on its side — and also because the issue was not considered significant enough to provoke a major confrontation.

But there is another angle to this affair which journalists are in the best position to spot.

Why did Mark Hosenball ask that innocent-sounding question of the Prime Minister in Washington? He knew the answer. We all knew the answer. It was as un-news-worthy as 'dog bites man'. And why did Andrew Neil, the editor of *The Sunday Times*, choose to give this essentially banal story the front page lead, when the world is crammed to the brim with juicy disasters? *The Sunday Times*, together with other British newspapers owned by Mr. Rupert Murdoch, *The Times*, *The Sun* and *The News of the World*, has published many articles critical of the BBC in what looks suspiciously like an organised campaign. The BBC is currently fighting a battle to preserve, in its opinion, the integrity of public service broadcasting against a move to make it partly financed by advertising. The government has set up a committee, under the chairmanship of Professor Alan Peacock, to investigate various methods of financing the BBC, and the BBC is wary of any new measures which may have the effect of limiting its independence or its central role in British broadcasting.

Hosenball and Neil were causing trouble for the BBC at a critical time. They may have been motivated by that cut-throat zest which is so endearing a feature of newspaper offices around the world; or they may have had at the back of their minds the thought that their proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, would not be at all displeased by their activities. Murdoch currently owns a satellite television station which beams out programmes to about a third of Europe. Its audiences are currently rather small, for few people can afford to buy or even rent the necessary dish aerials, but the cost of these aerials will soon come down and then Mr. Murdoch will be in a strong position to command maximum advertising rates, for his potential audience will consist of more than a hundred million viewers. The BBC's own plans to enter the satellite television race have suffered several setbacks and so far have not reached a launching pad.

The blow to the government's pride inflicted by the National Union of Journalists will not be forgotten by Mrs. Thatcher, who will probably blame the BBC for it; and this is one reason why I do not cheer too loudly at our famous victory, particularly because it was won in an artificial crisis largely concocted by my fellow journalists in the first place. I even have a sneaking sympathy with Mrs. Thatcher. Journalists love to force politicians into situations where they make fools of themselves. Bearing the context in mind, Mrs. Thatcher was almost bound to answer as she did — although perhaps she should have been more cautious. Her instinctive reply gave Hosenball and Neil the ammunition they needed to fire another salvo at the BBC.

And there is yet another perspective. One of the attractions of satellite television for entrepreneurs like Murdoch and Maxwell is that it transcends national boundaries. If you have a pirate radio station in the North Sea, you can jam its signals. You can't do that with a satellite, unless you lay a blanket of aluminium foil over the country. In the last resort, you could shoot a satellite down with one of President Reagan's laser guns, but that would be a very drastic step to take; because a satellite is not actually situated in any one country, it is almost impossible to enforce Copyright and Performing Rights agreements, which are in any case in international disarray. And so almost every artist who works within the telecommunications industry, that is, the makers of films, music videos and all kinds of television dramas and documentaries, may face a future in which theft and piracy of their work exists on an unprecedented scale, far wider than that caused by the spread of home video and sound recording equipment.

Perhaps cable will come to our rescue. When optical fibre cables are fully installed with their infinity of channels, you and I will be able to sit at home and select what programmes we wish to see from a whole library of works; and that kind of receptivity to the viewers' wishes is beyond the capacity of satellite television or indeed of home video recordings. Every time we select a programme, our choice will be recorded and monitored by computer, and thus we will be able to pay a royalty to the artists and

the companies which make the programmes. It may be a small royalty but that would be better than nothing. A large number of new companies would spring up to make use of the new opportunities. What we will need under those circumstances are strong Copyright laws, strong international agreements and governments prepared to treat the theft of intellectual properties as seriously as they regard every other form of theft. The cornerstone of these agreements will be provided through individual contracts made by individual artists with individual companies. Artists, in short, will come to rely upon national and international law for their protection, rather than on collective bargaining through their unions.

But that state of affairs is a long way off and may never happen, not unless there is a greater accord between governments which actually want to look after the interests of their artists. And it may happen that Western governments will start to follow the example of those in the East, and say, 'To hell with royalties! They're far too complicated. Let's just give our artists state pensions in return for services beneficial to the state' — which may not sound too frightening a prospect; but it does leave artists without alternative means of earning their livings if the state doesn't like their work; and it weakens the general bargaining-position of artists because there is no alternative; and the process through which ideas, values, hopes, fears, agreements and disagreements are exchanged, that continual debate which is still the glory of the open society, will dwindle away. We will have only state art, state artists and those views expressed which have been officially endorsed by governments, many of which will be led by those less scrupulous than Mrs. Thatcher.

And, of course, we will have no more honest documentaries about Northern Ireland and similar trouble spots, no mousetraps to worry future King Claudiuses. We will become mentally more rigid and less able to adapt to different outlooks and changing situations, and the world will become an even more dangerous place.

What role will the arts unions play in this unfolding drama? I fear that it will be smaller than it should be or than we have any right to expect; and this is partly the fault of the unions themselves. I have met most of the leaders of the arts unions in Britain. I am struck by the fact that they are all concerned with job prospects and salary scales, quite rightly, but are reluctant to discuss the overall shaping and dynamism of their industries. Thus, Equity, the actors' union, will describe how they have fought to raise the minimum wage in regional theatres, which remains at a paltry £92.50 a week, but they won't put forward constructive ideas as to how to halt the decline in theatre as a whole. In Britain, actors rarely have that kind of job security which can be found among the major theatres in other European countries; but in Norway, recently, a director of one of their companies and a leading union member, told me about her concern at the number of actors on her books whom she never actually wanted to put on the stage. They had been given what amounted to state pensions by previous managements — and she couldn't get rid of them. She couldn't employ younger actors except on a casual basis because then

she wouldn't be able to sack them either. And so her company was growing older year by year, and the audiences growing older with them. The National Union of Journalists frequently equate the public service principle in broadcasting with maintaining the levels of employment at the BBC; but the BBC, if it is to survive, will have to adapt to changing circumstances, which will mean that many jobs will have to go in order that others may be created.

The arts unions in Britain, in short, are in danger of becoming a reactionary force; and one reason for this is that they cling to a kind of proletarian nostalgia. They yearn for the good old days when you could recognise a capitalist by the size of his cigar; and of course such people do still exist. But most arts managements in Britain in both the public and private sectors are rather small and timid, living off bank overdrafts and promissory notes and containable deficits, and the grudging, suspicious treatment which they receive from the unions acts as another curb on their initiative.

I suspect that the arts unions have chosen the wrong or inappropriate models. They would like arts workers to be assessed like workers in, say, the car industry, so that one Grade 2 Electrician equals £230 for a 40-hour week. But artistic skills cannot be easily measured in this way. Artists have always to create the market by which they are to be appreciated. As a writer on the theatre, I have to persuade my readers that my contribution is worth looking at, and my ability to do so is what constitutes my professional credit-worthiness. There is no other measure, and I am not really helped by somebody insisting on my behalf that I should be paid as much as Jan Kott, or Martin Esslin, or as a teacher in a high school.

What is the alternative? I would like to see the arts unions transforming themselves into something more like service organisations for their industries, strong enough to crack down on greedy and bullying managements, internationally minded, sophisticated enough to cope with the challenges of the new technology and not so myopically one-sided that they fail to grasp the complexities of the problems.

During the next decade we will be facing a world where very rapid changes will be taking place which will affect all our professions. We have to develop rapidly the organisational means through which we can cope with them. The task is formidable, but we should remember that at any rate we are all artists. The shaping of experience is our common trade. If we cannot successfully search for the means by which technology can help us, rather than destroy us, what chance have politicians got, in the wider world, where the sword is still mightier than the pen — and the bomb more powerful than the brain.

# CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

## by David Shipman

WELL, let's get this over with first. I didn't like *Heimat*. I didn't dislike it either, but I'm damned if I could see what all the fuss was about. I know that this is supposed to be the *cinema* column, and *Heimat* was television; but sixteen hours long or whatever it was the director — Edgar Reitz — says he conceived it for picture houses. And those were *film* critics who were raving after seeing it at a number of festivals. I saw it too after someone (Julie Andrews, actually) observed that everything looks better on television. *Heimat* looked to me just like more television. True, I've met a lot of people who didn't tune in again after Episode One, but is this another case when I'm out of line with other movie reviewers? Do I have another *Napoleon* on my hands? My trouble with Gance's film is that I find only minimal intellect, minimal information and I'm not being compensated by the images, of whatever grandeur. Thus, almost, here. Perhaps better comparisons might be made with Bergman's *Fanny and Alexander* and Bertolucci's *Novecento*, for here is another film-maker trying for a synthesis of his country's history during this century. In quality *Heimat* comes somewhere between the two. To the television critic of *The London Standard* it is both 'earthy and dreamy', adjectives kinder than my own, honest and pretentious, though never too much of either. My perception of it is that it moves from realism to 'significance', from documentary to soap opera, though never in such extremes as to be laughable or jarring. The rather dull, unconvincing brothel scene (in Berlin, 1932) reminded me of the infinitely better one in Wolf Gremm's *Fabian*, from the Kästner novel about Germany during the rise of Nazism. There was a film made with passion. Kotulla's *Aus einem Deutschen Leben*, about the man who commanded Auschwitz, was another. Thinking of them and, if I may say so, reflecting on the time I worked in Germany only underlines why I found *Heimat* so unsatisfactory. No, I didn't stick to the end, but after more than eight hours of it I gave it more than half a chance.

So if *Heimat* hasn't been the event of the season, what has? Not *Absolute Beginners* either. Some people liked it: someone wrote to *The London Standard* to complain about an item printed in the paper headed 'Ten Reasons Not to See *Absolute Beginners*', on the grounds that the director Julien Temple has talent and that the British film industry needs films like this. I'm wondering why the *Standard's* columnist stopped at ten. Mr. Temple, former purveyor of pop videos, must be the least welcome director to the industry since Ken Russell. He too loves excess and cannot direct actors. His cast squeals and grimaces, so they have no humanity. In a fantasy as loud, absurd and disagreeable as this one we need something with which to identify. Temple chose Colin MacInnes's frail novel to tie in with his concept that teenagers were invented in the Fifties, but then he's dressed the characters in clothes of intermittent

period; and apart from some borrowings from *West Side Story* the musical numbers belong to the Eighties. Still, there's nothing intrinsically wrong with excess and *Absolute Beginners* isn't boring. That's one reason for seeing it. The only one.

One or two critics liked it. It seems to me healthy when there is dissent among the critical fraternity; I can see both sides' view of a much better musical, *A Chorus Line*. A debate raged as to why their American brotherhood so much disliked it — an answer provided by one of their number who said it reminded him of an official reception at the Swiss embassy. Directing, Richard Attenborough has approached this piece — the epitome of *pezzazz*, if I've got the spelling right — in a sedate, British manner. It entertains; the material is too strong. It is essentially an artificial piece, this account of youngsters auditioning for a Broadway musical. It is sunny outside, and New Yorkers are going about their own business, unaware of the dramas being played out in the dark, gloomy theatre — and a good point is made, since the Broadway theatre plays such a part in New York mythology, even if it matters not to the average New Yorker. But Attenborough and his colleagues weren't aware of what they were doing — or if they were, they promptly stopped doing it. The rest of *A Chorus Line* is theatre — if not stage-bound. The performances are of quality, the songs still work, except the last one, 'One' itself, which has joined 'That's Entertainment' and 'There's No Business Like Show Business' as one of the anthems of the business. It was magical in the theatre, and given the cinema's ability to create magic you might have thought — but it's bungled, at least till the original choreography comes to its rescue.

The most famous song in *White Nights* also comes at the end, Lionel Ritchie's haunting 'Say You Say Me', which won this year's Oscar in its category. It comes at the *very* end and perhaps it was placed thus to keep audiences in their seats as the credits roll, these days seemingly interminably; it did not have that effect when I saw it, for I was the sole figure remaining — if only to see where Russia was found. The answer is in Lisbon and Bristol for the theatres, Scotland and Finland for the exteriors. But some clandestine filming was done in Leningrad — I think. *White Nights* is in appearance at least the most convincing of all the Cold War thrillers, which have been such an undistinguished breed that I can't get worked up about this one, with the usual anti-Soviet stance, being chosen for this year's Royal Film. It would have been nice if the Russians had been portrayed as human for once, but in general its premise is only too correct: if you're Russian and the state doesn't like you you cannot leave; you may even cease to have an identity. This is the dilemma facing Mikhail Baryshnikov, playing a dancer who defected, who has been condemned in his absence and who is in the country because the 'plane on which he was travelling crash-landed. A daft plot has him teamed with a black American defector (Gregory Hines), who also dances, and between the anti-Soviet barbs it's unclear whether this is a musical or a thriller. It's not much of either, as directed by Taylor Hackford, but there is a fair nail-biting climax — which is, for the record, followed by an idiotic

anti-climax.

In the matter of making the palms sweat, they don't come much classier than *Jagged Edge,* which starts with a brutal murder and concludes with that time-honoured situation of the heroine alone in the house with a (the?) killer stalking her. She is a defence lawyer (Glenn Close) who has allowed herself an affair with a client (Jeff Bridges), a successful San Francisco newspaper tycoon who owes his position to the wife he is accused of murdering. The cut and thrust of the trial, with numerous surprises, must make up for those who have spent weeks or even days as weary jurors listening to dreary cases. Joe Eszterhas's clever script is expertly handled by the director, Richard Marquand — though it's not so clever that you can't pick holes in it when you've calmed down, which may need four or five Valium. I haven't had such a bad time in a cinema since I saw *Blood Simple,* on which I know I haven't reported to you, since I saw it in the midst of those higher endeavours which constitute the London Film Festival. My report is wholly favourable, but should be ignored by those who don't like nightmares in mid-afternoon (or whenever they watch films). When a bartender becomes the lover of his boss's wife, the cuckold sets a private detective to watch, and within minutes of that it's pretty clear that most, if not all, of this quartet, will end up very dead. Novice movie-makers — the brothers Coen, Joel and Ethan, writers, producer and director respectively — have nothing to learn about creating tension or suspense.

I know *Blood Simple* has been around a while, but it's worth checking out in the Video store. I saw it in a double-bill with *Prizzi's Honor,* and it made that look pretty small beer. For all my admiration — nay, reverence — for John Huston, who directed, and Jack Nicholson in the lead — this film struck me as an unfunny and unsophisticated comedy about basically unpleasant people, i.e. Mafia hit-men. I can feel little more enthusiasm for Norman Jewison's *Agnes of God,* a verbose and spurious drama centered on how a nun conceived a baby and why she killed it (though that's pretty obvious, really), despite bravura performances by Jane Fonda as a psychiatrist, by Anne Bancroft as the Mother Superior and Meg Tilly as the unfortunate (or unlucky?) young lady. Hollywood's been doing better by us with *Protocol,* directed unostentatiously by Herbert Ross from a script by Buck Henry which gets more humour from situation and character than we're accustommed to these days. Goldie Hawn, at her considerable best, plays a dumb dora who gets fancied by a middle-eastern emir when she (accidentally) saves him from an assassination attempt; since the US wants to install a military base in his country, Goldie is taken onto the White House staff — a job she takes most conscientiously — preparatory to being sent to his harem. The film, always tempted to be a Capra-clone, gets a bit heavy with its 'we, the people' preaching at the end, but this is the best comedy in ages.

It's certainly funnier than *Clockwise,* flabbily directed by Christopher Morahan from a Michael Frayn screenplay which sends a Comprehensive headmaster on a roundabout trip to Norwich, where he's to chair the

Headmaster's Conference. Since he's a pompous twit, cousin to Basil Fawlty as played by John Cleese, it's a joy to see him lose the train and start on a series of (at least) discomfiting misadventures. Frayn has plotted these brilliantly, at least to start with, but it's increasingly clear that he's not working towards a climax. He doesn't have an ending, either. Another leading British playwright is heard to better advantage in *Turtle Diary*. Harold Pinter scripted from Russell Hoban's novel and his ear for the cliches of the lower bourgeois classes was seldom put to better use. True, there is nothing as amusing and accurate here as Frayn provided for Joan Hickson's obsessed OAP in *Clockwise,* but then you wouldn't expect it. I'm one of that (gratifyingly large) group of people who have never understood why the hacks employed as theatre critics praise Pinter, who has never exhibited the least iota of understanding of the human condition or a sense of drama. This is, however, relevant, since the characters in *Turtle Diary* speak in what we recognise as Pinteresque cadences. This doesn't matter, since the material is also artificial: about a kids' book author (Glenda Jackson) and a shy bookseller (Ben Kingsley) who conspire with a keeper (Michael Gambon) to 'free' three turtles from the London zoo. There are some other delightful players — Harriet Walter, Rosemary Leach, Nigel Hawthorne — in this civilised entertainment directed by John Irvin.

It isn't the event of the season, which is Japanese and not Japanese-American, which disqualifies Paul Schrader's misconceived *Mishima: a Life in Four Chapters.* If you stay till the end you will be engrossed by an account of how Mishima (Ken Ogata) committed hara-kiri in 1970; the earlier chapters detail other events of that day, along with innaccurate, uninformative and murky monochrome reconstructions of Mishima's life and long undigested representations of three of his novels. These are as interesting as dry suet pudding, but to get the rights to them Schrader agreed with Mishima's widow to only hint at the writer's homosexuality and his political beliefs. Without these, Mishima is a mere narcissist who for obscure reasons headed a private army.

Which leaves us with *Ran,* which is head and shoulders above everything else around: and unless you can explain to me why a couple of critics truly disliked it I'll tell you that they should be writing copy for the packets of breakfast cereals. Kurosawa's version of 'King Lear' is not a work of art as was his 'Macbeth', *Throne of Blood:* it lacks an inner momentum, dynamism, even heart. There are moments in the first half when the compositions, admittedly stunning, seem to die before your eyes because they've been worked on too long; but as the old master gets into his stride that old familiar story — with its new twists — exerts all the fascination it ever had. You leave the theatre exhilarated: you don't often experience *cinema* like this these days — boldly conceived, executed in terms as majestic as anything in Shakespeare's play.

# LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

## A DISSIDENT'S STUDY OF GORBACHEV

*Gorbachev*. Zhores Medvedev. Basil Blackwell. £15.

This admirable study by a distinguished dissident scientist provides us with the essential facts about the present leader of Soviet Russia, and analyses them skilfully. At the end we are left with a large question mark. The author strikes a note of muted optimism.

Part I of the book (161 pages) deals with Gorbachev on the way to the top; part II (85 pages) is called: 'Gorbachev in Power'. We are told at the beginning of the last paragraph that 'it is possibly a mistake to expect too much from Gorbachev'. Medvedev says that 'he possessed the proper combination of orthodoxy, efficiency, toughness and political skill to move all the way up through the Soviet political system.' He credits him with having 'a better intellect and a better education' and being 'a more decent person than his predecessors'. Nevertheless there is nothing in the first two-thirds of the book to prepare us for the astonishing impact that he has made on the western world in the last two years.

His main responsibility in the period before he became second in command was for agriculture, in which he might appear to have been well qualified as the son of peasants. Agriculture in the Soviet Union has been a dismal failure by almost any standards in recent years. Gorbachev, I suppose, must be given extra credit for surviving triumphantly such a dispiriting connection.

As far as the West was concerned, Gorbachev broke through when as second in command he arrived in London on 15 December 1984. 'Gorbachev arrived in London . . . and it is clear that his visit would be a resounding success. The British press, which had taken to describing him as the 'leader-in-waiting', gave him enormous publicity. Everyone who met him found him charming, with a good sense of humour and his wife, Raisa, captured the British imagination. Mrs. Thatcher had a long talk with him and made the famous statement: she liked him and found that "we can do business together".'

Gorbachev also met senior M.P.s and peers at the Houses of Parliament, leaders of the Labour Party, representatives of the business community. He charmed everyone. Denis Healey who has met many Russian leaders in his time, became quite lyrical:

> 'He is a man of exceptional charm with a relaxed, self-deprecating sense of humour. Emotions flicker over a face of unusual sensitivity like summer breezes on a pond. In discussion he was frank and flexible with a composure full of inner strength. He was fierce but courteous in argument, raising Northern Ireland whenever we raised human rights with them.'

One thing puzzled Healey: 'How could someone so nice and human run the Soviet system?'

But Medvedev warns us in effect to be on our guard against his unexpected seductiveness. There was little, he tells us, in what Gorbachev said in Britain, to suggest radical new policies in the future. He was uncompromising on human rights and equally adamant about Afghanistan and other current problems. Nevertheless he was prepared to listen to alternative opinion and

hopefully might therefore become more tolerant towards diverse views in his own country and abroad.

One of the more interesting points to emerge is the determination, one might almost say the ferocity, with which he is pursuing the drive against alcoholism. This may take some unpalatable forms, e.g. his refusal to allow vodka to be supplied at embassy receptions. But it suggests a certain kind of idealism not dictated by party policy. It suggests, in other words, that when he sees his way clear he will go all out to achieve an improvement.

A man still in his middle fifties, hoping to be in power for many years, is well aware that the economic prosperity of Russia will benefit indubitably from better relations with the West. If he is, as he appears to be, a realist and potentially a man of strong action, we can draw limited encouragement from the coming to power of 'Gorb' as some of my diplomatic friends refer to him.

FRANK LONGFORD

## THE MAN OF INDEPENDENCE

*Truman* by Roy Jenkins. Collins. £12.95.

Mr. Roy Jenkins has been rightly praised for his study of President Truman. It is one of a considerable list of similar biographical surveys from him over the years: of near-contemporaries like Attlee and Asquith, or of those sixty-years-gone like Dilke and Balfour; and Baldwin is, one gathers, the next in line for the probing long-essay-style assessment. For one who has also, at various points, been Home Secretary, Chancellor of the Exchequer, President of the European Commission and both Deputy Leader of the Labour Party and (though at a remove) founder of the SDP, it constitutes evidence of a remarkably sustained capacity for work — the more so in one who has at least a reputation for enjoying the good life and — whatever his origins — of being unaccustomed to living on dry bread in a lonely and bleak writer's garret. It is all remindful of the scholar-statesman of a near-century ago, of John Morley or Lord Rosebery: of a world far removed from the stormy and gritty politics of militants, of Ken Livingstone and Neil Kinnock, or the storms of today's House of Commons of which, one has to remind oneself, Mr. Jenkins is still a member. But perhaps the SDP is in essence a party of those with Left-Wing nostalgias but distaste for the present ways of the horny-handed sons of toil alleviated by nightly confrontations with the police. It must be positively relaxing to fight the battles of 40 years ago from the comfort of an armchair in the Commons smoking room, and with the resources of a gentleman's library available next-door.

This is a good and readable survey of the man from Western Missouri. Mr. Jenkins writes avowedly from today's point of view and obtrudes his own comments and asides as he proceeds. His scholarly apparatus is confined to footnotes — many of them readable — and his bibliography is short. Again, the 'treatment' is that of a nineteenth-century-style essayist. He does not, for instance seem to have consulted Robert Messer's *The End of an Alliance* (1982) with its fascinating insights into the gulf between H.S.T. and Jimmy Byrnes, nor Alonzo Hamby's *Beyond the New Deal* (1973). He uses, and acknowledges his debt to, Margaret Truman's life of her father — still the most vivid brief insight into the President's quirky personality and quickly-triggered temper — and Robert Donovan's immense two-volume survey. He gives us a smoothly-

written, engaging and interesting portrait of a man who, if not born, grew into the greatness that was so suddenly thrust upon him. He has immersed himself in the politics of the Middle West during and after World War II, of the Pendergast machine and of the rise and rise of the captain from Battery D. To this reviewer's tastes, he minimises the immense awe in which Truman held F.D.R. and General Marshall — the last a god to him. He takes as read the New Deal inheritance, and wisely refrains from drawing those curious parallels with New Deal America to which Mr. Kinnock has recently and rashly become addicted. (Harry Hopkins summed it up as: 'spend, spend and spend, and vote, vote, vote'). And while noting the President's pride in the Truman Library built in his honour in Independence, he minimises the contrast between it and Eisenhower's memorial library less than two hours' drive away at Abilene, the one a library/schoolroom designed to illustrate the workings of democracy, the other a lavish mausoleum to the memory of a different type of great man. This is a sound introduction but it does not reveal anything new in the story of one of America's greatest presidents.

ESMOND WRIGHT

## INDUSTRIAL CO-OWNERSHIP

*Labour-Owned Firms and Workers' Co-operatives*. Edited by Sune Jansson and Ann-Britt Hellmark. Gower. £18.50.

This book is a collection of some of the papers presented at an International seminar on Labour-ownership and workers' co-operatives at Grythyttan, Sweden in 1983. The articles selected indicate both broad theoretical issues and the problems supervened by firms involved in the movement not only in Sweden but also in the US and Europe.

Perhaps the overriding idea that emerges from the book is the attempt to place co-operatives into the "Economic Framework". One thing seems clear co-operatives are not a major force on the production side. In the UK the Co-operative Development Agency reported that there were only 515 worker co-operatives in 1982. Perhaps what the book misses is an overview of the co-operative movement, thereby removing the need for the historical perspective that is common in a number of papers.

One problem throughout is the reference to theory rather than to actuality. For example, although historical actuality is propounded by Fanning and McCarthy, they conclude ". . . many of the hypotheses identified were advanced for different circumstances than those prevailing today", and from Mygind, "There is a big gap between the assumptions of the Illyrian Theory and reality". Furthermore, it is not only historical differences that are important but the role of the government within the particular country. Co-operatives in France and Italy developed in association with the State, the Mondragon co-operatives developed because of the State.

There is however, no simple and fast rule of why co-operatives were developed. To use the UK's limited experience, co-operatives can be found because of the collapse of an industry, because workers felt that they saw the prospect of better wages under their own ownership, because the MSC funded the move, because they were convrted from private ownership by their owners and so on. It is, therefore, difficult to place into any theoretical model, as some of the authors do, the co-operative movement.

Lichtenstein's critique of the firm's profit maximising assumption as inappropriate to co-operatives is correct; this is particularly so for some of

the co-operatives in the UK since the "new co-operative movement" has tended to attract a band of young middle class enthusiasts who are often fundamentally critical of capitalism. This is true also of the Industrial Common Ownership Movement linked closely with the Christian Socialists. Such is the fear of being regarded as profit maximising capitalists that many co-operatives eschew the open market seeking buyers more akin to their own aims.

What this book does not do is bring together the political strands more fully and develop the arrangements for finance. It is here that the co-operatives for all their "high-and-mighty" talk often need to join the capitalist market. But what it does do is to reveal the importance of the co-operative movement throughout Europe. Finally, the essays do contain some theoretical material but this should not deter the general reader. Furthermore, there are some typographical errors but persevere, there are some interesting points here even if sometimes they are hidden beneath theory.

MARK COOK

## JAMES AGATE RECALLED

*Agate*, a biography. James Harding. Methuen. £2.95.

I don't read many new books — three, to be precise, in the last year: this one, Barbara Leaming's biography of Orson Welles and 'Love, Sex and War' by John Costello. They are all bad books, but with the exception of the last named I didn't see a bad review — and in that case the complaints did not include its factual inaccuracy, which was considerable. I daresay Fleet Street looks favourably on a tribute to one of its own, but it is a Fleet Street, alas, much changed from the one Agate knew.

If I begin with this digression, it is because Agate himself often did. I must be careful, but even if I wasn't I'd still be ahead of Mr Harding, whose previous subjects have included Satie, Offenbach, Maurice Chevalier, Jacques Tati and the Duke of Wellington. Apart from a prose style which permits him to write fatuous sentences like this one, 'For six days (on a luxury liner) Agate consumed food and wine excellent beyond belief' — unforgivable when dealing with a particularly meticulous writer — he doesn't seem to know about research. Agate is described as 'having launched Ken Tynan', but Tynan didn't arrive in Fleet Street till some years after Agate's death. If Harding had looked in Tynan's own writings he would have found that Agate met Tynan when the latter asked him to Oxford, and that Agate encouraged him in his belief that he could become a dramatic critic. According to Harding, Olivier told Donald Wolfit that he had once hit Agate, which he may well have done — though it's unlikely, given Olivier's antipathy to Wolfit as man and actor. In any case, Wolfit could have read about it in the press, for it made headlines: if Harding had looked in the Agate files of any national newspaper he would have learnt that Britain's leading actor walloped Britain's leading dramatic critic for returning ten minutes late from the bar for the second half of *The Skin of Our Teeth*.

Harding's own digressions include an explanation of the Dreyfus Case, but too many of the vast cast trotting through these pages come and go without a gloss. What of Alan Dent, faithful amanuensis for fifteen years and betrayed at the end? Why did he continue to write some or part of Agate's articles after becoming recognised as a critic in his own right? We are denied even a sketch of Dent; and it would seem to me that the only events, opinions and

facts in this book not taken from Agate's own published works — including the nine volumes of the diary, 'Ego' — are the tidbits about his sex life. Agate would seem to have been the least discriminating and most voracious homosexual before or beyond Tom Driberg; it would be interesting to know how well-known this was and how such encounters fitted into an exhaustingly busy life.

Harding is certainly aware of the contradictions and anomalies of Agate, so numerous that he is right to stress them. Agate looked and dressed like a bookie; he was the most successful journalist of the day and yet was constantly bothered by writs for debts; he enjoyed high culture and low company; he led a disreputable, dishonest (Dent was not the only one to ghost his work) and disorganised life, yet published (bowdlerised) accounts of it which were best-sellers. In a last minute bid for respectability the author returns to an earlier theme, as to whether Agate was the Hazlitt of his time. Perhaps it's as well that he doesn't address himself to the question.

DAVID SHIPMAN

## CHRISTIAN VIEWPOINTS

*In Search of Christianity*. Edited by Tony Moss. Published by Waterstone. Distributed by Sidgwick and Jackson, Firestone Press. £5.95.

This collection of essays was published to coincide with the screening of the London Weekend Television Credo series, in which the contributors are featured. There is a Foreword by the Archbishop of Canterbury. The intention is to dispel the idea, current in newspapers, that the Anglican Church is in a mess. It would be kinder and more accurate to say that it is in transition. It is true, for example, that the number of Confirmation candidates has dropped. However, it must be twenty years ago that I heard a Bishop describing Confirmation as the great Farewell Service of the Church of England. One essay, as others including Bunyan have done before, speaks of Christianity as a matter for exploration and pilgrimage. It is not surprising, therefore, if harbour has not been reached by the age of fourteen.

Among the contributors are the Archbishop of York, the retired Bishop of Bristol, the Bishop of Aston, E. Martin Israel, Keith Ward and the Bishop of Durham. In the latter's essay, there are none of the fireworks associated with his television appearances, and one can be impressed by his devotion and sense of leadership. Other contributors are less well known, but they represent distinct viewpoints.

In general, the essays are more concerned with basic belief than what should happen in church, though the views of parish priests are well represented. The styles are so varied that each will make a separate appeal and challenge. Taken together, they give a picture of liveliness and give plenty of material for future debate. It cannot be right for one group to claim a monopoly of the truth for all and we are given a generous cross section of Anglicanism. As such, the book should be required reading for ordinands. It should broaden sympathies and might do something for that neglected clerical art form, the sermon. Not all the essays are easy reading but they stretch the mind. Some are anxious to demonstrate the historicity of Jesus: others concentrate on the reality of present experience.

This then can be regarded as an important book and many sided. "Like a mighty army moves the Church of God", says the hymn as if everyone has been in step. It never has been like this. Over the years the Church has been

inspired by prophets with more sensitive minds than the rest of us. These essays, or some of them, could be in such a category with a restless striving to get things right. Even if the institutional church has less hold on the mass of people, the name of Jesus still commands the attention of many. Yet it is only through the institution that the faith will reach generations ahead.

LAURENCE TANNER

## A FULL AND PERFECT SERVICE

*Wives of Fame: Mary Livingstone, Jenny Marx, Emma Darwin.* Edna Healey. Sidgwick & Jackson. £12.95.

The projected theme of Edna Healey's three Brief Lives is eminent Victorian man's dependence upon, and inhumanity to, the wife-nurse-secretary figure who stayed and propped the driven demon-hero in the pursuit of his particular obsession. When, valiant, often talented in her own right, and under-valued, she died, the hero faltered and was afflicted with guilt. The angel at the hearth of genius was liable to be called upon to abandon such comforts as were provided at home (Marx was a specially poor provider) and to bear her lord and master's quiverful in the company of alligators, serpents and scorpions, while he occupied himself with the transliteration of the Bible into some obscure native dialect. There is no evidence that these Victorian wives were morbidly self-immolatory: it was their mode, it was what was expected of them. Only a rare wife, then, escaped the marriage-ordeal. Paradoxically, that famous runaway, Effie Ruskin, fled an atypical marriage for a conventional child-bearing union with Millais. Another remedy, taken by Adelaide Bartlett or Florence Bravo, was to poison the husband. With a few, mild reproaches representing the feminist issue, Edna Healey is a great believer in letting the facts speak for themselves. Historical research, with an impeccable sense of time and its politics, is her forte, and she has an eye for a telling visual scene.

The life of a Victorian missionary's wife was nasty, brutish, and short, as Mary Livingstone, being born to it, knew well beforehand. Edna Healey's material, here, is the least familiar, and the most startling. Mary Livingstone travelled thousands of miles, often by ox-wagon, through deserts, forests and swamps: towards the end, her faith wavered. The life of a starving revolutionary's wife in Soho — sometimes the diet was bread and potatoes — was only marginally less harrowing. The sad tale of Marx's daughter, 'Tussy', is well known, but more of Edna Healey's excellent research has fleshed out the figure of Jenny Marx, the wife sacrificed (Edna Healey's own strong word) for *Das Kapital*. Emma Darwin's cross was Charles Darwin's poor health — retching at meal-times was one of his minor symptoms — to the extent that she appeared to be keeping him alive for many years. She also had to suffer the assault on her faith caused by Darwin's findings. If, as Emma Darwin did, these good wives survived the parturitive years, and the menopause, then, with their husbands' reputation established, there was a period left to them when they could reconstruct their own identity.

MOLLY TIBBS

# SHORTER REVIEWS

**Fair Game, Myth and Reality in Sport** (George Allen & Unwin. £12.95.) Dr. Eric Midwinter is a social historian, with a passionate interest in sport. His book is in effect in two parts. Most of it is devoted to the

history of sport and particular sports from the earliest times to the present day. Unfortunately there are no textual notes and no bibliography. The second part contains a scathing attack upon modern professional sports, with a few exceptions. 'It has become involved with distasteful practices on the field, offensive commercial entanglements, unnecessary media hype and ballyhoo', and 'most dangerous . . . locked into political stresses and social disorders'. He wants it recognised purely as a form of entertainment, under government licence and control. He argues that general participation sports should be encouraged where 'the avowed aim . . . would be engagement rather than excellence'. This viewpoint certainly invites a great deal of controversy.

**The Fiancée and Other Stories** (Penguin Books. £2.95.) In this recent addition to the Penguin Classics series, Dr. Ronald Wilkes has translated twelve of Anton Chekov's short stories, mostly written in the 1890s, except *The Fiancée*, completed in 1903. They also include *Peasant Women, Three Years, New Villa, On Official Business, His Wife* and *The Student*. Dr. Wilkes discusses all the stories in a useful and informative Introduction. Another new paperback in this Classics series is a collection of Henry James' short stories in **The Figure in the Carpet** (£3.95.) Apart from the book's title, there are seven other short stories included, *The Author of Beltraffio, The Lesson of the Master, The Private Life, The Middle Years, The Death of the Lion, The Next Time,* and *John Delavoy*. Professor Frank Kermode has introduced these stories, with useful notes on the texts. The latter are the New York edition renderings, with the exception *John Delavoy*. He has included selections from Henry James' Prefaces to the New York edition.

**Puritanism and Liberty** (Everyman. Dent. £5.95.) This selection from the Clarke manuscripts on the Army Debates (1647-49) was first published in 1938. The second edition was edited and introduced by A. S. P. Woodhouse in 1974. That edition is now reprinted with a new Preface by Professor Ivan Roots who has also provided a bibliography. The volume is concerned primarily with the Putney Debates, 1647, the Whitehall Debates, 1648-9 and Puritan views on liberty drawn from contemporary writings. This new edition comes at a time when, as Professor Roots points out: 'an historiographical conflict about radicalism in the English Revolution or the Great Rebellion is in process.'

**Handling Criminal Cases: A Guide to Preparation and Defence.** (Waterlow Practitioner's Library. £9.95.) The criminal solicitor, a beleaguered, under-remunerated, and under-valued figure, devoid of the glamour and inviolability of counsel, is supposed to acquire his expertise by some osmotic process. The tutelary endeavours of the Law Society have not prepared the young solicitor for the practicalities or the delicate ethical problems of criminal practice. There are no White or Green Books, as in the Civil Courts. Nor can senior members of the office always be persuaded readily to divulge their lore. Mr James Morton, now, comes to rescue the floundering novice, with a guide which is quite the best of the hand-books on criminal law practice. With delightful wit and an urbane acceptance of the frustrations attendant upon dealing with the courts and those who frequent them, he works through such tricky matters as the conduct of identification parades, or the return of prisoners' property. Mr Morton anticipates that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 will not, in practice, radically alter the access of solicitor to suspect.

(M.T.)

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

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